IS ENLIGHTENMENT POSSIBLE?
AN ANALYSIS OF SOME ARGUMENTS IN THE BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHICAL TRADITION WITH SPECIAL ATTENTION TO THE *PRAMĀṆASIDDHI* CHAPTER OF DHARMAKĪRTI'S *PRAMĀṆAVĀRTTIKA*

by

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To my grandmothers, Christine Challenger Reid and Annie Britton Jackson, one a sceptic, one a believer, both fearless and independent questioners

I think, just as you do, Socrates, that although it is very difficult if not impossible in this life to achieve certainty about these questions, at the same time it is utterly feeble not to use every effort in testing the available theories, or to leave off before we have considered them in every way, and come to the end of our resources. It is our duty to do one of two things, either to ascertain the facts, whether by seeking instruction or by personal discovery, or, if this is impossible, to select the best and most dependable theory which human intelligence can supply, and use it as a raft to ride the seas of life--that is, assuming that we cannot make our journey with greater confidence and security by the surer means of divine revelation.

Simmias, in Plato, Phaedo

The arguments employed by holy men to prove things that are of faith are not demonstrations; they are either persuasive arguments showing that what is proposed to our faith is not impossible, or else they are proofs drawn from the principles of faith.

St. Thomas Aquinas

Can we actually "know" the universe? My God, it's hard enough finding your way around in Chinatown.

Woody Allen

TABLE OF CONTENTS

*These titles do not correspond to rGyal tshab's actual section titles. They are, rather, indicative of important topics covered in the commentary.

PREFACE

Buddhist śāstra writers often prefaced their works with the following disclaimer: I have written this work only in order to improve my own understanding; if it is of benefit to others, so much the better. The effect--if not the intent--of such passages often is ironic, since those who wrote them are numbered by the Mahāyāna tradition among the greatest of Bodhisattvas. Here, I open with a similar disclaimer, but I make it without the slightest trace of self-consciousness or irony, for I am anything but a Bodhisattva: I have written this dissertation entirely out of personal philosophical concerns; if those concerns are shared by others, so much the better.

My concerns, which date back to my first contacts with Buddhist teachers in Nepal in 1974, revolve, simply put, around the question asked by the title: is enlightenment possible? It would not be unfair to characterize Buddhism as a "gospel" of enlightenment, hinging on the attainment of samyak sambodhi by Śākyamuni Buddha at Bodh Gāyā circa 527 B.C., and on the attempts of generations of Buddhists throughout Asia ever since to reproduce that experience, held by the tradition to be the supreme goal of sentient striving in the universe, the definite cessation of all suffering and the attainment of the highest possible wis-

dom and happiness.

The claim that such an experience has been and can be attained is not made idly: the possibility of enlightenment is as crucial to Buddhism as the existence and incarnation of God are to Christianity. The question of whether enlightenment is possible is not, therefore, an insignificant one. That enlightenment is possible certainly is an extraordinary claim--extraordinary at the very least in the sense that its truth is far from self-evident. The pursuit of enlightenment involves travelling a path that entails certain commitments and sacrifices, but most Buddhists undertake it with at least the implicit confidence that the path is not fruitless, that an ultimate attainment does await them at its end. It is not inconceivable, however, that--in an ultimate sense, anyway--Buddhists simply are wasting their time. Thus, another form of my question is: do Buddhists have good reason to believe that their path is not fruitless, that enlightenment does, in fact result from travelling the path? This, in turn, can be broken down into the two basic questions with which this dissertation most directly deals: What reasons do Buddhists give to prove their assertion that enlightenment is possible? Are they good reasons?

Among friends, reactions to my desire to pursue these questions at dissertation length were varied. One said,

"It's so obvious that enlightenment _is_ possible that I don't see why you should bother." Another said, "It's so obvious that enlightenment is _im_possible and its pursuit irrelevant to the real world that I don't see why you should bother." Still another said, "It's so obvious that it's beyond proof that I don't see why you should bother. Don't forget Thomas Aquinas, who had a mystical experience shortly before his death and pronounced the theology on which he had labored a lifetime to be 'of straw.'" A fourth said, "It doesn't matter whether enlightenment can be proven or even if it exists as long as the the effects of its pursuit are benficial, so I don't see why you should bother." This last reaction was perhaps the most common, and reflected an acceptance of a pragmatic criterion of truth, whereas my concern, for better or for worse, always has been with the correspondence criterion.

My concern with whether those propositions asserted to be true by Buddhists, most notably the "Four Noble Truths," can in fact be demonstrated to correspond with "the way things really work" was not, at least, a solitary obsession, for it is precisely the contention of those Buddhist teachers with whom I have most closely worked--members of the dGe lugs pa tradition of Tibetan Buddhism--that there _are_ good reasons for believing that the Four Noble Truths correspond to reality and, most particularly, that enlight-

enment is possible, and that any reasonable person, if he makes the effort to understand the arguments, will be convinced by them. The claim that enlightenment is rationally demonstrable is nearly as extraordinary as the claim that there is such an attainment. Are arguments for the Buddhist world-view in fact so compelling that all reasonable people should become Buddhists? That is what I propose to investigate.

I have divided the dissertation into two parts: an analysis of implicit and explicit arguments in the Buddhist tradition and a translation from the Tibetan of chapter two of rGyal tshab dar ma rin chen's 15th century commentary, the rNam 'grel thar lam gsal byed (elucidating the path to liberation according to the Pramāṇavārttika).

Part I is divided into examinations of (1) the Buddhist attitude toward truth, particularly with reference to the notion of "wrong view"; (2) arguments for the possibility of enlightenment from Pāli literature, including the nikāyas, the Kathāvatthu, the Milindapañhā and Buddhaghosa's Visuddhimagga; (3) arguments from what might be called the "classical" Sanskritic tradition, embodied in such sūtras as the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, Aṣṭasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā, Laṅkāvatāra and Śrīmāladevīsiṃhanāda, and such śāstras as the Abhidharmakośa of Vasubandhu, the Madhyamakakārikās of Nāgārjuna, the Ratnagotravibhāga (or Uttaratantra) of

Maitreya and the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* of Asaṅga; and (4) arguments from the "logical" Sanskritic tradition, with a focus on the systematic proof found in the *pramāṇasiddhi* (establishment of authoritativeness) chapter of Dharmakīrti's 7th century *Pramāṇavārttika*. Throughout, I will be concerned (a) to contextualize the texts and traditions I am discussing, (b) to isolate the arguments for enlightenment and allied notions found in them and (c) to analyze those arguments philosophically, bringing to bear in particular the perspectives of the philosophy of religion.

Part II is a translation of rGyal tshab's commentary on the *pramāṇasiddhi* chapter of Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavarttika*. I have chosen it for a number of reasons. Dharmakīrti's root-verses (translated into English with some commentarial interpolations by Masatoshi Nagatomi as his Ph.D. thesis for Harvard University, 1957) are in many cases incomprehensible without a commentary to fill in the lacunae. There do exist competent Indian commentaries on the *Pramāṇavārttika*, most notably those of Dharmakīrti's direct disciple, Devendrabuddhi (extant only in Tibetan), and Prajñākaragupta, but I have chosen to translate rGyal tshab's chiefly because, quite apart from its basic clarity of exposition and discussion, it is the commentary that has been most influential in the Tibetan tradition with the most adherents, the dGe lugs pa. Therefore, it is the commentary

that is the most "alive," because dGe lugs pa teachers who are asked to argue for the possibility of enlightenment invariably will refer to it. I by no means contend that rGyal tshab's commentary reflects Dharmakīrti's actual thought more accurately than other, earlier efforts--Devendrabuddhi's is probably best on this score, since it was written under the supervision of Dharmakīrti himself--but since my interest is in clearly presented arguments rather than questions of historical "fidelity," I feel my selection of rGyal tshab's to be most reasonable--particularly since, as a don 'grel (a commentary on meaning rather than a word-by-word commentary), it can be read largely on its own, with only occasional references to the root-text of the *Pramāṇa-vārttika*.

This dissertation will not, as the title may rather presumptuously imply, answer the question of whether enlightenment is possible. It will, I hope, at least represent an initial, undoubtedly flawed attempt to elucidate the problems that must be faced by Buddhists who are confident that their world-view is both true and rationally demonstrable.

I want to stress at the outset--as I will again at the end--that the fact that there may be philosophical problems inherent in Buddhist arguments for the *certainty* of the Buddhist world-view does not mean that that world-view is

necessarily false, let alone that to approach the world and live life as a Buddhist is either irrational or valueless. My aim here is simply to attempt to separate areas of certainty from what might be called areas of "belief." Many beliefs of which we cannot have ultimate certainty may be both true and useful. Philosophical criticism, therefore, does not negate their value--it merely clarifies the degree of confidence with which we can assert their truth.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Many people have helped me in the preparation of this dissertation. I would like to acknowledge first and foremost my adviser, Geshe Lhundup Sopa, who, very much in the spirit of the Buddha, always has encouraged critical examination of Buddhist doctrines, and has patiently and good-humoredly gone through my entire translation with me, clarifying countless difficult passages. I am also greatly beholden to Geshe Namgyal Wangchen, with whom I studied the first half of rGyal tshab's chapter in Sarnath, India. Further thanks go to: Pandit Jagannath Upadhyaya of Sanskrit University of Varanasi, who served as my adviser while I was an American Institute of Indian Studies Junior Research Fellow in India; Ven. Samdong Rinpoche, who put at my disposal the library of the Central Tibetan Institute of Higher Studies in Sarnath; Dr. E. Gene Smith of the Library of Congress, who gave me a copy of dGe 'dun grub's _Pramāṇavārttika_ commentary; Drs. Stephan Beyer and Leonard Zwilling, teachers whose sceptical questions first forced me to think critically and systematically about Buddhist doctrines; and the American Institute of Indian Studies and the U.S. Office of Education, without whose fellowship support I might today be a starving poet or a well-fed lawyer. I would like to thank Frank Barone, Marilyn Groves and John

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STYLISTIC NOTE

Throughout the dissertation, I have treated words found in Webster's New Third International Dictionary as English words. Therefore, I have not underlined such originally Indic words as saṃsāra, nirvāṇa, Bodhisattva, sūtra, etc. A fairly extensive list of such words may be found in *The Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies*, vol. 5, no. 2, 1982. I have maintained diacritical marks for the convenience of the reader. My only deviation from standard transcription is the use of ṡ (rather than s) to stand for the Sanskrit letter श. I do this for the simple reason that my typewriter is not equipped with European accent marks. I have attempted not to clutter the text with parenthetical foreign terms, particularly where (e.g., in the context of Dharmakīrti's discussions) they can usually be found in the Glossary, under the English words that translate them.

PART I

AN EXAMINATION
OF SOME BUDDHIST ARGUMENTS
FOR THE POSSIBILITY OF ENLIGHTENMENT

CHAPTER 1: BUDDHISM AND TRUTH

1. The Buddha meets Upaka, a sceptical ascetic

According to the *Ariyapariyesana Sutta* of the *Majjhima Nikāya*, when the newly-enlightened Buddha has been convinced by Brahmā Sahampati to preach his doctrine, and has decided first to seek out the five ascetics with whom he had formerly practiced austerities, he sets out from Uruvelā--now Bodh Gaya--for Benares. Between the bodhi-tree and Gaya, he encounters an Ājīvika ascetic named Upaka, who remarks on the Buddha's serenity and brightness. He asks him under whom he has taken vows, who his teacher is, and whose doctrine he professes. The Buddha replies in verse:

> "All-vanquishing am I, all-knowing,
> Untainted by any existent.
> All-renounced, I am freed through craving's destruction.
> Self-taught, whom should I declare (my teacher)?
>
> "I have no master, my equal is unseen;
> In this world, with its gods, I have no rival.
>
> "I, indeed, am sanctified, am the Teacher unsurpassed;
> Alone, indeed, I am perfectly enlightened; cooled, I have reached nirvāṇa.
>
> "I go to Kāsi-town to turn the Dhamma-wheel;
> In this world become blind I beat the drum of deathlessness."

"Friend," remarks Upaka, "It is as if you claim to be a saint, an unlimited Conqueror."

The Buddha replies:

"They are Conquerors who, like me, have won the contaminants' destruction;
I have conquered evil tendencies and so, O Upaka, I am a conqueror."

Shaking his head, Upaka replies, "Perhaps, friend," and continues on his way.[1]

At the very outset of his career, then, before he has preached a word, the Buddha's claim to supreme attainment is doubted. In the Ariyapariyesana account, the Buddha then proceeds to Sarnath, where his five former companions greet him with the same disrespectful term of address as had Upaka: āvuso, a word used by senior religious persons in addressing their juniors, and perhaps best translated as "friend." Unlike Upaka, however, the five ascetics are overwhelmed by the Buddha's charisma, and agree to listen to him. The Buddha announces to the ascetics that he is a Tathāgata, that the deathless has been won, and that he will preach to them the doctrine through which they will learn for themselves and come to possess "that highest good to which the holy life conducts."[2] In the Ariyapariyesana, the Buddha then proclaims the importance of overcoming attachment to the pleasures provided by the various senses. He likens those who are attached to pleasure to a deer caught in a hunter's snare; those who are detached from pleasure are like a deer free to roam through the woods. The Buddha enjoins practice of the jhānas and the subse-

quent attainment of the wisdom that utterly destroys one's defiling contaminants (āsavas) and blinds Māra.[3]

A far more famous account of the sermon at Sarnath is, of course, the Dhammacakkapavattana Sutta of the Saṃyutta Nikāya,[4] wherein the Buddha expounds the Four Noble Truths.[5] These are: (1) the truth of suffering (Pāli dukka, Sanskrit duḥkha), (2) the truth of suffering's origination (P. and S. samudaya), (3) the truth of suffering's cessation (P. and S. nirodha) and (4) the truth of the path (P. magga, S. mārga) to the cessation of suffering.

In particular, the truth of suffering asserts that there is suffering accompanying birth, aging, sickness, death, sorrow and lamentation, pain, grief, despair, association with the unpleasant, disassociation from the pleasant and not getting what one wants--in short, that the five aggregates (skandhas) that compose what we usually call a person are suffering. The truth of origination asserts that there is a cause for this suffering, namely craving (P. tanha, S. tṛṣṇā, literally "thirst"), which is directed toward pleasure, existence or non-existence, and which generates further existence and further becoming, i.e., subsequent births. The truth of cessation asserts simply that it is possible entirely to leave behind such craving and suffering. The truth of path asserts that there is a path that is conducive to the cessation of craving and

suffering, the eightfold noble path, consisting of right view, right thought, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness and right concentration. As long, the Buddha notes, as he had not fully comprehended that the truth of suffering is to be understood, the truth of origination to be abandoned, the truth of cessation to be realized and the truth of path to be followed, he was not perfectly enlightened. Once, however, he realized that each of the truths was true, that each truth entailed an appropriate action, that he had performed the appropriate action with regard to each, he knew that he had gained perfect enlightenment, and "a vision of true knowledge arose in me thus: My heart's deliverance is unassailable. This is the last birth. There is no more rebecoming (rebirth)."[6]

We will never know, of course, exactly what the Buddha taught the five ascetics at Sarnath, for the Pāli canon must be regarded not as a precise record of the Buddha's utterances but as a compilation and edition of various pericopes: stories, formulas and quotations of varying degrees of antiquity and authenticity. Still, virtually all Buddhist traditions, both "Hīnayāna" and Mahāyāna, have considered the <u>Dhammacakkapavattana Sutta</u> to be the Buddha's first discourse. There is poetic, if not historical, warrant for this view, for a more concise formulation of

the Buddha's doctrine is nowhere in the scriptures to be found,[7] and the Four Noble Truths have served as the basic statement of Buddhist principles wherever the religion has spread. It is important to note that what is basic to Buddhism is the assertion of "truths" (saccani, satyāni), propositions that purport to tell us about "states-of-affairs," "the way things are," or "what is the case." The Buddha, then, may proclaim his attainment to all he meets, and may be greeted with either the scepticism of Upaka or the ultimate acceptance of the five ascetics, but in neither case is the mere fact of his charisma or his assertion sufficient to compel assent: Upaka disbelieves and does not linger for a sermon; the five ascetics hearken and are presented with four propositions whose truth they are invited to discover for themselves.

Few truths come unattended; they usually are accompanied by a wraith-like host of presuppositions. The Four Noble Truths are no exception, for implicit in them are a number of cosmological and philosophical assumptions. In the most general sense, the Four Noble Truths are posited against the background of a twofold cosmological vision. The universe, in this vision, holds open two, and only two, possible modes of existence for beings: (1) the beginningless, ignorance-rooted experience--in life after life--of pain, sorrow, the transience of joys, separation from the

pleasureable, encounter with the unpleasant and not getting what one wants; and (2) the incorruptible peace that is the cessation of suffering, and which results from the eradication of the ignorance and craving that perpetuate that suffering. The universe, in short, holds open the possibilities of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa.

This cosmology, in turn, entails certain philosophical assumptions, which are, above all, assumptions about the nature and function of the mind: (1) the existence of past and future lives, which are contingent on the the mind's independence of the body; (2) the existence of a universal moral law, karma, that works with the same predictability in the psychological realm as causality does in the physical realm; (3) the fundamental purity of mind, such that when its adventitious defilements have been removed one attains an undecaying liberated state that is beyond suffering, and makes the greatest of worldly joys seem infernal by comparison; and (4) the possibility of control of the causal factors related to the universal moral law such that the liberated state can be attained. Assumption (1) bears most strongly on the truth of suffering. Assumption (2) bears chiefly on the truth of origination. Assumption (3) relates to the truth of cessation. Assumption (4) can be correlated with the truth of path. It is safe to say that if these four assumptions are true, the Four Noble Truths

are true; if any of the assumptions are false, then the Four Noble Truths--and thus the Buddha's teaching--are thrown into serious question.

Buddhists have not expressed their assumptions quite as I have, but they _have_ recognized that the Four Noble Truths have greater philosophical implications than appear on the surface. In the Vaibhāṣika and other Sanskritic traditions, for example, the Four Noble Truths are divided into sixteen "aspects" (_ākāra_), the direct realization of which transforms one from an ordinary being (_pṛtagjana_) into an Ārya, destined for enlightenment. A number of different arrangements of the sixteen aspects are found in Vasubandhu's _Abhidharmakośabhāṣya_. One of the most interesting of these, the fourth, explains each of the sixteen aspects in terms of the incorrect philosophical view to which it is an antidote:

1. The truth of suffering: The fact that suffering is impermanent (_anitya_) counters the view that it is permanent. The fact that it is suffering (_duḥkha_) counters the view that it is happiness. The fact that suffering is empty (_śūnya_) counters the view that it pertains to a self. The fact that suffering is non-self (_anātmaka_) counters the view that it has a substantial self.

2. The truth of origination: The fact that suffering has a cause (_hetu_) counters the view that it has no cause.

The fact that suffering is originated (samudaya) by a complex of causes counters the view that it has a single cause, such as God (Īśvara). The fact that suffering is successively produced (prabhava) counters the view that it merely is the transformation of some pre-existent cause, such as Prakṛti. The fact that suffering is variously conditioned (pratyaya) counters the view that suffering is brought about by an intelligent being.

3. The truth of cessation: The fact of cessation (nirodha) counters the view that there is no liberation from suffering. The fact that cessation is peaceful (śānta) counters the view that liberation is suffering. The fact that cessation is sublime (praṇīta) counters the view that the dhyānas and samāpattis are sufficient for liberation. The fact that cessation is emergence (niḥsaraṇa) counters the view that liberation is not definitive, and is subject to decline.

4. The truth of path: The fact that there is a path (mārga) counters the view that there is no path leading to the cessation of suffering. The fact that the path is reasonable, practical, or correct (nyāya) counters the view that a false path is the true path. The fact that the path accomplishes (pratipad) the goal counters the view that there is another path one might follow. The fact that the path leads to a definite removal (nairyāṇika) of suffering

counters the view that one on the path is subject to relapse.[8]

It is obvious even from this skeletal summary that in asserting the sixteen aspects of the Four Noble Truths a Buddhist is, at the same time, contradicting a number of views central to other schools of Indian philosophy, e.g., the _ātmavāda_ of most Astika schools, the _pariṇāmavāda_ causal theory of the Sāṃkhyas, the random causal theory of some materialists, the theistic view of some Naiyāyikas, and the soteriological scepticism of materialists and many Mīmāṃsakas. The philosophical assumptions expressed by the sixteen aspects only partially overlap those I have noted, but they do indicate that many Buddhists have had a healthy awareness of the presuppositions involved in the Four Noble Truths.

2. Did the Buddha mean what he said?

It would seem, from what we have noted so far, that the Buddha was quite serious in his assertion of the Four Noble Truths, and that he just as categorically subscribed to the cosmological and philosophical assumptions that lay behind them, viz., the bifurcation of the sentient universe into saṃsāra and nirvāṇa, and the reality of past and future lives, karma, liberation, and a control of karma such that liberation is possible. It would seem, in short, that

the Buddha--and most subsequent Buddhists--adopted a correspondence criterion of truth, which is defined, variously, as "the claim that truth is agreement with reality--that it consists in a correspondence between (for example) a statement and 'the way things are'";[9] and the belief that "a true proposition is one that corresponds to a fact--that is, to an actual state-of-affairs."[10]

In his Critique of Religion and Philosophy, Walter Kaufmann appears to endorse this view, when he maintains that the Four Noble Truths are both cognitive and meaningful, and that "the Buddha himself seems to have considered acceptance of four propositions essential for salvation. His Four Noble Truths...were clearly meant to be unambiguous,"[11] and "to be taken literally."[12] At the same time, however, Kaufmann maintains that Buddhism is essentially "unphilosophical," because its primary focus is on salvation, not truth,[13] and because "knowledge and understanding are...mere instruments for the attainment of an experience."[14] If that is the case, perhaps the criterion of truth in Buddhism is ultimately pragmatic rather than correspondence--perhaps the literal truth of propositions like the Four Noble Truths matters less than their psychological effectiveness. The correspondence and pragmatic criteria are not, of course, mutually exclusive, since one may select from among "correspondent" truths those that most ef-

fectively serve a pragmatic end; and, conversely, "pragmatically" selected truths are likely to be ultimately effective to the degree that they correspond to reality rather than wishful thinking. Still, the implicit or explicit invocation of the correspondence criterion is a "hard" claim to the truth of a particular proposition, one that immediately makes pragmatic concerns secondary. It is, after all, their supposed correspondence with reality that makes the Four Noble Truths "pragmatic." The Bibilical injunction, "...ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free,"[15] is almost exactly what is intended by the notion of four noble truths.

Kaufmann's uneasy sense that truth does not really matter to Buddhists opens the door to the idea that the Buddha "really" was a pragmatist. A number of Western (or Westernized) commentators have adopted this idea, and some of them, either from ignorance or zeal to "explain" in modern terms, have gone on to imply that neither the Four Noble Truths nor their cosmological and philosophical presuppositions are meant to be taken literally, i.e., as propositions corresponding to states-of-affairs. Some early British students of the Pāli canon believed they had found in the Buddha an ancient precursor of the positivism of their own day, and explained away such alien notions as rebirth and nirvāṇa as metaphors whose real intent was to describe

psychological states. Recently, the most egregious--and, unfortunately, influential--exponent of this view has been the late Alan Watts, who writes that

> Buddhists...who understand their own doctrines profoundly, who are in fact liberated, do not believe in reincarnation in any literal sense. Their liberation involved....a liberation from being taken in by social institutions; it is not liberation from being alive. [16]

Further, "The individual's multitude of lives is interpreted as the multitude of his physical and social relations."[17]

This psychological explaining-away of rebirth and liberation--of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa--is echoed in many of the equally influential works of Chögyam Trungpa, who writes, for example, that the traditional six realms of saṃsāric existence are "psychological states of being....different kinds of projections, the dream worlds that we create for ourselves."[18] As for the Four Noble Truths, _duḥkha_ is an assertion of our "neurosis," _samudaya_ an analysis of "how ego develops and operates," _nirodha_ the recognition that "there is a sane, awake quality within us," and _mārga_ "the practice of meditation."[19]

In a similar vein, Karl Potter explains that a "round of habits breeding habits is a part of what is called in Sanskrit _saṃsāra_, the wheel of rebirth, which is governed by _karma_, the habits themselves."[20] Potter also generalizes the notion of "freedom" employed in Indian philosophy, in-

terpreting it, quasi-existentially, as "freedom from" all constraints and "freedom to" do as one wishes.[21]

Existentialist terminology is employed even more freely in the works of Herbert Guenther. He writes, for instance, that in Buddhism,

> ...knowing himself not to be merely an object in time but to be temporality, man is called upon to make a choice as to authenticity or unauthenticity. In Buddhist terms, unauthenticity would be the disruption of a unitary reality into the events of Saṃsāra and Nirvāṇa.... 22

Further, each of the six types of saṃsāric existence is

> ...a fragmentation, positive or negative, we may say, and a disavowal of the unitary nature of man's existence. Stated otherwise, man's experience of himself as, say, a brute or a god, is a neglect of the transcendent in his total nature. 23

The intentions, understanding and actual beliefs of the men just cited are various. What they share is a common desire to "explain" Buddhism to a contemporary audience. Their explanations may not presuppose, but they <u>can</u> be taken to imply, that the Buddhist criterion of truth is pragmatic--that the Four Noble Truths need not be taken literally, and that what the Buddha "really meant" is psychological description <u>x</u> or existential analysis <u>y</u>, either of which is likely to be more palatable and comprehensible to Western readers than the relatively alien notions of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa. The virtue of explaining an alien tradition by recourse to "matching concepts" is comprehensibility; the vice is the danger of serious distortion.

Denials of the "correspondent" importance of the Four Noble Truths are not limited to modern interpreters; they are to be found within Buddhism itself, too, for the tradition is far from unambiguous in enunciating its priorities, and is full of statements that are open to various interpretations.

One interpretation, which might be termed the "radical Zen" view, implies that whether or not the Four Noble Truths are literally-intended propositions about conventional states-of-affairs, they are conventional truths, and the ultimate truth, emptiness, only can be cognized non-discursively--any conventional assertion tends to reify the empty, and therefore to misrepresent what is really the case and lead to further suffering. In this view, the silence of the Buddha, the smile that nonverbally communicates his experience, is more eloquent than any sūtra. It is the view of, for example, Hva shang Mahāyāna, a Ch'an monk who debated doctrinal matters with a number of Indian monks at the court of the Tibetan king Khri srong lde btsan in the late eighth century. The Hva shang propounded a rapid path to enlightenment through the elimination of all discursive thought, while the Indians were very concerned to preserve the integrity of the traditional sequence of practices, in which wisdom was founded on morality, analysis and concentration. The Hva shang believed that the

truth was verbally incommunicable and he was reluctant to debate, claiming that he preferred silence. Compelled nevertheless to debate, he consistently cited scriptures that seemed to show that truth had nothing whatsoever to do with propositions, and that intellectual analysis was both irrelevant and spiritually harmful.[24] The Four Noble Truths, in this view,seem at best expedients and at worst misleading, yet it is not clear that Hva shang Mahāyāna--or any other representative of the Ch'an/Zen tradition--is utterly denying their correspondence with conventional reality. It is simply that in the Ch'an/Zen tradition the stress on attaining a non-discursive experience of the ultimate truth has such importance that "conventional" truths often are ignored altogether; they are not denied so much as they are transcended. With their transcendence, however, comes an appeal to ineffability and a certain contempt for the sorts of confirmation procedures that a correspondence criterion of truth generally invites. It might also be noted that, whatever their disregard of conventional truths, all Ch'an/Zen practices presuppose a bifurcation of reality into--at the very least--satisfactory and unsatisfactory psychological states. This bifurcation is, of course, a "conventional" distinction.

If the "radical Zen" interpretation is, at least, pragmatic, then the view expressed by certain Tibetan

thinkers opposed by the great reformer Tsong kha pa (1357-1419)[25] is blatantly nihilistic. According to these thinkers--who are never specifically identified--statements in the *prajñāpāramitā* sūtras to the effect that, e.g., there is no suffering, origination, cessation or path; there is no gnosis, no attainment or non-attainment,"[26] are to be taken at face value: all conventional categories and distinctions are negated by the ultimate truth; they do not even have conventional validity! Similarly, Nāgārjuna's statement that "If I set any proposition, then I would be in error; / I do not set any proposition, so I am not in error"[27] is taken to mean that no propositions whatever are to be entertained. Taken at face value, these statements rule out cosmology, logic and virtually any sort of philosophical analysis, not to mention various conventional path practices; what, if anything, they *permit* is not clear. In interpreting both statements, Tsong kha pa's opponents make the mistake of subsuming the conventional to the ultimate, thereby leaving themselves with a "one truth" rather than a "two truth" theory.

According to Tsong kha pa and most other Mādhyamika scholars, a statement such as "there is no cessation" does not mean that in a conventional sense none of us ever will attain the cessation of suffering; it merely signifies that when subjected to an ultimate analysis the concept of "ces-

sation" cannot be found to exist independently of, for example, the concept of "suffering," or the mind that conceives "cessation." Similarly, Nāgārjuna's statement that he makes no propositions would, if taken literally, be self-contradictory; what he actually means by it is that ultimately he can make no assertions about reality, for assertions involve reification, and reification is contrary to the ultimate perspective, according to which all phenomena are empty of inherent existence, or "thingness."

3. Religion and truth

The views cited in the previous section all exemplify the explicit or implicit notion that the Four Noble Truths and their presuppositions do not necessarily correspond to states-of-affairs, that they are meant not so much literally as pragmatically, and that the problem of their empirical or logical confirmation should not overly concern us.

The psychological and existential interpretations we have cited from Watts, Trungpa, Potter and Guenther ultimately appeal to the idea that religious assertions are not confirmable philosophical propositions so much as they are "stories," or, to employ E.M. Hare's term, bliks, "factually empty statements" that are meaningful "as principles by which one lives and in accordance with which one interprets experience."[28] R.B. Braithwaite, similarly, claims that re-

ligious language is "the statement, but not the assertion, of certain stories."[29] Although not "factual," these stories are more than the mere expression of feelings: they are a declaration of adherence to a policy of action and a way of life. Whether or not they are actually true, they tend, like great fiction, to give us psychological support in the form of a meaningful vision of life or certain aspects of life.[30] According to T.R. Miles, religious stories are "silence qualified by parables," parables whose truth is less important than their message.[31]

This manner of turning religious statements into "soft" philosophical assertions has been severely criticized by other philosophers of religion. As Peter Donovan notes,

> ...there is little doubt that religious people themselves do care that their words be taken as the truth, and would be offended at the suggestion that it did not matter whether their language was misleading and their claims dishonest. 32

John Hick adds that "In order to render a distinctive style of life both attractive and rational, religious beliefs must be regarded as assertions of fact, not merely as imaginative fictions."[33] When a Christian asserts that God exists and was incarnated in Jesus Christ, or a Buddhist maintains that a cessation of saṃsāric suffering is attainable, he is not concerned merely to tell us a story that may prove edifying: he is asserting something he believes

to be the profoundest and most important of truths about the way things are in the universe.

A merely pragmatic criterion of truth, then, is inadequate. Santayana bluntly observes that

> If the argument is, that these beliefs, whether true or false, make life better in this world, the thing is simply false. To be boosted by an illusion is not better than to live in harmony with the truth; it is not nearly so safe, not nearly so sweet, and not nearly so fruitful....Believe, certainly; we cannot help believing; but believe rationally, holding what seems certain for certain, what seems probable for probable, what seems desirable for desirable, and what seems false for false. 34

Bertrand Russell adds that

> It is a commonplace that happiness is not best achieved by those who seek it directly; and it would seem that the same is true of the good. In thought, at any rate, those who forget good and evil and seek to know only the facts are more likely to achieve good than those who view the world through the distorting medium of their own desires. 35

It might further be noted that the very "softness" of a strictly pragmatic criterion of truth makes it likely that in the long run its "good effects" may well be undermined, for the simple reason that statements that actually correspond to states-of-affairs are likely to have greater predictive ability, hence greater effectiveness, than statements that are reassuring to believe but likely to be thrown into doubt by empirical tests. The correspondence criterion, in effect, is ultimately more pragmatic than the pragmatic criterion itself.

In short, then, as Kaufmann notes, "...no religion is

exhausted by rites or emotions or a fusion of the two: all religions are concerned with truth, too...."[36] Donovan makes the same point:

> ...despite the great diversity to be found amongst the religions of the world and the obscurity of the claims of even the most thought-over of them, it is simply a misrepresentation of religions to ignore their claims to tell us...what is so, regardless of whether everybody, or even anybody, acknowledges it to be so, or finds any point in the language in which it is claimed to be so. 37

A rather simple test of this assertion about religious statements would be to tell a Christian or a Buddhist that there now was conclusive empirical evidence that Jesus had never lived, or the Buddha had never really existed. Two responses could be forthcoming, and each of them indicates that religious people, by and large, are concerned that their beliefs correspond to states-of-affairs. The first response, from someone who took the presumed empirical evidence seriously, would be profound disappointment, which might lead in the end to a crisis of faith--this certainly has happened to many Christians in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in the face of what redaction criticism has revealed about the authorship of the Bible and what science has taught us of the literal veracity of some Biblical statements. A respondent will not be disappointed unless the truth of a belief matters to him--unless, in effect, he applies a correspondence criterion of truth.

The second type of response would involve the observa-

tion that the empirical evidence was basically irrelevant, because religious assertions correspond to actual states-of-affairs, but states of affairs whose locus is beyond the empirical realm--religious truth ultimately is given in religious experience, and religious experience is so different from ordinary experience as to be ineffable. This view is somewhat similar to the "radical Zen" interpretation cited above. A similar way of making the same point would be to claim that religious truths, while corresponding to reality, need not be subject to the same sorts of empirical tests that would be applied to other propositions that allegedly correspond with reality.

The appeal to the ineffability of religious experience--and thereby the exemption of religious assertions from empirical tests--has been criticized on a number of counts. Ninian Smart points out that (1) if ultimate reality is completely ineffable, then any designation of it, even as ineffable--let alone as "empty" or "taught by the Buddha"--is meaningless; (2) the notion of ineffability really is a way of expressing the extreme point on the human experiential continuum, of pointing to the experience that is least like other experiences; and (3) ineffability is a way of indicating the inadequacy of language--but all experiences escape language to a degree.[38] Peter Moore adds the observation that if religious experiences are utterly

ineffable, then those who report them are not to be believed, for their reports are _descriptive_, and presuppose a commonality of language and experience in those for whom the reports are intended.[39] Renford Bambrough succinctly notes that "To hold that there may be inarticulate understanding is not to hold that there may be any understanding that could not be articulated."[40] In short, then, ineffability claimed absolutely is self-contradictory, for _nothing_ then can be asserted meaningfully; while ineffability claimed relatively is not really ineffability, but a statement about the difficulty one is having in explaining a particular experience. Any experience that is described--and even the most recondite mystical experiences have been described, or we would not know of them--is susceptible of comparison with other experiences that we have had, and is therefore open to judgement and criticism as to, e.g., the appropriateness of the analogies employed or the truth of the conclusions drawn from the experience.

Equally unsatisfactory is the response that religious assertions do, in fact, correspond to states-of-affairs, but that they must be exempted from the sorts of rational and empirical tests applied to other assertions that appeal to a correspondence criterion of truth. There is no more reason to grant religious _propositions_ privileged status than there is to grant such status to religious _experience_.

In any case where a correspondence criterion of truth is invoked, the truth claim must be tested disinterestedly. Quite simply, if one is content merely to apply a pragmatic criterion, then one's truth-claim will be "soft," and little evidence is required beyond psychological reports; if, however, one wishes to apply a correspondence criterion, one's truth claim will be "hard," and will require "hard" evidence for its support. A religious apologist simply cannot make a "hard" claim and expect to have "soft" evidence accepted. H.D. Lewis claims in this regard that if a religious assertion cannot be proven or disproven, then "it is without factual significance, and makes no genuine truth-claim."[41] Donovan agrees: "Statements which fail to pay the necessary price for factuality (i.e. being open to confirming or falsifying observations) cannot be counted as statements of fact."[42] Quine and Ullian add that "What stands open to fresh verification may merit special confidence, since such a belief has been withstanding greater risk of disproof."[43] It is potential falsifiability that is the key to the meaningfulness of a religious assertion, for, as Smart puts it,

> Only a statement which sticks its neck out and runs the risk of being refuted in sense-experience is meaningful. If a supposed assertion does not do this, then it is a fraud. It is empty, meaningless (unless its truth simply arises from the meanings of the terms used in it). Thus, if I say, 'There is a fairy at the bottom of my garden,' but it turns out I am thinking of a fairy which cannot be touched, smelled, seen, etc., then no

> counterevidence could challenge my assertion and so by that very fact it is empty, meaningless. 44

At the very least, says Donovan, the "empiricist challenge" to religion amounts to the contention that for religious statements "some observations must be agreed to count for or against them, some tests must be accepted as relevant to their credibility."[45]

Religious propositions, then, if they claim to correspond to reality, must be open to confirmation, of which perhaps the most important criterion is falsifiability. Once this is admitted, however, there remains the problem of determining what sorts of facts,experiences or observations will be admissible as evidence for or against propositions. The problem is that of what in Indian philosophy is called _pramāṇa_, the sources of authoritative knowledge. This fundamental epistemological problem has been explored at length in both Western and Indian philosophy. It is a problem to which we shall, perforce, return--but for the moment let us remain with the problem of truth, and examine in greater detail the way it is treated in Buddhism.

4. Buddhism, truth and wrong view

On the evidence of the Pāli canon, it is beyond dispute that pragmatic considerations were important to the Buddha. He preferred to leave certain metaphysical ques-

tions, e.g., about the limits of the universe or the condition of the Tathāgata after death, as unanswered (avyākata) because their examination was fraught with philosophical pitfalls, and not considered conducive to spiritual advancement.[46] Also, he taught a number of parables that were intended to show that there are times when philosophical analysis is pointless. The "arrow" parable, in which it is suggested that a man shot by an arrow must seek treatment rather than to know particulars of the arrow and its shooter, indicates that we who suffer in saṃsāra should be more concerned with leaving it than with an endless analysis of its workings.[47] The "raft" parable compares the Dhamma to a raft, and suggests that just as a raft is left behind once we have successfully crossed a river, so the Dhamma is no longer necessary when one has reached its goal, Arahantship.[48]

The Buddha was concerned chiefly to teach a way to salvation, so it is not surprising that he should have tended to emphasize those truths that had the greatest bearing on the attainment of this goal, i.e., that were pragmatic truths. To teach pragmatic truths and to teach a pragmatic criterion of truth, however, are different matters. As K.N. Jayatilleke puts it, "...the truths of Buddhism were considered to be pragmatic in the Buddhist sense of the term, but it does not mean that Early Buddhism believes in a

pragmatist theory of truth."[49] A pragmatist theory of truth, as we have already seen, involves, in effect, the supposition that "a belief is true if it useful and false."[50] In the Abhayarājakumāra Sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya, the Buddha discusses statements in terms of their (a) truth or falsity, (b) usefulness or uselessness and (c) pleasantness or unpleasantness. He maintains that he asserts as truths only those statements that are (a) true, useful and pleasant, or (b) true, useful and unpleasant. He explicitly rules out asserting any truths that are useless.[51] Although it is not mentioned specifically, Jayatilleke infers that a proposition that was useful but false would not have been asserted by the Buddha, since

> ...it was considered self-contradictory to say of a statement that it was false but useful....Since falsehood or the assertion of a statement that is false (musāvāda) was considered a moral evil, it would have been held to be logically or causally impossible for what is false, i.e. what is morally evil to result in what was useful in the sense of being morally advantageous or good.... 52

Jayatilleke analyzes the term usually translated as "truth," bhūta, and shows that it means "fact, i.e. what has become, taken place or happened." This, he says, "tacitly implies the acceptance of a correspondence theory of truth."[53] The "conscious avowal" of the correspondence theory is found in the Apaṇṇaka Sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya, where the Buddha makes it clear that falsity is nonconformity with fact and truth conformity with fact. If,

for example, one believes, conceives or asserts that there is no next world--when in fact there is a next world--then one's belief, conception or assertion is false. If one believes, conceives or asserts that there is a next world--when, in fact, there is one--then one's belief, conception or assertion is true.[54] An even more explicit avowal is found in the Abhidharmakośa, where the Buddha is described as the "master of truth" because he teaches without error in conformity with what is; and it is because his teaching is true, not because he possesses supernatural powers, that he is able to draw beings from the mud of transmigration.[55] In short, then, the Buddha of the "Hīnayāna" only is concerned to assert true propositions that are useful. Their truth, however, is derived not from their usefulness, but from their correspondence to states-of-affairs.

Matters are somewhat less clear-cut in the Mahāyāna, where the concept of the Buddha's skill-in-means (upāyakauśalya) is invoked either directly or implicitly to explain both inconsistencies among the Buddha's teachings[56] and apparent breaches of traditional morality by Buddhas or Bodhisattvas: any act or statement that is conducive to the spiritual welfare of others, even if apparently immoral or false, is an example of skill-in-means, motivated by compassion and guided by wisdom, and is not, in fact, immoral or false. The issue is squarely faced and decisively set-

tled in the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka Sūtra, where the Buddha recounts for Śāriputra the parable of the burning house. A wise father (the Buddha) sees that the house (saṃsāra) in which his children (sentient beings) are playing is on fire (with suffering). He also perceives that they do not realize this (because of ignorance) and must be saved. Rather than panic them with a cry of alarm, he calmly lures them outside, promising each the sort of animal-cart the father knows him to desire (the śrāvakayāna, pratyekabuddhayāna and bodhisattvayāna). Excited, the children rush out of the house (enter the path). They discover then that the father actually had but one type of cart to offer (the ekayāna = bodhisattvayāna), but advertised several, knowing just what sort of promises would succeed in luring the children out. Having recounted the parable, the Buddha asks Śāriputra whether the father, promising several types of carts but delivering only one, was a liar. No, Śāriputra replies, he was not, because his "lie" had the effect of inducing the children to leave the burning house; a "white lie" such as this is no lie at all.[57]

Here, it seems, something very much like a pragmatic criterion of truth is being applied: the father's promises are true (or at least not false) because they are useful--in spite of their inaccuracy. The doctrine of skill-in-means carries a number of difficulties with it, the most

obvious of which is its susceptibility to misuse: lies may be asserted as truths because they hold a promise of future benefit, or immoral acts justified because they are "motivated by compassion"; because, like other pragmatic statements or acts, their susceptibility to objective tests is limited, they are difficult to judge. The problems it raises notwithstanding (we will discuss them at greater length in Chapter 3, section 2), the doctrine of skill-in-means does <u>not</u> replace the correspondence criterion, so much as it modifies it by granting a greater latitude to pragmatic considerations. After all, the employment of skill-in-means and pragmatic truths that may or may not correspond to states-of-affairs has a goal: to effect the spiritual benefit of sentient beings by freeing them from suffering. To have such a goal is to presuppose that reality is structured in such a way that to assert the actuality of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa is to state a proposition that corresponds to actual states-of-affairs. Saṃsāra and nirvāṇa and the Four Noble Truths may, as they often are in Mahāyāna rhetoric, be described as "false," or as merely provisional teachings, but they are false only in the sense that they are not assertions of the ultimate truth or interpretive category covering all phenomena, emptiness--they still remain the most important of "conventional" truths, and represent the world-view from which the search for ultimate truth and

enlightenment begins. Indeed, the ultimate truth may "negate" the conventional world-view, but the ultimate truth only has importance insofar as it serves a soteriological purpose within a conventional world-view that corresponds to the way things are.

The Buddha of the nikāyas does not propose a two-truth theory like that found in the Mahāyāna. He does, however, say that among his teachings some can be asserted categorically, while others cannot. Among those that cannot be asserted categorically are the avyākatas, unanswered metaphysical questions; among those that can be asserted categorically are the Four Noble Truths.[58] Where a correspondence criterion of truth is emphasized, as it is in the nikāyas, categorical assertions function, in effect, as "ultimate truths." The Four Noble Truths, then, are certainly believed to correspond to reality, and the cosmological and philosophical assumptions behind them must equally be regarded as true. Thus, saṃsāra and nirvāṇa are true in their most literal sense, as a round of rebirths and the cessation of that round. As Jayatilleke notes, "The conception of salvation from is intimately connected in Buddhism with the belief in rebirth. It is therefore an integral part of Early Buddhist belief and much of Buddhism would be unintelligible without it."[59]

Further evidence for the sort of ideas considered

"true" in Buddhsim is provided by a brief survey of the ideas considered false: the notion of "wrong view" (P. micchaditthi, S. mithyadrsti) shows a remarkable consistency throughout Buddhist history, Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna; Pāli and Sanskrit; Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, Yogācāra and Mādhyamika. The basic formulation of wrong view is found in a number of different places in the nikāyas, e.g., in the Mahācattārīsaka Sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya:

> What, O monks, is wrong view? (Saying) there are no alms, there is no sacrifice, there is no offering; there is no ripening of the fruit of karma that tends toward happiness or suffering; there is no "this" world, there is no other world; there is no mother, there is no father, there are no miraculously-born beings; there are in this world no samaṇas or brāhmaṇas who have reached the highest point, who live perfectly, and who, having themselves understood and experienced this world and the other world, relate (their experiences to others). This, O monks, is wrong view. 60

Vasubandhu, writing early in the first millenium A.D., identifies precisely the same set of ideas as "wrong view."[61] The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, also composed early in the first millenium, but half a continent away, and in the Mahāyāna rather than the Hīnayāna idiom, criticizes those who are

> destructive and nihilistic regarding abiding, activity, generation, dissolution, existence, nirvāṇa, the path, karma and its result, and truth. Why is that? Because they have not cognized these through perception, they have not attained a vision of them. 62

Nearly a thousand years later, Tsong kha pa writes that wrong view (Tibetan log par lta ba) is essentially nihil-

There are in the Pāli canon a number of places where the Dhamma and the truths of which it consists are characterized. The Dhamma is "actual, timeless, verifiable, transcendent and cognized by the wise."[65] The Dhamma, in other words, can be realized in this life, is eternally true, invites one to "come and see" (ehipassako = is verifiable), leads beyond suffering and is realized by the wise. The most important characteristic for our purposes is its "verifiability," the fact that it can be known through both reason and direct experience to be true. Buddhists of various schools have, as we shall see, variously emphasized experience and reason, but all have believed the Dharma to be true and susceptible of some sort of proof. Thus, we find in the Sanskritic-Tibetan tradition that such matters as liberation, omniscience and the existence of past and future lives are phenomena hidden from our senses, but nonetheless inferable through a chain of reasoning that ultimately leads back to "worldly perception."[66] They are, too, directly cognized by someone of sufficiently developed spirituality.

From the very beginning, then, Buddhists have believed that the Dhamma in general and the Four Noble Truths in particular are demonstrably true, and have been willing to argue the point with appeals to reason, experience, or both. To argue for the truth of the Four Noble Truths is,

in turn, really to argue for what the Śrīmālādevīsiṃhanāda Sūtra calls the One Noble Truth, cessation, which is true, permanent and a refuge.[67] A similar point is made in the nikāyas, where it is said that just as the ocean has one taste, that of salt, the Dhamma has one taste, that of liberation.[68]

The Buddhist emphasis on cessation, or liberation, on what is, in effect, the perfectibility of man, sets it at a considerable remove from the "mainstream" Greco-Christian-Humanistic tradition of the West which, whatever its internal and historical conflicts, is consistent in its belief that during his mortal span man is limited and imperfectible.[69] Greek thinkers from Heraclitus and Pindar, down through the great tragedians and Socrates and Aristotle, warned man against hubris, against seeking greater power or knowledge than was his to enjoy. Man's lot was basically suffering, but beyond a certain wisdom to be drived from it and a rather nebulous sort of beatitude to be found by some after death in the Elysian Fields or the Happy Isles, there was no real "solution" to the problem--hence the fundamentally tragic view of life shared by most Greeks (Plato and initiates of the mystery religions, it must be noted, are conspicuous exceptions). In Christianity, man is a contingent creature who is capable of beatitude after death. He cannot be perfect during his mortal span, and such beati-

tude as he may achieve is dependent ultimately not so much on his own effort as on the grace of a God whose supreme perfection he can never approximate. Humanists, particularly those of the modern "scientific" variety, have tended to espouse views that sound very much like the "wrong views" enumerated by Buddhists: they believe that the "mind" is a function of brain and dies with its organ, so they disbelieve in past and future lives of any sort; they doubt the existence of a universal moral law that mirrors the sort of causality found in nature, so they disbelieve in either karma or divine judgement; they believe that a human mental continuum is but a series of evanescent psychological states, some of greater duration and satisfactoriness than others, but none eternal or unmixed with some sort of suffering, so they disbelieve that there can be a permanent cessation of the mixture of sorrow and joy that is human life; and they believe that there are causal factors beyond the control of even the wisest and most skillful of men, so they disbelieve that man can control external and internal factors sufficiently to attain any sort of everlasting peace.

Against this view, which is prevalent in the West, and has been more influential in the East than generally admitted, Buddhism declares that--as the Buddha put it to the five ascetics at Sarnath--"the deathless has been won," the

total peace of nirvāṇa is within man's grasp. Nirvāṇa is, as Robert Slater says, the "gospel" of Buddhism--a gospel that begins with the certain knowledge that rebirth is ended, that there is a doorway that leads out of saṃsāra, and that across the threshold is eternal peace.[70] The exact qualities and parameters of the state of being that lies beyond the threshold have, in the long history of Buddhism, been variously described. Terms such as vimokṣa, nirvāṇa, arahattva, bodhi, buddhatva, and sarvajña refer to a whole range of differing interpretations of the attainment of an enlightened being, from the simple cessation of saṃsāric suffering attributed to Arahants in the nikāyas, to the omniscience, omnibenevolence and immense power attributed to the Buddha in the Mahāyāna. What is important about these various terms and visions is not their variety but their common feature: they all refer to a condition that lies beyond the threshold of the door leading from saṃsāra. The lowest common denominator among them, the "minimal enlightenment," as it were, is the third of the "three knowledges" (tevijja) gained by the Buddha (according to the nikāyas) on the night of his bodhi: the knowledge that the contaminants (āsavas) of desire, becoming and ignorance have been destroyed, and that there will be for him no more rebirths. The Buddha also had gained knowledge of infinite of his own previous incarnations, and of the manner of beings' birth

and death in saṃsāra[71]--but these two knowledges were not considered essential to liberation; what <u>was</u> essential was the knowledge that the contaminants had been destroyed (<u>āsavakkhayañāna</u>). One who had attained liberation by fulfilling this minimal criterion was said to be "liberated through wisdom" (P. <u>paññāvimutta</u>, S. <u>prajñāvimukta</u>).[72]

The Buddha, or an Arahant, has realized to his own satisfaction that he is liberated, but he also recognizes that this fact will not be self-evident to others--as it certainly was not to Upaka, the sceptic encountered by the Buddha on his way Benares. Indeed, the Buddha at one point rebukes Sariputta for praising him, asking him how he can be certain of the Buddha's superiority when he cannot even be certain that the Buddha is enlightened.[73] The Buddha doubts that Sariputta knows for certain that the Buddha is enlightened, or even that enlightenment is possible. Still, the Buddha <u>is</u> certain that enlightenment <u>is</u> possible, because he has attained it. He is certain that the "one" Noble Truth--and the four of which it is the quintessence--is a fact, a fact that can be verified by any human being. The Four Noble Truths are verifiable, but since they are not self-evident, men must be persuaded to consider them. Thus, the Buddha and Buddhists since him have been compelled to argue, from one vantage point or another, that his gospel does, in fact, correspond to the way things are. The

arguments, as we shall see, are manifold, but because they are serious, and claim to demonstrate the existence of certain states-of-affairs not generally assumed to be the case, they must be subjected to the scrutiny of philosophy, particularly of the philosophy of religion. The scrutiny is intended not out of superciliousness, but from respect, for Buddhist arguments are, by and large, serious and methodologically sophisticated enough to warrant detailed consideration--such consideration as they have not heretofore received.

Our basic procedure, then, will be to present and analyze a number of Buddhist arguments for the truth of the One Noble Truth, cessation. The "one Truth," of course, entails the Four Noble Truths of which it is a member, as well as the presuppositions behind them, so all of these must be considered. We will keep in the foreground the idea that we are seeking Buddhist answers to the question, "How do we know that enlightenment is possible?" Because we will attempt to focus on arguments for the existence of a particular type of state beyond saṃsāra, we necessarily must limit our discussion of (a) the qualities of particular enlightened states and (b) details of the path or paths that lead to any and all enlightened states. Some mention of these topics is, naturally, unavoidable, but I do not believe that a lengthy investigation of whether, e.g., nir-

vāṇa represents extinction or continuing awareness, or whether gradual or rapid paths are to be preferred, has any fundamental bearing on the more general philosophical problems I am attempting to raise, and they are investigations that, for the sake of conciseness, I will do my best to avoid.

CHAPTER 2: ARGUMENTS IN THE PĀLI TRADITION

1. The context and degree of the Buddha's attainment

The Pāli nikāyas were not compiled until several hundred years after the Buddha's parinirvāṇa,[74] but there is no reason to doubt that they are composed of pericopes of greater antiquity, and that we can, therefore, infer from them something of social and religious conditions during the Buddha's lifetime. The most marked religious feature of the Buddha's time was a proliferation of religious and philosophical schools, most of which addressed themselves in one way or another to the problem of the existence of a sequence of suffering rebirths (saṃsāra), its perpetuation through actions (karma) for one reason or another inappropriate, and the search for liberation (mokṣa or nirvāṇa) from saṃsāra. Let us briefly contextualize the Buddha's search and purported attainment by tracing the origins of the conditions into which, in circa 560 B.C., he was born.

It is not incorrect to say that what we might designate the "saṃsāra-karma-mokṣa complex" is a product of Indian culture, but we must remember that it may not be an original feature of that culture, but, rather, the outcome

of a long developmental process. Indeed, even to speak of "Indian culture" before the sixth century B.C. is somewhat misleading, for there were on the subcontinent really two cultures, which may loosely be termed "Āryan" and "Dravidian," out of whose centuries-long interaction arose those features that we usually consider "Indian." The saṃsāra-karma-mokṣa complex is, of course, a central feature, and in its fully-elaborated form (in Jainism, Buddhism and post-Vedic Hinduism), it clearly includes elements that are both Āryan and indigenous. The difficulty lies in trying to sort out just which elements derive from which milieu.

Most scholars tend to describe the interaction between Āryan and Dravidian culture as one in which the Āryans "absorbed" elements from the older culture. Given the eventual dominance of such apparently non-Āryan elements as transmigration, liberation and the worship of the Great Goddess, however, Joseph Campbell thinks it might be more accurate to speak of the Dravidians as having assimilated the Āryans.[75] Be that as it may, much of the final Indian synthesis must have been drawn by Āryans from outside their fold, and the tendency among scholars is to assume that such pivotal notions as transmigration and liberation do indeed have an "external" origin.

Though a non-Āryan origin probably can be assumed for much of the saṃsāra-karma-mokṣa complex, an almost total

lack of positive literary and archeological evidence prevents us from ascertaining much more than that very general fact. Who is the "yogi" on the Indus Valley seals? Does he have any connection with the munis and vrātis, ascetics described in the Ṛg Veda? Is there any continuity from the Indus civilization to the eremetical practices of the Āraṇyakas? What was the content of Indus and/or Dravidian religion? All these questions remain to be satisfactorily answered, and yet, granting at the outset our vast areas of ignorance, we can attempt tentatively to trace the outlines of the religio-historical development that issued in the saṃsāra-karma-mokṣa complex.

The Indus civilization, whose efflorescence antedates the coming of the Āryans by several hundred years, may itself have been a synthesis of Mesopotamian and indigenous Indian elements.[76] We never will know for certain, but even in the absence of a key to the Indus Valley language, we are able to draw certain conclusions about the nature of the civilization simply from what we can see: figurines, seals and ruins. It was, it would appear, a stable, highly conservative urban/argricultural civilization. Judging from figurines and seals that have been found, religious life must have been centered around a goddess or goddesses, fertility symbols (such as the "lingam"), and sacred trees and animals. More ambiguous--and more central to our concerns--

are two other pieces of "religious" evidence: the "yogi" on the Harappa seal and the "baths" in the ruins at Mohenjo Dharo. From these, many scholars have speculated that the later Indian concerns with yogic enstasy and ritual purity are inherited from the Indus civilization. Stephan Beyer, for instance, suggests that

> ...there may well have been a special class of religious practitioners whose aim lay in the induction of trance-like states of bodily immobility, and the impenetrability of the body to pollution. The entire yogic ideal of absolute withdrawal from sensory input cannot easily be traced to Indo-European antecedents; but in the Indus concern for the integrity of the bodily integument and in their representation of figures in cross-legged immobility, we may find a clue to what would become a major element of Indian religion. 77

Against this rather generally accepted interpretation, Campbell has issued a caveat, which should be borne in mind:

> The way is consummated (by yoga) to the gaining of absolute security through introversion; however, it is by no means certain that the earliest aim of yoga was to bear the sage along this road to release from the vortex of rebirth. Yoga is not intrinsically, necessarily, or even usually associated with negation. It is by no means certain, therefore, that because the earliest scriptures known to us in which yoga is analyzed describe it as a discipline of disengagement, the figures on the Indus Valley seals were in their time associated with any such ideal. In fact, in the popular mind to this day yoga is largely associated rather with the acquisition of "powers" (siddhi) than with the forcing of an exit from the world arena.... 78

This point notwithstanding, however, Indus civilization does seem to have been structured in such a way that notions like transmigration and liberation could have ta-

ken root. Because it was agricultural, it lived by cyclical patterns that might easily be projected into a vision of the cosmos and the soul's destiny; because it was urban, it may have given rise to the sort of spiritual unrest that seems characteristic of urban/commercial culture from the earliest times; most importantly, though, because it was founded on a surplus agricultural economy, it is likely to have given rise to a leisure class for whom

> ...the highest concern of mythology, ritual, and human wisdom shifted from the old magical interests of the nature cult, which were in fact now being gradually assumed by an improved agrarian technology anyhow, to the more intimately psychological task of achieving peace, harmony and depth of soul in this vale of tears. 79

By the time the Āryans, the people of the Ṛg Veda, arrived in northwest India late in the second millenium B.C., the Indus civilization already had declined, if not disappeared altogether, although its religion, as Basham notes,

> ...never died, but was quietly practiced by the humbler people, gradually developing from contact with other doctrines and cults, until it gathered enough strength to reappear, and largely to overlay, the old faith of the Āryan rulers of India. 80

This "old faith," at least on the surface, seems to have differed radically from that of the Indus civilization, as would befit the differences between an exhuberant, warlike, pastoral people and staid, rather comfortable urbanites. On the evidence of the Ṛg Veda, the wandering tribes who called themselves "Āryans" were worshippers of predominantly male sky gods, in the hope of whose favor they performed

sacrifices and sang songs, perhaps in hallucinogenic ecstasy induced by soma (possibly amanatia muscaria, the "magic mushroom"). The strata assumed to be earliest reveal little development in eschatology; the soul at death was said to transfer either to the desirable "world of the fathers" or the dreaded "house of clay," and one's fate after death seems to have been at least generally linked with the quality of one's deeds during life, but there is no evidence of belief in a circle of transmigration or the necessity to transcend it. At the same time, the earliest strata do reveal a dual concern with cosmological/metaphysical speculation and with a search for means of controlling divine forces. Without that concern, the eventual development of the saṃsāra-karma-mokṣa complex would not have been possible.

Mobile and warlike tribes that they were, the Āryans naturally expanded eastward from the Punjab into the Gangetic valley, and as they did so, they just as naturally encountered indigenous peoples, who probably are the swarthy dāsas and paṇis whose conquest is described in the Ṛg Veda. Also described there are the munis, the oddly-festooned silent wanderers who seem to have been quite outside the pale of Vedic society, and the vrātis, renegade Brahmins who had broken loose from the main tribal units.

When attempting to trace the development of the Āryans from their entry into the subcontinent until 600 B.C., we

really are reduced to hints and guesses derived from a tentative stratification of Vedic texts, but we can safely conclude that the Āryans' eastward expansion and consequent contact with indigenous peoples began to alter both their society and their religion. While the absorbtion of native elements into their society forced the Āryans to make careful distinctions between the "twice-born" and lower elements, their religion (perhaps because the direct inspiration provided by soma had been left behind), came increasingly to depend upon correct ritual performance for its efficacy. As the sacrifice grew more complex (a process attested to by the compilation of the Yajur and Sāma Vedas), the religious specialists who saw to it that the sacrifice was performed correctly grew in importance and power. In the Brāḥmaṇas, religious power belongs to the gods in name only--it is the sacrifice that has become the sustaining power in the universe, and real power has devolved upon those who control the sacrifice, the brahmins.

Though ritualization was the primary motif, Āryan religion by no means was moving in one direction only. The speculative (and in some case sceptical) hymns of the tenth book of the Ṛg Veda, the addition to accepted lore of the largely non-Āryan spells of the Atharva Veda, and the mention, in the later Brāḥmaṇas, of the eschatological prospect of "re-death," all indicate that Āryan thought, no

doubt impelled by both internal and external forces, was changing. The farther east the Āryans migrated, the farther they stood from the lands of which their traditions spoke, and the more thoroughly surrounded they were by indigenous elements.

The crucial development in Āryan history was the discovery, sometime before the sixth century B.C., of the uses of iron. Iron-tipped axes were able to clear large tracts of forest for planting, wood could be used to construct fortified settlements, and iron-tipped plows yielded rich harvests from the land around the settlements. In short, iron permitted urbanization, with all that implies: a surplus economy, specialization of labor, a centralized government, commerce, and a leisure class.

Leisure, as noted above, can free man from his obsessive concern with survival and with control of natural forces, and allows him to turn inward, to examine his condition and his relation to the world. Introspective Āryans living in the new towns along the eastern Ganges cannot have been entirely happy with the "brave new world" that had been wrought: the realtive egalitarianism of the tribe had been replaced by the stratified complexity of the monarchy, while religious power had been arrogated by the ritual specialists, whose attentions seemed divided between supporting the universe and supporting the monarch. Voca-

tion began to replace family as the central determinant of a man's place in the world: the family no longer provided the secure sense of definition and belonging that it once had. Wars raged, the basis of the economy shifted--there were, in short, ample reasons for insecurity and alienation.

The response of those alienated by the strange, new conditions of the urban monarchy (and they must have included members of both the new commercial classes, estranged from the old religion, and the old Vedic classes, confused by new developments) was what Campbell has felicitously termed "the Great Reversal," the movement whereby a sector of a society turns its back politically and spiritually on the world in which it no longer feels comfortable. Politically, the Great Reversal engendered at least some of the hill republics, whose institutions hearkened back to the "democracy" of the old Āryan tribes. Spiritually, the Great Reversal manifested in an increase in speculative thought and experimentation with new forms of religious practice, many of which centered on the ideal of release from worldly existence. This was probably stimulated by contact with non-Āryan elements, which may well have been the source of the general conceptions (if not the specific formulations that have been handed down to us) of transmigration and liberation, and the yogic techniques by which liberation from

transmigration might be obtained. The Buddha's age, which certainly lay in the midst of this Great Reversal, was a complex one, traversed by wandering bands of sophists and meditators, materialists, sceptics, magicians and determinists, yet in its general outlines it can be characterized as a "reversal," for, whatever their specific philosophical differences, most of the groups that sprang up within and around the Gangetic monarchies had in common a rejection of Vedic authority (or, failing that, of Vedic obsession with ritual) and the practice of purificatory and meditative techniques that were believed to assure the soul's transcendence of a world increasingly viewed as sorrowful--particularly, it might be noted, in relation to the blissful states that might be induced by meditation.[81]

There is no doubt that this new psychological orientation, this turn inward and toward from release from the world as a means to ultimate religious power, was vastly different in spirit and precept from the old, liturgical religion of the Āryans, and its main outlines may well have originated outside the Āryan fold; yet such "foreign" ideas as transmigration and liberation could not have been comprehensible, let alone acceptable, to vast numbers of disaffected Āryans had not Vedic thought itself evolved in many ways beyond the ritualism that was still its official practice. The impetus for the evolution was, as noted a-

bove, both external and internal. The vital transition, perhaps, can be seen in the late Brāhmaṇas, where the correct performance of the world-sustaining ritual is seen to depend on correct knowledge of certain procedures or, more importantly, of certain principles, such as brāhman. Once the external performance had been subordinated to an interior knowledge, it was only a matter of time before--for some--the external performance was itself internalized or simply bypassed in the newly inward quest for the one principle that would prove the key to religious power.

Such is the quest of the Āraṇyakas and the Upaniṣads, which are strongly influenced by, without always coherently articulating, doctrines of transmigration and liberation. The early Upaniṣads, as Jayatilleke has pointed out,[82] are intent on the attainment of liberating knowledge, but seem content to arrive at an understanding of the identity of brāhman and ātman largely through rational means; it is only in the middle and later Upaniṣads, those roughly simultaneous with and subsequent to the time of the Buddha, that liberation is to be achieved yogically, through direct intuitive insight. Yoga, saṃsāra and mokṣa, then, may be non-Āryan in origin, but they could be grafted onto Vedic thought only because the Vedic penchant for speculation and a quest for ultimate religious power through knowledge provided a suitable intellectual environment for the conside-

ration of new and strange ideas: again, the motive force behind Vedic religious development came from within as well as without.

It is certainly the case that the forceful, nearly simultaneous articulation, circa the sixth century B.C., of Jaina, Upaniṣadic and Buddhist visions of suffering, transmigration and liberation, is the result in part of a breakdown in cultural self-confidence, and the confluence of two fundamentally different religious traditions (sometimes referred to as śrāmaṇic and brāhmaṇic), but it is very difficult to specify just where the beliefs of one of these two traditions end and those of the other begin. Jainism, with its proportionately greater emphasis on world-negation, might be seen as more purely śrāmaṇic, while the Upaniṣads, with their acceptance of the authority and much of the vocabulary of the Vedas, might be regarded as more purely brāhmaṇic--although the argument could be made that the Upaniṣads have more fundamental metaphysical affinities with Jainism than with Vedic sacrificial religion. We might want to consider Buddhism śrāmaṇic because of its rejection of the Vedas and emphasis on liberation, yet the Buddha clearly belonged to a tradition of philosophical inquiry that can be seen as part of the broad development of Vedic thought, many of whose concepts (e.g., karma, which once had referred to correct ritual action, and now came to be

a principle of moral causation; and the status of brahmin, which was seen as an attainment rather than a birthright) he helped to redefine. Indeed, Jayatilleke and others have pointed out that the Buddha is far more concerned to refute the extremes of practice (asceticism and libertinism), eschatology (eternalism and nihilism regarding the soul), and metaphysics (determinism and randomness theory) that had arisen among śrāmaṇic groups than he was to denigrate the brāḥmaṇical order. Even the content of the Buddha's enlightenment is by no means uniformly "śrāmaṇic," but seems to reflect a combination of rational apprehension of truths, ecstatic vision and enstatic quiescence--only the latter is unambiguously non-Āryan. In short, the labels śrāmaṇic and brāḥmaṇic may be useful as general designations, but do not seem satisfactory as labels for any of these systems, which are essentially syntheses, the result of a miscegenation that covered hundreds of years, and not representatives of one or another "parallel culture."

The scope of the religious ferment of the Buddha's time is indicated in the Brahmajāla Sutta of the Dīgha Nikāya,[83] which list sixty-two philosophical views then prevalent--none of which the Buddha accepted. The nikāyas contain frequent references[84] to six major teachers who were near or actual contemporaries of the Buddha: the amoralist sceptic Pūraṇa Kassapa, the determinist Makkhali Gosāla,

the materialist Ajita Kesakambali, the rationalist Pakudha Kaccayana, the Jaina Nigaṇṭha Nāgataputta and the agnostic Sañjaya Belaṭṭhiputta.[85] The Buddha describes his own wanderings in this variegated religious world in the <u>Ariyapariyesana Sutta</u>.[86] After his renunciation of the householder's life, he visits and studies with, in succession, Ālāra Kālāma and Uddaka Rāmaputta, accomplished masters of enstatic <u>jhāna</u> meditation. The future Buddha swiftly gains proficiency in their practices, and each wishes him to remain and teach by his side, but Gautama finds each limited, and continues his quest. He is animated by the basic sense that there <u>must</u> exist a supreme attainment, the one definite door out of saṃsāra, and he experiments with various methods that purport to attain it, but finds them all wanting. Finally, under the pipal tree at Uruvelā, he gains transcendent knowledge of the way in which the cosmos actually functions and definite knowledge that his contaminants have been rooted out forever, that "my liberation is unshakeable, this is my last life, there is no more rebirth for me!"[87] This is but one of a number of "victory formulas" found in the <u>nikāyas</u>. Others include: "birth is destroyed, spiritual practice is complete, what is to be done is done, there is no more of this sort of existence"; "solitary (am I), aloof, earnest, self-mastering"; and "the contaminants are destroyed, what is to be done is done, the

burden is laid down, the true goal is attained, the fetters of becoming are destroyed, I am liberated by perfect knowledge."[88]

The import of all these formulas is the Buddha's unshakeable conviction that at last someone--he--has gained the key to attaining that ultimate goal of sentient striving so urgently sought by so many of his contemporaries, nibbāna, that liberation (mokṣa) from the sort of actions (karma) that perpetuate the cycle of rebirths (saṃsāra). The Buddha has seen reality "face-to-face,"[89] and therefore considers himself justified in making any number of fundamental assertions, e.g., that it is impossible for one who has attained right view to commit any philosophical or moral mistakes;[90] that he sees no other being with an attainment as sublime as his;[91] that beyond what a Buddha understands there is nothing to understand;[92] that the Tathāgata has knowledge of matters never before heard on earth;[93] that "there exists an unborn, unchanging, uncreated, uncompounded" sphere that is release from the born, the changing, the created and the compounded;[94] and that the goal and the path run into each other like the Ganges and the Jamuna.[95]

In short, then, against a background of social, philosophical and religious ferment, the Buddha set out to discover a solution to the problem of saṃsāric suffering. He

tried and rejected any number of prevalent views and practices, and finally, through a reliance on supreme insight into the nature of reality (and aided by enstatic and visionary abilities), he attained a state that was, he was convinced, the highest that can be attained. Having himself travelled a path and reached a goal, he felt justified in proclaiming the Four Noble Truths and announcing to sceptic and adherent alike that he was perfectly enlightened, a Tathāgata, a Conqueror than whom no being was more accomplished.

2. Types of attainment in the Pāli tradition

The types and parameters of spiritual attainment in the Buddhist tradition are less germane to our discussion than the fact that such attainments are asserted, but we might do well at least briefly to touch on those types and parameters, in an attempt further to contextualize the arguments that we will discuss shortly.

We have seen that the Buddha asserted that the path and the goal flow into each other like the Ganges and the Jamuna--in other words, that the fourth noble truth, the path, is true. The Pali *nikāyas* contain a variety of different descriptions of the path leading to nibbāna, of which we will mention only three.

The most famous--if least systematic--description of

the path is that offered in the _Dhammacakkapavattana Sutta_, the Buddha's first discourse[96]: the eightfold noble path. This consists of right view (_sammā diṭṭhi_), right thought (_sammā saṃkappo_), right speech (_sammā vācā_), right action (_sammā kammanto_), right livelihood (_sammā ājivo_), right effort (_sammā vayāmo_), right mindfulness (_sammā sati_) and right concentration (_sammā samādhi_). Right view, as we have seen in Chapter 1, involves the acceptance of the reality of past and future lives, karma, and beings who have transcended suffering. Right thought is thought that is free from lust, malice or hatred. Right speech is speech that is free from deception, slander, abuse or idleness. Right action is action that is free from killing, stealing and sexual misconduct. Right livelihood involves following a nonviolent profession and, ultimately, turning one's back on _all_ worldly professions. Right effort involves striving to avoid and overcome evil thoughts and actions, and to develop and maintain the good. Right mindfulness involves paying close attention to one's body, feelings, thoughts and mental events. Right concentration involves mastery of the enstatic techniques for fixing the mind single-pointedly and ascending through the various levels of absorbtion (_jhāna_).[97] The Buddhist path always requires the practice of morality, concentrative ability and wisdom (_sīla_, _samādhi_ and _paññā_, the three principles around which Buddhagho-

sa organizes his Visuddhimagga), and only when all three have been raised to the highest level will the path issue in the goal.

Still another account of the path is given in the Samaññaphala Sutta of the Dīgha Nikāya,[98] where the Buddha painstakingly describes the sequence to be followed by one who seeks nibbāna. He must first renounce the householder's life, then master his behavior in various ways and guard his sense-doors. He must become mindful and self-possessed, content with little, and must attain the joy of detachment. He then must ascend through the four jhānas, gain knowledge of the nature and abilities of his body and mind, and learn to project a mental body. He must gain various psychic powers, including clairaudience, telepathy, retrocognition and clairvoyance. Finally, he must gain certain knowledge that his contaminants are destroyed: that he no longer has the desire or need to take birth in the form or formless realms, and has no residual ignorance about the truth of the Four Noble Truths. He then knows that he is free, and is able to utter his victory cry: "birth is destroyed, spiritual practice is complete, what is to be done is done, there is no more of this sort of existence!"

A third important arrangement of the path is in terms of the so-called thirty-seven limbs, or factors, of enlightenment, whose practice the Buddha enjoins on his fol-

lowers in the Mahāparinibbāna Sutta of the Dīgha Nikāya.[99] The thirty-seven factors are: the four mindfulnesses (of body, feelings, thoughts and mental events); four exertions (in preventing non-arisen evil from arising, eliminating evil that has arisen, developing good that has not been developed, and maintaining good that has been developed); four powers (of will, thought, energy and investigation); five faculties (faith, energy, mindfulness, concentration and wisdom); five strengths (identical to the faculties, only intensified); seven factors, or qualities, of enlightenment (mindfulness, discrimination, energy, joy, tranquillity, concentration and equanimity); and, finally, again, the eightfold path.[100]

There are other path-arrangements besides these, some simpler, some more complex, but the basic thrust of all of them is well summarized by Warder:

> We might try to summarize the whole programme as follows, though there is no Tripiṭaka authority for this and the impression grows on the student that all the factors are to be cultivated together rather than serially, forming as it were a fugue in which a dozen different subjects combine in a tremendous crescendo leading up to enlightenment. A student who has a certain amount of confidence in the doctrine equips himself with the theory of the Four Truths. Having right intention and some understanding he conforms to virtue and practices discrimination of principles. He concentrates his will, thought, energy and investigations and so increases his self-possession and goes on to practice concentration, developing joy in this practice and tranquillity of body and thought, so that his meditations bring him to equanimity. Then his understanding can exercise its full potentiality and he should be able to attain enlightenment, to verify in his own ex-

perience, understand in their true nature, the Four Truths. 101

However many the twists and turns on the path, however varied the maps of it may be in the *nikāyas*, there is a way-station that divides the path into two fundamental, successive stages: the point at which the disciple becomes an *ariya* (S. *ārya*), a "noble" or "holy" being. Any being who has not yet become an *ariya* still is subject to uncontrolled rebirth in saṃsāra; once he becomes an *ariya*, a being no longer is subject to rebirth in any of the three lower realms (as a hell-being, hungry ghost or animal) and is assured of eventual enlightenment. At least one important distinction between a non-*ariya* and and an *ariya* is that the former does not understand, as they really are, the Four Noble Truths, while the latter does.[102] Though the term *ariya* is not always used for them in the *nikāyas*, there exist four types of beings assured of enlightenment because of, e.g., their comprehension of the Four Noble Truths or their destruction of the three types of ignorance (belief in a self, disbelief in karma, and belief in the efficacy of ritual). They are: the Streamwinner (*sotāpanno*), who will never again be born in the lower realms, and is assured of eventual enlightenment;[103] the Once-returner (*sakadāgāmin*), who by virtue of his further reduction of evil propensities will attain enlightenment in his next rebirth; the Non-returner (*anāgāmin*), who through fur-

ther refinement will pass at death to a heavenly rebirth, whence, without returning to earth, he will pass directly into nibbāna; and the Arahant, who has entirely eradicated his contaminants, is liberated, and at death will pass into parinibbāna.[104]

Just as disciples are divided into ariyan and non-ariyan, and ariyas into four types, so Arahants, those who have attained the cessation of saṃsāric suffering, admit of various types, depending on how many of the six superknowledges (the abhiññā: retrocognition of past lives, clairvoyance of the way beings take birth, knowledge of the destruction of the contaminants, magic power, clairaudience and telepathy) they may have possessed, or whether they were liberated only through wisdom (paññāvimutta) or through wisdom conjoined with ascent through some or all of the jhānas (ubhatobhāgavimutta). The minimum qualification for an Arahant was his attainment of the knowledge of the destruction of the contaminants.[105] Any ariya who attained this knowledge could be considered an Arahant, and therefore to know reality face-to-face,[106] and to be qualified to utter one of the "victory formulas" that sum up his transcendence of the world and its sufferings.[107]

Arahants are described in the nikāyas as having any number of qualities; they are, e.g., happy, mightily heroic, godlike, praiseworthy, free of craving, unspotted, the

best of the world's beings, etc.,[108] yet what is particularly important about them is the simple fact that they have attained nibbāna. Nibbāna has, of course, itself been the subject of a great deal of discussion and debate. Western scholars have been particularly concerned to determine whether it represents an utter cessation of consciousness or does, in fact, have "positive" qualities, such as knowledge, bliss, etc. The problem has been compounded by the fact that the Buddha made it clear that nibbāna was a sublime and difficult topic; among the questions he left unanswered was whether or not a Tathāgata exists after death. Nibbāna is generally divisible into nibbāna with and without remainder. Nibbāna with remainder is the state attained by one who still has a physical body, e.g., the Buddha after his attainment of enlightenment at Uruvelā; nibbāna without remainder is the state attained at the end of one's last physical existence. There is some question about how much "positive" content nibbāna without remainder may have, for, according to the Theravādin tradition, once the Buddha has passed away, he no longer affects the world. Still, there is no indication that the "content" of the two nibbānas differs in the least, and we probably are safe in agreeing with Francis Cook that

> A careful reading of canonical literature reveals nirvāṇa not as the extinction of the psychophysical being, but rather the extinction of the factors which are conducive to suffering--greed, hatred, and ignorance. Nir-

> vāṇa as cessation or extinction (nirodha) is better construed as the cessation of turmoil in one's life, rather than of life itself....Negative interpretations of the Buddhist summum bonum frequently overlook the cognitive elements in it. It is also wisdom and knowledge, the attainment of truth. 109

In characterizing the various types of Arahants, we omitted one: the Buddha himself. In the nikāyas he is accounted the Arahant supreme, possessing all six superknowledges as well as incomparable teaching ability. As a Tathāgata, who who has "thus gone" beyond suffering, he often is credited with four confidences and ten powers. The four confidences are his certainty that he has attained enlightenment, that the defilements have been destroyed, that obstacles to liberation have been identified, and that the path that does bear fruit has been proclaimed. The ten powers are (1) a knowledge of things as they are or are not, (2) a knowledge of the particular results of particular karmas, (3) knowledge of the paths leading to various attainments, (4) knowledge of the way the world exists, (5) knowledge of the individual inclinations of disciples, (6) knowledge of the superhuman attainments of other beings, (7) knowledge of the purity, impurity and efforts of those who strive for freedom, (8) retrocognition of his own past existences, (9) clairvoyant vision of the way in which beings take saṃsāric rebirth and (10) knowledge of the destruction of the contaminants.[110] These confidences and powers usually, but not exclusively, are attributed to the

Buddha; there is no reason in principle why they could not also be possessed by Arahants. Indeed, in the nikāyas, the only quality separating the Buddha's attainment from that of the most accomplished Arahants (those with all six superknowledges and an attainment rooted in both wisdom and the jhānas) is his ability as a teacher. In terms of spiritual attainment, they are identical.

In the later Theravādin tradition--not to mention in the Mahāyāna--a gulf began to open between the attainments attributed to Arahants and those attributed to the Buddha. Most notably, the Buddha came to be regarded as omniscient. He had passed away, so his newly-attributed attainment could not be challenged. Arahants, on the other hand, were available for observation, and some people certainly found reason to doubt that they were omnisicient--as evidenced in such early polemical texts as the Kathāvatthu. The nikāyas themselves, as Jayatilleke, Warder, and others have persuasively argued, give no indication that the Buddha claimed omniscience. Jayatilleke makes a number of important points in this regard: (1) in lists of the Buddha's epithets found in Pāli literature, he is described neither as omniscient (sabaññū) nor all-seeing (sabba-dassāvi) "until the very latest stratum in the Pāli canon and that is even after most of the books of the Abhidhamma had been completed";[111] (2) there are a number of places in the nikāyas where the

Buddha ridicules the ascription of omniscience either to a divine being, like Brahmā, who is said not to know some things that the Buddha knows,[112] or to a human teacher, like the Nigaṇṭha Nāgataputta, who "is criticized on the grounds that his lack of omniscience would be evident from his actions. For instance, he enters an empty house and receives no alms, a dog bites him, he meets a fierce elephant, horse or bull, has to ask for the names of people, of villages or hamlets to find his way";[113] (3) the Buddha claims an infinite knowledge of past rebirths, but claims to know of the future chiefly the fact that this is his final rebirth;[114] and (4) in the Tevijjavaccagotta Sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya, the Buddha specifically disclaims simultaneous knowledge of all events of all times, when he says that "those who say that the recluse Gautama is omniscient and all-seeing and professes to have infinite knowledge and insight, which is constantly and at all times present to him...are not reporting him properly and misrepresent him (as claiming) what is false and untrue."[115]

In the same Tevijjavaccagotta Sutta, the Buddha claims for himself merely the three knowledges (tevijja): retrocognition, clairvoyance and knowledge of the destruction of the contaminants. The third may be the minimal requirement for the attainment of liberation, but the other two are important, too, for, as we shall see, they serve as the ba-

sis for direct empirical verification of such elements of the Buddhist world-view as rebirth and karma. The knowledge of the destruction of the contaminants, of course, will serve as direct empirical verification of the reality of the possibility of liberation. In principle, the Buddha will claim, each element of the saṃsāra-karma-mokṣa complex is open to verification.

3. Notions of evidence in the nikāyas

Having examined the background out of which the Buddha's quest arose and the sorts of attainments admitted to be possible by the Pāli *nikāyas*, we must try to determine from the *nikāyas* what sources of knowledge were considered to offer good evidence for the truth of a belief or proposition. Once the *nikāyas*' notion of evidence has been clarified, we will be ready actually to examine implicit or explicit arguments for the possibility of enlightenment that are scattered throughout the *nikāyas* and certain later Pāli works.

In general, the Buddha of the *nikāyas* seems adamant in his assertion that any proposition must be open to test and verification, and that this requirement must be met by his own teachings as well as those of others. This attitude is admirably summarized in a verse cited frequently in the Tibetan tradition, which, although not traceable to the *nikā-*

yas, embodies their spirit: "Just as they would (test) gold by burning, cutting and rubbing, so should monks or wise men accept my word when they have examined it well, and not because they respect me."[116] The locus classicus for discussions of evidence within the nikāyas themselves is the so-called "Kālāma sutta" of the Aṅguttara Nikāya, where the Buddha tells his listeners:

> "Be ye not misled by report or tradition or hearsay. Be not misled by proficiency in the collections, nor by mere logic or inference, nor after considering reasons, nor after reflection on and approval of some theory, nor because it fits becoming, nor out of respect for a recluse (who holds it). But, Kālāmas, when you know for yourselves: These things are profitable, they are blameless, they are praised by the intelligent: these things, when performed and undertaken, conduce to profit and happiness,--then, Kālāmas, do ye, having understood them, abide therein. 117

Basically, the Buddha tells the Kālāmas that neither testimony nor reason is a sufficient condition for the acceptance of a religious belief or proposition; only verification through personal experience is sufficient.

There are numerous other passages in the nikāyas where the Buddha rejects testimony as sufficient evidence. In the Tevijja Sutta of the Dīgha Nikāya, for instance, he maintains that, whether or not Brahmā actually exists, we cannot accept his existence merely on the say-so of brahmins who have not themselves directly experienced Brahmā's reality.[118] Similarly, in the Caṅkī Sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya,[119] the Buddha cautions that traditions of which one

has heard testimony may or may not in fact be true and, quite independently of their truth or falsity, they may or may not be properly remembered and transmitted.[120] Indeed, the *sutta* notes, the objects of one's faith, inclinations, trust based on reputation, appreciation, and intellectual enthusiasm, all can be either true or false, and none of these mental attitudes is sufficient to guarantee the truth of its object. The appropriate attitude to take toward testimony about a tradition allegedly based on revelation is simply to report that one has heard thus-and-such said. As Jayatilleke points out, the use of the phrase *evam me sutam* ("thus I have heard") at the beginning of a *sutta* preserves for accounts of the Buddha's teaching the same "non-dogmatic" attitude that should be brought to any teachings. Further, Jayatilleke notes, the *evam me sutam* is uttered by Ānanda, not the Buddha--the latter never claims that his teachings are based on the testimony of another.[121] Faith, it hardly need be added, is a criterion of acceptance that depends on testimony, and often is influenced by considerations such as the charisma or reputation of the person giving the testimony, and so cannot be considered a sufficient basis for accepting a proposition, either.

Jayatilleke has concluded, from a number of different passages in the *nikāyas* where an opponent is criticized for

committing a logical blunder, that "there was a conception of valid and invalid reasoning at this time."[122] Furthermore, the use of reasoning in arguments was not entirely to be condemned. The term takka ("reason"), Jayatilleke believes, meant not just mere sophistry, but, more positively, it was "used primarily to denote the reasoning that was employed to construct and defend metaphysical theories."[123] Certainly the Buddha would not have believed his own theories irrational or utterly unsusceptible to discussion--he believed his philosophy to be coherent. At the same time, however, his assertion of the limitations of reason was just as pronounced as his distrust of testimony. The Sandaka Sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya, for instance, asserts that rational coherence never is a sufficient guarantee of truth, for the premises on which reasoning is based may be false, and the rational conclusions about states-of-affairs may or may not be borne out by empirical tests.[124] As Jayatilleke puts it,

> ...the truth or falsity of a theory in relation to fact cannot be judged by the consistency of its reasoning, for even a well-reasoned theory may be false in the light of contingent facts and an ill-reasoned theory true. The soundness of the reasoning is no guarantee of truth in the same way in which (as it was said) what was accepted on the best authority may be false. 125

Among the characteristics of the truths discovered by the Buddha is the fact that they are "not to be grasped merely by reasoning,"[126] and that the Buddha has come to them not

merely on the basis of his own reasoning and invention.[127] In short, according to Jayatilleke,

> ...nothing in the Nikāyas suggests that any doctrines were taught or were considered to follow from premisses which were held to be true in the _a priori_ sense. On the contrary, we always find the Buddha recommending doctrines which are claimed to be true in an empirically or experientially verifiable sense. 128

The sorts of evidence that the Buddha accepts and rejects are made quite explicit in the _Sangārava Sutta_ of the _Majjhima Nikāya_, where recluses and brahmins are said to be of three kinds: traditionalists (_anussavikā_), who base their religious assertions on the Vedas; rationalists (_takkī_), who base their assertions on speculation and logic; and experientialists, who base their assertions on personal acquaintance with reality. The Buddha specifically identifies himself as belonging to the last category.[129] The Buddha is, then, an empiricist, but we must hasten to add that his definition of reliable empirical knowledge is broader than that of either ancient Indian materialists or modern positivists--who tend to limit the empirical to what can be ascertained by the senses--for he admits the potential reliability of extra-sensory perception. Cleansing of the mind is said to enable one to gain some or all of the six superknowledges,[130] and "it was probably believed that 'since the mind was clear and cleansed'...in this state, it was possible to have a clearer insight into the nature of things by means of this knowledge, than by normal per-

ception."[131] The insufficiency of normal perception is pointedly indicated in the Pāyāsi Sutta of the Dīgha Nikāya, where the positivist Pāyāsi denies the existence of past and future lives or a transmigrating individual substance on the basis of the fact that they cannot be measured, seen or otherwise confirmed by the senses. His argument is rejected on the grounds that the non-perception of a particular phenomenon does not assure its non-existence, and because some matters that are not susceptible to sensory observation can be confirmed through extra-sensory perception.[132] Indeed, it would seem from the importance accorded the six superknowledges that it is extra-sensory perception that is the most important type of perception, for it alone is capable of verifying or falsifying religious propositions.

At the same time as he recognized the potential validity of propositions based on extra-sensory perception--or "intuition," or "religious experience"--the Buddha was quite aware that, as George Mavrodes puts it, "an experience can have intentionality without having veridicality,"[133] or, that, in the words of Russell, "insight, untested and unsupported, is an insufficient guarantee of truth, in spite of the fact that much of the most important truth is first suggested by its means."[134] For example, in the Pāṭika Sutta of the Dīgha Nikāya, the Buddha rejects a

number of metaphysical views that are based on incomplete yogic perception.[135] In the _Brahmajāla Sutta_, he avers that many of the opinions he regards as false are based merely on personal sensations.[136] In the _Mahākammavibhanga Sutta_ of the _Majhhima Nikāya_ he notes that it is conceivable that a recluse or brahmin conclude on the basis of limited extra-sensory perception that, e.g., there is no future good result of good actions or evil result of evil actions. The Buddha holds that this inference is based on insufficient data, i.e., from incomplete extra-sensory abilities; the _fact_ of the experience is veridical, but the conclusions drawn from it are false,[137] because the superknowledge involved is not suffciently developed--undoubtedly because the mind has not been sufficiently purified. This sensitivity to the potential delusiveness of extra-sensory perception carried over into the Buddhist tradition itself, where the _Vinaya_ counts among the four most serious moral transgressions a false claim to spiritual attainment,[138] whether made from sincere but mistaken conviction or from baser motives; and the _Sutta Nipāta_ considers as the lowest outcaste a person with false pretenses to sainthood.[139]

In summary, then, although the _nikāyas_ do not contain a fully developed theory of authoritative cognition (_pramāṇa_), such as was developed in later Indian philosophy, they do reveal relatively clear epistemological likes and dis-

likes. Neither testimony nor a priori reasoning is considered sufficient evidence for accepting the truth of religious propositions; no proposition can be said to have been verified unless its truth has been personally experienced by the person making the claim. Sense-experience is insufficient grounds for verification of religious propositions. Extra-sensory perception--one, some or all of the six superknowledges--is necessary, but not even it is sufficient, for it admits of degrees, and a limited degree of extrasensory perception will provide the perceiver with limited data, on the basis of which false inferences can be drawn.

The Buddha of the nikāyas established rigorous standards for the verification of religious propositions. Now, at last, we may turn to some of the arguments for the possibility of enlightenment presented in the nikāyas and in such later Pāli works as the Kathāvatthu, Milindapañhā and Visuddhimagga, and examine the degree to which these standards were upheld, while considering the problems created by both the standards themselves and the arguments based on them.

4. The problem of testimony: charisma and faith in the Pāli tradition

We have seen the the Buddha of the nikāyas was, in effect, willing to make the assertion, "I know that enlight-

enment is possible, because I know that I have attained it." It also most certainly is the case that, as Kaufmann puts it, "Before I make up my mind whether I am to accept a statement that is introduced 'I know that,' I must ask myself about the speaker's notion of evidence."[140] We have investigated the Buddha's notion of evidence, and it seems to be a strict one, admitting neither testimony, faith, nor rational coherence as adequate evidence for the truth of a proposition; it does require personal empirical verification, but is cognizant at the same time of the problems inherent in both normal and extra-sensory empirical verification.

It is not entirely obvious, however, that these strict evidential standards are consistently maintained--a fact that should not surprise us, given the patchwork nature of--particularly--the *nikāyas*. Despite the Buddha's advice to the Kālāmas and others against accepting propositions merely on the basis of testimony from a speaker believed for one reason or another to be reliable, we find in the *nikāyas* indications that in some instances the Buddha's statements were to be accepted on precisely such grounds. In the *Vīmaṃsaka Sutta* of the *Majjhima Nikāya*, for instance, it is asserted that a test of the Tathāgata's attainment is the determination of whether he is, e.g., pure of eye and ear, not swayed by a desire for popularity,

fearless, and passionless. These inner qualities, in turn, are guaranteed by such outer qualities as the Tathāgata's kindness and his manner of speech.[141] The _Sekha Sutta_ of the _Majjhima_ expresses confidence in the fact that the Buddha is enlightened, that he has perfected morality, concentration and wisdom (in the form of the three knowledges). The grounds for confidence that the Buddha has perfected morality and concentration are said to be his conduct; the grounds for confidence that he has perfected wisdom are the great knowledge that he displays about all aspects of the cosmos.[142] In addition, the _nikāyas_ are full of instances where it is the Buddha's _manner_ that wins him a hearing, if not total acceptance--the first and most notable such instance being when he encounters his five ascetic companions again after his enlightenment.[143]

If these passages are not, exactly, an attempt at what might be called an "argument from fruits," they _are_ an indication that the Buddha's obvious charisma was regarded as in some way indicative of his attainment, and as--at the very least--being sufficient grounds to compel potential listeners to hearken to him. Now, the argument, from observed "fruits" to the validity of propositions being asserted by the person observed to be enjoying certain fruits, is fraught with difficulties, which might be summed up in the appropriate metaphorical spirit as like that of

comparing apples and oranges: the behavior of individuals and the truth of the propositions they assert are not logically or necessarily connected. Persons whose behavior is impeccable may very well entertain any number of false beliefs, while persons whose behavior is bizarre, objectionable, or even unremarkable, may assert great truths. Nor is charismatic behavior a guarantee of transcendent vision: not only are there charismatic, moral individuals who have never entertained the slightest religious notion; so too there are religious visionaries whose post-visionary behavior is far from exemplary--yet their "merely external" behavior is not held in any way to belie the authenticity of their visions. Kaufmann, with characteristic bluntness, says, "When we want to know if a man's beliefs are true or false, his kindness is irrelevant."[144] Smart points out that the argument from fruits is "very nearly circular," for "Fruits are clearly evaluated by reference to certain ideals and values (such as serenity and zeal) which may themselves derive their centrality from the shape of the religious tradition in question."[145] Donovan correctly observes that an appeal to "changes in personality" is an implicit use of a pragmatic criterion of truth and, quite simply, "the fact that a belief works does not show that it is a true belief."[146] Flew notes that charisma does not guarantee authority, and that one must have reasons for be-

lieving that an individual, regardless of his charisma, knows what he is talking about--one must, in short, have a rational way of checking his credentials.[147]

The *nikāyas* give ample evidence of an awareness of these sorts of problems. The *Cūḷāssapura Sutta* of the *Majjhima Nikāya* asserts that a śrāmaṇa is to be judged not by his external appearance, but by his inner attainment--by whether his actions and views are proper and by whether he has eliminated his defilements.[148] In the *Mahāsakuladayī Sutta* of the *Majjhima*, the Buddha is said to be respected for his outer habits, but to be revered far more for the quality of his inner attainments: his grasp of the Four Noble Truths, his mastery of the four mindfulnesses, his possession of the three knowledges, etc.[149]

It is, thus, recognized in the *nikāyas* that a change of personality or behavior is not a guarantee of inner attainment, so it is only the inner attainment itself that is a sufficient guarantee either of a claimed attainment or the truth of propositions based on inner attainment. The *Chabbisodhana Sutta* of the *Majjhima* says that a claim to liberation can be evaluated on the basis of whether the person making the claim is detached from sense-objects, understands selflessness, etc.;[150] and the *Nagaravindeyya Sutta* insists that one must honor only those śrāmaṇas that are inwardly free.[151]

It is, of course, notoriously difficult to judge another being's psychological states--let alone any alleged transcendent attainments--particularly if we have rejected the existence of any intrinsic connection between his behavior and his inner states. We are, thus, led directly to the problem of faith (saddhā): to what degree, how soon and on what grounds should one trust another's testimony as to his own attainment? We have seen[152] that faith, as one of the "five faculties," is counted among the thirty-seven limbs of enlightenment, and thus is an integral part of the Buddhist path. The cardinal item, the "perfection" of faith, is belief in the reality of the Tathāgata's enlightenment.[153] Other items, too, become articles of faith, such as the effectiveness of the pātimokka restraints on behavior,[154] the existence of deities that are evoked in retreat,[155] etc. Faith is, further, said to be the quality--the opposite of attachment--that seeks out what is virtuous and beneficial.[156] We might generally allow that the objects of faith are the Buddha's various attainments and the truths asserted on the basis of those attainments. Thus, one would have faith in the Four Noble Truths and their cosmological and philosophical presuppositions.

There is no question that, despite the Buddha's admonition against accepting a teacher or his doctrines on faith, faith *does* have some importance in the Pāli (and in-

deed every) Buddhist tradition. At the same time, it is clear that faith is never supposed to be granted blindly. On the basis of his analysis of the nikāyas, Jayatilleke finds faith used for at least three

> different stages and types of acceptance of a proposition or doctrine. The first (is) that of accepting for the purpose of testing, the stage in which one 'safeguards the truth'....The stage in which one reposes faith in a person after realizing that he (is) honest, unbiased and intelligent...is perhaps the second. The next stage is the one in which there (is) a partial and personal verification of the doctrine...and it is at this stage that one is said to have 'rational faith'. 157

Jayatilleke contends that those suttas belonging to what he considers the earliest stratum of the nikāyas take faith in the third sense, as confidence based on partial personal verification. He maintains that faith is something like "appreciation based on understanding,"[158] and that Miss M. Dasgupta's study of śraddhā and bhakti in Vedic literature shows that faith even in pre-Buddhistic literature conveyed not a sense of loving devotion, but "confidence, trust or belief based on a knowledge of truth."[159] This attitude toward faith is borne out by Buddhaghosa, who writes that faith always must be balanced by understanding, lest one have confidence "uncritically and groundlessly."[160]

It is not clear exactly how much "understanding" is required to justify the third kind of faith, but it certainly would involve knowledge that falls far short of complete verification, so an element of trust still would have

to be applied. Fundamentally, we can say with Jayatilleke that faith, in the nikāyas and beyond, is "the trust that is required to put to the test a certain philosophy of life by devoting one's entire being to living it every moment of one's life,"[161] the acceptance of a proposition for purposes of verification.[162] In a similar vein, Frits Staal notes that the demand that we generate some sort of faith is not a demand that we abandon a critical stance altogether; it is merely the admission that we cannot begin a religious search with a complete rationale, that some religious propositions will have to be accepted provisionally and later subjected to rational analysis.[163] The Apaṇṇaka Sutta adds an interesting wrinkle to the problem by offering a sort of Buddhist version of Pascal's Wager: the Buddha argues that belief in, e.g., karma and rebirth, is advantageous even where there is doubt, because belief is praised by the wise in this life and will result in happiness in future lives if, in fact, future lives exist; whereas disbelief is censured by the wise in this life, and will result in unhappiness in future lives if future lives exist.[164]

Jayatilleke points out that the term saddhā is most commonly used in the nikāyas as part of the phrase "having heard his doctrine, he acquired faith in the Tathāgata," and that faith "ultimately implies a belief in the state-

ments of the Buddha."[165] What basis does an intelligent, uncommitted person have for believing the Buddha's statements, e.g., the Four Noble Truths, even provisionally? Why should he listen to the Buddha rather than to one of the countless other teachers who vie for his interest and loyalty? If charisma is not necessarily indicative of inner attainment, and if inner attainment is impossible to evaluate directly for a beginner on the path, what kinds of evidence are available on the basis of which a decision might be made? Only two genuine alternatives seem left: rational analysis and direct empirical verification. Since direct empirical verification is possible only when one has followed the path to its conclusion, and since the question at issue is whether one ought to consider entering the path at all, the beginner will want to--in Flew's phrase--check the Buddha's credentials and find out if he knows what he is talking about, by testing his statements for rational coherence and conformity to such facts as his limited empirical powers have assured him are the case. It is, then, to what might broadly be considered "rational" arguments that we turn next.

5. The problem of reason: is dependent origination the Buddhist a priori?

We have seen above[166] that the Buddha of the *nikāyas* rejected *a priori* reasoning as a sufficient method of attaining truth. Unlike some "rationalists" (*takkī*) of his day, says Jayatilleke, he did not try "to evolve systems of deductive metaphysics on the basis of a few premisses, axioms and principles...considered self-evident or true *a priori*."[167] Indeed, although the Buddha does not entirely deny the efficacy of rational operations, he rejects any suggestion that his is a predominantly rationalistic system, going so far, in the *Mahāsīhanāda Sutta*, as to suggest that those who describe his system thus will be reborn in hell.[168] At the same time, however, we do find operating in Buddhism from its very earliest times a general principle whose discovery is considered to be the heart of the religion: dependent origination (P. *paṭīcca samuppāda*, S. *pratītya samutpāda*). Because it is considered to be empirically verifiable *a posteriori*, dependent origination is not, strictly speaking, an *a priori* concept; yet it is so important to the Buddha's gospel that it might be considered the axiom on which the whole system turns, the general principle from which all particular religious propositions can be deduced.

It is given general formulation at a number of differ-

ent places in the nikāyas. Most famous, perhaps, is its occurrence in the Mahāvagga of the Vinayapiṭaka, where Sāriputta and Moggallāna both are converted to the Dhamma on hearing Assaji's summary of the Buddha's teaching: "Of those phenomena produced by causes, the Tathāgata has pronounced the cause; and also their cessation--thus speaks the great recluse."[169] Even more skeletal is its formulation in the Mahātaṅhasankhaya Sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya: "This being,that occurs; from the arising of this, that arises; this not being, that does not occur; from the cessation of this, that ceases."[170] The "law" of dependent origination, then, is a law of causality, an assertion of the fact that there are regular and predictable relations of cause and effect among phenomena in the universe. "It is evident," writes Jayatilleke, "that causation plays a central rôle in the Nikāyas. It is claimed to be the truth about the universe discovered by the Buddha in the final stage of his enlightenment (Ud. I,2; Vin. I,i,2)."[171] Causality is said in the Paccaya Sutta of the Saṃyutta Nikāya to possess four characteristics, translated by David Kalupahana as objectivity (tathatā), necessity (avitathatā), invariability (anaññathatā) and conditionality (idappaccayatā).[172] It is said that "He who sees dependent origination sees the Dhamma, and he who sees the Dhamma sees dependent origination,"[173] and that a monk who sees the Dham-

ma sees the Buddha.[174] "These two statements," as Kalupahana notes, "are combined in the Ārya-śālistamba-sūtra, a later composition based on the material found in the early discourses, to give the simple equation: causality = dhamma = Buddha."[175] The Buddha, then, according to the Sangīti Sutta of the Dīgha Nikāya, has a single doctrine: that all things and beings are subject to causes and conditions.[176]

Kalupahana finds the nikāyas full of passages that apply the general law of dependent origination to various types of phenomena, and

> As later scholiasts grouped them, there are five main spheres or realms in which causality predominates: (I) physical (inorganic) order (utu-niyama), (2) physical (organic) order (bija-niyama), (3) psychological order (citta-niyama), (4) moral order (kamma-niyama), and (5) ideal spiritual order (dhamma-niyama).
> These five groups appear to be so all-inclusive that nothing in experience is excluded. In short, everything in this universe comes within the framework of causality. 177

That causality applies to the first two orders, few would dispute, for observation of the organic and inorganic worlds is relatively easy. The latter three orders--the more important--are less unambiguously causal. Introspection assures us of a certain regularity in the psychological realm, but how thoroughgoing this regularity is is problematic. The regularity of the moral and spiritual orders is in itself not at all obvious, and it rests in large part on the problematic regularity of the psychological realm. In any case, Kalupahana claims that

> The Buddha was probably the first Indian philosopher to explain the process of both bondage...and freedom...or purity..., in terms of causation. The process of bondage is a natural causal happening..., in the same way as is the process of freedom. 178

Since bondage and freedom are the Buddha's central concerns, his application of the law of dependent origination to those two facets of existence is the most significant.

Generally speaking, the application of the law of dependent origination to the facts of bondage and freedom (the truths of suffering and cessation) entails an exposition of the truths of origination and path. The most familiar exposition of the truth of origination is in terms of what are called the "twelve links" of dependent origination, which describe the process whereby beings move from rebirth to rebirth within the unsatisfactory confines of saṃsāra: (1) ignorance about reality conditions (2) karmic complexes (saṃskāras), which ripen as (3) consciousness in a particular rebirth. Consciousness is associated with a body as (4) name-and-form, which, in turn, possesses (5) six organs for conveying sensations and thoughts. The existence of these organs assures (6) contact with the external world, which invariably generates pleasant, painful or indifferent (7) feelings. The existence of various feelings leads to a (8) craving for their perpetuation or removal, which, in turn, produces (9) grasping after particular states. At death-time, grasping after a particular type of

body or form of existence leads to one's (10) becoming that which one has grasped for. Becoming assures (11) birth, and on birth inevitably follow (12) aging and death, our fundamental ignorance of the nature of which sets the cycle into motion once again.[179]

The path to the cessation of this dependently originated suffering sometimes is described simply in terms of the undoing of these links. The most important links for the perpetuation of the saṃsāric process are number 1, ignorance, and number 8, craving. Their elimination is said to lead to the elimination of the unfortunate results that each entails, and thus to the supreme happiness of liberation. The path not only can be described in negative terms, i.e., as the elimination of the factors that condition saṃsāric becoming, but also positively, as, e.g., the perfection of morality, concentration and wisdom, or of the thirty-seven limbs of enlightenment. However it is described, the important point about the path is that--like the origination of suffering--it is causal. The <u>Bhūmija Sutta</u> of the <u>Majjhima Nikāya</u>, for instance, claims that a disciple who has entered the eightfold path will find that desire and craving cannot prevent him from ultimately reaching his goal, because in following the path he is cultivating the <u>causes</u> of the effect that is liberation.[180] The Buddha claims elsewhere that he has won enlightenment by following

a logical progression of practices, by systematic (yoniso) thought and effort.[181]

The fundamental religious application of the law of dependent origination, then, is the proposition that suffering has causes and conditions, and that the elimination of these causes and conditions (through the process known as the path) leads naturally to the elimination of suffering, which is attainment of the highest good, nibbāna.[182] The most important presupposition of this assertion is the claim that dependent origination, or causality, is, in fact, a law that applies to the moral-psychological-spiritual realm, and that it applies in just the way the Buddha has described. As important as the presupposition is, it is equally problematic.

In the first place, a sceptic might argue that actions and mental qualities cannot be as easily "quantified" as can physical events, and that in bringing them under a law that unquestionably is generally valid regarding external physical phenomena, the Buddhist may be committing a category mistake. There ceratinly is a tendency throughout the history of Buddhist thought atomistically to consider as dharmas phenomena that Western philosophers would tend to separate into very different categories, e.g., matter and ignorance, and--despite the linguistic sophistication found both in places in the nikāyas and in Mādhyamika philosophy

in general--Buddhists do not seem always carefully to have distinguished those "first-order" words that name things from those words that name activities, states of being, attitudes or concepts--all of which might be called "second-order," as they are predications regarding first-order words. The twelve links of dependent origination, for instance, include a bewildering variety of different _types_ of phenomena. There are general mental attributes, such as ignorance; specific emotional attitudes, such as craving and grasping; the apparently immaterial phenomenon known as consciousness; observable aspects of the organism, such as sense-organs; feelings, which may be physical or emotional; universal processes, like becoming; specific events like birth and death; human processes, such as aging; and--perhaps most mysterious of all--those unseen factors known as karmic complexes. It is not entirely clear that phenomena belonging to such different categories can, in fact, form a coherent and predictable causal chain.

Possible categorial objections aside, the statement of a general causal law--i.e., if _x_, then _y_; if no _x_, then no _y_--merely assures us that causality is a generally valid description of the operation of the universe. It does _not_ allow us to deduce that a particular _x_ is the cause of a particular _y_. From the mere fact of dependent origination, for instance, it does not necessarily follow that ignorance

is the cause of saṃsāra or that the Buddhist path leads to the transcendence of saṃsāra. The factors involved in the processes of saṃsāra and the path may (or may not) be susceptible of causal analysis on the basis of the law of dependent origination, but that the factors interact in the *way* asserted by the Buddha, with the results described by him is *not* guaranteed by the general law. His descriptions are problematic at best, and must ultimately be subject to checking through observation and inferences grounded in observation, for these are the means by which we determine which specific causal relationships are possible and which are not--and the Buddhist will, after all, admit that some cause-effect relationships are possible and some are not, for to deny this fact is to open the door to a causal anarchy quite opposed to the orderliness the Buddhist wishes to assert for religious and all other phenomena.

Furthermore, the manner of the operation of moral causality must be regarded as uncertain, because the assignment of "positive" or "negative" value to particular karmas not only must be taken in part on faith, but may also be suspected of reflecting particular cultural values rather than any universally recognized moral principles. Indeed, it is open to question whether there *are* such principles; many nowadays would consider morality simply to be a set of conventions, without transcendental or cosmological

warrant. As Russell puts it, "Good and bad, and even the higher good that mysticism finds everywhere, are reflections of our own emotions on other things, not part of the substance of things as they are in themselves."[183] Few sceptics would deny that our acts of body, speech and mind have some effect on us; what they may doubt is that the effects are inevitable and systematic, and that actions are valued precisely as they are in the Buddhist scheme of things. The problems raised by the concept of karma will be further explored in Chapter 3, section 1.

Furthermore, even if it be granted for the sake of argument that a universal moral law does exist, there remains some question whether human beings have sufficient control over their relationship to that law such that they can utterly eliminate all undesirable states of mind and abide eternally in undecaying happiness. Not only is there no ordinary empirical evidence that <u>any</u> human being has attained complete control of all psychological causal factors, let alone attained some inner state of necessarily eternal and unruffled tranquility, but, further, it is the observation of disciplines as varied as quantum mechanics, microbiology and genetics that many natural processes, particularly on the microscopic level, are unpredictable, so the very universality of regular causal relations is, at least in some spheres, called into question. This unpredictability (par-

ticularly at the subatomic level explored by quantum mechanics) is not such that it could be eliminated by further scientific advances, such as the formulation of a unified field theory--it is inherent in the way things present themselves to our observation. Even if one were to posit an omniscient consciousness that transcended the limitations of ordinary observation and could predict every roll of the dice or the path of every electron, that consciousness would be so far from anything that human beings, even with scientific instruments and calculations, can now approximate, that the sceptic's case--where ordinary empirical evidence is concerned--would be threatened only in principle.

Thus, the fact and manner of the applicability of the law of dependent origination to the psychological, moral and spiritual orders is not vouchsafed by ordinary empirical observation. Given that it is not self-evident that, e.g., karma and past and future lives exist, or that there is a series of actions (the path) whose logical outcome is transcendence of suffering, the Buddhist must appeal either to inference that is ultimately rooted in ordinary empirical observation or to some sort of extraordinary experience. The Buddha of the nikāyas, as we have seen, was rather suspicious of the range of reasoning employed in his day, and it is not until the time of Dharmakīrti, when Bud-

dhist epistemology and logic have fully flowered, that we find Buddhists attempting to argue such problems as rebirth and the possibility of enlightenment according to strict rules of inference. In the nikāyas, the primary means for verifying the applicability of dependent origination to bondage and freedom, for verifying that the Buddha's teaching is reasonable and the Four Noble Truths are true, is direct personal experience, which only can be gained if one follows the spiritual instructions handed down by the Buddha, and treads the Buddhist path.

So, although the Buddha's charisma and the general reasonableness of his central concept, dependent origination, may be attractive features, they are by no means a guarantee of the truth of the religious propositions he asserts. These, the nikāyas clearly indicate, only can be verified by accepting the Dhamma's invitation to "come and see" (ehi passako), to validate religious statements through religious experience.

6. "Ehi passako": the argument from experience

The most important and oft-stressed argument for the possibility of enlightenment and other truths asserted by the Buddha is the argument from experience, i.e., from the fact that by hearkening to the Dhamma's invitation to "come and see" (ehi passako) one will be able to verify for one-

self the truth of the Buddha's teaching, for by following the path, one will attain the same sorts of superknowledges as he did, e.g., retrocognition, clairvoyance and knowledge of the destruction of the contaminants. Thereby, one will understand that karma and past and future lives exist and that a cessation of the suffering of saṃsāra is possible. One will, in short, as Ergardt puts it, move from a knowledge of Buddhist truths by description to a knowledge of Buddhist truths by acquaintance.[184]

Jayatilleke has described the Buddha's religious propositions as hypotheses to be accepted provisionally for the purpose of verification.[185] His choice of language is quite deliberately scientific, for it is his contention that there is an analogy between the procedures of science and religion, with the undertaking of a religious practice serving the verification of religious hypotheses in the same way that experiments serve to verify scientific hypotheses. Jayatilleke is not alone in regarding the path as a sort of scientific experiment. Staal contends that mystical experience, like scientific, is <u>repeatable</u>, and therefore fundamentally empirical and "scientific" in the broad sense of the term.[186] Staal is echoed by Douglas Burns, who notes that "one who pursues Buddhist mental development to its maximum degree can have experiential certainty of theoretical concepts."[187] The analogy seems at first to be an

attractive one, for the religious believer can use language very similar to that of a scientist when attempting to persuade a listener of the truth of his hypothesis. "All right," he may say, "you don't believe that what I say is true, because it isn't immediately evident. There are, however, established procedures for checking whether my statements are true. If you follow these procedures correctly, you will be able to see for yourself whether or not what I assert is the case."

We have, of course, seen above that direct empirical verification was the procedure employed by the Buddha and the one he enjoined on his followers. Again and again he describes how he travelled the path and reached a point where, under the pipal tree in Uruvelā, he gained complete retrocognition, and thereby confirmation of the existence and details of his own past lives; complete clairvoyance, and thereby confirmation of the operation of karma throughout the cosmos in the present; and, most importantly, knowledge of the destruction of the contaminants, and thereby confirmation that he was delivered from saṃsāra, that he was liberated, and that liberation thus was both possible and actual. The Dhamma that the Buddha proceeded then to teach simply was an invitation to others to repeat the procedure that he had discovered, and thereby enjoy the same result. Again, the _nikāyas_ are full of instances in which

disciples _do_ "repeat the Buddha's experiment" and gain the same results as he had. Kassapa, for instance, is said to have travelled the path, realized the nature of reality, and to be in constant "face-to-face" contact with that reality,[188] just as the Buddha is, just as any Arahant is. Dīghanakha is reported in his eponymous _sutta_ to have independently confirmed the truth of the law of dependent origination in all its applications.[189] An enlightened nun reports in the _Therīgāthā_ that, simply, "For me the Buddha's words had come to pass."[190] The implicit Buddhist argument is: the Buddha discovered certain truths about the universe, and these have been confirmed by disciples who painstakingly followed the same procedures as he did. You too, O seeker, may know the Buddha's truths to be true by following the path he has indicated. This argument, compelling as it first seems, contains certain problems, some of which Buddhists have anticipated, others of which, perhaps, they have not.

We have already seen that the Buddha recognized that even extra-sensory perception was subject to limitations and error. Not only is it possible to draw incorrect inferences on the basis of incomplete extra-sensory perception; it also is possible to draw _correct_ inferences on the basis of incomplete experience. It is entirely possible, then, that Kassapa, or Dīghanakha, or the _therī_ has not, in fact,

really experienced what he or she claims to have experienced, even though the truths that he or she asserts are accurate models of what is asserted on the basis of a complete and satisfactory experience. How, then, are claims to enlightenment to be tested, given that the mere statement of true propositions is insufficient evidence that the propositions have been verified by direct experience? During the Buddha's lifetime, he was said directly to verify the attainments of others through telepathy, one of his six superknowledges. The question of who could verify the Buddha's knowledge of another's attainment does not seem to have been asked. One could not maintain that the Buddha's telepathy was confirmed by another Arahant, because it is precisely the attainment of other "Arahants" that is in question. As far as the attainments of others went, the Buddha's knowledge, it seems, was considered self-validating, the "here" where all experiential bucks stopped.

The Buddha's death should not, theoretically, have created any great problems, for it was the general principle that "He who sees can see another seer."[191] Mogallāna, whose attainment has been confirmed by the Buddha, himself realizes that the five hundred Arahants with whom he is staying at Rājagaha are liberated and void of the seeds of any future rebirths.[192] It should have followed, then, that an unbroken line of spiritual authority descended di-

rectly from the Buddha, allowing in every case the determination of claims to spiritual attainment. Even a contemporary--if his attainment has been vouchsafed by an Arahant whose attainment in turn was vouchsafed by another Arahant, and so forth all the way back to the Buddha himself--should be able to claim certainty on the dual grounds that he has seen the truth for himself and his experience has been assured by another whose attainment is assured.[193] In fact, the historical record, particularly as embodied in such texts as the Kathāvatthu, indicates that serious problems did arise in the generations following the Buddha, and that it became more and more difficult to distinguish genuine claimants to enlightenment from spurious ones. It is possible that with the passage of time and the disappearance of those who had been associated with the Buddha, the intensity of practice may have waned, thus providing fewer genuine Arahants who could, in turn, judge others. The Buddha had foreseen this possibility, and instructed that after his death it would be possible to test claims to attainment by their conformity with what he had taught. Unfortunately, this criterion ignores the recognition, expressed elsewhere in the nikāyas, that assertion of true statements does not guarantee that one has directly verified them. Furthermore, it fails to foresee the arising of doctrinal disputes. If there is dispute as to what the Bud-

dha actually taught, it is difficult to confirm transcendent experiences by recourse to the body of his teaching. Thus, a monk who may, in fact, have been an Arahant might not be accepted as a good judge of the attainment of another because his doctrine conflicted with that of others, and the others, by definition, would have to doubt that he was actually an Arahant. In orthodox modern Theravāda, the question has become academic, because it is not believed that there presently exist any Arahants. There no longer is anyone alive who could confirm the claim of another to Arahantship, but since Arahantship is impossible in principle in this era, any claimant is bound to be false.

In general, the idea that the attainment of one person is verified by the superknowledge of another does not seem satisfactory. In the first place, the notion seems doomed either to circularity or infinite regress. In the case of the Buddha, as we have seen, his experience is said to have been verified by disciples who had identical experiences; yet only the Buddha, as the pioneer of the path, could confirm that they had had identical experiences. The Buddha's attainment is confirmed by his disciples, but they must be confirmed by him; thus the circle. If one simply asserts that an Arahant is confirmed by another Arahant, then one must ask who will confirm the confirmer, and so on, in infinite regress. If one maintains that the regress is not

infinite, but ends with the Buddha, then we are faced with the circularity noted above--or with the idea that the Buddha's experience is self-confirming, which is rather dogmatic. If the confirmation of an Arahant by another Arahant is problematic, then how much more so the confirmation of an Arahant by an ordinary person--particularly where differing visions of reality may be asserted by different claimants to "supreme insight"!

It is not, then, after all, so obvious that the analogy between a religious path and a scientific experiment is a good one. Donald Evans, for one, challenges the comparison, holding that there are three important ways in which religious assertions are unscientific: (1) they are not logically neutral, i.e., value-free; (2) they are not comprehensible impersonally and (3) they are not testable by *inter*subjective observation.[194]

The Buddhist may readily grant that religious experience is not intersubjectively verifiable in the way that ordinary empirical observations are. He may, however, maintain that Buddhism's claim to be scientific is not thereby undermined, for the "subjective" knowledge gained at the culmination of the Buddhist path *is* an impersonal knowledge--not in the sense that Buddhism does not admit the existence of a substantial "person," which of course it does not--but in the sense that the Buddhist undertakes his

search for truth without presuppositions as to the truth or falsity of the religious hypotheses he is investigating. Therefore, his search is "logically neutral" and "impersonal," wherefore his observations should be "objective" and trustworthy.

This assertion entails certain problems, too. The Buddhist is appealing to the notion that it is possible somehow to have impersonal or value-free experiences which, because of their neutrality, beoome more reliable as guides to truth. Unfortunately, it is difficult to maintain that there is <u>any</u> experience that is not informed by personal projections and expectations. Scientists continually have to check their procedures to assure that they are not "rigging" their observations to conform with their hypotheses. If projection and expectation create methodological problems in the realm of the intersubjectively observable, how many more problems must they create in the nonintersubjective realm of religious and other "private" experiences! Steven Katz makes the point that there is not and cannot be any such thing as a "pure" experience. Experience, by definition, is experience of something, and is "had" by a human being who lives in a particular social milieu and entertains particular hopes and fears. All experiences are "mediated" by what we already are, whether through nature, nurture or self-modification. In the case of religion, it

is true that beliefs sometimes are shaped by experience, but it equally is the case that beliefs--or even "hypotheses"--help shape experience.[195] As Katz notes later,

> To say, "Smith experiences *x*" is...to recognize that this experience is in part dependent on what *x* is. But here is the rub--this recognition also requires the additional awareness of the complexity of the situation in that what "*x* is" is itself, at least partly, determined by a contextual consciousness. 196

Peter Moore agrees that there is no "pure" experience, and

> If an experience is not conditioned by one set of cultural factors then it will be conditioned by another, while if it were (or could be) free of all cultural conditioning whatsoever it might not be 'pure' so much as shapeless and undeveloped. In such a case, moreover, the subject of the experience would not only lack the means to communicate his experience coherently to others, but also find it difficult to represent it, reflexively or retrospectively, to his own understanding. 197

The specific feature that Moore finds informing most religious experience is religious doctrine, and

> ...to ignore the doctrinal elements...is to risk ignoring important features of the experience itself. For there is a complex interplay between experience and doctrine, both at the external level where doctrine affects the description of an experience, and at the internal level where doctrine may affect the substance of the experience itself. 198

These observations seem pertinent to Buddhism. Try as he may to engage in a disinterested and ethically neutral search for truth, a Buddhist who places himself on the path *already* has equipped himself with certain doctrinal formulas and certain sets of expectations about what experiences may be his. The very fact that he is undertaking a reli-

gious search indicates that certain sets of problems interest him, e.g., the "ultimate" nature of reality, suffering, transcendence. To be sincerely interested in religious problems--particularly to the point of actually embarking on a religious path--is already to assume that a certain general way of thinking and talking about the world is valid. Once this is accepted, one is open to the possibility that a specific instance of the religious way of thinking about the world may itself be valid. If one bothers actually to tread a Buddhist path, one presumably is impressed enough by the specifically Buddhist way of formulating religious problems that one has considered it worth further investigation. There is a paradox, however, for the more specific becomes one's religious practice, the more "committed" one necessarily becomes to specific doctrines and procedures, and the greater become the chances that one's experience will conform to the doctrines one has learned.

It might be argued that the Buddha, at least, did not let doctrine color his experience, because his doctrine only was "discovered" at the culmination of his experience. This is not entirely accurate. While it is true that the Buddha did find new ways to formulate religious doctrines, we have already seen that his search for truth was carried out within the context of the way religious problems generally were posed in his day, i.e., in terms of the probable

existence of saṃsāra and mokṣa and the search for an explanation of the functioning of the former and the way to attain the latter. His experience, then, was not ethically neutral, disinterested or pure, for it was informed by a search whose general parameters already were established. If the Buddha's experience inevitably was colored by his social and religious milieu, if not by specific doctrines, then how much more liable to coloration must be the experience of a disciple of the Buddha, who is seeking simply to reproduce an experience asserted to be complete and unsurpassable! The fact simply is that Buddhism is a gospel that makes essential claims about the way things are, and that it cannot help but provide someone who is investigating it with certain assumptions and categories that are likely to shape supposedly "neutral" confirming experience. It is, of course, true that science also provides assumptions and procedures that an experimenter is expected to follow, but there is a significant difference of degree--if not kind--between scientific assumptions and procedures, which have, over the years, been purged as thoroughly as possible of value-coloration in an attempt to determine only the facts, and religious assumptions and procedures, which invariably are oriented precisely toward the discovery of a supreme value, and ususally are interested only in facts that may tend to contribute to the attainment of that value.

The Buddhist may reply that science is just as value-oriented as religion, and that it is precisely "facts" that science values above all, to the point that cognition of any object not reducible to intersubjectively observable "facts" will simply not be considered "knowledge." Yet, much of what we know about the ordinary empirical world we know not through _a posteriori_ systematic checking but through direct, "intuitive" knowledge by acquaintance, and there is no reason to doubt that this type of knowing can give us information about the nonintersubjectively observable world described by religion, too. Furthermore, the Buddhist may add, the fact that Buddhists who have followed path-procedures conscientiously find themselves in agreement with the doctrines espoused by their teachers shows that religious propositions can be and have been verified empirically--even if we must expand our definition of the empirical to include phenomena cognized by extraordinary means. Does not, for example, Dīghanakha's independent confirmation of the truth of the law of dependent origination or the _therī_'s celebration of the fact that the Buddha's words had come to pass for her show that the Buddhist tradition is, in fact, full of such confirmations? Isn't it, as a _sutta_ rhetorically asks, remarkable how a master and a disciple of his who has travelled the path agree verbatim on the way in which reality is correctly described?[199]

The agreement of master and disciple _is_ remarkable. What is not so obvious, however, is that it is conclusive proof of the truth of the Buddha's religious assertions. Indeed, this agreement raises a number of difficult problems. First, as noted above, the fact that one undertakes a path presupposing particular problems and particular ways of structuring them makes it understandable--indeed, predictable--that the sorts of experiences one will have on the path will tend to be colored by and expressed in the language with which one has begun.

A second problem is that whatever the agreement abcut the "experienced" nature of reality within the Buddhist tradition (a point that is itself debatable, given the variety of doctrines that have gone under the name "Buddhist"), there are representatives of other religious traditions, e.g., Christian, or Hindu, or Islamic, who will claim that _their_ traditions _also_ contain systematic checking procedures, and that those who have employed those procedures have experientially confirmed the truth of the doctrines of _their_ tradition. The Buddha has confirmed certain facts about the universe through his "superknowledges," but what is an uncommitted observer to think when a representative of another tradition claims that he too possesses superknowledges, and that his superknowledges assure him of the truth of a set of propositions quite different from

those asserted by the Buddha? The Buddha may reply that he sees through _his_ superknowledges that the "superknowledges" of the other person are incomplete. Because the Buddha's experience is inaccessible to us, however, and its confirmation problematic, we have no more basis for believing the Buddha when he asserts _his_ superiority than for believing the other person when _he_ retorts--politely, no doubt--that _his_ superknowledge assures him that the Buddha is sublime and perceptive, but that his superknowledge is nevertheless limited, and the inferences based on it ultimately incorrect. In short, the fact that extra-sensory perceptions are (a) often at variance[200] and (b) cannot be checked intersubjectively, makes reliance on claims based on them alone epistemologically very risky.

The Buddhist may reply that he is not talking about the bewilderment of the uncommitted, but the certainty gained by someone who has followed the path. Those who have followed the Buddhist path to completion have agreed that the Buddha's description of the way things are was correct--thus, the Buddhist hypothesis has been confirmed, again and again. Of course we cannot know the transcendent attainment of another without ourselves reaching a transcendent level, but once we have done so, we will see that such attainments are possible and actual. Agreement itself poses problems, however, for it is one thing to concede

that different people have similar extraordinary experiences on the basis of which they draw similar conclusions about reality, and quite another thing to concede immediately that what has been vouchsafed by the extraordinary experience has any sort of ontological status; to repeat Mavrodes' dictum: "an experience can have intentionality without having veridicality." As Donovan notes, the fact that many alcoholics perceive pink rats while drunk does not assure the existence of anything like a Pink-Rat World, inaccessible to ordinary people but visible to those with eyes bleary enough to see.[201] Russell rather uncharitably contends that

> From a scientific point of view, we can make no distinction between the man who eats little and sees heaven and the man who drinks much and sees snakes. Each is in an abnormal physical condition, and therefore has abnormal perceptions. 202

It may seem unfair to compare alcoholic visions of rats and snakes with the religious visions of great and charismatic seers, but epistemologically one cannot really make a distinction of types among nonintersubjectively confirmable assertions, even if they are experienced separately by vast numbers of people.[203] If ordinary criteria of confirmability are sacrificed--as they inevitably are in an appeal to extra-sensory perception--then one gains subjective certainty at the cost of objective guarantee, and opens the door to the possibility that one is deluded--or that <u>all</u>

extraordinary perceptions are veridical. Quite simply, without being anchored in ordinary empirical checking procedures, extra-sensory perceptions all may be equally suspect, or all may be equally true. The mystic would like to distinguish among types and intensities of extra-sensory perception, but, as we have seen, he has no grounds for doing so without appealing finally either to a perception dogmatically held to be conclusive or to ordinary objective tests, and if they are the final arbiters, then there is nothing intrinsically secure in the extra-sensory perception itself.

The Buddhist may argue that notions of what constitutes "ordinary" empirical observation may differ from community to community or culture to culture, that, as Quine and Ullian put it, "Observation sentences for the arbitrating community are the sentences on which that community can reach immediate agreement under appropriate stimulation."[204] Thus, it is not fair to apply Western positivistic standards of observation to Eastern culture, where extra-sensory perception is far more readily granted epistemological status. Unfortunately--quite apart from the fact that the Buddha of the nikāyas seems well aware of the sorts of problems that reliance on extra-sensory perception can raise--the concept of an "arbitrating community" as the final judge of the validity of the experiences and state-

ments of its members entails a relativism that ultimately will be unsatisfactory to both the "worldly" and the "religious" person.

In the first place, a "community" can be rather difficult to delimit. Certainly there is little agreement about anything philosophical among the members of the community blithely described as "Eastern culture." Even "Buddhists" would probably find it difficult to consider that they shared a community consensus on any but the most basic facts about their religion. Let us suppose for the moment, however, that "Buddhists" would agree that the Four Noble Truths are true and can be realized as true through the superknowledges, and that the "community's" agreement that the truths are true is a sufficient guarantee of their truth. If the Buddhists agree that "prevailing community standards" (to borrow a phrase from American legal language) are a sufficient guide to truth, then they must be willing to grant that the standards of other communities--be they Christians, positivists or the Pink-Rat Society--equally are "valid for them," and that Buddhism is just one of a number of different, equally "valid" ways of looking at the world. It is, however, very nearly a *sine qua non* of the religious attitude that it seek to provide a single ultimate explanation of the way the universe works. Religions may vary greatly in the degree of tolerance they grant ex-

ternally to competing world-views, but in the final analysis, few religious people are willing to grant equal validity to other views. Even a neo-Vedāntin or Bah'ai, who claims that all religions are, in fact, equally valid, asserts a view that he considers superior to the view of someone who claims that one religion is correct and the others either partially or utterly mistaken. Most religious people--and Buddhists are no exception--believe that their account of the universe is the correct one, and by the very fact that what they are describing is the universe--the ultimate--they cannot really admit that alternative descriptions have equal validity: colloquially put, this universe ain't big enough for two conflicting descriptions. A religious community inevitably will maintain that its assertions have more than just local validity, that they are universal truths. Once they are claimed to be universal truths, the assertions must be opened to "translation" into the languages of other communities and inspection by the types of checking procedures established by other communities, especially the scientific community, which, by virtue of its subordination of value to fact and of the universal applicability of the procedures it has developed, has become the most widely-respected "community" in the present-day world. Not only, then, would an outsider find a community's agreement about certain assertions an insufficient

guarantee of the <u>truth</u> of those assertions, but the community itself is unlikely in the long run really to consider its internal agreement sufficient--especially when what is at stake is not merely a community matter but the very nature of the universe.

Still another problem posed by the verification procedures espoused by the Buddha--and this is one of the most important--is that of falsifiability. It undoubtedly is true that throughout history any number of people have followed the Buddhist path and personally verified to their satisfaction and the satisfaction of members of the tradition the fact that the Buddhist description of the universe is accurate. It is not, however, clear that the Buddhist tradition--claims to the contrary notwithstanding--really allows for the possibility that its claims will, in the final analysis, be falsified. What, for example, would members of the tradition say if a disciple painstakingly followed the path, reached the point where he had gained a number of superknowledges, and announced that he had a direct realization that, e.g., karma was a false and unnecessary metaphysical concept, or that past and future lives do <u>not</u> exist, or that an utterly transcendent attainment such as posited by the Buddha is, in fact, impossible? It is hard to imagine that representatives of the Buddhist tradition would be willing to admit that the disciple's expe-

riences were good grounds for re-examining their vision of reality. What they almost certainly would say--as the Buddha said of contemporaries whose extra-sensory perceptions did not accord with his--is that the desciple has not, in fact, followed the path as exactly and painstakingly as he claims, that _somewhere_ he must have made a mistake, or he would not have arrived at a conclusion in opposition to all previous experiences of those who have trodden the path. However, those whom the traditionalist cites as examples of those who have previously trodden the path are only those who have _agreed_ that what the tradition teaches is true. Those who disagreed have, by definition, been excluded from the ranks of those who have truly travelled the path. The tradition is thus made to seem more unanimous than it actually may have been.

As Katz points out, every tradition has criteria of the validity of experiences,[205] and these criteria are bound to include basic doctrinal formulas. A Buddhism that does not assert the Four Noble Truths hardly can be called Buddhsim, and it is overwhelmingly likely that virtually all Buddhists would reject as spurious any allegedly mystical experience the content of whose revelation was in fact the _falsity_ of the Four Noble Truths. It is true that Buddhist tradition has changed greatly over the centuries, and has admitted under its aegis many doctrines that are vir-

tually impossible to detect in those texts generally conceded to be earliest (I am thinking particularly of the doctrine of the Buddha's total omniscience and the "faith"-orientation of some Sino-Japanese sects), but the boundaries of Buddhism are not infinitely expandable. There is, as we saw in Chapter 1, a core of doctrine that Buddhists nearly everywhere have held to, the core being the minimal assertion that liberation is possible--an assertion that is accompanied in most cases by a belief in karma and rebirth. Should any "Buddhist" claim--without resorting to the verbal trickery sometimes employed by those who speak from the vantage-point of ultimate truth--that enlightenment is impossible, it is not likely that many, if any, living Buddhists would count him among their number. He would be accounted a spiritual failure. "The fact of failure," says Donovan, "is undeniable," but believers or traditionalists will not say that failures cast doubt on the validity of the experiences of "successes," for "The failure of a test does not disprove a hypothesis unless we are sure that the test was both properly carried out and entirely appropriate to the matter being tested."[206] Unfortunately, in a religious situation, it is very difficult to determine such matters, because so much of the religious path is noninter-subjectively observable. Furthermore, as Basil Mitchell concedes, the religious believer often is committed to dis-

counting negative evidence, and will do so on the basis of either his own powerful sense of conviction or an attempt to argue that the disciple providing the negative evidence has failed to appreciate the subtlety of the matter. The obvious hitch for the wayward disciple is that his appreciation of the subtlety of the matter only will be credited when he concludes that what the tradition asserted in the first place is, in fact, true.

Flew points out, in a Christian context, that

> ...it often seems to people who are not religious as if there was no conceivable event or series of events the occurrence of which would be admitted by sophisticated religious people to be a sufficient reason for conceding "There wasn't a God after all" or "God does not really love us then." 207

Rather than give up its ultimate assertions--even in the face of contrary evidence, religion "dies death by a hundred qualifications." As R.B. Braithwaite, in discussing the analogy between scientific and religious procedure, says:

> ...if a set of theological propositions are to be regarded as scientific explanations of facts in the empirical world, they must be refutable by experience. We must be willing to abandon them if the facts prove different from what we think they are. A hypothesis which is consistent with every possible empirical fact is not an empirical one. And though the theoretical concepts in a hypothesis need not be explicitly definable in terms of direct observation--indeed they must not be if the system is to be applicable to novel situations--yet they must be related to some and not all of the possible facts in the world in order to have a non-vacuous significance. 208

Braithwaite and Flew are concerned that the concept of God

is one that ultimately has vacuous significance, because the Christian will not abandon it in the face of any evidence (e.g., the problem of evil, the theory of evolution). There is, as we have seen, some question whether any evidence would cause a Buddhist to concede that, e.g., enlightenment is impossible or karma and unnecessary concept. Precisely because the empirical appeal to which a Buddhist ultimately will turn is an extra-sensory one, enlightenment never will be falsified, for there is too much variety possible in extra-sensory experiences, and the problem of categorical falsification (not to mention verification!) virtually insurmountable. Karma never would be considered an unnecessary concept because no matter how many "naturalistic" explanations are provided for facts formerly explained by karma, the denial of karma would rob the universe of its religious coherence--and the assumption that the universe does have religious coherence is fundamental to Buddhism, as it must be to any religion.

A tradition that is not open to falsification ultimately is a closed tradition, for it will not admit any new evidence that might alter its hypotheses. It is, thus, an unscientific tradition, for openness to falsification is an essential characteristic of a scientific hypothesis, and most religious traditions, it seems, however flexible they may be on certain inessential matters, ultimately will be

willing to draw a doctrinal line and say, "This far and no farther." Even if the line is not drawn with dogmatic pronouncements, but with the suggestion that "Perhaps you are not investigating the matter subtly enough," the inflexibility merely is sugar-coated. Buddhism, for all the Buddha's criticism of accepting propositions merely on the basis of testimony, seems finally to have to draw such lines, and thus not to be empirically falsifiable. It is not, therefore, scientific in the strict sense of the term.

Generally speaking, assertions based on religious experiences can be counted as certain knowledge only with great difficulty. I do not mean to suggest that religious experience--or what some call "intuition"--tells us nothing about the world, for, as Russell has pointed out, much of what we know about the world was first suggested by its means. Indeed, it is entirely possible that the Buddhist intuition of the nature and operation of the universe is, in fact, correct. It remains the case, however, that intuitive forms of knowledge entail the numerous epistemological problems raised above, and simply cannot be considered sufficient evidence <u>on their own</u>, either for the experiencer or for an uncommitted ordinary person whom he is trying to convince of the validity of his experience. To repeat Mavrodes' dictum still again, "an experience can have intentionality without having veridicality," and religious

experiences cannot, only by reference to themselves, provide adequate criteria for assuring their veridicality; or, to cite a European-born Hindu mystic, "private experience of an object of the religious sort does not confer existential status on the object."[209] It does not really demean mysticism to say of it, as Russell does, that it is "little more than a certain intensity and depth of feeling in regard to what is believed to be true about the universe,"[210] or that, like many private experiences, it ultimately results in what only can be considered as "reports of feeling-states."[211] To say such things merely indicates that one recognizes that precisely because of its privacy and exemption from normal intersubjective observation, as well as because of its tendency to be colored by values, it cannot be regarded as trustworthy without a posteriori checking, particularly where the concepts and explanations with which it is interwoven are susceptible either to linguistic and categorial criticism (as noted in the previous section with reference to the application of the law of dependent origination to psychological or moral matters) or to alternative naturalistic explanations (as in the case of the notion of karma). The latter is particularly underlined by Donovan when he says that religious experiences cannot carry very much evidential weight, because "too many alternative, naturalistic ways of interpreting them are availa-

ble....There will be no way of showing, by appealing simply to a subjective experience itself, whether it was what it was taken to be; or only seemed to be."[212] With this remark, we find ourselves back in the realm of the "ordinary empirical," of intersubjective observations and inferences based upon them--for it seems that only in this realm can propositions based on religious experience be verified to the satisfaction of anyone but the experiencer himself or those whose views he is confirming. We saw in the previous section that ordinary empirical tests could be applied only with difficulty to some of the Buddha's religious assertions--that, after all, was why the argument from experience was resorted to--but the fact that the Pāli tradition does not, by and large, seek to justify the Buddhist religion according to commonly accepted perceptual and inferential standards does not mean that such justifications are lacking in the Buddhist tradition as a whole. Dharmakīrti and others in the "logical" tradition maintained that the truth of Buddhism could be proven by applying commonly accepted empirical and logical criteria--they did not feel it necessary to appeal overtly to superknowledges as a justification of doctines, because the doctrines could be rationally proved to the satisfaction of all. The logicians' arguments we must save for later; in the mean time, let us examine some arguments contained in Pāli texts written af-

ter the nikāyas.

7. Logical, analogical and other arguments in the Kathāvatthu, Milindapañhā and Visuddhismagga

"In the Kathāvatthu," writes Warder, "we have the earliest Indian philosophical work which proceeds on the basis of a set of established logical techniques."[213] It is attributed to Mogaliputta Tissa, a contemporary of Aśoka (mid-third century B.C.). Written in dialogue form, the Kathāvatthu deals with a variety of divergent doctrinal interpretations that had sprung up in the two hundred plus years since the Buddha's parinirvāṇa, e.g., the "personalism" of the Puggalavādins and such aspersions on the sanctity of Arahants as cast by Mahādeva, who, at the second Buddhist council, at Vaiśalī, had asserted that Arahants (1) are subject to temptation, (2) may have a residue of ignorance, (3) may have doubts, (4) gain knowledge with the help of others and (5) attain the path through an exclamation.[214]

As Warder notes,

> Most of the refutations in the Kathāvatthu turn on the question of the consistency of new propositions with statements which all schools agreed to be those of the Buddha. Since both sides as Buddhists accept the latter as true they try to prove that their own new propositions are consistent with them and that the new propositions of other schools contradict them. 215

In terms of formal structure, Kathāvatthu arguments tend to

run thus: the opponent asserts proposition x, the Theravādin replies by asserting universally accepted proposition y then showing that y entails non-x.[216] For example, in refuting the idea that an Arahant can fall away from Arahantship, the Theravādin first establishes that his opponent is not asserting that a Streamwinner, Once-retuner or Non-returner can fall away, then goes on to show that it is impossible to assert a possible falling-away by an Arahant that does not entail fallings-away on the lower levels, for Arahantship and the lower fruits are logically related. Still more directly, the Theravādin asks his opponent if he accepts various characterizations of Arahants in the *nikāyas*, e.g., as never returning to saṃsāra; when the opponent admits that he does, the Theravādin points out that by a definition accepted by them both, an Arahant cannot fall away from his attainment.[217] Similar arguments are used to refute the five theses of Mahādeva.

The *Kathāvatthu*, then, does logically defend the possibility and irreversibility of the Arahant's attainment, but it ultimately does so on the basis of an appeal to commonly-accepted scriptural authority. It is not unreasonable that it should do so, since the disputes it is attempting to settle all are internal Buddhist matters, but this tends to make its discussions rather academic to an outsider, who cannot presuppose the validity of the Buddhist scriptures,

and thus cannot accept the arguments of the Kathāvatthu as carrying any weight for him.

Far more universal in spirit and appeal is the Milindapañhā, a dialogue between the Buddhist monk Nāgasena and the Greco-Bactrian king Milinda (= Menander?), written circa the first century A.D.[218] In it, Milinda expresses doubts and questions about various aspects of Buddhism, and Nāgasena answers him, in the process converting the king to the Buddhist point of view. Arguments in the Milindapañhā tend to be constructed analogically, with Nāgasena asserting Buddhist doctrine x, then justifying it by recourse to its analogy to commonly-accepted situation y.

How, Milinda wants to know, does an Arahant know that he will never be reborn again? By his knowledge, Nāgasena replies, that all possible causes of rebirth have been removed, just as a farmer who has ceased farming and has sold and lived off the grain of his granary knows that there exist no more causes for filling the granary.[219] How do we know that nibbāna is a happy state? By the testimony and characteristics of those who have attained it, just as we learn the pain of losing limbs from the lamentations of those who have lost limbs.[220] How do we know that the Buddha really existed? By the testimony of others, just as we can learn of the existence of a river we have never seen through the testimony of those who have seen it.[221] How can

we confirm the Buddha's alleged incomparability? By observing the behavior of his disciples, just as we can infer the existence of a mighty ocean from seeing the rivers that will flow into it;[222] or by examining the Dhamma, just as we can infer the existence and qualities of a dead man by the writings he leaves behind.[223] How can nibbāna, which is said to be unconditioned, be known to exist? By the fact that it can be perceived mentally, just as the wind can be demonstrated to exist, although it is invisible.[224] How can nibbāna itself be entirely blissful when the process of attaining it involves pain? By virtue of the fact that a painful process often can have an entirely pleasant result, as the process of the acquisition of knowledge, or royal power.[225] Is there any way nibbāna can be described or measured? No, just as the ocean is ultimately indescribable and immeasureable.[226] If nibbāna is unproduced, how can it be realized? Through study and practice, just as an art can be learned through study and practice at the feet of a master.[227] If nibbāna does not exist in a particular place, how can we know that it exists and is attainable? By the fact that its non-specificity does not entail its non-existence, just as fire, though not stored in a particular place, exists, and can be generated when we rub two sticks together.[228]

After virtually every answer, Milinda compliments Nā-

gasena for his acuity, and accepts what he has said as the truth. Unfortunately, Nāgasena's replies seem considerably less persuasive to us today than they did to Milinda, for arguments from analogy are notoriously weak. Indeed, although they purport to be arguments, they really are something more in the nature of explanations, an assertion that if _x_ is the case, the way in which it is the case may be illustrated with reference to commonly-accepted situation _y_. The fact that an analogy may be found for a particular doctrine asserted to be true does _not_ prove the truth of the doctrine; it merely proves that _if_ it is true, it may be likened to such-and-such. Analogies are particularly problematic where religious doctrines are at issue, because the religious side of the analogy generally is disputed and difficult to verify, whereas the "commonly-accepted" side is obvious and easy to verify, so the appositeness of the analogy remains highly questionable. Virtually any religious proposition will entail epistemological problems _not_ entailed by the examples. It certainly is true, for example, that we know the pain of dismemberment from the cries of those who have been dismembered, but testimonies as to the bliss or even existence of nibbāna are much more problematic. Not only can we not witness the cause of the resultant emotion--as we _can_ in the case of dismemberment--but the actual causes of psychological states, even of bea-

titude, are nowhere near as unambiguous as are the causes of a physical condition. Similarly, to conclude that the Buddha was incomparable on the basis of his Dhamma is to open up the whole problem of how the Dhamma's validity is to be established; to conclude that nibbāna exists although unseen just as wind does is to ignore the fact that wind is still a phenomenon perceived by the ordinary senses, whereas nibbāna is not.

Analogies are found frequently in the nikāyas, too, and are no less problematic there. A common analogy, not only in Buddhism but other religions as well, is that which likens those who have not seen the truth to blind men and those who do see the truth to those who can truly see.[229] The problem with the blind/sighted analogy is that it presupposes that we do see the truth and the others do not, and so does not prove the fact, but merely asserts that if we know the truth and the others do not then we can be likened to the sighted and they to the blind. That this is, in fact, the case only can be established through other means. Analogies, in short, can legitimately be applied once other investigations have revealed the possibility of the truth of the religious proposition involved; analogies cannot by themselves establish the validity of the proposition, for, quite simply, an analogy is an explanation or illustration, not an argument--even though it often feels

to a disputant as if, by providing an analogy for his assertion, he is thereby increasing its plausibility.

Incidentally, the Milindapañhā also contains a number of implicit responses to criticisms that might be levelled at the behavior of the Buddha or Arahants, but it upholds their attainment not by logical appeal to scripture--as had the Kathāvatthu--but by citing reasons that sound remarkably like the Mahāyāna doctrine of skill-in-means. For example, Milinda asks Nāgasena whether Arahants ever are afraid. No, comes the reply. Then what about the instance in the suttas where all the five hundred Arahants but Ānanda flee an elephant? This does not show fear on the part of the other Arahants, but consideration, for they wished that the special courage of Ānanda be made evident, so they withdrew--they did not flee.[230] Again, if the Buddha is perfect, how can one explain the fact that it sometimes rains on his hut? It is not that the Buddha could not prevent rain from falling on his hut; he lets it fall there so as to prevent others from thinking that he would perform miracles merely to amaze.[231] Although it is not spelled out, the implicit principle here is that enlightenment is a state of mind that colors all the behavior of the one who is enlightened. It is, thus, out of the question that any of his behavior--however it may appear--can proceed from any but enlightened motives. It cannot, by definition, be

negative or unenlightened, so an apparently unenlightened action must be explicable in terms of enlightened motives that are not at first apparent. It is not clear that asserting that all a Buddha's actions, however they may appear, spring from enlightened motives is any less problematic than a Christian's assertion that God, whatever he may do, loves us, and it is problematic for the same reason: it does not seem falsifiable, so its meaningfulness is suspect. We will discuss this problem in more detail in the next chapter, when we come to the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka Sūtra.

The fifth-century Visuddhimagga of Buddhaghosa, which is in many ways the Summa of Theravādin thought, does not really add any new arguments to those of the texts that preceded it, although it does attempt to clarify some of them. To the contention that if nibbāna cannot be aprehended then it cannot exist, for example, it replies that nibbāna cannot be aprehended by ordinary means, but it can be apprehended by means of practice of the path--if there were no nibbāna, the path would be fruitless.[232] Nibbāna is a state that is reached but not produced--if it were produced it would, like all produced entities, be subject to cessation, which it is not. It is itself a cessation, but it is not an entirely negative state--it is cognitive.[233] To assert that nibbāna is apprehensible by means of the path is to appeal to the argument from experience, with which we

dealt in the previous section. To argue that it is non-produced yet cognition is to risk--if not necessarily entail--a contradiction. The contradiction would arise from the fact that cognitions are held by Buddhists to be dependently originated, and thus impermanent, subject to cessation. The only way out of the contradiction is to assert that the individual cognitions of an enlightened being may be impermanent, but his enlightenment is not. That is, once one has passed a particular spiritual threshold--that at which all contaminants or defilements have been destroyed--cognition may continue, but there no longer is a basis for the defilement of those cognitions; thus, every cognition will be "enlightened," and nibbāna therefore can be described as a "permanent" state. A cognitive nibbāna is not, thus, contradictory in principle; nor, on the other hand, is it guaranteed in principle--let alone by ordinary empirical observation--that there does in fact exist a spiritual threshold after which no thought will be defiled, for cessations may be either temporary or permanent, and we have no assurance that defilement is a disposition that necessarily can be eradicated forever. At the very least, arguments about the problem will devolve into discussions about the nature of mind. These, in turn, are notoriously difficult, fraught as they are with linguistic, logical and epistemological problems. Of that, more in the following chapters.

8. Concluding remarks

Let us reiterate some of the points covered in this chapter.

1. The Buddha's quest for enlightenment arose out of the background of a culture that, mixing both Āryan and non-Āryan ideas, had become religiously preoccupied with the problem of finding an escape from the round of rebirths that is saṃsāra. It was the Buddha's contention that he uniquely had found the escape-route and that others could, too, if they followed the same procedures he had.

2. Various gradations of attainment are recognized in the Pāli tradition, and often there are distinctions within the gradations, but the most important points to note are that (a) it was agreed that there existed a point--when one became an *ariya*--after which one's liberation was assured and (b) an Arahant, who had completed the path, must minimally possess the knowledge that his contaminants had been destroyed, and thus that there would be for him no more rebirths.

3. The Buddha of the *nikāyas* was quite critical of reliance on either testimony or reason for the verification of religious assertions. In general, he urged his followers to gain personal empirical knowledge of religious truths, but he was aware as well of the problems inherent in both ordinary and extra-sensory empirical processes. In short,

the nikāyas demonstrate a sophisticated--if unsystematic--understanding of the verificatory problems posed by religious propositions.[234]

4. There are a number of passages in the nikāyas that indicate that there were instances in which disciples trusted the Buddha on the basis of his charisma, and may have developed faith without sufficient warrant, but in general faith was a virtue to be developed on the basis of understanding--either rationally, empirically, or both--the potential truth-value of the Buddha's assertions.

5. The Buddha does not admit any a priori principles that are exempt from verification, but the law of dependent origination is absolutely fundamental to the Buddhist vision of the universe. Confirmation of its applicability to the moral and psychological realms is problematic, requiring the invocation of a posteriori verification by extraordinary means.

6. The most important argument--and this, like the others, is largely implicit--is the argument from experience, from the fact that the Dhamma or the Four Noble Truths can be known to be true by following the Buddha's path and gaining the kind of knowledge that he did. Though it is tempting to liken verification-through-travelling-the-path to the way in which one would test a scientific hypothesis, there are a number of critical ways in which

religious verification is unscientific: (a) it is noninter-subjectively observable, making claims difficult to check and conflicting claims difficult to adjudicate; (b) it is strongly value-oriented, and thus likely to color the experiences of those travelling the path to a much greater degree than scientific presuppositions, which are oriented away from values and toward facts; and (c) it is practically unfalsifiable, to the degree that it is questionable that a tradition ever will admit conclusions that differ from those that are fundamental to it. In short, experience alone is an insufficient basis for accepting the truth of religious propositions; there must be some reference as well to the intersubjective realm that is under the sway of ordinary observation and inferences based upon it--although the Pāli tradition does not, in fact, offer many arguments based in this realm.

7. The logical arguments found in the *Kathāvatthu* show an appreciation for the principle of appeal to commonly-accepted truths and concomitances as a basis for inference, but the truths and concomitances it appeals to are the very truths that a non-Buddhist would be seeking to challenge, so they carry weight only in discussions within the Buddhist community.

8. The arguments from analogy found in the *nikāyas* and the *Milindapañhā* are not really arguments, but illustra-

tions--which do not prove religious assertions so much as explain what it would be like if they were true.

CHAPTER 3: ARGUMENTS IN THE "CLASSICAL" SANSKRITIC TRADITION

1. The Abhidharmakośa and Buddhist "classicism"

Religions invariably evolve in response to a combination of internal and external factors, yet the two types of influence seldom are in perfect balance. Indeed, one can identify particular phases in the development of a religion by charting the sorts of challenges to which it responds. Thus, Christianity before, say, Augustine, was--as a young and growing faith--subject to a variety of political pressures and philosophical influences that reflected the diversity of Mediterranean life under the Roman empire. Much of early Christianity was formulated explicitly or implicitly as a response to these various external challenges. Medieval Chritianity, on the other hand, was an established church, with no political, spiritual or philosophical rivals in sight, and its evolution was largely an internal matter. Certainly there was philosophical development, spurred by the rediscovery of Aristotle and the struggle between realism and nominalism, but the development occurred within the framework of certain basic doctrinal assumptions.The assumptions themselves were virtually never challenged, and few--with the conspicuous exception of A-

quinas--even felt the need to justify them. With the arrival of the Renaissance, however, and its attendant scientism, humanism, and opening up of other lands and faiths, Christianity once more was forced to respond to circumstances outside its immediate sphere. Faith, authority and doctrine all were challenged, and there began a process of redefinition that begat the Reformation and Counter-Reformation, and continues today in the liberal, evangelical and ecumenical movements.

Buddhism in India underwent an analogous evolution. The literature of the Pāli tradition, particularly the nikāyas, was, as we have seen, developed against the background of the religious and philosophical ferment prevalent in and around the Buddha's time. Buddhism was, quite consciously, a doctrine that claimed to avoid the philosophical and spiritual pitfalls of its predecessors and contemporaries, and the nikāyas are full of references to and criticisms of other doctrines. Because early Buddhism was not yet established as a religious power, its literature is full of arguments--albeit often implicit and/or unsystematic--that seek to establish a basis for the acceptance by others of its basic principles, e.g., the Four Noble Truths.

From the reign of Aśoka onward, Buddhism was a well-established faith and, although it did respond to Indian

religious developments in part extrinsic to it--e.g., bhakti and the early formulations of the six classical _darśanas_--most of its evolution was an internal matter, a refinement and development of concepts and problems found within the tradition. The concept of saṃsāra, for instance, was not examined as to its validity; rather, it was explored with an eye to more and more satisfactory ways of explaining its operation, e.g., through the development of various psychologies, epistemologies and karma-theories. Nirvāṇa was not analyzed to determine its attainability or impossibility; rather, it was made the generally-accepted (in fact, if not details) end-point of a variety of different paths that were described as leading to it.

In the late Gupta and post-Gupta period (fifth century A.D. onward), Buddhism's position increasingly was threatened, both by a diminution of the royal patronage on which monasteries depended, and by the full flowering of generally-accepted techniques of argument and inference, which gave new life to inter-systemic debate. Buddhists continued to debate among themselves, but more and more they found themselves criticizing and being criticized by other schools: Jaina, Vaiśeṣika, Lokāyata, etc. These other schools were more interested in basic Buddhist doctrines than in intra-Buddhist issues, and concentrated their attacks on those basic doctrines. Such writers as Bhāvavive-

ka, Dharmakīrti, Candrakīrti and Śāntarakṣita, therefore, were required to devote a considerable amount of energy to defending basic Buddhist doctrines, much as the Buddha had in the nikāyas, although they possessed far more sophisticated philosophical tools.

It is in the second, somewhat introverted phase of Buddhist thought that I am interested in this chapter. I realize that I am subsuming an immense body of literature under a rather artificial rubric. Not only can exceptions be found to my characterization of the literature as "introverted" (most notably the Mādhyamika writings of Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva), but it is difficult to see what, if anything, ever could unite, e.g., the Abhidharmakośa and the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka Sūtra, in a single category. Still, I contend that all of the texts considered in this chapter share at least one important characteristic: they presuppose the truth of basic Buddhist doctrines and seek to explicate more and more satisfactorily the processes by which saṃsāra operates and the path to nirvāṇa is travelled. As a result of this, few of them make explicit arguments for, e.g., the attainability of nirvāṇa, yet what is left implicit often is worth noting and, furthermore, the sorts of implicit arguments that can be found often represent developments of or departures from those found in the nikāyas, and merit discussion. I call the phase I am discussing the

"classical" Sanskritic phase because it was during this period that the "classical" philosophical viewpoints within Buddhism were broached, debated and, finally, systematized. We will begin, as it were, *in medias res*, with Vasubandhu's circa fourth-century *Abhidharmakośa*, whose importance for our purposes derives from its clear delineation of a number of attitudes, assumptions and issues that are common to both incipient and developed "classical" Buddhism.

The *Abhidharmakośa* consists of several hundred verses in which the realist views of the Vaibhāṣika school are spelled out in detail. Vasubandhu's interlinear prose commentary, the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, greatly elaborates on the occasionally gnomic root-verses and, in many cases, attacks from the Sautrāntika "nominalist" perspective the same Vaibhāṣika views that have been so painstakingly spelled out. The Vaibhāṣika tradition had developed around the *Mahāvibhāṣa*, an immense compendium of divergent views whose uniting factor was their preoccupation with studying the philosophical problems and formulations of the *abhidharma*, the third and latest of the three canonical *piṭakas*. *Abhidharma* studies focused in particular on the status of and relations among the basic existential categories of Buddhism, the dharmas. The Vaibhāṣikas recognized seventy-five such categories, both conditioned and unconditioned; and physical, psychological and neither of those. Generally

speaking, the Vaibhāṣikas granted ontological status to <u>all</u> dharmas, hence their alternative designation as Realists (Sarvāstivādins, "Everything-is-ists"). The Sautrāntikas generally eschewed the Vaibhāṣika preoccupation with the <u>Abhidharma Piṭaka</u>, looking instead to attitudes they found explicit or implicit in the sūtras. Specifically, they applied a sort of Buddhist version of Occam's razor to the Vaibhāṣikas' somewhat uncritical realism, reducing to the status of non-existent such "real" entities as the past and future, duration, the "obtainer" (<u>prāpti</u>) that liks karmic causes and results, and nirvāṇa (which was for the Sautrāntikas not an existent, but not impossible, either). Whereas Vaibhāṣikas granted "ultimate" reality only to the partless "atoms," durationless mind-moments and "cessations" into which they analyzed reality, Sautrāntikas made "efficiency" (<u>arthakriyatva</u>) the basic criterion of reality, considering as real any entity (<u>vastu</u>)--e.g., a pot, or a mental act, or, for that matter, an atomic event (<u>kṣana</u>)--that could, under analysis, be seen to have effects. In presenting both the Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika positions, then, the <u>Abhidharmakośa</u> and its <u>bhāṣya</u> summarize the culminating developments in the nearly millenium-old tradition of Hīnayāna interpretation, many of whose tools and concepts are the same as those found in the Mahāyāna.

The most important <u>Abhidharmakośa</u> topic for our purpo-

ses is its exposition of the higher stages of spiritual endeavor, which are divided into five "paths" (*mārga*).[235] The prerequisite for entering even the lowest of the five paths, that of accumulation (*sambhāra*), is a spontaneous desire utterly to be free of the suffering of *saṃsāra*. Very roughly speaking, the path of accumulation consists of learning how to calm the mind through *śamatha* meditation, and practicing insight (*vipaśyanā*) meditation on the objects of the four mindfulnesses (P. *satipatthāna*, S. *upasthānasmṛti*), the body, feelings, mind and mental events. The second path, that of application (*prayoga*), includes further development of *śamatha*, while *vipaśyanā* is turned toward a consideration of the Four Noble Truths in their sixteen aspects.[236] The critical juncture in the Buddhist's ascent comes with his passage from the path of application to the path of seeing (*darśana*). At the inception of the path of seeing he brings the combination of calm and insight (*śamathavipaśyanāyuganaddha*) to bear for the first time on the sixteen aspects of the Four Noble Truths. Whereas his cognition and understanding of them until this point have been conceptual, on the path of seeing his cognition and understanding are direct and unmediated. The power of direct cognition of the truth is such that, for the first time, defilements (*kleśas*; or contaminants, *āśravas*) actually are uprooted rather than merely suppressed.

The practitioner has become an Ārya. He is no longer an ordinary being (*pṛthagjana*), but a superior being, one freed forever from rebirth in the lower realms, one destined to enlightenment--he is, to use the Chritian term, "saved." The path of seeing lasts for sixteen "moments," during which one realizes the Four Noble Truths with respect to the desire realm (*kāmadhātu*) and the higher realms (the *rūpadhātu* and *arūpyadhātu*). At its conclusion, a number of the grosser defilements have been eliminated for good. One then passes onto the path of development (*bhavanā*). Here, the remaining defilements are, with varying degrees of swiftness, eliminated, until one reaches the peak of existence (*bhavāgra*). From there, one passes into the adamantine (*vajropama*) samādhi, which in turn issues in the knowledge of the destruction of the defilements or contaminants (*kṣāyajñāna*), which is the fifth and final path, that of no-more-training (*aśaikṣa*). On the path of no-more-training, one has become an Arahant. An Arahant possesses the knowledge of the destruction of the defilements and the knowledge of no more rebirth (*anutpādajñāna*). These two together are said to constitute bodhi, or enlightenment.[237]

Incidentally, the Vaibhāṣikas admit the existence of a class of "occasionally liberated" (*samayavimukta*) Arahants who, lacking the unshakable nature (*akopyadharman*) of one who has destruction-knowledge and no-more-rebirth know-

ledge, are capable of relapsing to lower levels of the path, though they remain Āryas. The Sautrāntikas deny the existence of such a class, maintaining (as had the Kathāvatthu) that a fallible Arahant is a contradiction in terms.[238] As in the Theravādin (as opposed to the nikāya) tradition, the Buddha is regarded as omniscient, not in the sense that he cognizes all past, present and future phenomena simultaneously, but in the sense that he is able to cognize any phenomenon of the past, present or future serially if he so chooses.[239]

The Abhidharmakośa's description of the path brings to the fore a number of philosophically interesting points that will be germane to discussions later in this chapter. Let us enumerate them, briefly indicating their implications.

1. We have already seen[240] that the nikāyas implied a bifurcation of those travelling the path into those who were ariyas and those who had not yet reached that stage. In the Abhidharmakośa path-system, this bifurcation is made explicit and systematic. It would not be an exaggeration to say that an Ārya has undergone a metamorphosis into a type of being utterly different in nature from the common run of sentient beings, and utterly different from what he himself has previously been. Whereas ordinary beings are capable sometimes of temporarily suppressing their defilements, the

Ārya is able to eradicate them systematically and permanently. Whereas ordinary beings are subject to uncontrolled rebirth in saṃsāra, the Ārya need never be born in the lower realms again, and is certain to attain enlightenment.[241] In other words, a person is held able to undergo what might fairly be described as an ontological change. Arahantship or Buddhahood is the culmination of such a change, but the point at which one becomes an Ārya demarcates the actual transition from one mode of being to another. It is, of course, difficult for ordinary beings to know that or how such a change can take place, but Buddhism is not alone among religions in insisting that man is capable of sanctification and a radical transcendence of his worldly dissatisfactions.

2. Closely tied in with the _fact_ of the ontological change marked by the attainment of Ārya status is the _mode_ of its attainment, which is essentially cognitive. We have seen in the _nikāyas_ that the various descriptions of the path offered by the Buddha invariably included both concentrative and analytical types of meditation, but that the analytical, pursued through _vipassana_ or _satipatthāna_, seemed to have precedence, both in the Buddha's attainment of enlightenment and in his prescriptions for others. It was, after all, such specifically analytical features as the law of dependent origination and the Four Noble Truths

that set Buddhism apart from the plethora of competing systems, many of whose _śamatha_ techniques were little different from the Buddha's. Once again, what the _nikāyas_ had implied, the _Abhidharmakośa_ makes explicit. It is a cognitive change, the sudden power of insight when coupled with proficiency in calming meditation, that makes one an Ārya, and the _objects_ cognized by an Ārya are, originally, discursive--the sixteen aspects of the Four Noble Truths. It is a specific, powerfully focused insight that alone can assure the eradication of defilements; _śamatha_ or dhyāna or samādhi meditation unaccompanied by specific insights is capable only of temporarily suppressing defilements.[242] The truth that is cognized directly on the path of seeing will be described variously by different interpreters--Dharmakīrti will subsume understanding of the Four Noble Truths under the general category of selflessness, while Yogācārins will claim the direct cognition to be of subject-object non-duality, and Mādhyamikas will say that the cognition is of emptiness--but everyone will agree that a specific, profound transformation of one's understanding of reality is the necessary condition of the ontological change entailed by becoming an Ārya.

This assertion raises a couple of possible objections. First, it might be argued that to assert that an essentially _psychological_ change--as one's direct cognition of truth

certainly is--is the condition for an _ontological_ change is to commit a category mistake, or, at the very least, to attribute to psychological changes a permanence and profundity of impact far greater than that of any psychological changes that we commonly observe. Second, the question inevitably will be raised why a _particular_ understanding or truth, be it of the Four Noble Truths or of emptiness, should uniquely have transformative power. After all, many are the "ultimate truths" asserted by various religions and the sects within them. Not only must it generally be established that a direct cognition of truth can be ontologically transformative, but it must be established that the truth itself is sufficiently true and profound that it even can be transformative psychologically, let alone ontologically. These two problems, as we will see in Chapter 4, were addressed in considerable detail by Dharmakīrti.

3. Underlying the very process of detailing the path--as it underlay many discussions in the _nikāyas_--is the assumption that the law of dependent origination, the description of the universe in terms of identifiable causes and effects, _can_ be applied to the psychological, moral and spiritual realms, so that suffering can be said to have specific and identifiable causes that exist within the human mind. Since, quite simply, the removal of a cause entails the elimination of its consequent effect, if the cau-

ses of suffering are removed suffering itself can be removed, and what remains when suffering is removed is nirvāṇa.[243] As Vasubandhu rather picturesquely expresses it, one attains nirvāṇa by getting rid of obstacles, as when one cries, "Make room! Knock down the house!"[244]

Common to all path-construction is a quasi-mathematical mode of thinking, in which dharmas are, in effect, given numerical value. Non-virtuous tendencies may be given negative value and virtuous tendencies positive value. A worldling begins the path with an immense negative sum weighing upon him, but through subtraction of the negative and/or addition of the positive he comes sooner or later to a point where all the negatives have been removed and all the positives remain. Even given an infinite number of negative factors, there is no reason why, theoretically, those factors should not all at some point be eliminated, since the realization of selflessness is the key to their elimination, and on the path of development one is able to eliminate defilements simultaneously as well as serially.

It is, however, as we saw in the last chapter, open to question whether various mental factors can be granted causal status as readily as can observable physical forces. The mathematical model, then, may be open to dispute on the grounds that assigning quasi-physical causal status to psychological states involves a category mistake. This issue

only can be settled by a closer examination of the nature of mind, which we will begin later in this chapter. These objections notwithstanding, the "mathematical model" of saṃsāra and path-factors is fundamental to Buddhist path-descriptions, and fundamental to the assumption behind the construction of paths: the assumption that the cessation of suffering is possible because its causes can be identified and eliminated. Thus, Vasubandhu, like most "classical" period thinkers, is content to enumerate certain spiritual causes and effects, never questioning whether they can appropriately be described in cause-and-effect terms, satisfied that they are units in a mathematical equation whose final result must be enlightenment.

4. Essential to Vasubandhu's system--as to Buddhism in general--is the assumption that mind and body are substantially different, for without this difference rebirth would be impossible and the concept--not to mention dread--of saṃsāra rendered meaningless. Also largely meaningless without rebirth is the central principle of the operation of saṃsāra, karma. Karma denotes actions of body, speech and--most importantly--mind, and their residual force, which are taken as the ultimate explanation not only for our past, present and future minds and bodies, but for the arrangement of the external world, as well.[245] Everything in the universe, thus, is the result of sentient acts that

have a particular moral weight. Because karma and its results are invoked to account for virtually everything, and because they are invisible to ordinary inspection, karma comes very close to being "meaningless" in the sense in which a positivist would apply the term, i.e., as so pervasive that it explains everything and nothing simultaneously. It certainly seems incapable of falsification and, like the traditionally-conceived Christian God, seems liable to a steady diminution of its explanatory power, to the point where it may become otiose, because many of the questions to which the answer is "karma" either now have alternative answers provided by science or need not be asked.

For example, a question such as, "Why do I have weak eyes and my wife strong eyes?" or "Why are my teeth straight and hers crooked?" can be answered with reference to clearly-ascertainable genetic and/or physiological causes--there is no need for recourse to, e.g., my honesty and her lying in a hypothetical previous life.

Questions such as "Why was the child hit by the truck?" can be answered adequately by specifying, "He didn't hear it coming and darted into the street after the ball, and the driver didn't have time to stop." To insist that there must be an additional occult cause, such as his murder of the truck driver in a previous life, seems gratuitous, and is based on the requirement that every event be

an instance of a quasi-mathematical moral justice. It may simply be the case that certain events occur as a result of a confluence of psychological and physical causes and conditions, without reference to moral principles. It is comforting, in a way, to believe that a child hit by a truck or dying of leukemia created the karmic cause in some previous life, but only in that it provides a sense of moral orderliness (such as also is provided by the Christian concept of "the will of God"). That such a moral orderliness does exist is open to serious question.

Questions such as "Why was I born a human being rather than a raccoon?" only can be reasonably asked if we assume that there pre-exists the birth of a particular human or raccoon some sort of an "I" (not a substantial self, to be sure, but a non-physical mental continuum) for which it is meaningful to speak of possible birth as this or that.

Finally, questions such as "Why did he go to Nepal to study Buddhism?" can be answered satisfactorily by enumerating a number of more or less profound psychological factors, e.g., "He thought it would be novel," "He was desperately seeking the meaning of life," or "Such was the wont of certain sensitive and shiftless youths of his class and era." One need not posit in addition the existence in his mental continuum of a karmic seed, planted by contact with Buddhism in a previous life and now in some mysterious way

helping to impel him towards Nepal.

Generally, to answer the question, "Why did such-and-such occur?" by saying "because of karma" seems to beg the causal question, for karma inevitably must come to fruition through particular causes and conditions; yet once the causes and conditions have been specified, a causal account has been given, and karma appears superfluous, a ghostly projection of our all-too-human need to find moral meaning in <u>everything</u>. Indeed, karma no more explains how events come about than than does the general law of dependent origination, of which it is perhaps the most important corollary. The <u>fact</u> of causality does not establish the <u>ways</u> in which causality may work and which types of entities may be subject to it; similarly, the fact that particular mental, physical and environmental results may have the specific, morally-weighted acts of sentient beings as their forerunners does not inform us of the particular causes through which these actions bear fruit, and so add nothing to our knowledge but the rather anthropomorphic supposition that the invisible basis of many of what we consider "natural" causal processes is in fact <u>another</u> process, in which moral valuations are paramount. It is the supposition that the universe is, above all, a field of spiritual struggle, of which the very galaxies themselves are simply by-products. Perhaps this is, in fact the case, but its verification is

as problematic as that of the Christian God, and its falsification is inconceivable, so its value as a description of the "real" state-of-affairs behind states-of-affairs remains dubious.

Karma, like many of the other concepts employed by Vasubandhu, is reasonable in a very general sense, and may help to provide Buddhist practitioners with a needed incentive. The fact remains, however, that its applicability in the universal sense believed by most traditional Buddhists cannot be established with any certainty, for the reasons outlined above and in Chapter 2, section 5.

2. The Saddharmapuṇḍarīka Sūtra and the rise of Mahāyāna

There is, of course, no such thing as a "typical" Mahāyāna sūtra, but the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka (Lotus of the True Law) can conveniently be taken as a starting point for discussions of Mahāyāna because it embodies most of the important themes that set the Mahāyāna apart from the so-called Hīnayāna. Although the sūtra as it now stands was not completed until perhaps 200 A.D., parts of it probably were composed two or three centuries earlier.[246] It is, thus, among the oldest Mahāyāna sūtras. Further, not only does it present important Mahāyāna themes in a literarily effective manner, but it has been one of the most influential of all sūtras, particularly in East Asia.

The Saddharmapuṇḍarīka does not adduce any new arguments that purport to demonstrate the attainability of enlightenment. Indeed, like many "classical" period texts, it takes enlightenment's reality for granted. Two parables found in the sūtra illustrate this. One likens ordinary worldlings to a man born blind. He is unable to see things as they actually are, but he is treated by a skillful doctor. He is cured of his blindness and comes to see things as they actually are. Thus, through the medicine of the Buddha's Dharma, worldlings can come to possess knowledge that is both profound and comprehensive, i.e., they can understand the nature of reality and they can gain omniscience.[247] A second parable likens disciples on the path to travelers in quest of a distant city. The length of the journey causes many of them to despair, so the group's leader creates a magical city, which his companions believe is their goal. After they have rested there and regained their strength, the leader dissolves the city and leads them once more toward their real goal. The leader is, of course, the Buddha. The actual city is the fully omniscient enlightenment of a Buddha; the magical city is the lesser enlightenment, the nirvāṇa of the Arahants.[248] In each parable, the desired attainment--of vision or of the distant city--is assumed, and the parable related in terms of the assumption. It is not, thus, a matter of doubt whether om-

niscient Buddhahood exists, but of describing what it is like to travel toward or awaken to it, given that it does exist. Like the analogies of the Milindapañhā, the parables of the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka are not arguments but exemplifications, which tell us: "Given that such-and-such is the case, this is what it is like."

We have seen that the second parable downgraded as merely provisional the "nirvāṇa" attained by Arahants--or, to employ Mahāyāna terminology, Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas. The insufficiency of the "Hīnayāna" goal is, of course, one of the central themes of Mahāyāna. The criticisms of Arahants launched by Mahādeva--and rebutted in the Kathāvatthu--largely were on what might be called "empirical" grounds, i.e., the observation that many so-called Arahants were not behaving in a manner commensurate with their alleged achievement. The Saddharmapuṇḍarīka's--and most Mahāyāna--criticism, on the other hand, is based on the Arahants' alleged failure truly to grasp the nature of reality. An indispensible prerequisite of enlightenment is comprehension of the ultimate laws of the universe. A Śrāvaka or Pratyekabuddha believes that by his comprehension of the selflessness of persons (pudgalanairātmya) he has penetrated the most fundamental law and that there are no more laws to be penetrated. He is incorrect, for there *are* more laws to be penetrated, specifically the fact that the

three realms of existence are empty, a magic show, a dream, a mirage, an echo; and that all dharmas are unproduced and undestroyed, unbound and unfreed, neither light nor dark.[249] In short, "He who recognizes that all dharmas are deprived of self knows the enlightenment of the supreme Buddha, the Blessed One."[250] The Saddharmapuṇḍarīka does not--as the prajñāpāramitā sūtras do--dwell on emptiness, but it is nonetheless clear that this central Mahāyāna wisdom-concept is regarded as extremely important, for it is very nearly definitive of enlightenment. We will examine it in greater detail in the next section.

Enlightenment is constituted not only by wisdom, however, but also by skill-in-means (upāyakauśalya), a concept the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka discusses much more extensively. Skill-in-means is essentially an ethical doctrine, invoked to explain seeming breaches of traditional discipline or morality by sanctified or enlightened beings; its hermeneutical corollary is the concept of teaching-according-to-disposition (adhimuktatā), which explains the variety and apparent contradictions among the Buddha's many teachings by appealing to the notion that he taught different doctrines to different beings at different times to correspond to the differences in their interests and capacities. The parables of the magic city and the burning house[251] may be taken as illustrative of both skill-in-means and teaching-

according-to-disposition. In each parable, the Buddha invokes an apparent falsehood--the magical city of the lesser nirvāṇa and the three different types of carts (= yānas)--in order to lead ignorant beings toward a higher truth; and in each he teaches doctrines--the lesser nirvāṇa and the three vehicles--that are only provisional, but taught nevertheless because they are effective stepping-stones to profounder doctrines. Skill-in-means and teaching-according-to-disposition are not concepts used directly to argue for the possibility of enlightenment or other fundamental Buddhist assertions, but they *are* used as a way of circumventing possible criticisms that the Buddha was either ethically or doctrinally inconsistent. To this degree, they are indirect arguments, and deserve at least brief consideration.

The behavioral norms for a Hīnayāna Arahant are fairly well-defined: he must show no indications of greed, anger, ignorance, pride or jealousy, and must abide strictly by the rules set down in the Vinaya. If a person alleging himself to be an Arahant deviates from these norms, it is doubtful that he really is an Arahant. Thus, the *Kathāvatthu* was able rather unambiguously to indicate that anyone who was an Arahant by definition would not deviate from the norm; and the converse implication was that anyone who *did* deviate probably was *not* an Arahant. This clear-cut norm

may have begged any number of other questions (e.g., about the connection between outward behavior and inner attainment), but at least it established relatively clear standards. With the growth of the Mahāyāna idea that a Buddha or Bodhisattva may infringe upon, e.g., his prātimokṣa vows in the interest of benefitting sentient beings either individually or collectively, Buddhism placed itself in far more ambiguous ethical territory. It is not unusual for an ethical system to distinguish between ends and means, and to conclude that an exalted end--particularly a difficult-to-attain one--sometimes may require expedient means for its achievement. Still, the Mahāyāna assertion that certain types of spiritually-advanced beings may flout ordinary morality if they do so from compassionate motives raises a number of problems, particularly for someone viewing the system from without.

The most fundamental problem posed by the doctrine of skill-in-means is, perhaps, its implicit divorce of observable behavior from "inward motive." Taken to its logical extreme, this divorce entails complete ethical relativism, for whatever a man's action may be, it is always possible that his motives are different. An apparently good act may spring from selfish motives, and an apparently immoral act from compassion. Certainly, ordinary people act immorally and selfishly most of the time, and their actions do not

spring from compassion. Bodhisattvas, on the other hand, because their minds are, as it were, colored by compassion, invariably act from good motives, whatever the outward appearance of their acts. Unfortunately, if motivation is divorced from behavior and sequestered in some invisible mental realm, it becomes impossible for ordinary beings, accustomed to judging by observable actions and their effects, to know who is a Bodhisattva and who is not. Thus, it becomes impossible finally to judge anyone's actions, because the ultimate standard of judgement, an inner disposition or way of thinking, is inaccessible, and not inherently related to behavior. It may be argued that a Bodhisattva, at least, can recognize another Bodhisattva, but such an assertion obviously begs the question, for it is the way in which _we_ can ascertain that someone is a Bodhisattva that is at issue. If it is argued that, while motivation is invisible, good results _can_ be observed, and the motivation thereby determined _a posteriori_ to have been compassionate, two problems arise: (1) not only do good results not inevitably spring from well-motivated actions but, further, good results, even if they spring from good motivation, may not necessarily spring from a mind that is dominated by compassion--for ordinary beings are capable of specific instances of well-motivated action, even though their minds are still fundamentally polluted by attachment

and ignorance. (2) Not all results are easily ascertainable, for many of them are postulated to occur in future lives, whose existence is debatable. A compassionately-motivated "immoral" act committed in this life does not always bear fruit in this life--yet, if we cannot see the future results, we have no way of being certain that the act really was compassionate; and if there are no future lives, then the act was not compassionate, for it will not entail the result that is the only criterion of measurement of its quality.

The assertion,that a particular act of someone said to be a Bodhisattva or Buddha is an instance of the compassionate application of skill-in-means, is essentially unfalsifiable, for once a being is defined in a certain way, i.e., as a Bodhisattva whose every act is colored by compassion, or as an ordinary being whose every act is colored by ignorance and attachment, everything that that being does will automatically have an ultimate significance that is determined by the category into which he has been placed. Yet, we have no certainty that the idea of a basic mental quality coloring one's every action is valid, and even if it is, the quality is unobservable, and we thus are left having to take on faith the particular assignments that may be given to particular beings--yet how can we know whether to believe particular beings who make particular

claims or assignments? Charlatans and self-deluders are not unknown in the history of religion, so this is a real problem. Further, we ultimately have to take on faith the very existence of the division of beings into deluded and sanctified or enlightened, unless the philosophical basis of the division is justified rather than merely asserted.

In short, then, the doctrine of skill-in-means begins with the reasonable observation that there is no inevitable correlation between the apparent quality of an action and the motives from which it is done; but this observation opens the door to a radical separation of motivation and behavior, at whose extreme point behavior is ultimately irrelevant to the moral quality of an action. Only the motive can be taken as a basis for judging the act; yet the motive is by definition unobservable to ordinary beings, so judgement is finally impossible--particularly since it is asserted that there are beings whose every action is influenced by compassion, and whose every action, therefore, by definition is good. Because we have no basis for determining who may be a Bodhisattva, anyone may be, so anyone's action may be good, and no act can be condemned--except by a being with the ability to perceive the mental qualities of others independent of their behavior, and existence of such qualities or beings is problematic.

The doctrine of teaching-according-to-disposition is

exemplified in the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka by the specification of nine different types of teaching that the Buddha offered to beings of various inclinations: sūtras, a mixture of narrative and verse (geya), prophecy (vaiyākarana), verse (gāthā), solemn utterances (udāna), sayings (ityukta), birth-stories (jatakas), miracle-stories (abhutadharma), and lengthy narratives (vaipulya). The doctrine received a far more significant formulation later, in the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra, which explicitly stated for the first time the idea that all of the Buddha's teachings could be classed under two headings: those of direct meaning (nītārtha) and those whose meaning required interpretation (neyārtha). The former were unambiguous, and could be taken literally; the latter were taught provisionally, and needed explication.

This hermeneutical principle came to shape most subsequent Buddhist discussions of reconciling the Buddha's various teachings, but, like the doctrine of skill-in-means, it is not without its problems. The most important is, quite simply, that although various traditions have accepted nītārtha-neyārtha as a fundamental interpretive tool, each has regarded texts expounding its point of view as having a direct meaning, and has relegated the texts of all other traditions to the category of teachings requiring interpretation. Thus, the prajñāpāramitā teaching of the emptiness of all phenomena is regarded by Mādhyamikas as a di-

rect teaching, while Yogācārins take it as requiring interpretation, because it can be misunderstood as entailing nihilism. How is an uncommitted observer, Buddhist or not, to reconcile disagreements among second-order texts that purport properly to arrange first-order texts? The only method, it seems, is to examine the philosophical views of the various traditions and attempt to determine on the basis of perception and inference which is most nearly correct. That this in principle is possible--although laborious--means that, at least, the process of determining which teachings are direct and which require interpretation is not entirely circular.

Of course, the necessity of harmonizing the various teachings in an extensive tradition is one whose urgency is felt far more strongly by those within the tradition than without it. The historian of religions is likely to view religions as evolving institutions, which are bound to contain variations, contradictions and changes of direction. To an adherent of the religion, however, the admission of loose ends, let alone contradictions, is subversive to the belief that the religion's founder was perfect or omniscient. If the Buddha contradicted himself, he could not lay claim to a Buddha's attainment. Since he was, of course, a Buddha, he cannot have contradicted himself, so apparent contradictions in his teaching are just that, apparent--

there is a deeper harmony to his teaching that is explained by recourse to his compassionate response to the inclinations and needs of his listeners. Once the distinction between *nītārtha* and *neyārtha* is accepted, *any* apparent contradiction can be explained away, because virtually any teaching attributed to the Buddha can be accepted as having been taught at least provisionally by him. The tradition, thus, is guaranteed to be free from internal inconsistency--as long as one accepts the two levels of meaning and does not ask too many hard historical or psychological questions.

Let us return to the basic thrust of the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka*. We have seen that it emphasizes both wisdom--of which the understanding of emptiness is the supreme instance--and method--especially as embodied in the concept of a Buddha's compassionate exercise of skill-in-means. Wisdom and method together, when perfected, equal Buddhahood. Buddhahood, in the Mahāyāna in general and the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka* in particular, is equated not only with great miracle-working ability but, quite simply, with total omniscience, without which there is no final nirvāṇa.[252] We have seen above that such omniscience was not ascribed to the Buddha by the *nikāyas*. It came to be accepted by the later Theravādin tradition, and by nearly all Mahāyānists--perhaps inevitably, for it is logical for a tradition that

regards its founder as "perfect," even in an initially limited sense, eventually to come to regard him as perfect in as many ways as possible. Thus, the Buddha eventually was regarded as omniscient, all-compassionate and infinitely skillful in assisting beings toward enlightenment. These qualities were, by and large, taken for granted in the "classical" sūtras and śāstras; only in the logical tradition were they given serious philosophical examination and defense.

The various Mahāyāna themes explored by the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka* were echoed, with varying emphases and terminology, in the all-important *prajñāpāramitā* sūtras. These sūtras placed a great emphasis on the importance of understanding emptiness, but did not neglect the "method" side, extolling the six or ten perfections (pāramitās) of a Bodhisattva, and *bodhicitta*, the altruistic aspiration to enlightenment, which was considered the seed or cause of Buddhahood.[253] The actual process by which *bodhicitta* eventually sprouted, flowered and bore fruit in Buddhahood was not explicated until later, when Maitreya--through Vasubandhu's brother, Asaṅga--spelled out in the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* the five Mahāyāna paths implicit in the *prajñāpāramitā* sūtras.[254] The five Mahāyāna paths are structured like their Hīnayāna counterparts, and they share their counterparts' presuppositions: the existence of an enlightened state

(though now defined as omniscience), the distinction between ordinary beings and Āryas, and the transformative power of the realization of an essential principle (now taken to be emptiness). The methods implicit in the *prajñāpāramitā*, then, became the basis for yet another description of the process by which enlightenment--its existence presupposed--was to be attained. The wisdom side of the *prajñāpāramitā* and its central doctrine of emptiness became the basis of discussions that had more bearing on the question of enlightenment's existence and attainability, so it is to emptiness and its soteriological implications that we turn next.

3. Prajñāpāramitā, Mādhyamika and the argument from emptiness

While the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka Sūtra* may typify the Mahāyāna in style and range of themes, it is the *prajñāpāramitā* sūtras that are the basic philosophical texts. The two major schools of the Mahāyāna, the Yogācāra and Mādhyamika, both claim to be interpreting the *prajñāpāramitā*, for both seek to expose the actual meaning of the pivotal concept of emptiness (śūnyatā), the Yogācārins glossing it as emptiness of a substantial dualism of subject and object, the Mādhyamikas taking it as emptiness of any sort of independent self-existence.[255] While Yogācārin writers devoted

most of their attention to psychological, cosmological and metaphysical matters only tangentially related to the explicit content of the prajñāpāramitā literature, Mādhyamikas, beginning with Nāgārjuna, and continuing through Āryadeva, Buddhapālita, Bhāvaviveka, Candrakīrti and beyond, concerned themselves much more directly with exposing the meaning of emptiness and elucidating the ontological and metaphysical implications of the apparently paradoxical language of the prajñāpāramitā sūtras. Indeed, the continuities between the prajñāpāramitā and Mādhyamika are much clearer than between the prajñāpāramitā and Yogācāra, to the point where we can safely say that it is to the Mādhyamika that we may look for the most serious philosophical interpretations of those essential sūtras.[256]

At first glance, both the prajñāpāramitā sūtras and the text generally regarded as the first systematic attempt to interpret them, Nāgārjuna's Madhyamakakārikā, appear paradoxical, if not downright ambiguous or contradictory. If we examine passages germane to our primary concern, enlightenment, we are likely to feel bewildered. For example, the Aṣṭasāhasrikā, generally conceded to be the oldest prajñāpāramitā sūtra, claims that both Buddhahood and nirvāṇa are like an illusion, like a dream.[257] On the other hand, it also describes in various places practices that are aids or obstacles to salvation. Among the aids are faith, the

ten virtues, renunciation, gratitude, etc.; among the obstacles are attachment, distorted views, pride, etc.[258] The most widely read prajñāpāramitā sūtra, the "Heart of Perfect Wisdom" (Prajñāpāramitāhṛdaya), similarly asserts quite straightforwardly that "there is no suffering, origination, cessation or path; there is no gnosis; there is no attainment or non-attainment;"[259] and then goes on to describe the Bodhisattva who, having overcome obstacles (āvaraṇa), fear and distorted views (viparyāsa), "in the end attains nirvāṇa."[260] Nāgārjuna, too, seems to assert the paradoxical, for he writes, on the one hand, that "As an illusion, as a dream, as a celestial city: thus has generation, thus has duration, thus has destruction been characterized;"[261] that "nirvāṇa is not an existent;"[262] and that "nirvāṇa is not in the least distinct from saṃsāra."[263] On the other hand, he describes the cessation of suffering through the elimination of the mental elaboration (prapañca) or ignorance (avidyā) that imputes self-existence (svabhāva) to phenomena and thereby perpetuates the various accepted causes of saṃsāra, such as defilement and karma.[264]

The predominantly negative language of the prajñāpāramitā is easily misunderstood. Indeed, at the beginning of the 24th chapter of the Madhyamakakārikā, Nāgārjuna has a hypothetical opponent object that "If everything is empty, then there will be neither arising nor destruction, and it

follows that the Four Noble Truths are non-existent;"[265] and that "Through emptiness, the true existence of results, right and wrong, and all conventional and worldly (knowledge) is undermined."[266] In short, emptiness threatens both the fundamental assertions of Buddhism and ordinary empirical and inferential knowledge. Nāgārjuna's response to this misunderstanding is to introduce the notion of the two levels of truth, the worldly conventional (lokasaṃvṛti) and the ultimate (paramārtha), and to add that "Those who do not know the distinction between the two truths do not know the profound principle of the Buddha's teaching."[267] The assertion of emptiness is not, thus, the negation of either the Buddhist path or conventional reality, for emptiness is a different type of truth, a meta-truth that describes the ultimate mode of existence of all conventional truths. It does not nullify the conventional truth of conventional truths; it merely affirms that in an ultimate sense all conventional phenomena and truths lack self-existence, i.e., they are dependent. Not only is emptiness not a negation of the conventional--it actually is the only principle by which the conventional can be understood to work, for if phenomena possess self-existence, they must be unchanging and independent. If all things are unchanging and independent, nothing can "work" in the sense in which we know it actually does. It is only because phenomena are

impermanent and interdependent--empty of self-existence--that the processes of the world can occur as we know they do.[268] Simply put, "There is no dharma that is not dependently originated, so there is no dharma that is not empty."[269]

Once again, then, we have found at the core of a Buddhist analysis the concept of dependent origination. In the Pāli canon and the *Abhidharmakośa*, the assertion of the truth of dependent origination served chiefly as the basis for establishing a universal causal principle that could explain, among other things, the process by which saṃsāra is perpetuated and transcended. In the hands of Nāgārjuna, dependent origination becomes a powerful philosophical weapon, the basis for the establishment of emptiness as the ultimate nature of all phenomena. In the *Madhyamakakārikā*, a variety of arguments (though most commonly the tetralemma, the *catuśkoti*) are adduced to show that a variety of different phenomena (though most commonly *abhidharma* categories and principles) are empty and dependently originated. Generally, however, we can divide the applications of dependent origination into the empirical and the conceptual. When we make an empirical and objective investigation of the way in which phenomena actually exist, we find that there is, in fact, no entity that does not depend for its existence on causes and conditions and that does not depend

for its coherence on qualities and parts. Indeed, the "existence" of any entity is simply a subjective linguistic convention that has no basis in fact, for there is, as later Mādhyamikas would put it, no real "basis for the imputation of a name." The "existence" of an entity, then, is dependent on causes and conditions, parts and qualities, and also on conceptual constructions that we foist upon these causes and conditions, parts and qualities. Not only do <u>entities</u> exist dependently; so too do concepts: light cannot be considered apart from darkness, long from short, motion from rest or time from eternity. Concepts may not have causes or parts, the way objective entities do, but they are dependent on contrasting or contradictory concepts, and so are not exempted from ultimate emptiness. Everything in the universe, then, all dharmas objective and subjective, are dependently originated, and their existence is a linguistic fiction, an imputation that reifies what is not a thing, makes what is a process seem substantial, and gives ontological status to what, in a ultimate sense, does not exist.[270]

Although Mādhyamika texts are generally more concerned to refute possible or actual philosophical views held by opponents than systematically to establish, e.g., the possibility of enlightenment or the truth of the Four Noble Truths, both the style and content of Mādhyamika analysis

suggest a number of implicit arguments that might be offered. One modern commentator, Peter Fenner, attempts to argue that the way is paved to liberation by Mādhyamika analysis in part because the conventional authoritative sources of knowledge (pramāṇa) are shown by Nāgārjuna in the Vigrahavyāvartanī to be of dubious validity, for they cannot be authenticated by either themselves or another pramāṇa: if they are said to be self-authenticating, then they are tautologous; if they are said to be other-authenticated, then there ensues an infinite regress of authenticating cognitions.[271] If conventional sources of knowledge, the bases of logical and empirical arguments, are shown to be philosophically indefensible, it follows that the conventional arguments that might be brought to bear against, e.g., the idea that understanding of emptiness is liberating knowledge, ultimately cannot be confirmed. This, in turn, opens up the possibility that there may exist a species of non-dualistic knowledge that escapes the contradictions of the conventional pramāṇas--for it neither operates by means of them nor can be described and analyzed by them.[272]

There are a number of difficulties with this view. The first is that by setting up the cognition of emptiness as a species of knowledge that transcends conventional pramāṇas one comes very close to arguing from ineffability and si-

lence, and thereby to removing the cognition of emptiness from the realm of philosophical discourse. If ultimate reality is _utterly_ uncharacterizeable, then to designate it even as empty is false; if some conventional cognitions or terms are believed more appropriate to the ultimate than others, then the _pramāṇas are_ regarded as having some bearing on the characterization of the ultimate, so neither are conventional _pramāṇas_ utterly irrelevant to the ultimate, nor is the ultimate entirely ineffable.

Second, it seems impossible to escape _pramāṇa_-language when describing ultimate cognitions. Unless a Mādhyamika is to say, "I describe the cognition of emptiness as a cognition, but it is not really a cognition"--and thereby open himself to a charge of self-contradiction--then his assertion that there exists an ultimate understanding or cognition of emptiness is a statement about types of knowledge. It may very well be that the understanding of emptiness involves knowledge of a profound universal principle that may require "yogic perception" for its full comprehension, but the understanding still involves "knowledge" and "perception." Thus, it is ultimately cognitive, and therefore open to the sorts of inquiry that may be applied to other cognitions. The Mādhyamika may or may not accept such an inquiry, but he should not rule it out in principle.

This leads to a third difficulty. It is true that Nāg-

ārjuna refutes the possible validity of conventional pramāṇas, yet he does so by applying a logical dilemma, which is an instance of conventional argumentation. If the conclusion of the argument, the incoherence of conventional pramāṇas, is accepted, then the argument used to arrive at the conclusion must be invalid, so the conclusion need not be accepted; if the argumentative procedure is accepted, then the conclusion to which it leads again is invalidated, for the very argument itself presupposes the contradictory of the conclusion, namely, that logic does have some validity.

Thus, although Nāgārjuna points out the difficulties in validating pramāṇas, he in fact presupposes their usefulness, for he employs logical arguments to make his points and uses cognitive language to characterize the mode in which the ultimate is apprehended. It does not seem, therefore, that we are assured that there is a non-dualistic knowledge utterly beyond conventional predications, for in asserting such a knowledge one must either presuppose the validity of the cognitive and descriptive means that are to be transcended, or lapse into silence. If the silence is total, then nothing whatsoever can be predicated, and religious assertions are as unacceptable as any others. If the silence is that which "points the way" to an experience, then we are faced with the problems posed by the "argument from experience," which we examined in Chapter 2.

If, in fact, a Mādhyamika is to argue from his analysis to the truth of Buddhist religious propositions, he is likely to do so on the basis of the fact that all phenomena are ultimately empty. Indeed, Nāgārjuna himself spells the argument out in the final verse of the Vigrahavyāvartanī and his commentary to that verse:

> For whom this emptiness prevails, all things prevail;
> Nothing prevails for whom emptiness does not prevail.
>
> For whom this emptiness prevails, all worldly and transmundane things prevail. Why is that? For whom emptiness prevails, dependent origination prevails. For whom dependent origination prevails, the Four Noble Truths prevail. For whom the Four Noble Truths prevail, the fruits of a Śramaṇa prevail, all special attainments prevail. For whom all special attainments prevail, the three jewels, Buddha, Dharma and Saṅgha, prevail. For whom dependent origination prevails, good (dharma), the cause of good and the result of good prevail; and evil (adharma), the cause of evil and the result of evil prevail. For whom (both) good and evil, the cause of good and evil and the result of good and evil prevail, defilement, the origination of defilement and the entity of defilement prevail. For whom all the aforementioned prevails, there is established the existence of happy and unhappy rebirths, the paths leading to happy and unhappy rebirths, the transcendence of happy and unhappy rebirths, the means of transcending happy and unhappy rebirths, and all worldly conventions. 273

The basic sequence of arguments presented by Nāgārjuna is this: If things have self-existence (svabhāva), they will--by the definition of self-existence--be permanent, independent and partless. That which is permanent, independent and partless cannot function at all, because functioning entails change and interaction. Things only can function if they are impermanent, dependent and divisible, i.e., if

they are subject to the law of dependent origination. To be subject to the law of dependent origination is, essentially, to be empty. Emptiness/dependent origination is the only logical alternative to self-existence, and once it has been determined that emptiness/dependent origination obtains, it follows that the Four Noble Truths and all worldly conventions obtain, for they function through the law of dependent origination. Thus, the notion that "For whom this emptiness prevails, all things prevail" comes to entail the possibility of enlightenment, for in emptiness all things are possible.

This argument is not as persuasive as it first seems. In asserting that because of emptiness all things are possible, the Mādhyamika certainly does not imply what is meant by the phrase "anything is possible," because to assert that anything is possible is to imply that anything can come from anything. If anything can come from anything, then there is no causal predictability, and causal predictability, as we have seen, is the very heart of the law of dependent origination and its religious application. The Mādhyamika will acknowledge that the notion that things originate in dependence upon causes and conditions entails the idea that every thing or event has <u>specific</u> causes and conditions; thus, some things have the power to generate it and some do not. Similarly, there are things that <u>do</u> have

causes and conditions, and so are possible, and things that do not have causes and conditions, and so are impossible. In short, then, to say that because of emptiness all things are possible does not mean that _anything_ is possible--merely that anything _that is_ possible is possible.

Thus, the Mādhyamika finds himself in the same position as those who expounded the law of dependent origination in the Pāli canon: asserting an undeniable general principle whose particular applications are problematic. The _fact_ that phenomena originate dependently may be established, but the actual details of _how_ particular phenomena originate dependently and what is possible or impossible are not provided by the general law. Thus, the fact that phenomena originate dependently does not, _ipso facto_, guarantee that there is a specific application of the law such that, e.g., the Four Noble Truths are true, the various Buddhist spiritual fruits attainable, good and evil karma created, and happy and unhappy rebirths taken. The general law of dependent origination may be susceptible of logical demonstration of the sort supplied by Nāgārjuna, but what the law's specific applications are is basically what might broadly be regarded as a "scientific" question, answerable only through appeal to commonly-accepted methods of confirmation, such as perception and inference. Emptiness, in short, ensures that what is possible is possible (for it is

the opposite of self-existence, whereby nothing is possible), but it cannot tell us what, in fact, is possible.

The Mādhyamika may reply that he does not merely assume Buddhist religious truths, and that he can show them to be true for two reasons: (1) because the fact that defilements are dependently originated assures that they can be eliminated, and thus that enlightenment is possible; and (2) because it can be demonstrated that ignorance of emptiness is the "root" of saṃsāra and that, therefore, cognition of emptiness can lead to transcendence of saṃsāra.

1. To argue from the fact that defilements are dependently originated to the possibility of enlightenment does not seem entirely warranted. In the first place, it is one thing to assert that defilements have causes and conditions and that they come and go--certainly, anger and desire have causes, and they are not constantly expressed--and quite another to assert that defilement in general can be forever eliminated. The latter assertion entails a basic asymmetry, for defilement in general is said to be dependently originated, and thus eradicable through the elimination of its causes and conditions, but the state in which defilement is absent, itself dependently originated through both positive factors (e.g., merit and gnosis) and the elimination of negativity, is said not to be reversible in the way that defilement is. This asymmetry quite aside, the elimination of

defilement in any single being is not vouchsafed by observation, and the assertion of its possibility rests on the problematic suppositions that (a) the language of dependent origination can, in fact, appropriately be applied to mental events, (b) the mind is intrinsically pure and (c) "true" understanding can have salvific power. We will have occasion to examine these suppositions later. For now, suffice it to say that they are not self-evident.

2. The Mādhyamika may admit that there is an asymmetry in his contention that defilements are capable of cessation while enlightenment is not, but that this is for a good reason: the eradication of defilements is based on the direct realization of emptiness, and when emptiness is directly understood, defilement cannot occur, because defilement is rooted in ignorance that attributes self-existence to phenomena and does not know that ultimately they are empty of any such self-existence. According to the Mādhyamika's analysis, ignorance acts as the root of saṃsāra in the following way: on the basis of memory and the continuity of our bodies, we develop an instinctive sense of a self-existent self. This self is set apart from the rest of existence, from other selves and entities, and given special importance. Its needs are pursued, its interests defended, and thus desire, attachment, anger, pride and the whole spectrum of negative emotions--the defilements--are

generated. These emotions, in turn, help obscure our understanding of reality, and reinforce our sense of self, so that we continue to act on the basis of defilements, and thus to circle in saṃsāra. The transcendence of saṃsāra begins with the recognition--usually attained through philosophical analysis--that our innate or conceptual imputation of a self to ourselves or phenomena has no foundation whatsoever, that all things are, in fact, empty of the sort of selfhood we attribute to them. Since the various defilements are based on the notion of a self, once that notion has been eradicated, there no longer is any basis for their arising. Thus, a direct, nonconceptual cognition of emptiness has the power to eradicate defilements because it is the antidote to the conditions in which they can flourish.

This analysis has a great deal of psychological cogency, but that it necessarily has soteriological implications is not so obvious. It is eminently sensible to suggest that we all would be a lot happier if we acted less out of selfishness and attachment, and that one of the ways we can become less selfish and attached is to realize that that to which we are attached does not have ultimate existence. That this is so, however, does not necessarily entail that ignorance of emptiness is the basis of a continuing series of more or less unhappy rebirths, or that a profound comprehension of emptiness turns one into a special kind of

being, an Ārya, who is destined to an enlightenment that is a definite exit from the round of rebirths and itself a state of unsurpassable knowledge, happiness, compassion and power. The Mādhyamika analysis only can have soteriological import if Buddhist soteriology is, in general, accurate--and we have seen how difficult it is to establish that, e.g., the Four Noble Truths are propositions describing actual states-of-affairs. At the very least, they and their presuppositions require demonstration, rather than simply acceptance, and the Mādhyamika analysis does not provide this demonstration.

We may agree that the Mādhyamika analysis can have tremendous psychological import, for it can show us a basis for eliminating attachment and thereby much of our unhappiness; and we may agree that it is philosophically sophisticated, anticipating Whitehead in its thoroughgoing denial of self-existence and insistence on interdependence, and Wittgenstein in its understanding of the way in which linguistic confusions lie at the root of many of our philosophical and existential perplexities. To agree to these things, however, is not to assent to the Mādhyamika's assertion that his analysis is most important for its religious and soteriological implications, for that these implications in fact obtain remains to be seen.

4. Yogācāra, Tathāgatagarbha and the natural purity of mind

Yogācāra (or Cittamātra)--a Mahāyāna philosophical and meditational tradition that stresses the importance of "the loosening and shedding of the mentally constructed,"[274] particularly through a realization of the ultimate lack of substantial difference between subject and object--and Tathāgatagarbha--a Mahāyāna philosophical term that denotes the "womb" or "embryo" of the Tathāgata and connotes the potential for enlightenment, or "Buddha-nature," inherent in all beings--are closely, but not inextricably, intertwined. On the one hand, the earliest texts expounding Yogācāra doctrines and the concept of Tathāgatagarbha seem to date from roughly the same period--post-Nāgārjuna--and both can be seen as a general attempt to counteract the "nihilism" some believed implicit in the Mādhyamika interpretation of the prajñāpāramitā concept of emptiness: Yogācāra stressed the ontological and spiritual primacy of the mind, and the notion of Tathāgatagarbha was an affirmation in the face of philosophical dialectics that enlightenment definitely is possible. Furthermore, the Tathāgatagarbha is discussed primarily in sūtras--such as the Laṅkāvatāra and Śrīmālādevīsiṃhanāda--and by authors--such as Maitreya and Asaṅga--whose leanings and terminology may generally be classed as Yogācārin.[275] On the other hand, Tathāgatagarbha is neither a distinct philosophical vāda, nor exclusively a

Yogācārin concept, for there are Yogācārin texts that ignore or contradict the idea that _all_ sentient beings are capable of enlightenment, and later Mādhyamikas have integrated Tathāgatagarbha into _their_ own vision of reality. In short, Tathāgatagarbha is a concept--more often than not expressed poetically rather than technically--that originated in Yogācārin texts, but came to be accepted and expounded technically to various degrees by both Yogācārins and Mādhyamikas.

Philosophically, the most important Yogācārin concept is probably that of the division of reality into three "natures" (_trisvabhāva_) or "characteristics" (_trilakṣaṇa_). These three, mentioned in passing in the _Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā Sūtra_,[276] were given their first systematic exposition in the _Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra_, which is, as we have seen above, also important for its discussion of direct (_nītārtha_) teachings and teachings that require interpretation (_neyārtha_). The three natures are: the imaginary (_parikalpita_), the dependent (_paratantra_) and the absolute (_pariniṣpanna_). The crucial term is the dependent nature, which is what might be regarded as the conventional world. The dependent nature is ultimately empty of the sort of predications and subject-object distinctions that we impute to it. Our false imputation of ultimate qualities and

subject-object distinctions to dependent nature _is_ the imaginary nature. Beacuse it is confused about the way things actually are, the imaginary nature is ignorance, and thus the root of saṃsāric suffering. On the other hand, the dependent nature's emptiness of the imaginary nature _is_ the absolute nature, so our realization that the dependent nature lacks the characteristics we falsely impute to it is the basis of realization of the way things actually are, and thus of our transcendence of saṃsāra.[277] Other, later Yogācārin texts would debate the ontological status of the three natures themselves, identify emptiness with the dependent nature's lack of any objective reality apart from the subject perceiving it, and regard the recognition that all is "mind-only" (_cittamātra_) as the highest realization; but these distinctions are at best implicit in the _Saṃdhinirmocana_, which seems more generally concerned to establish the principles by which we can understand the continuation and transcendence of saṃsāra. As in Mādhyamika, the key to wisdom--which is, in turn, the key to enlightenment--is an understanding of emptiness, broadly construed as the conventional world's lack of existing the way we think it does.

Psychologically, the most important Yogācārin concept is that of the _ālayavijñāna_, or "storehouse consciousness." It is introduced in the fifth chapter of the _Saṃdhinirmoca-_

na, where it is said to have three characteristics: it is "appropriating" (ādāna)because it is that which, based on seeds and propensities, appropriates the five aggregates (skandhas); it is a "storehouse" (ālaya) because it carries the unripened seeds and propensities produced by previous actions of body, speech and mind; and it is "mind" (citta) because it is "amassed (ā-cita) and accumulated (upa-cita) by form, sound, smell, taste and touch."[278] Originally posited in part to explain personal continuity, the ālaya eventually came to be regarded as the basis (āśraya) of all phenomena, both objective and subjective.[279] Hopkins summarizes its functions in fully-systematized Yogācāra as follows:

> (It is) a repository of seeds or predispositions including those which simultaneously produce a cognizing subject and object of cognition. It is a non-defiled, neutral consciousness and thus capable of being "infused" or "stained" with virtuous, non-virtuous, and neutral potencies. It is a steady consciousness, capable of existing through states which are otherwise mindless, such as deep sleep, the meditative equipoise of cessation, and fainting. 280

The ālaya is likened in the Saṃdhinirmocana to a mirror, which is unaffected by the images that rise and fall in it, and the ocean, which is unaffected by the waves and tides that play on its surface or in its depths.[281] The Mahāyāna-saṃgraha accepts it as the basis of both saṃsāra and nirvāṇa, both in the cosmological sense that all physical and mental phenomena actually are generated from it, and in the

religious sense that it is the *ālaya* that is defiled and the *ālaya* that ultimately is liberated--after a "basic transformation" (*āśraya paravṛtti*) in one's vision of and attitude toward reality, e.g., through understanding that the dependent nature is empty of the imaginary nature we impute to it. The *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* plainly states that nirvāṇa is attained with the final purification of the *ālaya*.[282] The *ālaya* is in this sense synonymous with the Tathāgatagarbha, although the concept of Tathāgatagarbha does not necessitate the positing of an *ālaya* (since, e.g., Mādhyamikas accept Tathāgatagarbha while denying the *ālaya*).

Like most of the "classical" texts we are considering in this chapter, the Yogācārin writings tend to *assume* the possibility of enlightenment, and to spend less time arguing for its possibility than describing the wisdom and method necessary to its attainment--once again against the background presuppositions that dependent origination assures that there are causes and conditions capable of bringing about enlightenment, and that perhaps the most important of these is the attainment of a state of mind that cognizes reality just as it is, and thus no longer partakes of the ignorance that is at the root of all suffering and rebirth in saṃsāra. Curiously, however, there appears in a number of Yogācārin texts a concept that, while not nega-

ting the possibility of enlightenment, does entail that it is _not_ attainable by everyone, even given infinite time. The concept is that of fixed _gotras_, or "lineages," which might best be described as spiritual types.[283] The notion that there are "three final vehicles" (those of the Śrāvaka, Pratyekabuddha and Buddha) is a corollary of the general concept of fixed _gotras_. According to the general concept, each being belongs to a certain spiritual type, which both defines and is defined by his disposition to act in certain ways. Dispositions to act in certain ways lead to actions of a specific type, which lead to fixed results appropriate to those actions and only those actions. Thus, one whose _gotra_ is that of a Śrāvaka will enjoy a Śrāvaka nirvāṇa, but not the full enlightenment of a Bodhisattva who has entered the Buddha _gotra_. At the opposite extreme from those who have entered one of the "three final vehicles" are those who are utterly cut off from any hope of enlightenment, the _icchāntikas_ ("cut-off ones") or _agotrakas_ ("lineageless ones"). _Icchāntikas_ are said by Asaṅga to have six characteristics: indifference to saṃsāra, lack of confidence in the Buddha, lack or respect for themselves, lack of respect for others, absence of compassion and lack of regret for their evil actions; and, "Abounding in these six negative qualities they have no chance of becoming Buddhas."[284] Generally speaking, an _icchāntika_ cannot attain

enlightenment because he is deficient in its causes (*hetu-hīna*).[285] He is deficient in its causes because he is not disposed to act in ways that are appropriate for bringing about an enlightened result. Between the three *gotras* destined for some form of liberation and the *icchāntikas* falls the large class known as the indeterminate lineage (*aniyata gotra*), whose members, depending on the causes and conditions that they encounter, will eventually join one of the three liberation-oriented *gotras* or become *icchāntikas*.

The concept of *gotra* is a somewhat ambiguous one, for it connotes not just certain dispositions, but an added causal factor that assures that those dispositions will continue to be exercised. Taken in this latter sense, *gotra* is the ghost in the machinery of general types of behavior much as karma is the ghost in the machinery of specific events--and, like karma, *gotra* is granted a causal status independent of and ultimately superior to the particular events or dispositions through which its action can be detected. In any case, we see that even when Buddhists deny the possibility of ultimate enlightenment to some unfortunate beings, it is in terms of *causes* or their absence that the possibility is affirmed or denied. Thus, *gotra*-theory falls within the general class of causal descriptions that assume that the law of dependent origination assures the possibility of enlightenment, and the theory itself, like

so much of what was developed during the classical period, is simply an attempt at a more satisfactory description of how enlightenment can be explained and actualized, given the presupposition of the possibility of its attainment.

Because we cannot be certain of the absolute dating of texts expounding the idea of a fixed gotra and three final vehicles, the concept of Tathāgatagarbha cannot be regarded as an historical "answer" to the idea that, e.g., there are beings who will never attain enlightenment. At the same time, it does stand in marked contrast to the fixed-gotra theory. Its central assumption, that all beings have within them the capacity to become fully-enlightened Buddhas, is reminiscent of the sort of ekayāna universalism stressed by the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka Sūtra, where all vehicles but the Buddha-vehicle are really but temporary expedients. In the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, the Buddha-nature inherent in all beings is a general policy; in the Tathāgatagarbha literature, the general policy is explained through an analysis of the mind and its relation to the defilements that keep it from enlightenment. This relation is most strikingly expressed by the nine similes of the Tathāgatagarbha Sūtra, which are cited in the Ratnagotravibhāgamahāyānottaratantra Śāstra, attributed to Maitreya.[286] The mind, or Tathāgatagarbha, is said to be like: a Buddha enfolded in a lotus, honey under a swarm of bees, a grain kernel inside its

husk, gold covered by dross, treasure buried in the ground, a sprout within a seed, a statue dressed in a tattered garment, a universal monarch (cakravārtin) in the womb of a pauper, and a statue begrimed by dust.[287] Each of these "coverings" can be related to a particular kind of defilement, but the important point is the general one: the mind is essentially pure, and, although it is "covered" by defilements, these defilements are adventitious (āgantuka), and their removal assures the mind the full expression of the liberation and omniscience that are its fundamental nature.[288]

Perhaps even more appropriate is the Tathāgatagarbha's similarity to the sun behind clouds,[289] for the sun is in part revealed by the passing on of clouds, but also helps to dispel the clouds itself with its warmth--similarly, the Tathāgatagarbha is said not merely to be passive, but active, for it helps to stimulate in beings an aversion to saṃsāra and a desire for nirvāṇa.[290] There are within Tathāgatagarbha-theory a number of specifications, such as the division of its purity into a general natural purity and a particular purity that lacks defilement;[291] and different schools have defined the Tathāgatagarbha differently: the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra expressly identifies it with the ālayavijñāna,[292] while Mādhyamikas tend to identify it with the mind's ultimate emptiness of inherent existence and its

consequent potential for enlightenment--a position discussed in the previous section. We will pass over these distinctions, however, and examine the philosophical implications of the basic assertion of the Tathāgatagarbha literature, that the mind is naturally pure and undefiled, as well as the implications of some of its corollaries.

We will consider one of the corollaries first: the notion that the Tathāgatagarbha is the key causal element in the process of attaining enlightenment. This is so in three ways: (1) As rGyal tshab points out in his subcommentary to the Ratnagotravibhāga, if there were no perfectly pure Tathāgatagarbha, then all our efforts to eliminate defilements would be futile--without the potential for Buddhahood, there can be no actual Buddhahood.[293] (2) The Tathāgatagarbha is divided into an unconditioned aspect and a conditioned, transformed (or purified) aspect. The latter aspect is said to be the actual "material cause" (upadāna hetu) of enlightenment.[294] (3) The Tathāgatagarbha actually stimulates beings to generate an aversion to saṃsāra and to seek nirvāṇa, and if it did not do so, such aversion and seeking would not exist.[295]

What each of these three causal descriptions has in common is the attempt to supply an explanation for a phenomenon that is assumed or a process that is observed. None, therefore, can be taken as a convincing ar-

gument. (1) It is true that if there is no Tathāgatagarbha, then the quest for enlightenment is futile, but this is simply equivalent to saying that if there is no cause of enlightenment, then there is no enlightenment, which is self-evident. It simply establishes the need for there to be a cause leading to enlightenment--it does not establish that there really is such a cause. (2) Again, presupposing the attainability of enlightenment, the assertion that the conditioned, transformed Tathāgatagarbha is the material cause of enlightenment simply specifies what the cause is, given that enlightenment is presupposed. (3) Positing the Tathāgatagarbha as the cause of aversion to saṃsāra and the search for nirvāṇa is simply an attempt to give an observable psychological process a "real" basis. It is, in fact, possible that our spiritual yearnings are stimulated by some kernel of purity deep within us, but it also is possible that there is no attainment that corresponds to our yearnings for ultimate happiness: the objects of our desire are not guaranteed reality simply because we desire them, for virtually nothing that we desire has existence in an ultimate sense, and much that we desire does not even exist conventionally, but is merely fantasy.

The central assertion, that the mind is fundamentally pure and the defilements staining it merely adventitious,[296] is problematic, for the simple reason that it of-

fers a definition of mind that is far from self-evident and rests on certain suppositions that need to be exposed and defended. Most of these points will be discussed in the next chapter, in the context of Dharmakīrti's defense of interactionism and the Four Noble Truths, but let us at least raise a number of them here.

1. The concept of the natural purity and luminosity of the mind rests on the presupposition that the mind, quite apart from being substantially different from and independent of states of the body in general or brain in particular, is ultimately "beyond" even the various states that we describe as "mental": intention, judgement, emotion, etc. It is not at all clear, however, that (a) the "mind" is necessarily ultimately independent of the nervous system or (b) there is some sort of entity, called "mind," that exists apart from the various dispositions and occurrences that we describe as "mental." Buddhist psychology, of course, divides the mental realm into mind (citta) and mental factors (caitta), but whether this phenomenology is justified is a matter for further psychological and philosophical investigation. To argue that the mind's purity is shown by the fact that the first moment of a perception always is pure and indeterminate is to presuppose that perception (or any cognition) does function the way Buddhists assert it does; yet this presupposition, too, is open to

question and criticism. Perception may, for example, actually be determinate from the beginning: it is not at all obvious that the mind's "real" nature is the cognition of reality as it actually is--the mind may always (as, e.g., Kant insisted) merely give us a "version" of reality, altered by the conceptual lenses through which we view the world.

2. It is almost certainly true that the concept of the natural purity of mind arose in part on the basis of meditative experience, particularly of the calming (*śamatha*) or concentrative variety, where both external and internal distractions are systematically eliminated. The feeling-states induced by such meditation and the religious context in which it is performed tend to give great weight to the perceptions that occur during it and the conclusions drawn from those perceptions. There is, however, no guarantee that particular states of mind, no matter how extraordinary they may seem, and no matter how much conviction they may induce, can be regarded as uniquely authoritative regarding the nature of reality. Indeed, the exaltation of such states, as we saw in the last chapter, probably raises more problems than it solves, because the states are exempted from ordinary checking procedures, and this exemption paves the way for self-deception and multiple contradictory claims that cannot be adjudicated. Quite simply, the fact

that the mind can be cleared of much of its usual "debris" through certain exercises does not necessarily entail the truth of any particular assertions about the nature of mind that may be made on the basis of the experiences gained through those exercises.

3. There is an asymmetrical assumption involved, namely, that purity and good qualities are inherent while defilements are adventitious. If it is claimed that this is vouchsafed through meditation, then the problems raised above will arise; and if we retreat then to ordinary observations, not only are we uncertain of the mind's independence of brain or various "mental factors," but we cannot admit that either "good" or "defiled" states seem to take precedence. Some of us seem more influenced by one than the other, but these balances can shift in the course of a life, and <u>no</u> life seems <u>entirely</u> under the sway of one or the other. Empirically, it seems that all we observe is the constant rise and fall of mental states, and that not only is it difficult both morally and conceptually to describe these states as unambiguously "pure" or "defiled," but that even if we can so describe them, they follow general patterns of alteration: like yin and yang, they replace each other, but neither one is ultimately "triumphant" or ontologically more basic. It would be reassuring to know that the root and goal of sentient striving is some quasi-teleo-

logical pure mind, but we have no greater assurance of the existence of such a mind than we do of the existence of the similarly-conceived Aristotelian-Christian divine cause that is guiding man and/or the universe toward some final perfection.

A corollary of the doctrine of the mind's natural purity is that of its natural omniscience. The corollary is logical: if the mind knows things as they are by nature and is freed from all defilements and obstacles (āvaraṇa), then what remains must be something very much like infinite knowledge.[297] Omniscience also is a topic that will be discussed when we come to Dharmakīrti, but let us raise here some of the problems that it presents--quite aside from the obvious difficulties of either verifying or falsifying its possibility.

One problem is that it is rather difficult to conceive of a mind that cognizes all conventional and ultimate phenomena directly and still merits the name "mind." A mind is something that usually presupposes a particular point-of-view, the occupation--at least metaphorically--of a particular space. Yet a mind that cognizes everything everywhere simultaneously can hardly be said to have a point-of-view, or even a metaphorical "location." It would seem far more closely to approximate a universal mind, yet a universal mind is a nearly incoherent concept, precisely because it

bends the meaning of "mind" to the breaking-point, and, besides, is rejected by most Indian Buddhists. It may be that an omniscient mind can retain individuality and particularity while at the same time cognizing everything everywhere directly, but trying to determine how it could do so certainly strains the imagination.

A second problem with the notion of omniscience is the difficulty presented by the existence in the universe of indeterminacy. If there are states or events that are, within known spatio-temporal frameworks, in principle unpredictable--e.g., those governed by Heisenberg's indeterminacy principle--then it would seem that omniscience in the fullest sense is impossible, because the future cannot be known with certainty. It may be that many of the so-called "random" happenings known to science, e.g., in molecular biology, simply lack sufficiently complete explanations, and may in principle some day be explicable. On the other hand, the problem posed by Heisenberg's principle is of a different order, for the principle states that the very act of observing alters what is observed. The alteration that will ensue cannot be predicted by the observing mind, yet if a mind that cognizes the observing mind is posited, the problem is simply shifted, for there is no predicting how the mind that cognizes the observing mind observing unpredictable phenomena will itself affect the phenomena. If

still another mind is posited, an infinite regress ensues. Perhaps an infinite mind will escape this regress by knowing beforehand how its observation will alter phenomena, but, again, the imagination is strained.

Assuming that the problem of indeterminacy can be overcome (e.g., by maintaining that omniscience is outside known spatio-temporal frameworks), it still remains to be seen that it makes any sense to say that a mind directly cognizes the past and future. It seems that for this to be possible the past and future must in some sense "exist" in the present and be open to inspection, rather than simply being concepts useful in describing that which has already occurred and that which has not yet happened. It might in principle be possible for a mind that cognized everything everywhere in the present to infer simultaneously all of the past and future from that present, but a direct cognition of the past and future would seem ruled out unless the past and future do exist in such a way that they can be directly cognized.

The final problem, of course, is that omniscience presupposes that mind ultimately is independent of the brain or nervous system, for if an omniscient mind is unfettered by any defilements or obstacles, even less must it be shackled by a mere physical organ, whose demise would mean its own demise. This problem, which is basically that of the

nature of mind, has arisen again and again, and only with Dharmakīrti, whose views we will examine in the next chapter, do we encounter a Buddhist who attempts to meet the problem in a manner direct enought to appeal to the temper of an analytically-inclined philosopher.

5. Concluding remarks

To reiterate: my designation of a "classical Sanskritic tradition" as a single topic for consideration leaves us with a necessarily unwieldy category, and I undoubtedly have failed to appreciate either its breadth or depth. At the same time, however, the texts that I have considered--and many that I have not--share at least one characteristic: their presupposition of the existence and attainability of a definite and permanent cessation of saṃsāric suffering, and their attempt in the light of this presupposition to describe in the most satisfactory possible way the path that leads to that cessation. Describing the path, in turn, entails the multifarious discussions of wisdom and method that so concerned classical Buddhist thinkers, and these discussions, in turn, were based on different ways of analyzing the basic constituents of reality--and Buddhist discourse--dharmas. As Potter puts it, the goal of most Indian philosophers is "to find a mapping scheme, a set of categories and relationships, in terms of which they can

plot a route from here to complete freedom."[298] In most classical Buddhist texts, the emphasis is on plotting the route, not on attempting to justify the existence of the destination; or, if it is justified, it is justified by the fact that a route has been plotted.

Let me briefly reiterate some of the main points covered in this chapter:

1. Fully-developed path-Buddhism, as represented by the Abhidharmakośa and the Abhisamayālaṃkāra, posits five stages, or paths, enroute to enlightenment, and the positing of these five paths in turn presupposes (a) the existence of Ārya and ordinary beings, the stage of the former to be attained by some kind of direct cognition of a liberating truth, e.g., the Four Noble Truths or emptiness, (b) the overall adequacy of the dharma-description of the universe, and its "quantifiability" in such a way that the law of dependent origination can easily be applied to it, and enlightenment thus in principle assured, and (c) the operancy of a specific moral causitive factor, karma, which not only assures that every action has an appropriate result here or hereafter, but explains results and events, both psychological and physical, that we see in our present situation. Each of these is, in turn, dependent on the even more fundamental supposition that mind is ultimately independent of body and capable of taking rebirth after re-

birth. Quite aside from the problematic nature of _that_ assumption, each of the foregoing three presents its own problems. (a) The assumption that Ārya status can be attained by a profound cognitive transformation is open to the criticism that it may entail a category-mistake, since it assumes that an ontological change can be effected through a cognitive change; and assumes, too, that the truth profoundly cognized is sufficiently basic to warrant its catalytic role in spiritual change. (b) The "quantifiability" of the dharma-scheme also is open to category questioning, because it is uncertain that all dharmas can in fact be granted causal, hence "numerical," status. (c) Karma, while providing moral explanations for much that seems to need moral explanation, seems unfalsifiable, and also seems invariably to be an "extra" causal factor beyond the ascertainable causes and conditions of any event. It is, thus, a rather elusive element, the "ghost" in the machine of causality.

2. The Mahāyāna, as generally represented by the _Saddharmapuṇḍarīka Sūtra_, embodies the assumptions cited above, and some specific ones of its own, as well: (a) the insufficiency of the "Hīnayāna," either because its practitioners lack sufficiently profound wisdom (as in the _Saddharmapuṇḍarīka_ and most other Mahāyāna texts) or sufficiently extensive methods (as, again, in most Mahāyāna

texts, but particularly in those of the Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamikas, who claim that <u>all</u> Āryas gain the same wisdom);[299] (b) the Bodhisattva's possession, by virtue of his compassion and wisdom, of a "skill-in-means" that enables him to perform apparently inconsistent or immoral acts when a greater individual or collective good--as perceived by him--warrants it; and (c) the corollary idea that the various apparent contradictions among teachings attributed to the Buddha simply are a result of his having taught different doctrines to different beings at different times in accordance with their needs and circumstances. (a) The criticism of the Hīnayāna presents no special problems apart from those entailed by any attempt to prove the superiority of one way of thinking to another: philosophical and experiential justification--themselves not inconsiderable matters. (b) The doctrine of skill-in-means, though beginning from the reasonable observations that (i) a good end sometimes justifies expedient or "skillful" means and (ii) behavior does not always accurately reflect motive, threatens in principle to separate behavior from motive so thoroughly that moral judgement becomes impossible except on the basis of pre-ordained spiritual characterizations that are--because behavior cannot ultimately be judged--unverifiable. (c) The doctrine that the Buddha expounded both teachings that are literal and teachings that require interpretation

may be regarded by a cynic as an attempt to gloss over inconsistencies in the Buddha's teaching, the existence of which is unacceptable if he is granted perfection. Furthermore, the doctrine faces the problem of differing interpretations of _how_ teachings are to be categorized, i.e., which are "unambiguously true," hence direct, and which are only provisionally true, hence requiring interpretation--a problem that only can be solved through close study of Buddhist doctrinal disputes.

3. We encountered two basic Mādhyamika arguments for the possibility of enlightenment: (a) that the problems involved with confirming conventional modes of cognition, such as perception and inference, opens the way to the potential validity of modes of cognition that transced conventional _pramāṇas_; and (b) that the fact that all phenomena are empty means that all phenomena are dependently originated, which means, in turn, that enlightenment, as the end-point of a dependently-originated process, is possible. (a) The fact that there are logical problems involved with the confirmation of _pramāṇas_ does _not_ assure the validity of a mode of cognition that transcends conventional _pramāṇas_, because (i) the fact that there are conceptual problems with describing _pramāṇas_ does not guarantee that there is a mode of cognition free from these problems; (ii) such a transcendental mode of cognition, when it is described,

must be described in *pramāṇa*-language, so there is no *prima facie* reason for exempting it from the sorts of problems endemic to *any* confirmatory cognition; and (iii) the very act of pointing out the logical contradictions involved in confirming conventional *pramāṇas* is itself an application of logical principles that would be undermined if the attack on *pramāṇas* were utterly successful. (b) The argument that enlightenment is possible because phenomena are empty/ dependently originated is inconclusive, because to assert dependent origination is simply to assert that, in general, phenomena arise through causes and conditions. The assertion does not explain the *ways* in which they dependently originate, i.e., it does not establish which causal relations are possible and which are not. It is perfectly conceivable that in a universe governed by dependent origination, enlightenment is impossible, because there *are* in such a universe some causal relations that are impossible, and those described as entailing enlightenment may be an instance of such relations. At best, the question of what is and is not possible in a dependently originating universe is a broadly "scientific" question, and must be investigated by scientific means. The Mādhyamika counter-argument--that enlightenment *is* a possibility in a dependently originating universe because there is a cognition, that of emptiness, in which defilements no longer can subsist--

faces the problem of overstating its case, because there is no guarantee that a cognition that unquestionably may be of great psychological value to some people in fact has ultimate soteriological value for all people--particularly when it is the soteriological schema and and its presuppositions that are themselves open to question.

4. The notion, introduced in Yogācārin literature, that all beings belong to a particular spiritual lineage (gotra) that both explains and helps to bring about particular types of actions, faces some of the same problems as the concept of karma: it is posited as a causal factor, yet it seems actually to be an explanatory principle or principle of psychological classification, whose ontological status might not stand up to a judicious application of Occam's razor.

5. The argument, in the Tathāgatgarbha literature, that enlightenment is possible because defilements are adventitious and the mind intrinsically pure, faces a number of problems: (a) it rests on a description and definition of mind that must be defended rather than merely asserted and (b) it establishes an asymmetry between negative and positive mental factors, the former being <u>in general</u> adventitious, the latter not being so--an asymmetry that may be tempting to assert on the basis, e.g., of meditative experience, but one whose assertion is not warranted by obser-

vation of ordinary mental states. The corollary assumption that the mind is naturally omnisicient faces the problems posed by any doctrine of omniscience: (a) how to assert total omniscience and at the same time maintain that enlightened beings retain some sort of individuality, (b) how to explain the element of chance widely regarded to be a factor in most events, both micro- and macroscopic, and (c) how to explain an enlightened being's alleged direct cognition of the past and future when past and future only have limited ontological status, i.e., they are not causally efficient, and do not exist in the same way as the present does.

6. In general, texts in the "classical" tradition assume that dependent origination is the case, and that what is necessary for a justification of the possibility of enlightenment is simply an account of its "causes." Among the direct or indirect causes of enlightenment are one's _gotra_, _bodhicitta_, the cognition of emptiness, the tantric harnessing of mind and prāṇa in the central psychic channel, etc. Each of these is simply asserted as the cause of a presupposed result, though, and each, therefore, provides a description rather than a justification of enlightenment and the paths that may or may not lead to it. Justification only can be provided if the presuppositions behind path-and-goal descriptions are themselves justified. Classical

thinkers, by and large, did not attempt this basic a justification. Thinkers of the "logical" tradition, such as Dharmakīrti and Śāntarakṣita, did.

CHAPTER 4: ARGUMENTS IN THE "LOGICAL" SANSKRITIC TRADITION

1. The turn toward epistemology and logic

Dharmakīrti's Nyāyabindu, probably written during the seventh century, begins with the sweeping observation that "All human accomplishment is preceded by correct cognition."[300] As striking in its way as the opening of Aristotle's Metaphysics--"All men by nature desire to know"--this passage signals the epistemological turn taken by Indian and Buddhist philosophy in the middle of the first millenium A.D. Buddhists came to recognize, notes Warder, that

> We cannot make any assured progress in philosophy, or, therefore, in the practice of Buddhism which is founded on knowledge of the truth, unless we first ascertain what sources of knowledge can be accepted. The theory of knowledge therefore becomes the basis of all study and of all practice...going to the root of all philosophical problems. 301

With the central acknowledgement that knowledge is the basis of all successful human action, philosophers felt constrained to determine the number, types and mode of functioning of authoritative cognitions (pramāṇa), for only in so doing could they establish a firm foundation for determining how to admit evidence and confirm or deny propositions, whether formally stated or not.

Though the different Indian traditions disagreed about the number, types and mode of functioning of authoritative

cognitions--their disagreements often rooted in fundamental metaphysical differences--they <u>did</u> agree on what the important problems were. All of them, thus, contributed to the ongoing debate over the relation between perception and conception, the nature of error, the status of universals, the relation between word and object, and the correct procedures for inference and argument. The latter, because they were the medium through which philosophical discussion was carried on, were particularly important. The Pāli canon, Upaniṣads and even the Vedas contain scattered references to techniques of debate and discussion, and we have seen that basic logical principles were applied to arguments in the <u>Kathāvatthu</u> and <u>Milindapañhā</u>. It was, however, a non-Buddhist school, the Nyāya, that--beginning with the <u>Nyāya Sūtras</u> of Gautama (first-third centuries A.D.)[302]--made the greatest strides in developing a generally-applicable theory of inference. It was the Naiyāyikas who introduced most of the terms and procedures that would be debated and refined by later thinkers from other schools. Out of the efforts of the Naiyāyikas and, in short order, the Jainas and Buddhists, there gradually emerged a set of logical canons that facilitated intersystemic debate.[303] The logical canons were of three types: (1) fundamental logical rules, (2) general criteria for distinguishing good from bad arguments (<u>tarka</u>) and (3) formal inference (<u>anumāṇa</u>).

The fundamental logical rules were presuppositions that framed all presumably intelligent philosophical discussion. As summarized by Richard Robinson,[304] they include:

1. The rule of the conservation of being: something does not come out of nothing, and something does not become nothing.
2. To exist means to exist in space and time.
3. Contradictory things cannot occupy the same place at the same time.
4. Every effect has a cause; nothing happens without cause.
5. The cause must be like its effects.
6. The existence of non-A inplies the existence of A.
7. The agent and the object of an action cannot be identical.
8. The unseen is to be known from the seen.

One might add to Robinson's list the law of the excluded middle--a thing must be either A or non-A--a principle applied with particular forcefulness in the reductio ad absurdum (prāsaṅgika) arguments of Nāgārjuna, but applied by other philosophers, Buddhist and non-Buddhist, too. "These axioms and definitions," Robinson maintains, "are generalizations from common sense experience, true to no greater extent than the congruence between common sense and reality. They are imprecise, and not well qualified or defined."[305] Their difficulties notwithstanding, the fundamental logical rules helped to establish a common philosophical language that could be a medium of discussion and debate. The Indians seldom questioned their own axioms--and thus "did not open up new sources of factual knowledge, and

did not rejuvenate their problematic"[306]--but they did develop a framework adequate for a sophisticated exploration of many of the problems that most interested them.

Criteria for distinguishing good from bad arguments were as numerous as were fundamental logical rules. We need not detail them, but merely indicate that among the fallacies to be avoided in debate were: (1) self-residence (_ātmāśraya_), wherein an entity is used illegitimately to explain itself, in terms of origination, subsistence or cognition; (2) reciprocal dependence (_anyonyāśraya_), wherein one term is explained by a second term, which then is explained in turn by the first term; (3) vicious circle (_cakraka_), wherein one term is explained by a second term, which is in turn explained by a third term, which is in turn explained by the first term; (4) infinite regress (_anavasthā_), wherein one term's relation to a second term is explained by recourse to a third term, whose relation to the first and second terms must be explained by recourse to a fourth term, and so forth, _ad infinitum_; (5) complexity (_gaurava_), wherein either entities or concepts are multiplied unnecessarily, a procedure that will lead to eventual, if not immediate, explanatory difficulties.[307] All of the above have parallels in Western philosophy. Self-residence, which is the general fault of explaining something in terms of itself, is similar to--if not an exact equiva-

lent of--question-begging. Reciprocal dependence and vicious circle are direct and indirect instances of circularity. An infinite regress is just that. Complexity is a sin to be cleansed away by something like Occam's razor.

Formal inference was conducted through what, for lack of a better word, has been termed a "syllogism." The choice of the term is not entirely unwarranted, for despite its structural differences from a classical Aristitelian syllogism, the Indian formal inference contains the same functional elements, and can easily be rearranged to fit the Aristotelian mold. Abstractly, an Indian syllogism is of the form:

Subject is	Predicate because	Reason
dharmin	sādhya,	hetu,
	dharma	liṅga

The Subject and Predicate together comprise the Thesis (pakṣa, pratijñā). The Reason is bolstered by an accordant example (sajātīya dṛṣṭānta) and a non-accordant example (vijātīya dṛṣṭānta); and--most importantly--the Reason must be (a) relevant to the Subject (pakṣadharma), (b) invariably concomitant with the Predicate (anvaya) and (c) such that its negation is invariably concomitant with the negation of the Predicate (vyatireka). A typical correct syllogism in which a cause is inferred from an observed effect is the following:

(S) On the hill,
(P) there is fire,
(R) because there is smoke,
(accordant) as in a kitchen,
(non-accordant) unlike in a lake.

The syllogism is correct because (a) there is smoke on the hill, (b) generally, where there is smoke, there is fire and (c) generally, where there is no smoke, there is no fire. (b) and (c), the Reason's invariable concomitance with the Predicate in positive and negative instances, serve as the unstated premises on which an Aristotelian equivalent would be constructed. Thus:

Where there is smoke there is fire.
On the hill there is smoke.
Therefore, on the hill there is fire.

To make the functional similarity of the two forms of inference even clearer, let us take the traditional Western example:

All men are mortal.
Socrates is a man.
Therefore, Socrates is mortal.

Stated in Indian form, this would be a syllogism based on identity, and would run:

Socrates
is mortal,
because he is a man,
like Pericles,
unlike Zeus.

The syllogism is correct because (a) the Reason is relevant to the Subject, i.e., Socrates is a man, (b) the Reason is invariably concomitant with the Predicate, i.e., all men

are mortal and (c) the non-Reason is invariably concomitant with the non-Predicate, i.e., if a being is not mortal, he invariably will not be a man. There are, of course, many further details of Indian logical thoery: enumerations of fallacious Reasons (hetvābhāsa), specifications of the various types of proofs, etc., but these need not be mentioned here; for the moment, let our general characterization of the structure of formal inference suffice.[308]

Whatever their religious and philosophical differences--and they certainly were manifold--the Indian traditions gradually reached a point where they shared a general language in which to carry on intersystemic discussion and debate. The development of a general philosophical language allowed different traditions to interact more effectively, and this change in interaction in turn affected the philosophical agenda. Individual traditions did not, of course, cease to carry on their internal debates, but they had now to concern themselves with the points of view and objections that might be--and were--raised by members of other traditions. Thus, such great Buddhist thinkers as Bhāvaviveka, Dignāga, Dharmakīrti and Śāntarakṣita are at least as interested in attacking and meeting the objections of non-Buddhists as those of Buddhists.

The increasing concern with intersystemic issues, in turn, had at least two effects: it promoted a greater rigor

and care in the presentation of arguments, and it tended to shift the focus of philosophical concern to the broad epistemological and logical problems that arose with the possession and refinement of a common philosophical language, and also to fundamental cosmological and metaphysical doctrines--which were far more likely to draw the attention of thinkers from other traditions than were intra-systemic disputes that presupposed the prior acceptance of a large number of propositions and assumptions that might be unique to that system. Thus, Buddhists, for example, who had devoted much of their energy during the "classical" period to rather idiosyncratic discussions of problems arising from the *abhidharma*, suddenly found themselves being criticized on a far more fundamental level. Materialists, such as the Cārvākas and Lokāyatas, made sophisticated criticisms of the concepts of rebirth and liberation. The Mīmāṃsakas denied that there could exist an omniscient being. The Vaiśeṣikas attacked Buddhist nominalism. Jainas and Sāṃkhyas attempted to refute the theory of momentariness and the Buddhist analysis of causality. Virtually everyone attacked the Buddhist belief in selflessness. Thus under attack--though they certainly initiated as many skirmishes as did their opponents--Buddhists took in hand the logical weapons at common disposal and sought to articulate and defend their most basic beliefs. Much as had the Buddha of the *ni-*

kāyas, they found themselves in a world of wide-open discussion, and were forced to argue carefully and with an eye to the essentials. It is undoubtedly for this reason that--despite their complexity--discussions arising out of the "logical" tradition seem the most pertinent today--for those who took part in them had a sensitivity to problems of authority and confirmation not inferior to that of contemporary philosophers.

Let us return to Dharmakīrti's contention that "all human accomplishment is preceded by correct cognition." This is an assertion of fundamental philosophical importance, for it brings together two philosophical realms that sometimes are divorced: that of value and that of fact. The realm of value is dominated by what might be called existential concerns, that is, the attainment of particular human aims, the completion of certain projects. The realm of fact is dominated by what might broadly be called epistemological concerns, that is, the attempt to discover what is, in fact, the case. The reason why we seek to discover what is the case--why "all men by nature desire to know"--is because we have aims that we wish to accomplish, and one of the first things we come to know is that, generally speaking, possessing true or accurate information about what is the case enhances our prospects of attaining our aims. Generally, in striving to attain particular aims, we need to

know what actions (whether of body, speech or mind) are to be avoided and which pursued. What to avoid and what to pursue (or what to reject and what to adopt, S. heyopadeya) only can be determined with certainty if we have a firm understanding of what can be known and how it can be known. Thus, an exploration of the world of fact that is based on a sound epistemological theory is the only way that we can be certain of bringing to realization our values and aims--whether what we wish to attain is simply survival, or a physical object, or an intellectual concept, or an ultimate state, such as enlightenment. In every case, a specific object is sought, and in every case one must gain knowledge of what to do and what not to do so as to attain that object. An exploration of the realm of fact based on sound epistemological theory will yield up information on whether a particular object can be attained, and if so, how it is to be attained.

Our object or aim of "ultimate concern" (in Tillich's phrase) often is a religious one. Certainly in India there was a widely-shared preoccupation with the problem of freedom, most often--but not necessarily or exclusively--construed as freedom from a cycle of rebirths whose nature was shot through with suffering. Whether and how such freedom was possible became a central philosophical problem, and by the "logical" period, many thinkers had come to recog-

nize that religious goals--whatever their ultimacy--still had to be subsumed under the general rubric of human aims whose accomplishment must be preceded by correct cognition. Thus, the determination of whether and how religious aims could be accomplished had to be subjected to the same sorts of tests that would be applied to more mundane concerns. If what is to be rejected and what adopted in the pursuit of religious goals can be justified by appeal to commonly-accepted authoritative perception and inference, then the existence and attainability of a religious goal will have been upheld, and one's world-view vindicated, if not necessarily to the satisfaction of all.[309]

2. The background and presuppositions of Dharmakīrti's arguments

Most writers on Indian philosophy--both Indian and Western--have regarded the contributions of the likes of Dignāga, Dharmakīrti and Śāntarakṣita to have been greatest in the sphere of epistemology and logic. That may be so, but they neither ignored nor demeaned the discussion of fundamental religious issues--precisely because those issues were now subsumed by epistemological theory, as encapsulated by Dharmakīrti's dictum to the effect that "all human accomplishment is preceded by correct cognition." Indeed, because they were considered open to authoritative

confirmation or refutation, and because they were "ultimate concerns," religious issues were taken quite seriously by any number of members of the "logical" tradition. The most important contributions to the ongoing attempt to justify the Buddhist world-view came from Dignāga (sixth century), Dharmakīrti (seventh century) and Śāntarakṣita (eighth century). Of these, the most important was Dharmakīrti, who, in the pramāṇasiddhi (establishment of authoritativeness) chapter of his Pramāṇavārttika (Commentary on Authoritativeness), systematically set out to demonstrate conclusively that the Buddha was a being who had become authoritative (pramāṇabhūta)[310] for those who strive for freedom. Dharmakīrti's chapter is, in theory, a commentary on a single śloka praising the Buddha at the outset of Dignāga's Pramāṇasamuccaya, and some of Dharmakīrti's arguments were later reworked or elaborated by Śāntarakṣita, in his Tattvasaṃgraha, as well as by generations of commentators, but the pramāṇasiddhi is the locus classicus for Buddhist arguments purporting to demonstrate the truth of Buddhist religious propositions, such as the existence of past and future lives and the validity of the Four Noble Truths. Before outlining and analyzing Dharmakīrti's arguments, we must briefly indicate some of the ontological and epistemological assumptions that structure and color those arguments.

There is no firm consensus on the school of Buddhist philosophy to which Dharmakīrti should be assigned. The Tibetan philosophical systematizer dKon mchog 'jigs med dbang po, for instance, notes that there are both Sautrāntikas and Yogācārins who claim to be followers of Dharmakīrti.[311] A. Singh Moriya has concluded in a recent study that both Dignāga and Dharmakīrti were, in fact, Sautrāntikas.[312] Most Tibetan writers, on the other hand, consider Dharmakīrti a "Yogācārin following reasoning." Warder avoids the problem entirely by lodging Dharmakīrti in a "Pramāṇa School."[313] The problem is not alleviated by the fact that the distinction between Sautrāntika and Yogācāra is not always clear, nor by the fact that Dharmakīrti, like any original thinker, is susceptible of being read in a number of different ways, and that his very brilliance made him likely to be claimed by members of schools to which he did not belong. Still, it seems that the Tibetan argument, that he was a Yogācārin, is the most persuasive, for there simply are too many refernces in Dharmakīrti (e.g., verses 320ff. and 532ff. of the _pratyakṣa_--perception--chapter of the _Pramāṇavārttika_) to such notions as the ultimate non-difference between between epistemological object and subject, for him not to be counted as a Yogācārin. At the same time, the _pramāṇasiddhi_ chapter is admittedly written chiefly from a Sautrāntika standpoint, and the majority of

the assumptions that we are about to recount are considered by Tibetan writers on systems of tenets (S. siddhānta, T. grub mtha') to be Sautrāntika.

The central ontological doctrine of Dharmakīrti is the theory that all existents are ultimately momentary, and that what we call the objective world is, in fact, a composite of "atomic" events (kṣaṇa) of negligible extension and duration, onto which we impute various general characteristics. The theory of momentariness is a logical extension of the basic Buddhist belief in the impermanence of all phenomena, and seems to have arisen specifically to counter the Vaibhāṣikas' attempt to divide a supposedly atomic event into sub-moments of arising, subsistence, decay and non-existence. The Sautrāntika (e.g., Vasubandu in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya) argues that such a division makes a mockery of the idea of an atomic event, for an atomic event by definition is irreducible. Furthermore, if an atomic event is thus subdivided, then each of the subdivisions must be further subdivided along the same lines, and so forth, in an infinite regress. Not only, the Sautrāntika feels, can an atomic event, or moment, not be subdivided--it cannot be asserted to have any duration at all, for if it lasts more than the minimal length of time required to qualify it as an existent, there is no reason to believe that it ever will cease, for its perishability--granted to be among the

qualities of an impermanent entity--must come into play immediately, or not at all. An atomic event whose cessation is not virtually simultaneous with its arising will be permanent. Anything that is permanent is incapable of changing or affecting other things. If all atomic events are permanent, then the universe as we know it is inexplicable, for the universe that we know is one in which change and transformation manifestly are the general "way things are." The law of the excluded middle leads us to conclude that phenomena must be utterly permanent or utterly impermanent. Since the former completely fails to provide a basis for explaining the world, the latter must be the case, and all phenomena ultimately must be reducible to temporally and spatially atomic events.[314]

The theory of momentariness has not been without its critics, nor is it entirely free from problems. It was opposed by most other Indian philosophical schools. Two criticisms made by the Jaina, Akalaṅka, may be taken as a case in point. He argues, in the first place, that the severity of the Buddhist application of the law of the excluded middle is unwarranted and that, in fact, the truth is usually attained through a "middle" approach that <u>includes</u> logical extremes. Thus, phenomena are best explained not through an insistence that they be either utterly permanent or utterly impermanent, but through a recognition that all produced

phenomena are involved in both duration <u>and</u> change, and thus are <u>both</u> permanent and impermanent. For the Jaina, this approach manages to circumvent the second problem he believes the theory of momentariness entails: its inability to explain causality. If atomic events are extensionless, durationless and separate, then there really is no basis for speaking of one as cause and one as effect; causality only is meaningfully described where some continuity obtains between cause and effect, and the Buddhist view excludes this. The Jaina view, on the other hand, which admits of both continuity and change, does permit an intelligible relation between cause and effect.[315]

The Buddhist is not without a response. He will defend his strict application of the law of the excluded middle on the grounds that a failure to do so--though it may help solve certain explanatory problems--violates the even more fundamental law of contradiction, whereby opposite qualities cannot be predicated of a single entity at the same time. If an existent is admitted to be both permanent and impermanent, then a contradiction is being asserted, a contradiction that renders discussion unintelligible. The law of contradiction must stand, and so must the law of the excluded middle. Hence, the Buddhist analysis is justified. Furthermore, causality is <u>not</u> inexplicable on the Buddhist view, for every atomic event is essentially efficient (<u>ar</u>-

thakriya), in that it is able to "impress" its particular mark (svalaksana) on a subsequent atomic event, or act as the cooperative condition for the arising of an atomic event of a different type. At the ultimate level, particular marks are virtually impossible to distinguish, yet atomic events do combine in various ways to form composites whose efficiency and particular marks are easier to identify. The efficiency and particularity of the composites that we see in the world entail their being based on atomic events that are efficient and have particular characteristics. Thus, fidelity to logical rigor demands that we break temporal duration and spatial extension into atomic events, but the fact that what have thus analyzed manifestly is causally efficient and has particular characteristics assures that the atomic events must be the same--for, a complex phenomenon cannot be composed of simples with qualities opposed to those of the complex, which is, as it were, the "given" from which analysis begins.

A more general problem posed by the theory of momentariness is its tendency to lead those who subscribe to it into a sort of "logical atomism," whereby every conceivable type of phenomenon is reduced to the same status, that of atomic event. This is not a problem where strictly physical phenomena are concerned, but difficulties arise when it is applied to the mental or psychological realm. Can mind be

atomized in the same way as matter can? Does it make sense to speak of mind as having causal efficiency independent of that of its physical correlatives? These are serious conceptual questions, with which we will deal in greater detail in section 6 of this chapter. Suffice it to say that Buddhists in general and Dharmakīrti in particular give mind the same sort of status as matter, i.e., as momentary and causally efficient. Among Buddhists--indeed, among all Indian philosophers--the Sautrāntikas were perhaps the most skilled at separating actual events from our conceptual constructions of them, but the analyses that were turned against such concepts as universals, substantially separate wholes and a permanent self never were applied to the concept of mind--for mind was assumed, on the basis of apparently good empirical evidence, not to be a concept, but a functioning entity (vastu), broadly explicable in the same "substantial" terms as is matter.

We have already seen that the theory of momentariness is inextricably intertwined with the problem of causality. In general, the causal process as viewed by Dharmakīrti is one in which the larger "causes" and "effects" that we observe in everyday life actually consist of a series of atomic events, each one of which is an ever-so-slight variation on the one that preceded it and will, in turn, effect an ever-so-slightly variant event that succeeds it. Each a-

tomic event is, thus, both effect and cause. The "continuity" that we observe on the macroscopic level simply is an instance of a series of atomic events whose conditions vary insignificantly from moment to moment. A "change" occurs when the alignment of causes and conditions has shifted significantly enough that we are moved to observe, e.g., "that seed has become a sprout." The transformation of seed into sprout actually has occurred in infinitesimal increments, but our perception and concepts are not attuned to such subtlety, so we speak of one thing "changing into" another. "Destruction" occurs when the conditions necessary for an atomic event's effecting a subsequent similar event are removed. Thus, the breaking of a jar by a hammer can be seen in terms of the removal of the condition--a coherence of baked clay--for the perpetuation of the atomic series that has the power to generate in our minds the knowledge, "this is a jar." Similarly, if a seed "dies," i.e., if there is an end to the series of events that would culminate in a sprout, it is because the conditions, such as those of soil, moisture, sunlight, etc., have been altered significantly enough that the ordinary process is stymied.

Buddhist philosophers have described as many as twenty-four different types of causes and conditions. Dharmakīrti does not recognize that many and, indeed, there are only two types of cause that are central to his discussion.

The first is the upadānahetu, literally the "obtaining cause," but most often translated as "material cause." The material cause is that atomic event that has the capacity to--and therefore does--leave an imprint of its essential nature on an immediately-following atomic event. Thus, one seed-event "generates" another seed-event with an essentially similar particular mark. The seed is said to be the material cause of the sprout, and clay the material cause of a jar. In ordinary language, we say that the seed "transformed" into the sprout, or the clay "was transformed" into the jar, but, in fact, the material cause has been remarkably similar from moment to moment: the fact that the same atomic-event series can be described differently at different times merely reflects different subsidiary conditions. The most important conditions in any causal process are the sahakāriyapratyaya, the immediately-preceding or cooperative conditions of a given result. Cooperative conditions, in turn, are of two general types, indispensible cooperative conditions and assistant cooperative conditions. Indispensible cooperative conditions are conditions in the absence of which the result cannot occur (as moisture and minerals for the seed), or on the alteration of which the result invariably will be altered (as the relative balance among the three bodily humors for physical energy). Assistant cooperative conditions are condi-

tions that contribute toward a particular result without being inevitably associated with it (as the body--on the Buddhist view--can affect the mind without their connection being intrinsic).[316]

One corollary of Dharmakīrti's view of causality that is critical to his discussions, particularly of the relation between mind and body, is the notion that a particular effect's material cause must be of the same type, or homogeneous (sabhāga). Thus, a seed-event only can come from a seed-event. Such homogeneous continuity is obvious in cases like that of a seed, but what about cases in which it appears that something "new" is brought into existence, as when--on the Buddhist view--object, organ and attention combine to generate a sense-cognition? Is not the sense-cognition something "new"? Not according to the Buddhist view: the object, organ and attention are simply the indispensible conditions of the sense-cognition. The material cause of the sense-cognition is a previous moment of cognition. If the particular sense-cognition involved is an eye-cognition, even if one's eyes had been closed and one's attention on a sound during the previous moment, the present eye-cognition's material cause still would be a previous eye-cognition, only in latent (or seed, bīja) form. Generally, thus, something only can result from its likeness, and only can generate its likeness. There is, strict-

ly speaking, no novelty--only shifts in the configurations of basic types of events (i.e., dharmas), which give the illusion of novelty. An especially important application of what might be called the principle of homogeneity is the division of the cosmos into two general types of homogeneous events, the mental and the physical. This "two worlds" theory has its origins primarily in uncritical introspection, which informs us that there is a "mind" that exists in the same causal manner as does matter, yet at the same time is "substantially" different from it, for it is a subject where matter is an object, a perceiver where matter is the perceived. The assumption that mind and body are heterogeneous "substances" still analyzable in the light of the Buddhist theory of causality is, as we shall see, basic to Dharmakīrti's arguments for interactionism--and it also is basic to some of the difficulties that his arguments engender.

The means by which we authoritatively come to know the world thus described by the theories of momentariness and causality are two: perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāṇa). These are the two types of authoritative cognitions (pramāṇa). Other Indian schools accept varying numbers of pramāṇas, from the materialists' one (perception--their denial of inference makes it rather difficult to argue their case) to the Vaiśeṣika, Caraka's, eleven. Dharma-

kīrti argues for limiting the number to two in a number of different places;[317] his contention and that of other Buddhists who have discussed the point is that most of the additional pramāṇas posited by non-Buddhists can ultimately be subsumed under inference. The most important pramāṇa thus subsumed is testimony, whose establishment as an independent means of knowledge is crucial to Hindu traditions that base their religious practices on received tradition, either oral or scriptural. Buddhists argue that information gathered from testimony cannot be confirmed without recourse to perception and inference, and that when we decide to believe something on the basis of testimony, we come to "know" it only because we already have drawn certain conclusions about the source of the testimony, and thus make an inference such as: "x is y, because z says so," where z already is regarded as authoritative.

Perception is regarded as a nondeceptive cognition that does not involve mental constructions of any sort. Perception directly cognizes objects just as they are, in their particular marks. Perceptions are of four kinds: (1) a sense perception directly cognizes a sense-object, through the medium of a sense-organ. (2) A mental perception follows directly on a moment of sense or mental perception, or may be an instance of extra-sensory perception. All mental perceptions are non-conceptual. (3) An ap-

perception (<u>svasaṃvedanā</u>) is, in effect, a perception of a perception: the Sautrāntikas explain memory by recourse to the notion that each perception of the other three types has as its substantially identical but conceptually distinguishable concomitant a "second" perception that perceives it. (4) Yogic perception involves the direct, defilement-uprooting cognitions of Āryas, who realize, e.g., the Four Noble Truths, or emptiness. Apperception is accepted only by Sautrāntikas and Yogācārins; the other schools reject it as a logically indefensible concept. All Buddhist schools accept the other three types of perception. The most important of those for an account of ordinary perception is sense perception. The process of an ordinary being's cognition of an external object begins with a moment of direct sense perception, which is followed by an infinitesimal, unconscious moment of direct subsequent mental perception. The third (or second, if the mental instant is discounted) cognitive moment is a subsequent sense perception that cognizes the object directly, but no longer is "authoritative," since it is "induced" by the first perceptual moment, and cannot ascertain its object independently. Subsequent moments of cognition no longer grasp the object directly; rather, they grasp a generic image (<u>arthasāmānya</u>) of the object, and, thus, involve some degree of mental construction.[318]

The Sautrāntika description of the process of cognizing an external object has a remarkably Humean sound to it, and it is open to many of the criticisms to which one might subject Hume. There is, first of all, the Kantian riposte the the effect that our perception invariably is determinate rather than direct, because it invariably presupposes a frame of reference, the operation of such <u>a priori</u> categories as space and time, not to mention psychological factors, such as anticipation, memory, desire, etc. There is, further, the objection that the "Sense Datum Theory" (as Ryle calls it) simply is inadequate to explain the complex manner in which we perceive and conceive objects, and that, further, it involves an error that

> makes nonsense simultaneously of the concept of sensation and the concept of observation. The theory says that when a person has a visual sensation, on the occasion, for example, of getting a glimpse of a horse-race, his having this sensation consists in his finding or intuiting a sensum, namely a patchwork of colours. This means that having a glimpse of a horse-race is explained in terms of his having a glimpse of something else, the patchwork of colours. But if having a glimpse of a horse-race entails having at least one sensation, then having a glimpse of colour patches must again involve having at least one appropriate sensation, which in its tuen must be analysed into the sensing of yet an earlier sensum, and so on for ever. 319

The point undoubtedly is moot; I simply want to emphasize that the Buddhist account of cognitive processes is not immune to criticism, "logical" though it undoubtedly is.

Dharmakīrti's theory of inference follows the broad outlines set forth above, in section 1. To reiterate:

Subject
is Predicate,
because Reason,
like accordant example,
unlike non-accordant example.

A Reason is correct when and only when it fulfills three criteria: it is relevant to the Subject, it is invariably concomitant with the Predicate, and its absence is invariably concomitant with the absence of the Predicate. We might add that Dharmakīrti specifies three types of fallacious Reasons (hetvābhasa): unproven (asiddha), where the Reason is not relevant to the Subject; uncertain (anaikāntika), where the Reason's invariable positive and negative concomitance with the Predicate cannot be established; and contradictory (viruddha), where the Reason directly opposes the Predicate.[320] There is, of course, more to the theory of inference than this skeleton. There are discussions of the different types of syllogisms (synthetic, i.e., based on causality; analytic, i.e., based on identity; and negative, based on the absence of either causality or identity), further elaborations of the different ways in which Reasons can be fallacious (based on Dignāga's ninefold "wheel of Reasons"), etc.--but a knowledge of the structure of a syllogism, the three aspects of a correct Reason, and the three types of fallacious Reasons is an adequate general basis on which to consider Dharmakīrti's arguments.

Inference is a process by which one establishes a par-

ticular fact about a particular phenomenon (i.e., a Predicate in a Subject) through knowledge of a particular fact (the Reason) that has particular relation to the Subject and a general relation of causality or identity to the Predicate. Further, inference, like any form of knowledge where classes (or universals) are involved, is said to be not so much a "positive" cognition (as a direct perceptual cognition might be described), but as negative--for it is most accurately described as a process whereby one excludes everything that is not a part of the class that is to be cognized. This theory of apoha, in which, e.g., the cognition of a cow is arrived at through a process of (simultaneously) eliminating as possible objects all entities not meeting the description of a cow, has the advantage of avoiding the assertion of permanent universals that somehow "inhere" in particular things, but it is not entirely clear that universals have been disposed of once and for all. Akalaṅka points out that the theory of apoha still presupposes universals (whatever their ontological status--they certainly do not, as the Vaiśeṣikas insist, exist in the same way as particulars do), because to speak of recognizing a cow through excluding everything that is not a cow still involves the recognition that there are certain qualities whose combination is generally accepted as characterizing an entity as a cow. At the very least, it seems

that the Buddhist must accept universals as conceptual tools, though not as real entities.[321] The theory of <u>apoha</u> is closely related to the theory of meaning: a word does not correspond directly to a real entity to which it "refers"; rather, a word excludes everything that is not the object being described. There is, therefore, no intrinsic relation between word and object, and no problem such that the existence of a word entails the existence of the object it describes--a problem faced by Indian systems less nominalistically and more realistically inclined, such as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.

If, as we have indicated above, Dharmakīrti probably was a Yogācārin, the religious orientation we would expect him to bring to his discussion of religious issues would be clearly Mahāyānist. Yet, the <u>pramāṇasiddhi</u> chapter has a distinctively "Hīnayānist" orientation, concentrating as it does on the Four Noble Truths and the doctrine of the selflessness of persons. There is no reason, however, to assume that this orientation reflects Dharmakīrti's personal beliefs; it is quite reasonable to suppose that he is concerned with establishing the truth of Buddhism's lowest common denominator. If he was a Yogācārin, he probably held that the essential realization of an Ārya was that there is no substantial difference between subject and object, and it is probable that he subscribed to a five-path system si-

milar to that set forth in Maitreya's Abhisamayālaṃkāra, and that he believed that the spontaneous generation of the intention to attain enlightenment for the sake of all sentient beings marks the beginning of the first of the Mahāyāna paths, that of accumulation. On the other hand, it must be admitted that virtually none of this is explicit in the pramāṇasiddhi chapter, and that (with the exception of the first point), little of it is discussed elsewhere in Dharmakīrti's work, either. It has been up to later commentators, the most notable being Prajñākaragupta, to supply the Mahāyānist framework Dharmakīrti neglected to explicate. Such later expositions of what Dharmakīrti "really meant" may shed light, but they must be regarded carefully, too, for there is no real assurance that every Mahāyānist view attributed to Dharmakīrti by later commentators was, in fact, held by him, and there are some doctrines, such as the Buddha's total omniscience, that there is at least some reason to believe he did not hold.

Such questions always will remain moot where a brilliant but ambiguous text is open to a variety of interpretations. It is perhaps more important to note of Dharmakīrti's religious arguments that they presuppose a number of the ontological and epistemological theories outlined above, but that otherwise his arguments begin with a minimum of assumptions. Even the theory of karma, so central to so

much of Indian religious thought, is used by Dharmakīrti, but not as an axiom that can in turn establish the truth of religious propositions he is seeking to prove. He does not, for instance, argue that there must be past and future lives because otherwise karma would be largely meaning-less--he seeks to establish the existence of past and future lives on the basis of more fundamental ontological and cosmological laws, and karma is held valid only to the degree that these laws are valid. In general, Dharmakīrti displays a remarkable sensitivity to what might broadly be called "the philosophy of religion," i.e., the attempt to view religious problems as a subset of the epistemological and other philosophical problems that all men must face. Beginning with the general assumption that all human accomplishment is preceded by correct cognition and that correct cognition will involve a recognition of what is to be done and what not done toward the accomplishment of a particular aim, Dharmakīrti recognizes that the pursuit of religious aims is a typically human endeavor, and thus subsumable under his general assumption. The pursuit of religious aims, therefore, must be based on correct cognition just as is the pursuit of any other aim. Thus, religious propositions must be justified by appeal to authoritative perception and inference, just as other propositions must.

Dharmakīrti is particularly aware of the need to es-

tablish religious truths authoritatively without recourse to dogmatism based on scriptural authority or an appeal to special experiences. Thus, scripture can give us a general indication of how to proceed with our religious inquiry, but scriptural statements only can be accepted to the degree that they are corroborated by perception and inference, i.e., that they are confirmable. Furthermore, though Dharmakīrti, like all Buddhists, accepts the existence of yogic perception, he does <u>not</u> attempt to justify religious propositions simply on the basis of their being the object of a Buddhist yogi's cognition. Indeed, quite to the contrary, a Buddhist yogi by definition only will have direct cognitions of propositions or truths that can be confirmed by perception and inference, for if the propositions are not confirmed by perception and inference, they cannot be said to be true, and if they cannot be said to be true, they will not have the power to uproot defilements. The uprooting of defilements is, after all, the religious accomplishment that one seeks, and it cannot be preceded by incorrect cognition.[322] Thus, although Dharmakīrti nowhere explicitly discusses his "philosophy of religion" (very few Indian thinkers did, so intimately related were their philosophical and religious concerns), he nevertheless displays a sensitivity to its problematic that is in many ways as sophisticated as that of modern philosophers--and it is

only on the basis of an appreciation of that problematic that he proceeds to justify Buddhist religious propositions.

3. The pramāṇasiddhi chapter of Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttika: general considerations

Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika* is arguably the greatest single work in the Buddhist logical tradition. It certainly has been the most influential, inspiring generation after generation of Indian commentators, and later coming to be regarded as the epistemological and logical canon by most of the important traditions of Tibetan Buddhism. Young Tibetan monks to this day memorize the *Pramāṇavārttika* in its Tibetan translation (as the *Tshad ma rnam 'grel*), and an understanding of its subject-matter is considered essential to a real mastery of Buddhist philosophy. Seminal though it is, the *Pramāṇavārttika* actually was itself composed as a commentary on an earlier work, the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* of Dignāga, Dharmakīrti's great predecessor.[323] The four chapters of the *Pramāṇavārttika* cover inference for oneself (*svārthānumāṇa*), the establishment of authoritativeness (*pramāṇasiddhi*), perception (*pratyakṣa*) and inference for the sake of others (*parārthānumāṇa*). There is some dispute as to the proper ordering of the chapters. Tibetan tradition accepts the ordering just given, while the ordering in the most re-

cent and authoritative Sanskrit editions[324] is: establishment of authoritativeness, perception, inference for oneself, and inference for the sake of others.[325] The _svārthānumāṇa_ chapter covers the types and general structure of syllogism, and the _apoha_ theory of meaning. The _pramāṇasiddhi_ chapter establishes the definition of authoritativeness, and seeks to establish that the Buddha is authoritative for those who strive for freedom.[326] The _pratyakṣa_ chapter settles the number of _pramāṇas_ at two and discusses the four types of perception. The _parārthānumāṇa_ chapter details the three-aspected logical Reason (_trairūpya-liṅga_) and the various fallacies of the Reason (_hetvābhāsa_) to be avoided.

Although purportedly a commentary on the _Pramāṇasamuccaya_, the _Pramāṇavārttika_, as Warder notes, "does not follow Diṅnāga directly,"[327] but, rather, reformulates old issues and raises new ones. The _pramāṇasiddhi_ chapter is a perfect illustration of Dharmakīrti's tendency to depart from the "original," for it consists of 287 complex verses that comment on a single śloka of the _Pramāṇasamuccaya_, the first:

> To the one who became authoritative, who desires to benefit the world, the Teacher, the Sugata, the Savior, I bow down.
> In order to establish auhtoritativeness, I here make a single compendium of my various scattered writings. 328

It is the first half of the verse that is critical for

Dharmakīrti, for there Dignāga lists the five epithets of the Buddha that become the basis of Dharmakīrti's argument. He is: (1) the Authoritative One (pramāṇabhūta), (2) the Benevolent One (jagaddhitaiṣin = one who desires to benefit the world), (3) the Teacher (śāstṛ), (4) the Sugata and (5) the Savior (tāyin). The goal of Dharmakīrti's pramāṇasiddhi chapter is to prove that the Buddha is authoritative for those who strive for freedom, or liberation. To do this, he must first establish the definition of authoritativeness, then indicate generally how he believes the Buddha fulfils this definition. He demonstrates that the Buddha fulfils this definition, by showing the cause of his authoritativeness, i.e., the path that leads to Buddhahood. This involves showing first that he is the Benevolent One, then showing that this entails his being, in turn, the Teacher, the Sugata and the Savior. He also demonstrates why the Buddha is the Authoritative One, by demonstrating first that the validity of his fundamental teaching, the Four Noble Truths, qualifies him as the Savior, and then showing that his being the Savior entails, in turn, his being the Sugata, the Teacher and the Benevolent One. The way of proving that the Buddha is the Authoritative One by showing the cause of his authoritativeness is referred to by later commentators as the forward system of explanation. The way of proving that the Buddha is the Authoritative One by

showing the *reason* for his authoritativeness is called the reverse system of explanation.[329]

Dignāga himself seems to have recognized the general implications of his five epithets, for in his autocommentary to the first verse of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, he indicates that the four latter epithets, which are probative of the Buddha's authoritativeness, correspond to a sequence of "excellences" (*sampat*) developed by the Buddhist path.[330] The Buddha is said to have two general excellences, that of cause (*hetu*) and that of result (*phala*). The excellence of cause is divided into the excellence of thought (*āśaya*), which is the Buddha's benevolence; and the excellence of application (*prayoga*), which is his Teacherhood. The excellence of result is divided into the excellence of one's own aims (*svārtha*), which is his attainment of Sugatahood, with its abandonment of all faults; and the excellence of others' aims (*parārtha*), which is his Saviorhood. Schematized, the excellences and epithets appear thus:

Buddha
the Authoritative One

- excellence of causes
  - thought — Benevolent One
  - application — Teacher
- excellence of results
  - own aims — Sugata
  - others' aims — Savior

The five epithets that were for Dignāga but general indications of the Buddha's excellence become, in the hands of Dharmakīrti, the basis of a detailed attempt to estab-

lish nothing less than the validity of the Buddhist religion. In generally indicating that the Buddha is the Authoritative One, Dharmakīrti first establishes the definition of authoritativeness, as a new, nondeceptive cognition, then turns to proving that the Buddha fulfils this definition. He first refutes the idea that a permanent creator God can fulfil the definition of authoritativeness, chiefly by showing that it is impossible that such a being exist. He then indicates that the reason the Buddha _does_ fulfil the definition of authoritativeness is because he has a perfect understanding of what is to be rejected and what adopted by those who strive for freedom. The cause and reason for the Buddha's authoritativeness are then demonstrated by the four remaining epithets, taken in forward and reverse order.

Dharmakīrti recognizes that in order to prove that the Buddha is the Benevolent One, he must show that the Buddha is extraordinarily benevolent. He only can be extraordinarily benevolent if there exist a multiplicity of lives in which to develop that benevolence. Thus, Dharmakīrti sets out to prove the existence of past and future lives, and this proof, in turn, entails a demonstration that mind does not have the body as its material cause or principal condition, and that it is, thus, independent of body and capable of transmigrating from life to life. Dharmakīrti then shows

that, given countless lives, a being can develop benevolence to an infinite degree, because it is based on a stable mind and its effects are cumulative and geometrically progressive. The Buddha's benevolence leads him to realize that he only truly will be able to aid others when he himself has found the key to suffering and its cessation. Therefore, he seeks and finds the antidote to the suffering of saṃsāra, the wisdom realizing selflessness, which is characterized as "the Teacher." The wisdom directly realizing selflessness has the capacity to uproot the defilements that are the cause of one's continuing to circle in saṃsāra, and its full development entails the uprooting of all defilements. One who has uprooted all defilements is said to be a Sugata, with Sugatahood glossed as an "abandonment" that has three qualities: goodness, because it truly uproots defilements, and thus represents the highest good; irreversibility, because one who has attained it never will return to saṃsāra; and remainderlessness, because there exists in one who has attained it not the slightest fault. One who has utterly abandoned all defilements in his own mindstream must by definition understand the basis for attaining such an abandonment. That understanding, combined with the desire to assist others that is entailed by his benevolence, assures that the Buddha both can and does teach his path, and that, therefore, he is fit to be consi-

dered the Savior.

The Buddha only will be fit to be a Savior if what he teaches is, in fact, true, i.e., if he truly has discovered the antidote to the suffering of saṃsāra. Thus, the Four Noble Truths, which encapsulate the Buddha's discoveries concerning the causes of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa, must be shown to be true. The truths are proven in turn. The proof of the truth of suffering involves identifying suffering with the five aggregates that take uncontrolled rebirth in saṃsāra, then showing that saṃsāric suffering must be beginningless and based on appropriate mental--not physical--causes. The proof of the truth of origination involves a demonstration that suffering has an identifiable cause, which is craving (which is, in turn, rooted in self-grasping). Since suffering has an identifiable cause, it stands to reason that the elimination of that cause entails the elimination of suffering. Thus, the truth of cessation is proved. It is shown, in particular, to entail cessation, peace and sublimity. The truth of path centers on the identification of the path with the wisdom realizing selflessness, and showing, on the one hand, that that wisdom <u>is</u> capable of serving as unfailing antidote to saṃsāric suffering, whose root is ignorant craving; and, on the other hand, that it is impossible that liberation result from other "antidotes," such as (a) abandoning attachment to a perfect Self, (b)

meditating on suffering in the manner of the Vaiśeṣikas or Sāṃkhyas, (c) relying on the sacred words or injunctions of God or (d) attempting to dispose of karma and the body through rites (like theistic Naiyāyikas) or austerities (like Jainas). The Four Noble Truths thus proved, the Buddha has been shown to be a Savior. If he is a Savior, he must have abandoned all defilements, so he must be the Sugata. He only can have abandoned all flaws through the development of the antidote to the origination of those defilements, so he must be the Teacher, possessing the wisdom realizing selflessness. He only will have found and developed the antidote if he has a motive for doing so. His motive is his benevolence, which, developed through countless lives, led him at last to discover the Teacher-antidote that he could test on himself and--when he had proven its worth by becoming a Sugata--give it to others in his capacity as the Savior. Thus, Dharmakīrti has shown to his own satisfaction--and the satisfaction of generations of subsequent Buddhists--both how and why the Buddha is the Authoritative One for those who strive for freedom.

As even this bare summary indicates, Dharmakīrti's proof is a complex one. Its success, however, actually rests on the demonstration of two fundamental propositions: (1) mind is ultimately independent of body and past and future lives are possible--so speaking of the cosmos in terms

of saṃsāra is meaningful and (2) the saṃsāric process has an identifiable cause, self-grasping, which can be thoroughly eliminated through the application of its antidotal opposite, the wisdom realizing selflessness--so speaking of nirvāṇa is meaningful, too. These propositions are discussed in the greatest detail, respectively, in the sections on benevolence and the truth of path. A failure to demonstrate the mind's independence of body would considerably dampen further inquiry, for both saṃsāra and nirvāṇa would thereby be rendered largely meaningless. Saṃsāra would become meaningless because the succession of suffering past and future lives that define it would be impossible. Nirvāṇa would be meaningless in part because the saṃsāra from which it is alleged to be release would be nonexistent, and in part because, even if one attained liberation in this life through the wisdom realizing selflessness, one's liberation would be short-lived, ending with one's death. A failure to demonstrate that self-grasping is the root of saṃsāra and the wisdom realizing selflessness the key to nirvāṇa--i.e., a failure to demonstrate the second and fourth noble truths--would lead one to conclude that even if saṃsāra exists, the key to its perpetuation or cessation has not been conclusively shown, and that we must, therefore, despair that enlightenment is possible. In the analyses to follow, we will pay particularly close at-

tention to Dharmakīrti's success or failure in demonstrating these two propositions.

Dharmakīrti wrote an autocommentary only on the svārthānumāṇa chapter of the Pramāṇvārttika; he did not write a commentary on the chapter with which we are concerned, the pramāṇasiddhi. The chapter has not, however, lacked commentaries, some of them voluminous. The most important were the Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā, written under Dharmakīrti's guidance by his direct disciple, Devendrabuddhi; and the Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra (or -bhāṣya), written later by Prajñākaragupta (eighth century?). Devendrabuddhi's commentary is a rather straightforward exposition of Dharmakīrti's root-verses, filling in lacunae and fleshing out arguments. A large subcommentary on it was written by by Devendrabuddhi's direct disciple, Śākyabodhi (eighth century?). Prajñākaragupta's commentary--which criticizes Devendrabuddhi's in a number of places--approaches the pramāṇasiddhi chapter from an unashamedly Mahāyāna perspective, maintaining that it implicitly assumes such concepts as the selflessness of dharmas, the five Mahāyāna paths, and the Buddha's total omniscience. Subcommentaries on Prajñākaragupta's commentary were written by Ravigupta (eighth century), Yamāri (eleventh century) and others.[331]

Tibetan scholars displayed a keen interest in the Pramāṇavārttika as early as the time of Sa skya paṇḍita (thir-

teenth century). Probably the greatest Tibetan commentary--one that combines the insights of both Devendrabuddhi and Prajñākaragupta--was the rNam 'grel thar lam gsal byed (Elucidating the path to liberation according to the Pramāṇavārttika) of rGyal tshab dar ma rin chen (1364-1432), one of the chief disciples of Tsong kha pa. Tsong kha pa's other two important disciples, mKhas grub rje and dGe 'dun grub, also wrote commentaries, as have most great Tibetan scholars since, right down to and including Mi pham, the nineteenth-century rNying ma pa master who was one of the prime movers of the "non-sectarian" (ris med) movement.[332] In the examination of Dharmakīrti's arguments that follows, we will concentrate mainly on those discussions and assumptions that clearly are contained in his root-text. We will, however, indicate alternate and additional interpretations where appropriate, drawing often for those on rGyal tshab's synthetic commentary and occasionally on Śāntarakṣita's Tattvasaṃgraha, which is not, as such, a commentary on the Pramāṇavārttika, but discusses many of the same points, occasionally from a different perspective.

4. Authoritatveness: its definition, why God does not fulfil the definition, and why the Buddha does

As we have seen, authoritativeness, or means of valid cognition (pramāṇa), is the primary concern of Dharmakīr-

ti's _Pramāṇavārttika_, and showing that the Buddha is authoritative for those who strive for freedom is the primary concern of the _pramāṇasiddhi_ chapter of the _Pramāṇavārttika_. If Dharmakīrti is to establish that the Buddha is authoritative, he must first establish the definition of authoritativeness, then show how the Buddha fits this definition--as well as how some beings asserted to be authoritative do not.

Authoritativeness is defined initially by Dharmakīrti as "a nondeceptive cognition," adding that "nondeceptiveness is said to entail attainment of an object."[333] Another way of saying that an authoritative cognition is "nondeceptive" is to say that it is unsublated, i.e., that it is not subject to subsequent disconfirmation by other authoritative cognitions. It will not subsequently be disconfirmed because it is a cognition that will in principle result in the attainment of some object that one wishes to cognize or some goal that one wishes to reach. Any cognition that leads in principle to the attainment of the cognitive object is authoritative; any cognition that does not lead to the attainment of the object, or leads to the attainment of an object different from what one expected,is not an authoritative cognition. Thus, a perception of a blue patch is an authoritative perception, because one immediately attains the desired object, a blue patch (which could be con-

firmed as blue by subsequent intersubjective observation). An inference that there is fire on a hill because there is smoke is an authoritative inference, because if one follows up one's initial cognition and climbs the hill, one will be able to discover that the source of the smoke is, indeed, a fire. A perception of a snake where there is, in fact, only a rope, is a non-authoritative perception, because the object one believed attained will, on subsequent observation, turn out not be present where one had assumed. An optical illusion, such as the countryside's "rushing by" as we sit in a moving train that seems stationary, is a non-authoritative perception, because it can and will be sublated by a more careful consideration of the actual situation. An inference that a lake is on fire because one sees smoke in its vicinity is a non-authoritative inference, because on subsequent inspection, one will discover that the smoke either was a cloud, or came from a fire near the lake, because there is a generally-accepted non-concomitance between water and fire. The inference that "God has answered my prayers" if one has prayed for a Mercedes-Benz and shortly thereafter receives one, will not be an authoritative inference if other inferences that ultimately rest on commonly-observed concomitances are able to establish that the sort of God one had in mind cannot possibly exist.[334]

Having established the general parameters of authori-

tativeness, Dharmakīrti goes on to consider particular cases by which his definition can be measured. The first case discussed by rGyal tshab is present only implicitly in Dharmakīrti's verses, but is worthy of consideration nonetheless. If an opponent should maintain that any authoritative cognition's authoritativeness will immediately be established by the apperception (svasaṃvedanā) that is simultaneous with and substantially identical to it, the reply is that apperception validates some but not all cognitions--for some cognitions only can be established as authoritative by a posteriori confirmation. Apperception can cognize the nondeceptiveness of a cognition of blue, for the authoritativeness of such a cognition is immediately evident. On the other hand, a cognition of fire on a distant hill may or may not be authoritative. Its authoritativeness only can be established through subsequent checking, so the apperception of the original cognition of fire on the distant hill cannot cognize that cognition's authoritativeness.[335]

The first case considered by Dharmakīrti himself is that of ear-cognition (śrotavijñāna), which an opponent might argue is not an authoritative cognition because, for example, one does not obtain a cow simply by virtue of a speaker's utterance of the word "cow." Dharmakīrti's reply is that the opponent is misconstruing the meaning of "at-

tainment of an object," taking it far too literally and broadly. In the case of the utterance of the word "cow," the object that is attained is not the object referred to, but certainty of the speaker's desire to express the object that corresponds to the word "cow." The idea that one might attain an object simply by hearing the word for it is, of course, absurd, for then the utterance of any word would entail the immediate attainment of the object to which it refers. Not only does the hearing or uttering of a word not entail the attainment of an object, but the hearing or uttering of a word does not entail the existence of the object, either, for there is no intrinsic relation between a word and the object to which it refers. If there were, there would ensue the absurdity that simply saying "rabbit-horns" or "God" would assure the existence of the entities described. In fact, some entities are possible and others are not, so some words describe real entities, while others do not.[336]

If an opponent maintains that a subsequent cognition or memory should be regarded as authoritative, because it is a cognition of an object that is attainable in principle, the reply is that--like apperception--a subsequent cognition is not itself a cognition that is confirmable in principle, because it has no power to determine its object independently, having been induced by an initial cognition.

Thus, only the initial cognition of a particular sense-object attainable in principle is itself confirmable in principle--all subsequent moments of cognition of the same object are either non-independent direct subsequent cognitions, or indirect cognitions of the generic image of the object. Direct subsequent cognitions or indirect subsequent cognitions of the generic image of an object are unable themselves to ascertain the attainability of the object--their certainty is completely dependent on the authoritativeness of the initial cognition on which they are based. Thus, because a subsequent cognition does not independently determine the attainability-in-principle of a particular object, it cannot be regarded as authoritative.[337]

If an opponent were to argue (as the Naiyāyikas do) that physical organs, such as the eyes, should be counted as authoritative, because one attains objects in dependence upon them, the reply is that only a cognition can be authoritative. Only a cognition can be authoritative because authoritativeness entails confirmability-in-principle, and confirmability-in-principle, in turn, entails that the object is attainable in principle. Understanding that an object is attainable in principle entails a knowledge of what must be done or not done to attain it in actuality. Such knowledge cannot be in the province of a physical organ; it only can be entailed by a cognition. An eye never would at-

tain the object of vision, e.g., a blue patch, if there were not a cognition aware of the data supplied through the eyes and able to recognize those data as a blue patch. Organs, therefore, simply are conduits for the data that form the basis of particular cognitions, and it is only through the cognitions that objects actually are "known."[338]

A sceptical opponent may argue that an authoritative cognition represents a self-contradictory concept, because the confirmation of a cognition's authoritativeness cannot be established: if it is confirmed by itself, then it is not in principle confirmable or falsifiable, and therefore one cannot meaningfully speak of it as authoritative; if it is confirmed by some subsequent authoritative perception or inference, that subsequent authoritative cognition will require still another authoritative cognition for its confirmation, and so on, in an infinite regress.[339] Dharmakīrti replies that it is not the case that all cognitions must be either self-ascertaining or other-ascertained. Some cognitions, such as apperceptions, simply cognize the content of a particular cognition to which they are substantially identical, and thus are said to be self-ascertaining. Other cognitions, like many perceptions and most inferences, must in principle be confirmable by subsequent action, and thus are said to be other-ascertained. A self-ascertaining apperception is not tautologous because, although substan-

tially identical to the cognition it cognizes, it still is conceptually separable from it, and therefore--in a certain sense--distinct. An other-ascertained perception or inference does not entail an infinite regress, because authoritativeness ultimately is confirmed by the attainment of the object one has cognized, and one's attainment or non-attainment of most objects is not open to serious dispute, being easily determinable by oneself or others. There are cases of attainment that are more difficult to ascertain than others, and in these cases an infinite regress may be threatened, but in principle all other-ascertained authoritative cognitions should be confirmable by attainments whose confirmation, in turn, rests securely upon generally-accepted intersubjectively observable concomitances. Scepticism, thus, is sophistical and unwarranted.[340]

Dharmakīrti goes on to specify that an authoritative cognition must be new, i.e., the <u>first</u> moment of cognition of a particular object, because, as we have seen above, subsequent cognitions of the object do not draw independent certainty about the object, but are, rather, induced by the first cognitive moment.[341] rGyal tshab then goes on to consider a problem that may never have occurred to Dharmakīrti. Given the Buddha's omniscience regarding all details of the past, present and future (a notion there is no indication Dharmakīrti accepted), will the second moment of omni-

science when one has attained Buddhahood be authoritative? It seems that it might not be, for if everything is cognized in the first moment, then there is nothing to cognize newly in the second moment. If there is no new cognition, there cannot be authoritative cognition, for newness has been established as part of the definition of authoritativeness. rGyal tshab's answer is simply that, while everything, past, present and future, is cognized in each omniscience-moment, the aspect under which each event is cognized changes from moment to moment. Thus, what is immediately past in this moment will be further past in the next moment; what is present in this moment will be past in the next; and what is immediately future in this moment will be present in the next. Thus, the next moment will be as authoritative as this one, because everything is cognized anew, i.e., under a different temporal aspect.[342]

Having established the general and particular characteristics of authoritativeness, i.e., as a new, nondeceptive cognition, Dharmakīrti turns to the main business of his chapter: the determination that the Buddha is uniquely authoritative for those who strive for freedom. In determining the Buddha's authoritativeness, Dharmakīrti first will deny the soteriological authoritativeness of a being such as God, then explain and prove the authoritativeness that is uniquely the Buddha's. Incidentally, there is not,

as there might at first appear, a discrepancy between the definition of authoritativeness as a cognition and the assertion that a particular being, the Buddha, is authoritative, for a particular being will be no more or less authoritative than his cognitions. Thus, when Dharmakīrti speaks generally of the authoritativeness of the Buddha, what he actually is referring to is the authoritativeness of Buddha-cognitions.

In his refutation of the idea that God is soteriologically authoritative, Dharmakīrti first refutes the idea that God's cognitions can be authoritative, then refutes the idea that a creator-God can exist. According to Dharmakīrti, an eternal God (*īśvara*) asserted to be soteriologically authoritative must be either permanent or impermanent. He cannot be permanent, because objects of knowledge (that about which he is alleged to be authoritative) are impermanent, and a cognition of those objects must be impermanent, too. The theist cannot argue that God himself is permanent, but his cognitions impermanent and dependent on causes and conditions, for a permanent entity cannot (a) be subject to cause and condition, for if it is, it loses its independence or (b) have an impermanent aspect, because there is no logical way of relating permanent and impermanent aspects of the same entity. If the theist argues that God's permanence in relation to impermanent objects of

knowledge is like an eye's persistence regardless of the changes in the phenomena it sees, Dharmakīrti will reply that the eye's "permanence" is only illusory and that, in fact, it is momentary in the same way that objects are.[343] A soteriologically authoritative God cannot be _im_permanent because, on the one hand, if he is subject to causes and conditions, then he cannot be omnipotent; and, on the other, if he _is_ eternally omnipotent and liberated, then he is not and never has been affected by the vagaries of saṃsāra, and thus has had no basis for learning first-hand what is to be rejected and what adopted by those who strive for freedom. Dharmakīrti's point in the second instance is that when we speak of something as generated or impermanent, we imply that it is actually helped or hindered by the presence or absence of certain causes or conditions. If God is asserted not to be and never to have been thus helped or hindered by the conditions of saṃsāra, it is not meaningful to speak of him as generated or impermanent--indeed, a being thus unaffected is more accurately described as permanent.[344]

Dharmakīrti next turns to a refutation of the idea that there exists a God who is the creator of all objects of knowledge--his creatorship, if established, would of course entail his authoritativeness regarding his creation. The theist argues that objects of knowledge are necessarily

preceded by an intelligent creator, for only an intelligent creator can explain their intermittence, their particular shapes, or their efficacity. Dharmakīrti undertakes a detailed analysis of this assertion. Is the theist simply attempting to argue the general point that all objects have some intelligence preceding them? If so, then he is making an assertion so general as to be useless to his own case, because Buddhists, too, accept that objects are preceded by intelligence--in the form of the various mental karmas that are asserted to help condition both our own lives and our environment. In any case, there is no certainty that the precursor of objects of knowledge need be a God like that asserted by the theists, for the Buddhists have provided at least one coherent alternative explanation, and there may be others. If, as before, the creator-God is asserted to be permanent, there is then no way of accounting for his alleged creation of impermanent objects, for the creation of an impermanent object implies an impermanent act of creation, and impermanence--by the law of contradiction--cannot be predicated of a permanent entity.[345]

Dharmakīrti next analyzes a specific example offered by the theist to prove a creator-God, a pot: just as the shape, etc., of a pot indicate an intelligent creator, so does the "design" of everything in the cosmos indicate an intelligent creator. For the analogy between the pot and

the cosmos to hold, it must be demonstrated that everything in the cosmos exists in the same way as a pot does. According to Dharmakīrti, this manifestly is not the case, for we see that, e.g., there are natural objects, such as stones and mountains, or natural phenomena, such as lightning, that do not reveal the same obvious signs of intelligent handiwork that a pot does. If the analogy is uncertain, the argument on which it is based must be uncertain.[346] Dharmakīrti also refutes the idea that the cosmos was shaped by God simply because a pot and the cosmos both have as a predicate the word "shaped." The <u>fact</u> that "shaped" can be applied to both a pot and the cosmos does nothing to establish the particular causes and conditions that may have contributed to the shaping, so one cannot reasonably assert that a creator-God necessarily has shaped the cosmos. Furthermore, the presence of the <u>word</u> "shaped" in assertions regarding both the pot and the cosmos does nothing to establish the validity of the theist's argument, because the existence of a word does not automatically entail the existence of what is named. Generally speaking, it is meanings, not words, that establish the validity of a logical Reason. Thus, the theist may use the word "shaped" in reference to both a pot and the cosmos, but the <u>meaning</u> of the word "shaped" is quite different in each case, so the cases are not the same, and neither are the Reasons, so, again, the

analogy breaks down, and the argument from design fails.[347]

Dharmakīrti next argues that the intermittent nature of things, rather than establishing a creator-God, precludes it, for intermittent objects must have an intermittent cause, but a permanent God is anything but intermittent. Indeed, a permanent God who is held to be the creator of impermanent and intermittent objects must be asserted at one time to be a cause and at another time to be a non-cause. For instance, when God creates a pot, he is the cause of that pot. Once the pot has been made, or once it has been destroyed, then he no longer is creating it, so he must have become its non-cause. Conversely, while he is creating the pot, he is the non-cause of all the objects he will create in the future. Later, when he actually creates them, he becomes their cause. It is a contradiction in terms for a permanent entity to change its nature, so God cannot, in fact, be asserted to act sometimes as cause and sometimes as non-cause--only impermanent causes can satisfactorily account for the impermanence and intermittence of things in the world. There is, according to Dharmakīrti, no general warrant for asserting that God is the cause of anything, for we have perfectly adequate "natural" explanations of the causal processes by which all objects of knowledge come into existence. To assert that an unseen God is, in fact, the cause is to open the possibility that there

are countless irrelevant or invisible causes for any object. Quite simply, however, the fact that we can provide adequate explanations of the causal process without recourse to a none-to-coherently conceived invisible being makes such a being an unnecessary concept--for if God is permanent, he is irrelevant, and if he is impermanent, he is redundant. In neither case can he be asserted to make a difference in the way events unfold. He is not, therefore, causally efficient and--since causal efficiency is the basic criterion of existence--he must be non-existent.[348]

Other Indian atheists cited additional problems that call God's existence into question, such as the impossibility of an immaterial, bodiless substance creating material objects,[349] and rGyal tshab launches an attack that is akin to the argument from evil when he notes that even if there _is_ a creator-God, because he has created all the world's sufferings and the lower realms, we hardly should take his benevolence for granted, and thus should not look to him as soteriologically authoritative.[350] We will limit ourselves to what we have indicated of Dharmakīrti's arguments. Let us only add that it is uncertain to what extent Dharmakīrti's arguments might prove effective in refuting the existence of the God posited by Christianity. Dharmakīrti clearly rejects the argument from design, and points out the grave problems entailed by the positing of either a perma-

nent or impermanent God--in the former case, his irrelevance; in the latter case, his redundance if he is asserted as a cause additional to observed causes, and his impotence if he is subject to causes and conditions. Put in Christian terms, God cannot be accepted as either totally transcendent or totally immanent, nor can two such contrary qualities logically be predicated of the same being. The only version of the Christian God that might be "acceptable" to Dharmakīrti is the "process" God of someone like Whitehead or Kazantzakis--a God that is conceded not to be omnipotent, but who is, instead, an immensely powerful, benevolent entity who unquestionably depends upon man's efforts for the realization of his cosmic aims. Such a God is considerably different from the more traditionally-conceived omniscient, omnipotent, omnibenevolent creator. Indeed, he is not far removed from Mahāyāna Buddhist conceptions of the Buddha--the difference being that he has never suffered in saṃsāra, while the Buddha has. Another parallel is worth noting: that between the Buddhist notion of karma and the Christian creator-God. Dharmakīrti, as we have seen, did not deny the general contention that objects of knowledge are preceded by intelligence--he merely asserted that such intelligence consisted not in God but in specific mental karmas, whose fruition can be seen both in our lives and in our environment. The notion of karma, however, is function-

ally indistinguishable from that of the impermanent God that Dharmakīrti has refuted, for karma is as much a ghost in the causal machine as is God: each is made redundant by the availability--in fact or principle--of alternative non-metaphysical explanations. Each is, then, in the Occamian sense, an unnecessary concept, whose correspondence to an actual entity or process cannot, perhaps, be disproved, but whose reality we have no certain indications of.[351]

Having refuted the idea that there can exist a creator-God, Dharmakīrti then goes on to indicate generally why the Buddha does fulfil the definition of authoritativeness that has been established. The Buddha's essential authoritativeness is soteriological, i.e., he is authoritative for beings who strive for freedom from the suffering of saṃsāra. Generally, authoritativeness entails the knowledge of what is to be done and what not done toward the attainment of a particular goal or object. Those who strive for freedom, therefore, will seek out a being who knows what is to be done and what not done when one's goal is liberation. A being who knows what to reject and what to adopt (heyopadeya) on a spiritual path must have an understanding of the causal processes involved in the perpetuation of saṃsāra and the attainment of nirvāṇa, for there will be causes to cultivate and causes to avoid.[352] A soteriologically authoritative being must--in short--understand the Four Noble

Truths or their functional equivalent, for those who strive for freedom begin with the fact of suffering, and wish to determine from that fact whether their suffering (a) has an identifiable cause, (b) whether its cessation is conceivable, and (c) whether there is a causal path that issues in that cessation. The Buddha has determined that there is suffering, that it does have an identifiable cause, that the elimination of that cause entails the elimination of the resultant suffering, and that there is a process, a path, whereby one can eliminate the cause, and reach the cessation of, suffering.[353]

In the process of establishing that the Buddha's authoritativeness consists in his knowledge of what is to be rejected and what adopted in the pursuit of freedom, Dharmakīrti ridicules the idea that superknowledges, such as that which would inform us of the number of insects in the world, could be of any use--they are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions of soteriological authoritativeness. If the ability to see an extraordinary distance is what we seek in a teacher, he jokes, then we should rush to make vultures our teachers![354] Implicit in this mockery is a rejection of the relevance--if not the possibility--of total omniscience as an attribute of the Buddha. In fact, Dharmakīrti nowhere indicates that he believes the Buddha to be totally omniscient, yet Prajñākaragupta and, following him,

rGyal tshab and most other Tibetan commentators, take the section in which Dharmakīrti explains the Buddha's authoritativeness to be an implicit explanation of his total omniscience. The reasoning seems to be as follows: It is true that the Buddha's authoritativeness consists in his knowledge of what is to be rejected and what adopted. When we examine what is to be rejected and what adopted by those who strive for freedom, however, we find that what is to be rejected is saṃsāra and the causes originating it, and what is to be adopted is nirvāṇa and the path leading to it. Within these categories, everything in existence is included; there is nothing outside saṃsāra and nirvāṇa. Thus, when it is said that the Buddha knows what is to be rejected and what adopted, the sense is that he knows every single thing that is to be rejected or adopted, for if he does not know every single thing that is to be rejected or adopted, it cannot be said that his knowledge of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa is complete, and he therefore cannot be counted as soteriologically authoritative. The tone of Dharmakīrti's writing indicates that he did not identify Buddha-authoritativeness with total omniscience, and that he regarded knowledge of the essentials (not the details) of what is to be rejected and what adopted as the necessary and sufficient condition for soteriological authoritativeness--but since he nowhere explicitly rejects the possibility of to-

tal omniscience, the assertion that he did not believe in it must be based on guesswork and silence.[355]

Whatever Dharmakīrti's actual intent, there is no question that what is important for those who strive for freedom is not that the Buddha is omniscient, but that he knows the essentials of the causes and results involved in the perpetuation and cessation of saṃsāra. That knowledge is the necessary condition of his authoritativeness. It should be noted that in this section Dharmakīrti has not "proved" that the Buddha is authoritative; he merely has asserted the fact, and identified the conditions that the Buddha must fulfil if he is, in fact, authoritative. The remainder of the pramāṇasiddi chapter will be devoted to a demonstration that the Buddha is authoritative in the way it has been determined he must be, first by showing that authoritativeness can be attained through specific causes and conditions, and then by showing that what is cognized and taught by one who has attained authoritativeness is true and confirmable by perception and inference. Once the cause and reason for the Buddha's authoritativeness have been established, his authoritativeness will have been convincingly proven.

5. Can benevolence be developed infinitely? Dharmakīrti's refutation of materialism

To say that the Buddha is soteriologically authoritative is, essentially, to say that he is a Savior. To say that he is a Savior is to imply that he himself is saved, that he is free from all faults and defilements--that he is the Sugata. To have become the Sugata, he must have known and successfully applied the antidote to the origination of saṃsāric suffering. This antidote is the wisdom realizing selflessness, which is designated as the Teacher. To have sought and discovered the antidote, he must have had a sufficiently powerful motive. The motive for his search is his desire to aid all sentient beings to attain liberation, i.e., his benevolence. A benevolence sufficiently extensive to cover all sentient beings, however, only can conceivably be developed in a greater span of time than that encompassed by a single human life. Therefore, the possibility of anyone's developing a benevolence so pervasive that it merits the name "Great Compassion" rests on the existence of a multiplicity of lives in which to develop that benevolence. For a multiplicity of past and future lives to exist, mind must be ultimately independent of the body, preceding its birth and surviving its death. Dharmakīrti, therefore, sets about refuting the materialist contention that mind is either substantially identical to or caused by

the body, and to prove instead that mind is substantially different from body and causally generated from previous homogeneous mental events, independently of any necessary connection to the body. Having established mind's independence of body and the consequent existence of past and future lives, he then demonstrates that positive mental qualities are susceptible of infinite development.

Dharmakīrti's arguments cover nearly a third of the pramāṇasiddhi chapter, and there is no doubt that they are fundamental to the establishment of the Buddhist worldview. A mind-body dualism such as Dharmakīrti seeks to establish is basic not only to the possibility of the infinite development of various positive mental qualities, such as benevolence and wisdom, but basic also to the very concept of saṃsāra. The reality of saṃsāra, in turn, is co-extensive with the first noble truth, that there is suffering. Dharmakīrti clearly recognizes the importance of the mind-body problem for the truth of suffering, for his defense of the validity of the truth of suffering, later in the chapter, consists almost entirely of a reiteration or elaboration of arguments adduced earlier to demonstrate the beginninglessness of mind, i.e., the existence of an infinity of past lives. If there are no past or future lives, the cycle of suffering from which Buddhists seek freedom is no more meaningful than the notion of an "infinite" devel-

opment of benevolence or an "eternal" blissful release from suffering, for one's suffering, benevolence and blissful release all would be limited to a single life, and all would end at death.

Dharmakīrti argues that there is a way in which the Buddha became authoritative, and that that way is logically shown by the following sequence of facts: the Buddha developed his benevolence through many lives, and thereby generated a motive for discovering an antidote to suffering, i.e., his desire to benefit all beings. He then discovered the antidote, the wisdom realizing selflessness, the "Teacher." He applied the antidote assiduously over a long period of time, and eventually became utterly free from all defilements and the propensities thereto, i.e., a Sugata. As a Sugata who also was compassionate and had a method to teach, he became the Savior, authoritative for those who strive for freedom.[356] Dharmakīrti's hypothetical materialist opponent objects that the very first assertion in this proof--that the Buddha developed his benevolence through many lives--is false, because there are no past or future lives, because mind is ultimately dependent on body, and is destroyed when the body dies.[357] Dharmakīrti's refutation of the materialist position involves both general and specific analyses. We will summarize each in turn.

Dharmakīrti begins his general discussion with the ob-

servation that the only causal concomitant of a mind-moment that can be established with certainty is a previous moment of the same type, i.e., a previous mind-moment. We invariably observe that where there is a mind-moment, there has been a previous mind-moment, and the absence of a mind moment entails the absence of a previous mind-moment; we do not invariably observe such a relation between mind-moments and body-moments. That this is so, Dharmakīrti will demonstrate in due course; for the moment, however, he is content to make that general assertion, and to draw from it certain general conclusions. Because mind (= a mind-moment) invariably is preceded by mind, if we trace mind all the way back to the moment of the conception of this body, we must find a cause for that first mind, lest it arise causelessly. Because minds in this life have been observed invariably to have been preceded by a mind, the first mind of this life must be the same. It must have been preceded by a mind, and that mind, by definition, must have been in some other life. Therefore, one's past lives are real, and must be beginningless. If one traces mind forward into the future, and arrives at the death-time mind of this life, one will see that, just as mind has generated mind during this life, so the final mind will be able to generate a subsequent mind, and that mind, by definition, will be that of another life. Therefore, future lives exist. They, however,

are not endless in the same way that past lives are beginningless, for Dharmakīrti specifies that only an attached mind has the causal efficiency necessary to generate a subsequent mind. If all death-time minds had the capacity to generate a subsequent mind, then there would be no end to rebirths for anyone. In fact, however, Arahants do not take any more rebirths, and this is because their death-time minds are non-attached, and therefore lack the cause that impels continued uncontrolled rebirths.[358]

Dharmakīrti next turns to a general analysis of several of the physical phenomena asserted by materialists to be invariably correlated with mind. He denies that the "great elements," earth, water, fire, air, or space, can be the cause of mind, because the elements sometimes form the body of a sentient being and sometimes do not, as when they form natural objects; if they alone are asserted to be the cause of mind, then they invariably should generate mind, which they obviously do not. The elements alone are inadequate as a causal explanation of mind because there must be an additional factor that explains why sometimes the elements combine to form the bodies of sentient beings, but other times combine to form non-sentient natural objects. Furthermore, the elements alone cannot account for the great variety of charcateristics displayed by sentient beings. The uniformity of the elements should assure the relative uniformity of

sentient beings, but we see, in fact, that sentient beings are almost infinitely various. This variety must be explained by some factor other than the elements; Buddhists hold that previous mental karma provides the explanatory principle. In addition, changes in the elements simply cannot be correlated with changes in the mind, or vice versa.

This same line of reasoning leads Dharmakīrti to reject the idea that the sense-organs are the invariably concomitant cause of mind. He observes that damage to one does not necessarily entail damage to the other, for one may go blind without any impairment of one's mental faculties, and mental derangement does not necessarily lead to impairment of the sense-faculties, although on occasion it may.[359] Dharmakīrti later analyzes the way in which the sense-organs could serve as the cause of mind, and finds that all the alternatives are unsatisfactory. If the sense-organs that are alleged to be the cause exist together with the body--as they must--then the body would grasp intentional objects just as the mind does. If it is the collection of sense-organs that is the cause, then if even one organ were absent, mind could not arise, and a blind person could have no mind; besides, the organs have distinct functions and abilities, and these have nothing to do with mind. If just _one_ sense-organ is the cause, then the other organs are redundant.[360] Incidentally, the brain never seems to have

been considered by Indians to function as mind's "organ" in the same way that the eye is the organ of sight, the ears of hearing, etc. Buddhists usually locate the mind at the heart, and its "organ" is said to be a previous mind. More will be said on this later, when we evaluate Dharmakīrti's arguments.

Dharmakīrti next rejects the idea that the mind has body as its cause. The body that serves as the cause of mind must--like all entities--be either permanent or impermanent. A permanent body cannot be the cause of mind, because mind is impermanent, and an impermanent entity cannot result from a permanent one. If the opponent argues that a permanent body generates mind with the assistance of particular conditions, then it no longer can be asserted to be a permanent body, because something that acts differently according to different conditions is _im_permanent. These analyses, it should be noted, are very similar to those used above to refute the existence of a permanent creator-God. Dharmakīrti also notes in passing that when the Buddha was quoted as saying that mind and body are mutually dependent, he did not mean to imply that body is a _direct_ cause of mind; it is only an _in_direct cause, because tactile sensations will generate a body-cognition, and it is the body-_cognition_ that can directly cause another cognition.[361]

The materialist now attempts to frame an argument of

his own disproving past and future lives. He argues that a death-time mind necessarily does not connect with a subsequent mind because it is, by definition, a final mind, like the death-time mind of an Arahant. Dharmakīrti immediately takes the materialist to task for citing the Arahant as an example, because the materialist does not even admit the existence of Arahants. If a particular entity is unproven for a disputant, the disputant cannot use that entity as an example bolstering his Reason. The materialist, therefore, cannot cite the Arahant--unless he does accept the existence of Arahants, in which case he is upholding the Buddhist position, which is contradictory to his own.[362] In fact, Dharmakīrti believes, the materialist has desperately reached for the Arahant as an example because he can find no other: of no other being can we categorically state that we know with certainty that his death-time mind does not connect with a subsequent homogeneous result, i.e., another mind, which perforce must be that of another life.

Dharmakīrti goes on to explain generally how body and mind are and are not related. They are not related as basis and based, because simultaneous, substantially different parts of a single collection cannot be so related, as, e.g., the color and sweetness of sugar coexist and are not related as basis and based. The coexistence of body and mind in the same "collection" (e.g., a human being) is ex-

plained by their generation from a single previous karmic cause and, in more immediate terms, the one acts as the immediately-preceding cooperative condition of the other. Body and mind are, however, merely assistant mutual cooperative conditions; the one is not an indispensible cooperative condition of the other, i.e., a cooperative condition in the absence of which a result cannot arise. Furthermore, as noted above, body only serves as an indirect cause of mind, because it affects mind only through the intervention of a body-cognition that has as its object sensations occurring somewhere in the body.[363]

His general observations completed, Dharmakīrti now undertakes a detailed refutation of the materialist idea that mind ultimately is dependent on and inseparable from body. His analysis is divided into two general considerations, of the way in which body and mind are alleged by the materialist to be related, and of the type of body that is alleged to be the basis of mind. The analysis of the way in which body and mind are alleged to be related is, in turn, divided into refutations of the ideas that they are (a) substantially different but invariably related and (b) substantially identical. The refutation of the idea that they are substantially different but invariably related, in turn, is divided into demonstrations that they can be related as neither material cause and result nor as indispen-

sible cooperative condition and result.[364]

Dharmakīrti begins his refutation of the idea that body is the material cause of mind by observing that if that is the case, then a corpse should possess mind, since its material cause, the body, is present and complete (and the presence and completeness of the cause should entail the generation of the result). The materialist replies that while body is, in fact, the material cause of mind, it is breath that is the indispensible cooperative condition, and since a corpse lacks breath, it will lack mind. Dharmakīrti upholds the Buddhist position, i.e., rather than breath being the indispensible cooperative condition of mind, mind is the indispensible cooperative condition of breath: there can be no breath in the absence of mind, while there can be mind in the absence of breath. Indeed, if breath does not result from mind, then it must result from the body. If that is the case, then it still follows that a corpse will have mind, because the cause of breath, body, is present, so there must be breath, and since there is breath, there must be mind.[365]

The materialist next attempts to explain the absence of mind from a corpse by maintaining that mind has been eliminated by a contradictory condition, the deterioration of the factors conducive to life, and therefore to mind. Dharmakīrti replies that with the onset of death, the dete-

rioration that is alleged to be the contradictory condition by definition ceases. In the absence of its contradictory condition, mind should again be susceptible of generation, and thus should be present in a corpse. The materialist maintains that the deterioration that issues in death is irreversible, so mind will not be present in a corpse. Dharmakīrti rejects this qualification, on the grounds that the deterioration that is involved is synonymous with disease, and if the body's deterioration is irreversible (like wood's transformation into ash when burned), then no disease should ever be curable. In fact, however, disease is a reversible transformation, like molten gold, which can be changed again into a solid. When the materialist objects that it then would be meaningless to speak of "incurable" diseases, Dharmakīrti replies that diseases are incurable not by virtue of the inherent nature of disease, but by virtue of the unavailability of the appropriate curative conditions, and/or by the exhaustion of one's karmically-determined lifespan.[366]

Dharmakīrti goes on to maintain that body cannot be the material cause of mind because a material cause is defined as that entity whose alteration automatically entails an alteration in its alleged result, and which, further, will generate a result that is homogeneous to it--for it imprints its essence upon the result. Body fulfils neither

of these criteria in relation to mind, because its alterations are not invariably and immediately followed by alterations in the mind, and because it is a different type of entity from mind, being physical where mind is not. To the materialist objection that if body is not the material cause of mind, then it is impossible to explain the coexistence of the two, Dharmakīrti replies by reiterating his contention that they are able to coexist in the same collection because they have an identical karmic cause and because they are mutually assistant cooperative conditions.[367]

The materialist now argues that body is not the material cause of mind, i.e., indispensible to it in terms of temporal sequence, but that it does act as the simultaneously-existing basis of a mind that has been generated from a previous mind, and that without body as its basis, that mind could not exist. Dharmakīrti replies that this cannot be so. In the first place, he notes, two terms that exist simultaneously as basis and based only can do so if they are substantially identical, like liquor and its intoxicating power. Two simultaneously existing terms that are not substantially identical cannot be described as basis and based. The whiteness and sweetness of sugar, for instance, exist simultaneously, but they are substantially different, and neither is the basis of the other. In fact,

"basis" and "based" are only reasonably predicated of temporally successive, i.e., causally related terms. Thus, a pot is the basis, or support, of the water inside it because a previous pot-moment ensures that the subsequent water-moment will not be a moment in which the water spills. It has already been demonstrated that body and mind cannot be material cause and result, i.e., basis and based in a temporal sequence; since they are substantially different terms existing simultaneously in the same collection, they cannot be described as simultaneously existing basis and based. On the other hand, they can coexist because (like the whiteness and sweetness of sugar), they are mutually assistant cooperative conditions. Secondly, Dharmakīrti points out, the very notion that body somehow makes mind "abide" once it has been generated is incoherent, because a mind alleged to abide for more than an instant cannot be inherently destructible, since an inherently destructible entity must perish instantaneously; if mind is not inherently destructible, it must be permanent--an obvious impossibility. The materialist replies that the body does not assure that the mind persists forever, but only that it persists until it meets its destructive cause. Dharmakīrti maintains that the notion of a destructive cause is completely unnecessary, because, on the one hand, if mind is not naturally destructible, and persists, then no cause e-

ver will be able to destroy it; on the other hand, if mind _is_ naturally destructible, there is no need for an extra "destructive cause," because mind is its own destructive cause, and naturally will perish in the same instant in which it arises, lasting only long enough to effect a subsequent homogeneous result, i.e., another mind.[368]

Having refuted the idea that body is the material cause of mind, Dharmakīrti next turns to the notion that the body is mind's indispensible cooperative condition, i.e., that condition in the absence of which the result cannot be generated, and an alteration in which will entail an appropriate alteration in the result. The idea that the elements or the sense-organs can be such an indispensible cooperative condition already has been refuted above, in the course of Dharmakīrti's general discussion, and the type of reasoning used in those instances is now applied to the specific case of the body. If body were the indispensible cooperative condition of mind, it would follow that the strength or weakness of the body should entail a corresponding intensification or flagging of various mental qualities. This is not observed to be the case, and, in fact, as also noted before, body only serves indirectly to condtion mind, which actually is affected by feeling-states generated in the body, not by the body itself.[369]

By refuting the ideas that body is either the material

cause or the indispensible cooperative condition of mind, Dharmakīrti has refuted all possible ways in which body might be asserted to be the substantially different, temporally precedent, indispensible cause of mind. He now quickly disposes of the idea that body and mind are substantially identical, simultaneous terms, one of which invariably entails the other. If body and mind are substantially identical, he argues, then what appears in the mind should simultaneously appear in the body, a patent absurdity.[370] Later, Dharmakīrti will argue that body and mind cannot be substantially identical because we cognize them as different types of phenomena, the one physical, the other non-physical, and two such disparate types of pheneomena only can be related in the most tenuous way.[371] This tremendously important observation does not exactly beg the question of the relation between mind and body, but it is at best an argument from common sense and from one of the initial premises of any discussion of the mind-body problem, so its usefulness in sealing an argument is, as we shall see below, somewhat dubious.

His logical arguments having been refuted, the materialist now attempts to establish that past and future lives do not exist, on the negative empirical grounds that they are not perceived. Dharmakīrti replies that its non-perception is not an adequate disproof of any phenomenon, for it

is possible that one's perception is hindered by the lack of clarity of one's sense-organs--and certainly, if anyone has unclear organs, it is the materialist! An Ārya, who has clear sense-organs and some or all of the superknowledges, is able to perceive that past and future lives do exist.[372] Furthermore, even a phenomenon not open to direct observation can be inferred to be real from its effects or its explanatory power. Thus, the existence of past and future lives, regardless of whether they are seen or not, have been inferred to be necessary to help explain what we know about the way the world works; hence, the materialist should accept their likely existence on the basis of the arguments Dharmakīrti has adduced.

Having analyzed all possible ways in which body and mind might be related, Dharmakīrti next considers the specific type, or aspect, of body that might serve as the basis of mind. He first rejects the idea that mind can be generated from a body that is a permanent, partless whole substantially different from its parts. Such a whole was, in fact, posited by the Vaiśeṣikas, and might conceivably be used by the materialist to bolster his own arguments. Dharmakīrti argues that the body cannot be such a whole, because if it were, the motion of a single part would entail the motion of the whole. Thus, when a hand moved, the whole body would have to move, and if the whole body were

at rest, a hand could not move. Such obviously is not the case: a body generally has some parts that are moving and others that are at rest. If the body is asserted to be a partless whole, but also said to be both moving and non-moving, then it has contradictory qualities. In fact, according to Dharmakīrti, since the body cannot be a partless whole, it must be atomic. The Vaiśeṣika replies that if the body is atomic, it should be invisible, because the atoms that are all it is are invisible. Dharmakīrti explains that atoms may not be visible individually, but that in aggregate they are visible.[373] Dharmakīrti goes on to press his advantage against the Vaiśeṣikas, refuting, in turn, the existence of a whole that is substantially different from its parts and a Number that is substantially different from the entities that are numbered. He goes on to refute the idea that there must exist a substantially separate entity that corresponds to every word that we apply, and then discusses various types of verbal expressions, e.g., subject-expressions and predicate-expressions, and genus-expressions and collection-expressions.[374] These discussions are of interest to those concerned with Buddhist-Vaiśeṣika debates or the Buddhist theory of meaning, but they are only tangential to the mind-body problem, and so will not be discussed at length here.

Having disposed of the idea that a partless whole body

could serve as the special basis of mind, Dharmakīrti refutes the logical alternative, i.e., that the atoms that are all the body actually is are the basis of mind. If the collection of atoms is asserted to be the basis of mind, then the absence of even one atom of the body would entail the absence of mind--yet someone who has a limb amputated loses many atoms from his collection without thereby losing his mind. If the atoms are said to be able to generate mind individually, then it follows that as many minds will exist at once as there are atoms--another obvious absurdity.[375] The materialist replies, as he has before, that it is not the body alone, but the body as material cause combined with the breath as cooperative condition that generates mind, and that the cooperative condition, the breath, will assure that the body only generates one mind at a time--not the many Dharmakīrti claimed was entailed by the assertion that individual atoms were capable of generating mind. Dharmakīrti proceeds then to analyze the breath that is alleged to assure the generation of only a single mind at one time. If the breath is permanent, then, like any permanent entity (such as God or a permanent body), it will either be powerless to generate a successive, impermanent result, or it will generate all possible minds at onee--since it is capable of generating the results, it must do so forthwith, or it will generate all possible minds all the time, since

it is permanent and eternally present. If breath is said to be <u>im</u>permanent (and based on an impermanent body), it still will follow that many minds are generated at once, because breath has extension, and therefore many atomic parts, and each of these will be able to--and therefore will--generate a mind. The materialist claims that, in fact, the many atomic parts of a single breath generate only one mind, because it is their <u>collection</u> that has the power to generate mind. Dharmakīrti replies that, in that case, the consequence is the same as when the collection of atoms was asserted to be the basis of mind: if a single part of the collection is missing, then the result of the collection, mind, will not arise. Anything less than a normal breath with a full complement of atoms, e.g., the breath of an asthmatic, should then entail the absence of mind, another obvious absurdity. Finally, Dharmakīrti refutes the idea that mind is initially generated from body, but that after that it is generated from its own homogeneous causes. This view is unacceptable because there is no reason why the body, initially able to generate mind, should then cease to do so. Indeed, once capable of generating mind, it should always be capable, and thus always should in fact serve as the basis of mind.[376]

These, in brief, then, are Dharmakīrti's arguments against materialism and for the existence of past and future

lives. They cover most of the important points made by any attempt, either Eastern or Western, to establish a mind-body dualism, and we will evaluate them shortly. Let us just add that in addition to Dharmakīrti's arguments, others later became popular, of which we will mention only two. Śāntarakṣita, in his Tattvasaṃgraha, adduces as an additional demonstration of the likelihood of the existence of previous lives the empirical observation that an infant, who has not yet been exposed to the teaching of its elders, instinctively gropes for its mother's breast, and displays such characteristics as desire, anger, etc. According to Śāntarakṣita, the existence of these traits--since they cannot be explained by anything that we can observe in this life--must be explained as carry-overs of traits developed in some previous life.[377] The notion of genetically-transmitted traits obviously had not been developed in Śāntarakṣita's time; nowadays, many, if not all, of the traits that he explained by recourse to influences from a previous life could be given more or less straightforward non-metaphysical explanations. A second argument, spelled out by rGyal tshab, is a refutation of the idea that a child's mind has the minds of his parents as a material cause. If that were so, he notes, then the child should display exactly the same mental traits as do the parents, which clearly he will not. Therefore, one's mental traits must follow on the de-

velopment of one's own mental complexes (saṃskāras), not those of someone else.[378]

6. Some comments on Dharmakīrti's refutation of materialism

Cross-cultural philosophical evaluations never are easy to make, particularly when the philosophical languages of the cultures involved are as different as their written languages. Dharmakīrti's arguments against materialism and for the existence of past and future lives are based to a large degree on logical considerations, backed by such empirical evidence as was available during his time. In the West, on the other hand, the philosophy of mind, or "cognitive science," increasingly has become, in Daniel Dennett's words,

> ...a branch of the philosophy of science concerning itself with the conceptual foundations and problems of the sciences of the mind. This has changed the shape and texture of philosophical theories of the mind by introducing into the discussions of the traditional issues many of the data and conceptual tools of...new scientific approaches, and raising new issues arising from the puzzles and pitfalls of these approaches. [379]

The contemporary philosophy of mind is particularly strongly grounded in biology and cybernetics, and therefore in the theories of natural and artificial systems. The Western and Buddhist approaches seem light years apart, but at the same time, when one clears away many of the cultural and philosophical idiosyncracies that seem to obviate a compa-

rative discussion, we find that Dharmakīrti's concerns--and in some cases his approach--are very similar to those of Westerners who have dealt with the mind-body problem:

> The mind-body problem, in the first instance, concerns the question whether a valid distinction can be made between the mind and the body. If such a distinction can be made, then we can ask whether in fact any things exist to which we can apply either term, or both terms. Finally, if there are things to which both terms can be applied, we can, for those cases, ask what the relation is between the mind and the body. 380

Dharmakīrti's ideas _are_ generally translatable in these terms, and we therefore are in a position to offer a tentative, and by no means sufficiently detailed, evaluation of his arguments.

It is not inaccurate to describe the theory of mind-body relation offered by Dharmakīrti in the _pramāṇasiddhi_ chapter of the _Pramāṇavārttika_ as interactionism, the dualist theory that there exist two distinct types of substances, mind and body, or, better, two types of _events_, mental and physical. The one cannot be reduced to the other because physical events are intersubjectively observable and conventionally describable in spatial and extensional terms, while mental events are only subjectively observable and not describable in spatial and extensional terms. Dharmakīrti clearly indicates, in verses 163b-164a of the _pramāṇasiddhi_ chapter, that he considers mental and physical events irreducible because an "unmistaken mind" cognizes the one as related to internal feelings and the other

as related to observable formal properties.[381] Śāntarakṣita puts the same argument somewhat differently:

> If the cognition is of the same nature as the body,--then why is the consciousness (cognition) of love, hatred, etc., not perceived by others as clearly as the body is?--In fact, cognition is cognized by the cognizer himself alone, while the body is cognized by himself as well as by others. 382

At the same time, mental and physical events are not so utterly distinct that "substantial" or causal language cannot be ascribed to both. Therefore, mental events can at least indirectly affect physical events, and vice versa. Dharmakīrti maintains that the relations between the mental and physical are only indirect--effected through such intermediary factors as "body-cognition" and "propensities" to act in certain ways--but, like most Buddhists, he believes that mental actions, because of their karmic force, have a tremendous ultimate impact, not only on our own minds and bodies, but also on our environment. In any case, the fact that in Dharmakīrti's theory mind and body are considered to be different <u>types</u> of substances or events makes the theory dualistic; the fact that mind and body are different types of <u>substances</u> makes the theory interactionist. The classic formulation of interactionism in the West was that of Descartes, who posited mind and body as radically different types of substance, that nevertheless were able to interact through--he thought--the pineal gland. More recent versions have been proposed by, e.g., Sir Charles Sherring-

ton, who, in attempting to trace a perception from its object, through a sense-organ and into the brain, arrived at the conclusion that

> ...in the sequence of events a step is reached where a physical situation in the brain leads to a psychical, which, however, contains no hint of the brain or any other bodily part....The supposition has to be, it would seem, two continuous series of events, one physico-chemical, the other psychical, and at times interaction between them. 383

Still another recent version is that of Sir Karl Popper and John Eccles, who posit the phylogenetic and ontogenetic emergence from the physical world ("World 1") of ontologically distinct worlds of the self ("World 2") and of ideas ("World 3"), which are capable not only of being affected by the physical through "upward causation," but of affect- the physical in turn, through "downward causation."[384]

An interactionism like that of Dharmakīrti--or, for that matter, of Descartes, Sherrington, or Popper and Eccles--is open to a number of serious criticisms. The first, and most basic, is that the assumption that the mental and physical are different types of substances, or events, i.e., that they both are describable in causal language, seems unsupportable. As Douglas Hofstadter and Dennett point out,

> Ever since Descartes first struggled with it, interactionists have had the apparently insuperable problem of explaining how an event with no physical properties--no mass, no charge, no location, no velocity--could make a physical difference in the brain (or anywhere else). For a non-physical event to make a differ-

> ence, it must make some physical event happen that wouldn't have happened if the non-physical event hadn't happened. But if we found a sort of event whose occurrence had this sort of effect, why wouldn't we decide for that very reason that we had discovered a new sort of physical event? 385

The interactionist seems, in the familiar expression, to want to have his cake and eat it too, for he maintains on the one hand that the mental and physical are different enough that one cannot be reduced to the other, but, on the other hand, that they are similar enough that one can at least indirectly affect the other. Hofstadter and Dennett's criticism seems quite to the point, for if the mental cannot be described in physical terms, it is difficult to see how it can be described in causal terms, and if it cannot be described causally, it is difficult to explain how it can "interact" with the body, or nervous system, or brain--for action implies causality.

This point has been driven articulately and forcefully to its extreme by Ryle, who argues that the idea--for which Descartes is responsible--that there is a "ghost in the machine," i.e., a non-physical but nevertheless causally efficient "substance" called mind, is a category mistake, i.e., the attribution of qualities appropriate to one type of entity to an entity that cannot reasonably be shown to have those qualities. Thus, to speak of a non-extended, non-intersubjectively-observable, non-physical mind in causal terms that we usually reserve for extended, observable,

physical entities is to commit a category mistake--a mistake based on common-sense observation and familiar notions of the relations between words and "objects," but a mistake nonetheless.[386]

Ryle's discussion is complex and subtle, but it boils down to the assertion that when we describe mental activity, we always and only actually are describing behavior--either actual or potential. Since behavior is--to a greater or lesser degree--intersubjectively observable, there is, properly speaking, no mental realm to which one has privileged access.[387] In short, logical behaviorism, as Shaffer calls it, maintains that "mentalistic statements should be construed as physicalistic statements."[388] Some logical positivists (Ryle is not among them) have taken this idea as far as to suggest that mentalistic language is completely unjustified, and ought to be abandoned; but, as Shaffer notes, "This position no longer has many supporters, primarily because it has proved impossible to provide a plausible translation into physical terms of even so simple a mentalistic report as 'I have a pain.'"[389] Indeed, as U.T. Place puts it,

> In the case of cognitive concepts like "knowing," "believing," "understanding," "remembering" and volitional concepts like "wanting" and "intending," there can be little doubt...that an analysis in terms of dispositions to behave is fundamentally sound....On the other hand, there would seem to be an intractable residue of concepts clustering around the notions of consciousness, experience, sensation and mental imagery, where

some sort of inner process story is unavoidable.[390] A Buddhist might offer the further defense that in his case "substantial" or causal language is justifiably applied to mental events because the disjunction between body and mind is not as radical for him as it is, say, for Descartes. It certainly is true that Buddhists ascribe causal efficiency to the momentary events that make up a mental continuum, but they also are quite unequivocal in their assertion that the mental is non-physical, so it is not entirely clear that the defense can be successful in the face of an attack as fundamental as Hofstadter and Dennett's--or even Ryle's.

In any case, behaviorist reductionism may not adequately "explain away" all mentalistic statements, and we are, therefore, justified in using both "physical" and "mental" terms; and the mental and physical may not be so utterly different as not both to be describable in "substantial" or causal terms. These facts, however, do not assure that there necessarily exist two ontologically distinct realms corresponding to the two different types of terms or statements. As Place points out,

> ...statements about pains and twinges, about how things look, sound and feel, about things dreamed of or pictured in the mind's eye, are statements referring to events and processes which are in some sense private or internal to the individual of whom they are predicated. The question I wish to raise is whether in making this assumption we are inevitably committed to a dualist position in which sensations and mental images form a separate category of processes over and above the physical and physiological processes with which they are

> known to be correlated. I shall argue that an acceptance of inner processes does not entail dualism and that the thesis that consciousness is a process in the brain cannot be dismissed on logical grounds.[391]

Therefore, the interactionist assertion that the mental and physical are different types of substances or events comes close to begging the question, for that there is a difference in ways of speaking of mental and physical events is--assuming one has rejected logical behaviorism--axiomatic; indeed, it is the very basis of the inquiry into the mind-body problem. One cannot, therefore, resolve the mind-body problem simply by asserting the common-sense observation from which discussion of the problem begins. This is the weakness in Dharmakīrti's assertion that an "unmistaken mind" cognizes a substantial difference between mind and body or that the non-mental cannot be the cause of the mental.[392] Precisely what is at issue is whether a truly unmistaken mind would, in fact, cognize a substantial difference between the mental and physical; and whether the "non-mental" cannot, in fact, be the cause of the "mental," or whether, rather, common usage has misled us into failing to recognize that the "physical" may display properties that we traditionally have labelled "mental." In short, as Shaffer rightly observes,

> Even if there are no direct logical connections, there still may be empirical facts that indicate a relation between mentalistic and physicalistic statements. Perhaps such statements, despite their difference in meaning, refer to one and the same set of facts, substan-

> ces, events, or properties. Or perhaps they refer to different sets of properties, but the properties belong to one and the same set of substances. Or perhaps they refer to quite different substances. All these possibilities, and more, remain to be chosen from when we attempt to solve the mind-body problem. The fact that mentalistic statements and physicalistic statements differ in meaning in no way favors one solution or another. Rather, it establishes that there is a problem.... 393

Presupposing the difficulties involved in attempting to translate mentalistic reports into physicalistic reports, and vice versa, and also presupposing the validity of Shaffer's observation that this fact does not tend to favor one solution or the other, we must turn to an examination of Dharmakīrti's general argument to the effect that no invariable concomitance can be established between the mental and the physical--that is, that mental and physical events are neither substantially identical entities nor substantially different entities related as result and special indispensible cause.

We must preface a specific analysis with a general observation: many of the particular anti-materialist arguments offered by Dharmakīrti have been antiquated by the discovery by Western science of the close correlation between "mind" states and neurophysiological or brain states. Many of the materialist arguments rejected by Dharmakīrti (whether hypothetically or actually proferred) are crude and improbable. The invariable concomitance of mind with body as a whole, or the breath, or the sense-organs, can be

upheld neither empirically nor logically, and Dharmakīrti's criticisms on this score are sound--but now perhaps irrelevant. Science has discovered that, at the very least, there are strong positive and negative correlations between mental states and neurophysiological or brain states. For example, the electrical or chemical stimulation of certain areas of the brain can be correlated with the experience of certain specifiable types of mental states; conversely, the removal of or damage to certain areas of the brain can be correlated with the failure of certain mental states to occur. Therefore, it generally is the view of scientists that mental states <u>can</u> ultimately be explained in terms of physical, i.e., brain states--although there is a healthy recognition that the complexity and apparently hierarchical structure of the nervous system make precise explanations difficult in many cases.[394] In the wake of the considerable explanatory power already offered by the neuro-sciences, the modern materialist philosopher frames the general hypothesis that "a mental state only will exist where there exists an appropriate neurophysiological or brain state." In other words, a mental state is invariably concomitant with a brain state, either in terms of identity or causality. The hypothesis that mental and brain states are invariably concomitant in terms of identity, i.e., substantially and ontologically the same, is

called identity theory. The hypothesis that mind and brain states are substantially different but that mind states are invariably caused by brain states (but not vice versa) is called epiphenomenalism. We will consider each of these in turn.

According to Dharmakīrti, two terms are substantially (though not necessarily ontologically) identical if--although linguistically different entities, with different opposites of the negative--they exist in the same collection simultaneously and one invariably entails the other, either logically or empirically. An example offered by Dharmakīrti is that of liquor and its intoxicating power, which, while distinct concepts, refer to aspects of one and the same thing. When one cognizes the liquor, its intoxicating power is entailed, and when one cognizes the intoxicating power, the liquor is entailed.[395]

As concisely defined by Flew, the identity theory of mind is

> A materialist theory of consciousness..., which identifies being in such and such a state of consciousness with being in some corresponding neurophysiological state. It maintains that the modes of consciousness involved in the occurrence of thoughts, feelings, or wishes cannot be considered as constituting a separate class of entities or happenings, nor are mental and physical events merely correlated in any particular way....Mentalistic or physicalistic terms in fact describe one and the same event. The identity claimed is empirical or contingent, not logical: statements about mental events are not synonymous with nor analysable into statements about neurophysiological states. 396

As expressed by, e.g., Place, identity theory begins by pointing out that when we say that mind or consciousness _is_ a brain-process, we are not making an analytic statement but a synthetic one, in which identity is not self-evidently the case, but must be empirically established, "because the operations which have to be performed in order to verify the presence of the two sets of characteristics inherent in the object or state of affairs in question can seldom if ever be performed simultaneously."[397] The logical independence of expressions does not, in this case, entail the ontological independence of the entities to which the expressions refer. Examples commonly cited by identity theorists are that of the morning and evening star (both Venus, but not self-evidently so), water and H_2O (that water is in fact "nothing but" H_2O had to be discovered experimentally, but it was always the case), and lightning and electrical discharge (where the true nature of lightning had, again, to be discovered experimentally).[398] Mind and brain can be described in the same terms as these examples: their identity is not of a logical or analytical variety, but must be established experimentally. The assumption is that, ultimately, every mental state will be describable as a brain state, but that mentalistic language need not therefore be abandoned--for different types of discourse are appropriate to different levels or realms, regardless of the ontologi-

cal status of the entities described by a particular type of discourse. Thus, identity theory is generally monistic--because it asserts that, ultimately, the mental _is_ physical--but not reductionistic--because it does not, as behaviorism might, deny the appropriateness of mentalistic discourse; it only will deny that the existence of a realm of discourse in any way assures the ontological status of the entities assigned to that realm.

Identity theory has gone through a number of phases since its initial articulation in mid-century.[399] Generally, continuing work in neurophysiology and philosophical work based on advances in cybernetics have convinced most philosophers of the mind that the original identity-theory ascription of one _type_ of mental event to one _type_ of brain event was far too simplistic, and that mental events are probably more closely related to the overall systemic state of the brain, within which multiple levels of behavioral complexity can be encoded physiologically and symbolically. Hofstadter finds a charming metaphor for brain processes in the idea of a "thinking wind chime":

> Think of a complex wind chime structured like a mobile, with glass "tinklers" dangling like leaves off branches, branches dangling from larger branches, and so on. When wind strikes the chime, many tinklers flutter and slowly the whole structure changes on all levels. It is obvious that not just the wind, but also the chime state, determines how the little glass tinklers move. Even if only one single glass tinkler were dangling, the twistedness of its string would have as much to do with how the chime would move as the wind would.

> Just as people do things "of their own volition," so the chime seems to have a "will of its own." What is volition? A complicated internal configuration, established through a long history, that encodes tendencies toward certain future internal configurations and away from others. This is present in the lowliest wind chime. 400

Hofstadter goes on to add to his lowly wind chime various features that make it ever more complicated, such as various fans whose switches are under the control of the tinklers, and he thereby builds up the correspondence between the ever-more-complex wind chime and what we would ordinarily call "mental" properties: representation, perception, etc. Generally,

> In the wind chime...and the brain,...organization is stratified. The levels in the wind chime corresponded to the different levels of branches dangling from other branches, with the spatial disposition of the highest branches representing the most compact and abstract summary of the global qualities of the chime state, and the disposition of the many thousands (or millions?) of quivering individual tinklers giving a totally unsummarized, unintuitive, but concrete and local description of the chime state. 401

The chime/brain, then, has both upward and downward causality, i.e., the simpler levels can affect the more abstract and the more abstract the more concrete, but "the whole thing is still explicable in terms of physics,"[402] and, furthermore,

> In our...systems, various semiautonomous subsystems exist, each of which represents a concept, and various input stimuli can awaken certain concepts, or symbols. Note that in this view there is no "inner eye" that watches all the activity and "feels" the system; instead the system's state itself represents the feelings....In this kind of system...the self-awareness

> comes from the system's intricately intertwined responses to both external and internal stimuli....
>
> The closest one could come to having a "little person" or an "inner eye" that perceives the brain's activity would be a <u>self-symbol</u>--a complex subsystem that is a model of the full system. 403

We can see, then, that without departing from their basic physicalism, or materialism, identity theorists have increasingly turned to defenses of physicalism couched in terms of non-neurophysiological models, employing biological, cybernetic or even "mentalistic" terms.

A biological explanation takes an evolutionary overview, and considers that, both phylogenetically and ontogenetically, mind is an emergent property of matter, developed as an organismic survival strategy over a long period of time through natural selection. The biological explanation springs from the general observation that all life forms display--to one degree or another--the capacity for adaptive self-stabilization and adaptive self-modification. Mind is considered to be a self-stabilizing and modifying capacity of an unusually complex sort, but functionally it lies on the same continuum as the expressions of self-stabilization and self-modification found in the simplest of life forms--indeed, as found even in non-sentient natural systems, such as atoms, molecules, elements, etc.[404] This "systems" view does not entail panpsychism because, rather than granting mental attributes so liberally that the meaning of "mind" is stretched to the breaking point, systems

theorists choose to describe what we call "mind" as a specific instance of the general properties of all natural systems. By placing "mind" on a continuum with phenomena that are functionally similar but structurally too unsophisticated to deserve the name "mind," the systems theorist is able to make a strong case for the hypothesis that mind is a function of an ultimately physical system, and that it therefore can accurately be described as a function of the brain.

The biological, or systems view draws its models in part from the discoveries of biology and other of the traditional sciences, but it also has drawn inspiration from the philosophical possibilities opened up by the development of computers. Since Alan Turing suggested over a quarter-century ago that there is no "mental" trait that cannot be displayed by a computer, philosophers of mind (particularly in America) have devoted increasing attention to explaining mind in terms of models drawn from present or potential machines that display "artificial" intelligence. The most enthusiastic proponents of AI (as they abbreviate their central concern) believe that there is in principle no reason why every aspect of human mentality could not be reproduced in a machine of sufficient sophistication. While speculative at this point, their notions are extrapolated from experience with "modest" present-day computers that,

through physical components--hardware--able to accomodate ever more complex and multi-layered programs--software--are able to approximate some of the "mental" states that we ordinarily attribute to humans and other "sentient beings." Our instinctive objection that an immensely sophisticated computer may mimic mental traits, but still lacks "mind," or sentience, begs the question, for how else do we establish "sentience" but through the ascertainment that certain mental traits are displayed? Indeed, it was Turing's hypothesis, held my many today, that one could in principle build a computer that was programmed to convince us that it was a human being, and that if it gave us printed answers to printed questions from a room in which it was sequestered, we would have no way of determining that the entity supplying our answers was not, in fact, a human being.[405] The sort of analysis and speculations undertaken by proponents of AI and computer modeling are far from conclusive, but they are richly suggestive, and give empirical evidence that purely physical systems are able to display mental traits, and that "mind's" ultimate identification with "physical" states is by no means an impossibility.

Biological and systems descriptions, therefore, establish that mind is functionally, if not structurally, on the same continuum as analogous phenomena belonging to "non-mental" systems, while the philosophy of mind based on

speculations about artificial intelligence establishes that "mind" need not be uniquely predicated of humans. Following these lines, a number of philosophers have searched for a vocabulary abstract enough to speak meaningfully of a broad range of cognitive phenomena, both human and non-human. The systems description offers one such language, perhaps the most neutral yet devised, but a number of thinkers have found that "mentalistic" language itself in many ways offers the proper degree of abstraction for the task. Hofstadter, therefore, considers humans and some computers and animals (not to mention highly sophisticated wind chimes!) to be "representational systems," any of which is "an active, self-updating collection of structures organized to 'mirror' the world as it evolves."[406] Further,

> ...a representational system is built on categories; it sifts incoming data into these categories, when necessary refining or enlarging its network of internal categories; its representations or "symbols" interact among themselves according to their own internal logic; this logic, although it runs without ever consulting the external world, nevertheless creates a faithful enough model of the way the world works that it manages to keep the symbols pretty much "in phase" with the world they are supposed to be mirroring. 407

Representational systems contain various levels of abstraction and complexity, and the lower, more differentiated affect the higher, more abstract and generalized, while the higher, in turn, affect the lower. Hofstadter holds that

> Just as evolutionary biologists feel free to use "teleological shorthand" to condense their concepts down to an intuitively reasonable size, so we feel that people

> who study the mechanisms of thought must necessarily become conversant with ways of translating back and forth between purely reductionistic language and a sort of "holistic" language in which wholes do indeed exert a visible effect on their parts, do indeed possess "downward causality." 408

The fact that one uses mentalistic language as a kind of "shorthand" does not, however, imply that there exists some "whole" at any level that is somehow ontologically distinct from its parts. Thus, one may speak of "mind" affecting the body or brain, without thereby positing a mental entity that is substantially different from the physical states of which it is an index, or description.[409]

Dennett describes humans and some computers and animals as "intentional systems," entities to which a certain logical consistency and certains beliefs and desires can be ascribed.[410] Gregory Bateson applies mentalistic language even more broadly, maintaining that "Insofar as we are a mental process, to that same extent we must expect the natural world to show similar characteristics of mentality."[411] On the surface, this sort of description appears to be the converse of the systems-description, viewing everything in the cosmos in "mentalistic" terms rather than viewing mind in terms of the processes common to all entities. This appearance is deceptive, however, for the way in which Bateson--and most other thinkers who employ "mentalistic" language--talks about the mental is precisely in the abstract language provided by biology and systems theory.

The important point to be made about "mentalistic" descriptions is that--even should they go so far as to suggest panpsychism or idealism--their understanding of "mind" is based chiefly on naturalistic models, which do not entail the existence of any ontologically independent spiritual substance. The choice of mentalistic language in no way entails dualism, and need not entail a belief in past and/or future lives--it simply indicates that the cosmos may be more easily described in metaphors drawn from the language of mind than in those drawn from the language of physics. Mind, thus, still is viewed as a property of natural physical systems, in no way independent of those systems, but nevertheless--because of its abstraction and elegance--suggesting new and perhaps more adequate ways of describing systems, natural and otherwise.[412]

Generally, then , identity theory establishes on both logical and empirical grounds that it is by no means impossible to explain mind naturalistically, and that, therefore, it is not impossible that mind is, in fact, simply an index, a way of referring to certain complex physical states and that, therefore, there is a substantial identity between mind and neurophysiological activity--in the words of the eighteenth-century physicalist Pierre Cabanis: "Les nerfs--voilà tout l'homme."[413] The identity theorist will not seek to banish mentalistic terminology from the lang-

uage, nor will he deny that in a conventional sense we may speak of "mind" affecting the "physical" just as the "physical" affects the "mind," but that this does <u>not</u> entail any sort of dualism, since "mind" is not some separate non-physical substance, but an index of complex neurological states that are capable of modifying the simpler elements out of which the complex states are built. The nervous system is fundamentally hierarchical, and each level of operation has a particular "language" appropriate to it and not semantically reducible to the language of another level. At the same time, hierarchical thresholds can be crossed both "upward" and "downward"--indeed, as Steven Rose points out, if they could not be, then each level would be utterly autonomous, and the nervous system hardly could be called a system.[414] If mind is considered autonomous of the nervous system, it is difficult to see how it can be associated with it; if it is accepted that it is associated with it, it is difficult to see how mind could not ultimately be physical--granting that the complexity of the "physical" is now understood far better than it was in Dharmakīrti's day.

The materialist or physicalist theory that asserts that neurological and mental states are substantially different and related unidirectionally as material cause and result, is epiphenomenalism, defined by Flew as the theory that consciousness is "an epiphenomenon of molecular chan-

ges in the brain...all mental events (are) the effects of physical events but never the causes of either physical or other mental events."[415] This view grants separate ontological status to mind as--in effect--a by-product or (to use Cabanis' picturesque phrase) "secretion" of the brain. The relation between brain and mind in epiphenomenalism may be likened to that between a lamp and lamplight, as described by a Buddhist: each moment of lamplight is temporally successive to and causally dependent upon a preceding moment of the lamp; the lamp affects, indeed it effects the light, but the converse is not the case. In Dharmakīrti's terms, then, epiphenomenalism asserts that each mind-moment is invariably preceded by a brain-moment. It is, thus, both affected and effected by the brain-moment, but is unable in turn to affect or effect a subsequent brain-moment--there is no reciprocity.

Epihenomenalism is a curious and ultimately unsatisfactory theory. It avoids the criticism faced by interactionism, i.e., that if the mental is non-physical it cannot affect the physical, but sees no problem with the converse idea that the physical may somehow effect something non-physical. In fact, of course, causality is difficult to account for in either direction when the cause and result are posited as radically different types of substances. Interactionism is problematic--for explanations in which the

of the nervous system, i.e., its material result, but that it is not just a <u>by</u>-product: it is ontologically separate and can in one way or another affect the material forces that generated it. Popper and Eccles seem to agree that the nervous system is only initially the material cause of mind, and that once mind is "established," and able to function as its own material cause, the nervous system continues to affect the mind as (in Buddhist terms) a cooperative condition. Popper considers it an indispensible cooperative condition, and thus he does not believe in survival of death; Eccles believes it merely an assistant cooperative condition, which permits him to explain immortality.[416] A Buddhist might find either explanation incoherent, because he will not accept that the nature of the causal relation between two entities can change as Popper and Eccles seem to think that between the brain and mind does, and he will maintain, in addition, that an entity only can have a previous entity of the same <u>type</u> as its material cause. Thus, mind cannot <u>ever</u> have brain as its material cause, because brain and mind are not homogeneous. If one asserts that, e.g., brain is the indispensible cooperative condition for mind, one necessarily accepts that the material cause of mind is a previous mind. If one accepts that, however, one must trace the sequence of minds back to the beginning of life--and beyond, to a previous life. There is

a crucial disagreement between Dharmakīrti and Popper and Eccles. Dharmakīrti believes that if homogeneous causes are accepted, there can be no beginning to their sequence, for there is, as it were, no new _type_ of phenomenon under the sun. Therefore, a phenomenon that has homogeneous causes _never_ can have had a non-homogeneous material cause. Therefore, mind _never_ can have had brain as its material cause. Popper and Eccles, on the other hand, believe with most evolutionists that the cosmos is capable of novelty and that, specifically, it is capable of generating "new" entities that can develop some autonomy from the forces that generated them. Hence, the mind may have physical phenomena as its original material cause, but may then become capable of generating its own homogeneous results--with its physical correlates as cooperative conditions of one or another degree of indispensibility. This is not the place to defend one view of causality or the other (Popper and Eccles still have satisfactorily to explain how the non-mental can "cause" the mental); I merely wish to indicate why on Dharmakīrti's view one cannot maintain that the nervous system is at first the material cause and later a cooperative condition of mind, while on Popper and Eccles' view one _can_ so maintain.

In any case, it seems that among alternatives to an interactionism of the specific sort held by Dharmakīrti

(with his assumptions about causality and past and future lives), the most satisfactory monistic theory (identifying mind as a brain-process) is identity theory, while the most satisfactory dualistic theory (identifying mind as a brain-product) is an interactionism of the sort proposed by Popper. Of these two, identity theory seems to be the less problematic (for the criticisms raised against interactionism in general can be raised against Popper in particular), although it has by no means been conclusively established.

Interactionism may face serious philosophical problems, and the explanatory power of identity theory may be considerable, but the issue is not settled, for there are a number of arguments that can be made on behalf of interactionism in general and Dharmakīrti's particular version of it, in which past and future lives are entailed. Interactionism does not automatically entail a belief in survival. We have seen that Popper, for instance, holds the brain, or nervous system, to be the original material cause of mind and, subsequently, its special indispensible condition: when the condition, brain function, is absent, so is the result, mind. Therefore, given that death marks the irreversible cessation of brain functions, death also marks the end of mind. Eccles, on the other hand, holds that while brain is the material cause of mind, once mind has established its own homogeneous continuum, brain simply

acts as an <u>assistant</u> cooperative condition, and that mind, therefore, <u>can</u> exist without it. Therefore, when brain functions cease, mind is capable of continuing independently, though the exact way in which this might occur is not very clear. Still another interactionist explanation, Dharmakīrti's, maintains that mind never has the nervous system as its material cause, but that it invariably is associated with it--the "nervous system," however, must be understood here in the sense of prāṇa, the elementary wind or "life-breath" that is considered the "vehicle" of mind. The assertion that mind invariably is associated with prāṇa frees the Buddhist from the charge that he holds the problematic position that disembodied mental existence is possible, for even beings in the formless realm (<u>arūpyadhātu</u>) have minds that are associated with prāṇa; they simply do not have either physical or subtle material bodies, as do beings in the desire and form realms. Mind is always generated "materially" from previous homogeneous causes, and thus continues from life to life, associated at the very least with prāṇa, and occasionally, even, with a brain.[417]

Interactionism does not, then, automatically entail past and/or future existence, let alone any particular version of the way in which such existence might be possible, but there is no question that evidence of the possibility that there <u>is</u> past or future existence tends to bolster in-

teractionism in general. It must be remarked immediately that much of the evidence cited to support one or another theory of personal immortality need not necessarily be taken as <u>good</u> evidence. In the first place, much of the "evidence" for immortality rests on reports of "psychic" experiences, which are notoriously difficult to check experimentally, and as subject as other "paranormal" experiences to a considerable degree of misinterpretation by the experiencer. A large percentage of reports of psychic experience are dismissable on grounds of either fraud or the availability of an alternative naturalistic explanation--or, at least, of an alternative naturalistic <u>hypothesis</u>. Let us consider one recent example that has raised considerable excitement in scientific circles (not to mention among the weekly tabloids!): the disclosure that people who have come close to dying but survive seem to have remarkably similar experiences, and that those experiences seem to indicate the existence of an afterlife. The first and most obvious criticism to be made of this as evidence for an afterlife is that the people involved have <u>not</u>, in fact, died. They have not "been to the other side and returned"; they have been on "this side" all along, and since death is generally agreed to represent some sort of radical discontinuity from life, there is no guarantee that what is experienced by a "dying" mind in fact represents what is on "the other side"--if there is anything at all. It is not outlandish to

suggest, as a psychologist might, that the experiences represent something like the "life-wish" of a dying organism, a hope of immortality translated into a "promise" of immortality--but a promise that comes from the organism itself, not from a hypothetical "other side."

On the other hand, not all paranormal experiences are susceptible of naturalistic hypotheses, let alone naturalistic explanation. There are well-documented cases of out-of-the-body experiences (e.g., those of Robert Monroe), remembrance of details of "past lives" (e.g., those studied by Ian Stevenson), and clairvoyance (as in the "medical readings" given by Edgar Cayce while in trance).[418] It is possible that these will some day be explained naturalistically, but such explanations have not yet been offered. Indeed, one must point out in fairness that "naturalism" itself is a concept subject to revision, and that it is possible that further scientific hypothesis and experiment will alter the way in which we think physical "nature" operates. It is not impossible that science will discover presently unknown forces or phenomena that will adequately explain paranormal experiences and may, in the process, lend greater support to one or another interactionist theory. One such recent theory is Rupert Sheldrake's "hypothesis of causitive formation," which posits the existence of a "morphogenetic field" associated with every physical sys-

tem. Generated by the system, the morphogenetic field has a certain autonomy and is causally efficient, able to affect and "program" conventional physical phenomena, both directly and at a distance. Such an hypothesis, if confirmed, could lend considerably greater weight to interactionism, for mind as a product of brain might be construed as a morphogenetic field that is both ontologically distinct and causally efficient. On the other hand, Sheldrake himself has admitted that his hypothesis would not definitely uphold one world-view or the other, and that it can be accomodated by either "Modified Materialism" or by one or another theory in which either the person or the universe as a whole has a transcendent agent that is associated with it.[419] It is not, in fact, entirely clear that Sheldrake's hypothesis contradicts identity theory, and that morphogenetic fields are not simply--like mind--a way of describing the action of a system in its most complex and abstract state. In any case, there remains a final defense of the possibility that there are other existences: the fact that their non-perception does not entail their non-existence; indeed, whether or not the existence of past and future lives or invisible realms is validated by conventional authoritative perception, their existence--like that of, e.g., quarks--can be inferred if they can be shown to provide the best possible causal explanation for otherwise in-

explicable effects. It is not impossible that hypotheses like Dharmakīrti's do, in fact, offer the best possible explanation of all known phenomena, and that science will eventually bear this out, but the question certainly still is moot.

The mind-body question, then, is still open. It is entirely possible that interactionism is true, that an interactionism that entails past and/or future lives is true, and even that an interactionism exactly like Dharmakīrti's is true. Interactionism in any of its forms is, as we have seen, fraught with problems, but it is not impossible in principle once some of its conceptual incoherencies have been cleared away. Finally, however, we must conclude that the arguments offered by Dharmakīrti and other Buddhists for refuting materialism and establishing an interactionism that entails past and future lives do not succeed, because (a) Dharmakīrti's arguments for his own position are open to the various objections to which interactionism can be subjected and (b) his arguments against materialism tend to beg the question of the physical's relation to the mental and underestimate the potential sophistication of materialist arguments. Dharmakīrti is not to be faulted for this second failing, for the materialist arguments of his day were not sophisticated, but scientific and conceptual advances in the West have made materialism far more plausi-

ble (if by no means certain), on the grounds (a) that there is good evidence for a virtually invariable concomitance between mental and neurophysiological states and (b) that contemporary materialist models of "mind"--particularly those offered by identity theorists in biological or systems terms--show how "physical" systems can possess "mental" traits, and therefore show that the traditional sharp distinction between the mental and the physical--upheld by Dharmakīrti--is ultimately insupportable. Therefore, an "unmistaken mind" would not--contrary to Dharmakīrti's view--necessarily cognize the mental and the physical as substantially different entities, for what we traditionally have designated as "mental" may, in fact, merely be a complex physical process.

As a sort of ironic post-script to our comments, we must make explicit a point that may have occurred to the reader in this section, namely that many of the arguments adduced against mind-body dualism by Western philosophers employ analytical tools remarkably similar to those Buddhists had developed, but did not turn toward the mind-body problem. Specifically, (1) Buddhism developed a very sophisticated theory of language and meaning, part of which involved a recognition that when we employ a word we neither directly refer to an object, nor confer ontological status on that object by the use of the word. Buddhists used their analysis primarily to criticize the existence of

universals, as predicated by the Vaiśeṣikas, and to establish their own brand of nominalism. Logical behaviorists and identity theorists use almost precisely the same analysis to point out that while we commonly speak of the mental and physical as separate realms, the existence of different ways of speaking does not assure that there is not, ultimately, only one phenomenon that is being described. (2) Buddhism investigated the philosophical notion of a "self," or "person," and discovered that no such entity could be found, and that what we conventionally refer to as a "person" is, in fact, nothing but a collection of five "aggregates" (skandhas), form, sensation, perception, mental complexes and consciousness. The discovery that much of what is usually described as the "mind" could be classified as "mental complexes" (saṃskāras), i.e., dispositions to behave, anticipates Ryle in the sophistication of its insights. Further, Buddhist analyses of material composites led to the conclusion that there was no "whole" that had an ontological status separate from that of its parts. Each of these three types of analysis is used by identity theorists to criticize the notion that there is a "mind" that is substantially different from complex physical states; yet it never seems to have occurred to the Buddhists to apply their analytical tools in just the same way--in part because the understanding of physical systems was slight e-

nough in ancient times that the substantial difference between mind and body was accepted as nearly self-evident, but in larger part, perhaps, because the elimination of mind-body dualism would threaten the underpinnings of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa, and therefore of the very heart of the Buddhist world-view.

7. The Buddha as infinitely benevolent, the Teacher, the Sugata and the Savior

Having proven to his own satisfaction--if not the satisfaction of all possible opponents--that past and future lives are indeed a reality, Dharmakīrti goes on briefly to describe the way in which a future life might be taken. He already has indicated[420] that he believes that the essential impulse for continued rebirth in saṃsāra is craving, which is based on the mistaken belief that there exists a self; and now he notes that the actual material cause of a future life's body or sense-organs is the present life's body or sense organs. As long as the present life's last mental moment is attached, one is assured of rebirth into some sort of saṃsāric realm. If the karma of that last mental moment is such that one's destiny is rebirth in the desire or form realm--where one has a body--then that last mind-moment is said to be a cooperative condition that assists the last body-moment in effecting a body in the first

moment of the next rebirth; if the karma of that last mental moment is such that one's destiny is rebirth in the formless realm--where one has no body--then the last mind-moment is not a cooperative condition that assists the last body-moment in effecting a body in the first moment of the next rebirth. When, at the end of one's formless-realm existence, one is reborn in the desire or form realm, the material cause of one's body is the "seed" (bīja) of a desire or form realm body, planted by past karma. The seed is able to exist in the mindstream of a formless realm being because it is itself neither mental nor material--as long as it is not material, it can exist in a non-material realm.[421] Specific cases aside, Dharmakīrti maintains, it is sensible that the present body or sense-organs be considered the material cause of a future life's body or sense-organs, because we see that body and organs generate body and organs during life, and there is no reason why that process should cease at death, given that one possesses the attached mind requisite for further rebirths.[422]

With the fact and process of multiple lives thus established, Dharmakīrti turns next to a specific proof that benevolence and other mental qualities are capable of infinite development through a multiplicity of lives. Dharmakīrti's materialist opponent is willing to concede for the sake of argument that multiple lives may be possible, but

he maintains that mental qualities are not, therefore, necessarily susceptible of infinite increase. Indeed, he says, although benevolence, etc., can be developed a little, they are inherently limited, like human jumping ability--which can be developed to where one can jump six, seven or eight feet, but not to where one can jump a mile--and like boiling water--which, however hot it becomes, never will turn into fire.[423] Dharmakīrti replies that the materialist's argument is vitiated by the inapplicability of the examples he has cited. In the first place, jumping ability is dependent on repeated effort: one always, as it were, begins from zero, i.e., from the ground. The development of mental qualities, on the other hand, is cumulative and geometrically progressive. Each instance of, e.g., benevolence, adds to a previously accumulated store of benevolence, and, in turn, becomes the seed of _many_ future instances of benevolence, while at the same time making benevolence more and more "natural" to the mind, so that benevolence will be generated in the future with greater and greater ease. Secondly, boiling water has an unstable basis, for water boils _away_, and will disappear long before it is hot enough to "become fire." Mental qualities, on the other hand, have a stable basis; indeed, they have an _increasingly_ stable basis, for they become more and more natural with development, and thus less and less likely to be

supplanted or destroyed by other factors. Thus, boiling water has a less and less stable basis, but mental qualities have a more and more stable basis.[424] Thus, neither example is applicable, for the materialist has made the mistake of attempting to describe mental qualities on the basis of physical examples, which are inappropriate--especially given the existence of a multiplicity of lives in which such qualities can be developed.

The opponent argues that if mental qualities can be increased infinitely, then so too can jumping ability. Dharmakīrti replies that the cases are not the same, because jumping ability inevitably is limited by such factors as the strength of the body, while mental qualities are <u>not</u> so limited. Well, then, the opponent retorts, it would seem that jumping ability cannot be developed at all, because each jump requires a new, seaparate effort. Dharmakīrti replies that this is not the case, either, because one <u>can</u> improve one's jumping ability through the gradual elimination of the physical impediments to excellence, such as an excess of the phlegmatic humor. One's bodily strength simply sets the outside limits to jumping ability--it does not preclude development within those limits.[425] The opponent next takes a different tack, arguing that if benevolence has beginninglessly been generated from previous instances of benevolence, then all beings should by now be greatly

benevolent, for they have had an infinity of time in which to develop such benevolence. Dharmakīrti answers that this is not the case, for benevolence, like any other quality, is susceptible of hindrance or destruction by such contrary conditions as anger. The vast majority of beings continue to be ruled by such negative dispositions as ignorance, attachment and anger, so they never have given their benevolence an adequate chance to develop. If it <u>has</u> developed, its range probably extends no farther than oneself and one's family and friends; it certainly is not the infinite benevolence that extends to all sentient beings--for such benevolence only can be developed when one abandons in large measure the negative dispositions that oppose it. Nevertheless, we do know that mental qualities can be developed to a remarkable degree, for we observe the natural dominance of attachment in the attached, of <u>de</u>tachment in Arahants, and of aversion in yogis meditating on the ugliness of the body. These examples assure us that mental qualities are capable of great development. Thus, given an infinity of lives and the proper sort of discipline, one ought to be able to develop one's benevolence to the point where it intends all sentient beings, and thus is worthy of being called Great Compassion.[426]

When benevolence has been developed to the point where it becomes Great Compassion, then one's primary concern is

that one somehow be able to assure that all sentient beings be freed from their saṃsāric suffering. One recognizes that the only way one will be able to assure that is if one personally discovers an antidote to suffering, tests it on oneself, ascertains that it works, then gives it to others. It might be objected at this point that in fact Great Compassion--or the infinite development of benevolence--is not necessary to one's seeking an antidote to suffering, because one's disgust with one's own suffering can be a sufficiently powerful motive--as it clearly is in the cases of Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas. It is true that infinite benevolence is not necessary for the attainment of personal liberation, but what this objection fails to take into account is that Dharmakīrti is not seeking to prove merely that the Buddha is liberated, but that he is authoritative for those striving for freedom, i.e., that he is a Savior. A savior must be not only liberated but compassionate, for it is only out of his compassion that he will teach to others what he has discovered. Thus, the fact that his search for an antidote is motivated by compassion assures that once he has ascertained that it works for himself he then will give it to others, thus becoming the Savior he sought to be. If his search for an antidote is not motivated by compassion, then even when he has ascertained that it works for himself, he will not necessarily be willing to

give it to others. He will not, therefore, be a savior.

In any case, the proof of the existence of past and future lives, followed by the proof that mental qualities can be infinitely developed, adequately establishes for Dharmakīrti's purposes that the Buddha could be, and was, the Benevolent One, desiring to benefit the world. Thus motivated, he did, in fact, seek the antidote to saṃsāric suffering, specifically by seeking a method for pacifying his own suffering. Such a search necessarily must discover the keys to saṃsāra and nirvāṇa, and therefore one must conduct an inquiry along the lines suggested by the Four Noble Truths. One establishes first that suffering exists, and that it exists on a cosmic scale, in the form of saṃsāra, the seemingly endless series of involuntary and more or less miserable rebirths. Thus, one arrives at the first noble truth. One next attempts to discover whether saṃsāric suffering has an identifiable cause for its origination. One discovers that it _must_ have a cause, and one further determines that that cause is craving, which is rooted in instinctive and philosophical self-grasping. Thus, one arrives at the second noble truth. Having established that there is suffering and that its origination has a cause, one determines that the elimination of the cause must entail the cessation of the resultant suffering, and one determines to attain that cessation, thus arriving at the

of how the Buddha came to be soteriologically authoritative. First, he developed his benevolence over countless lifetimes, finally reaching the point where he desired to benefit all sentient beings. At that point, he had achieved the excellence of thought, and therefore merited the title of Benevolent One. Next, motivated by compassion, he sought an antidote to suffering that he might prove on himself, then give to others. He discovered that the root of saṃsāra is self-grasping and that the wisdom realizing selflessness is the antidote to that suffering. When he had discovered and begun to apply that wisdom, he had achieved the excellence of application, and therefore merited the title of the Teacher. When he had applied the antidote to suffering so thoroughly that not a single defilement or stain of a defilement remained, he had achieved the excellence of his own aim, and therefore merited the title of Sugata. Having completed his own aim, and thus being utterly knowledgeable about saṃsāra and nirvāṇa, he compassionately began to teach what he knew so that other sentient beings might do as he had. He therefore achieved the excellence of others' aims, thereby meriting the title of Savior--which is synonymous with his authoritativeness.

The correctness of Dharmakīrti's description of the Buddha's path to authoritativeness is dependent on the establishment of two crucial facts, one of which is dealt

with in the forward explanation, one of which is not. The first is the reality of past and future lives, without which saṃsāra is meaningless and nirvāṇa at best short-lived. Dharmakīrti sets out to prove past and future lives as part of his demonstration of the Buddha's infinite benevolence. We have seen that his arguments have shortcomings, but Dharmakīrti undoubtedly thought them conclusive, as have most subsequent Buddhists--for whom Dharmakīrti's arguments remain <u>the</u> classical proof of past and future lives. The second crucial fact on which the validity of the forward system depends is the correctness of the Buddhist analysis of the causes conducive to saṃsāra and nirvāṇa. If the Buddha has incorrectly identified self-grasping as the cause of the origination of suffering, it is likely that he has thereby failed in his identification of the wisdom realizing selflessness as the antidote. If he has wrongly identified the antidote, he cannot be the Teacher. If he is not correctly applying the antidote, he will not uproot defilements. If he does not uproot defilements, he cannot become a Sugata, and if he is not a Sugata, one who has fulfilled his own aims, he has no basis for becoming a Savior who fulfills the aims of others--whatever his good intentions. Thus, the correctness of the Buddha's analysis of the causes conducive to saṃsāra and nirvāṇa is crucial. The correctness of that analysis only can be established by

showing that the Four Noble Truths (particularly the second and fourth, the "causal" truths) are true. Dharmakīrti does not actually do this in the course of his forward explanation, saving it for the reverse explanation that follows. If, however, one were to insert a lengthy proof of the Four Noble Truths into the forward-system system explanation of the Buddha as "Teacher," one would have a forward explanation that omitted none of the arguments necessary to its validity.

8. The reverse system of explanation: the Four Noble Truths in general

The general purpose of the reverse system of explanation is, in rGyal tshab's words, to demonstrate that "The Muni, the Blessed One, is the Savior for those who strive for freedom, because for those who strive for freedom he is one who completely teaches undistortedly the reality of the Four Noble Truths."[434] The Four Noble Truths are believed by Buddhists to be the fundamental truths about saṃsāra and nirvāṇa. Thus, they are soteriological assertions. If they can be shown to be reasonable, i.e., an accurate description of reality, then those who study them will have gained the key to salvation, and their teacher--as much as any being can be--must be considered a Savior. If the Four Noble Truths are true, then the Buddha is a Savior, and if he is

a Savior, we can infer in turn that he himself must have personal experience of what he teaches--so he must be the Sugata and the Teacher--and that he must have a desire to share his knowledge with others--so he must be the Benevolent One. In that way, then, having shown the reason why the Buddha is a Savior, one can infer backwards that the other epithets applied to him by Dignāga must be appropriate, too.

rGyal tshab prefaces his commentary on Dharmakīrti's proof of the "reality" or truth of the Four Noble Truths with a brief general discussion of his own, in which he explains the reasons for the number of truths, their ordering, examples of them, and their sixteen aspects. The number of the truths is said to be established as four because "The chief (matters) to be established for those who strive for freedom are ascertained to be classified on two sides, that of saṃsāra and that of nirvāṇa," and each of these must be investigated as to its reality and its causes. To establish the reality of saṃsāra is to establish the truth of suffering; to establish saṃsāra's causes is to establish the truth of origination. To establish the reality of nirvāṇa is to establish the truth of cessation; to establish nirvāṇa's causes is to establish the truth of path. Thus, given that soteriological inquiry is conducted in terms of two basic categories, soteriologically significant truths

must necessarily number four.[435]

According to rGyal tshab, there are two possible correct orderings of the Four Noble Truths. In terms of the actual occurrence of the phenomena they describe, the truths would have to be ordered from cause to result. Thus, the causes for the origination of suffering result in the occurrence of suffering, and the path to the cessation of suffering results in the cessation of suffering. In terms of the way human beings understand the truths, however, the traditional ordering is appropriate, for reality proceeds from cause to result, while inference proceeds from result to cause. Thus, one recognizes first that there is suffering, then that there must be an identifiable cause of the origination of that suffering. The identification of a cause leads to the inference that a removal of the cause will entail a removal of the result, hence that that the cessation of suffering must be possible. Finally, one seeks to discover the method or procedure that leads to that cessation, and thereby ascertains the truth of path.[436]

rGyal tshab identifies the specific examples of each of the truths as follows:

> Now the feeling of pain, etc., in the kidneys is the suffering of suffering. The feeling (resulting) from the excessive craving of delicious food is the suffering of change. The contaminated aggregates on which are placed the imprints of karma and defilements are the suffering of complexes. All those are the truth of suffering. All contaminated karma and defilements are the truth of origination. The freedom that is the stop-

> ping of suffering is the truth of cessation. The wisdom directly realizing selflessness is the truth of path. 437

Each of the four truths has four aspects, each of which counters a particular distorted notion about the truth of which it is an aspect. Thus, the fact that suffering is impermanent counters the idea that it is permanent or eternal; the fact that suffering is suffering counters the idea that it actually is happiness; the fact that suffering is selfless counters the idea that suffering is a permanent, substantial self; and the fact that suffering is empty counters the idea that it is caused or controlled by an extrinsic, permanent, substantial self. The fact that origination has the aspect of cause counters the idea that suffering is causeless; the fact that origination has the aspect of all-origination counters the idea that suffering has a unique cause; the fact that origination has the aspect of generation counters the idea that suffering can have God or some other non-efficient entity as its cause; and the fact that origination has the aspect of condition counters the idea that suffering could be caused by any entity that cannot change according to circumstances. The fact that cessation is cessation counters the idea that there is no cessation of suffering; the fact that cessation is peace counters the idea that some contaminated and therefore ultimately turbulent state represents the cessa-

tion of suffering; the fact that cessation is sublime counters the idea that some lesser pleasurable attainment is the cessation of suffering; and the fact that cessation is definite release counters the idea that the cessation of suffering is reversible. The fact that the path is a path counters the idea that there is no path to the cessation of suffering; the fact that the path is reasonable counters the idea that the realization of selflessness that is identified with the path is based on a misapprehension of reality; the fact that the path is accomplishment counters the idea that some spiritual practice that does not utterly accomplish one's aims is the path to the cessation of suffering; and the fact that the path entails definite removal counters the idea that the path is conducive to suffering.[438]

rGyal tshab concludes his general discussion of the truths by urging his readers to strive not only to comprehend the truths intellectually but to meditate upon them earnestly and make them a basis for genuine spiritual development.[439]

9. The truth of suffering

Of the three types of suffering included by the truth of suffering, the first two, the suffering of suffering and the suffering of change, are more or less easily comprehen-

sible in psychological terms. The suffering of suffering is something of which we all have had experience, while the suffering of change can be accepted as long as we recognize that all our pleasures are apt sooner or later to be replaced by sufferings and that--in that sense--they too are suffering. It is neither of these, however, but the broader and more elusive suffering of complexes that Dharmakīrti has in mind when he sets out to prove the truth of suffering. He says, simply, "Suffering is the saṃsāric aggregates,"[440] and since aggregates that are under the influence of karma and defilement are synonymous with saṃsāra, Dharmakīrti's characterization of suffering is closely tied up with the concept of saṃsāra. Therefore, the truth of suffering in the thoroughgoing sense in which Dharmakīrti intends it is necessarily dependent on the existence of past and future lives, and therefore on the mind's ultimate independence of the body. Dharmakīrti's proof of the truth of suffering, accordingly, is in many ways an extension of his earlier discussion of the mind-body problem, specifically in the form of an attempt to demonstrate that defilements are produced from homogeneous mental--not physical--causes and that, therefore, in rGyal tshab's phrase, "saṃsāra is beginningless."[441]

Having identified suffering with the saṃsāric aggregates that are under the sway of karma and the defilements,

Dharmakīrti quickly goes on to observe that suffering is not uncaused, because it arises occasionally (and anything occasional must have extrinsic factors whose presence or absence will entail its arising or not arising) and that, in his view--just like benevolence and other positive mental qualities--the defilements that control the suffering aggregates are generated by previous homogeneous causes, not from any physical source.[442] Dharmakīrti's demonstration that defilement cannot arise from "inappropriate" (i.e., physical) causes consists of a refutation of the idea that either the humors or the elements can be an indispensible cause of defilement.

Dharmakīrti first attacks the rather uncritically held assumption that attachment is generated from an excess of phlegm, anger from an excess of bile, and ignorance from an excess of wind. He points out that the concomitance cannot be this straightforward, because if it were, then a person under either the long- or short-term dominance of phlegm never could be expected to display anger or ignorance, which obviously is not the case. The opponent replies that one is able to display anger or ignorance while under the dominance of phlegm because, e.g., the phlegm becomes mixed with bile, which then leads to a display of anger. Dharmakīrti replies that this explanation is inadequate, because the addition of bile to phlegm should lead

us to expect <u>all</u> the by-products of bile, not just anger, to be displayed. In fact, however, the prematurely white hair, jaundice, excessive perspiration and mental clarity that result from bile as surely as anger does are <u>not</u> manifested. If they are not manifested, then bile cannot be acting as the opponent suggests. The opponent next tries to suggest that each of the humors is capable of generating all of the defilements. Thus, someone under the dominance of phlegm still could display anger and ignorance. Dharmakīrti rejects this explanation, too, on the grounds that since all men have the humors in equal amounts, all men should display defilements to the same degree, which manifestly is not the case. The opponent retorts that people's body-sizes vary, even though all people are made from the same elements, and that the case is the same with defilements, which vary despite the relative equality of the humors that are their basis. Dharmakīrti replies that the opponent's example is not well taken, because if the elements alone are the causes of body-size, then their equality should entail the equality of body-sizes; in fact, the elements alone are no more able to explain variations in body-size than the humors alone are able to explain variations in defilement. In either case, the variations must be explained by appealing to an additional factor, which Dharmakīrti takes to be previous karma and mental complexes.[443]

On the basis of these observations, Dharmakīrti notes, we can assert with some confidence that there is, in fact, no invariable concomitance between the state of one's humors and the manifestation of one's defilements, since the dominance of a particular humor not only does not entail the invariable manifestation of a corresponding defilement and the suppression of all other defilements, but, further, that humor's dominance may even be correlated with a <u>de</u>crease in the "appropriate" defilement, as when a severe excess of phlegm leads to a listlessness in which there are few if any signs of the attachment that ought to be entailed. A one-to-one correspondence between humors and defilements cannot, thus, be upheld, but neither can the alternative assertion that each of the humors can generate <u>any</u> of the defilements, for the reason already given: the consequential sameness of defilements because of the sameness of their material cause, the humors. In fact, says Dharmakīrti, the humors only "cause" the defilements to the degree that a disequilibrium of the humors generates certain internal sensations that may or may not then generate the sorts of mental defilements alleged to result from them. The humors, thus, are an assistant cooperative condition for some defilements, but cannot be their principal cause.

The opponent now adopts the somewhat different view

that while anger may result from bile and ignorance from wind, attachment actually results from an equilibrium among the humors. Thus, if Dharmakīrti insists that the defilements arise on the basis of internal feelings produced by a disequilibrium among the humors, he will be unable to account for the arising of attachment, since the equilibrium of which attachment is a result will not generate any internal feelings. How, Dharmakīrti asks, is attachment then generated? From semen,[444] the opponent replies, which is, in turn, a natural result of an equilibrium among the humors. Dharmakīrti denies that concomitance is any better established in this instance than in the earlier one. In the first place, there is no invariable concomitance between an equilibrium among the humors and the arising of attachment, because Āryas have their humors in equilibrium, yet are largely or entirely free of attachment. Secondly, there is no invariable concomitance between the production of semen and the arising of attachment, for some beings who have low "semen" levels through blood-loss, etc., still are observed to have attachment; and, on the other hand, not everyone who has semen invariably shows attachment to a potential object of attachment, such as a beautiful woman. The opponent attempts to argue that it is not semen as such, but the beauty of a beautiful woman that leads to attachment to her, but Dharmakīrti replies that if that were

the case, then everyone who looked at a "beautiful" woman would automatically grow attached to her, which is not so. In fact, "beauty" is merely a designated quality, quite relative to "the eye of the beholder."[445]

Dharmakīrti concludes his refutation of the idea that defilements are generated by the humors by observing that, on the one hand, the materialist explanation is utterly unable to account for either the lack of concomitance between the humors and defilements or the variations in the defilements; and that, on the other hand, the Buddhist explanation, in which defilement is based on karma and previously-developed mental complexes, is able to provide a satisfactory explanation of both the origin and distribution of defilement.[446]

Dharmakīrti begins his refutation of the idea that the elements are the invariably concomitant basis of the defilements with the observation that the elements cannot be the simultaneous basis of the defilements because they are asserted by the opponent to exist simultaneously, and two simultaneously-existing factors only can be "basis" and "based" if they are substantially identical. The opponent counters with the example of secondary qualities, such as color and shape, which are simultaneous with but based upon the elements that are their cause, and he maintains that the defilements are based upon the elements in just the

same way. Dharmakīrti replies that the elements and secondary qualities cannot be described as simultaneous basis and based, because they are substantially different. Two entities can be described as basis and based only if they are either successive, substantially different and invariably causally related; or simultaneous and substantially identical. The elements and secondary qualities may be related causally, but the one cannot be the simultaneous basis of the other. Since it is the simultaneous existence of the elements and defilements in a basis-based relationship that the opponent is trying to maintain, his argument fails because his example is inappropriate. The opponent counters with a new example, that of liquor and its intoxicating power, which are substantially different, yet simultaneous and correctly described as basis and based. Dharmakīrti agrees that they are correctly described as simultaneous basis and based, but only because they are substantially identical, with the one always entailing the other. Thus, the elements and the defilements cannot be likened to liquor and its intoxicating power any more than they can be to the elements and the secondary qualities, for the example once again is inappropriate: the elements and the defilements are substantially different, while liquor and its intoxicating power are substantially identical.[447]

Dharmakīrti next points out that if the elements are

indeed the material cause of the defilements, then the defilements should be continuous, because the elements that are their material cause are permanent or, at the very least, persistent, and a change in a material result only can follow on a change in a material cause; we see, however, that mind changes very rapidly, while the elements and the body do not, so neither the elements nor the body can be upheld as the material cause of the mind. The opponent claims that although the elements and body are relatively stable, the mind _still_ is able to fluctuate as it does because of variations in the external objects that it cognizes. Dharmakīrti replies that most mental activity is _not_ dependent on an external condition; indeed, if it were, then we would have no way of accounting for imagination, memory or conceptual thought. Only _sense_-cognition is dependent on an external condition; all other mental activity is based on previous cognitions of one sort or another. Furthermore, Dharmakīrti points out, the elements cannot be the material cause of the defilements because the elements are non-mental and the defilements mental, and the mental cannot arise from the non-mental--the ontological barrier between them is too great. The opponent then suggests, somewhat in the manner of a Sāṃkhya, that the assertion that the elements are the cause of the defilements need not contradict the notion that the mental cannot arise from the

non-mental, because the mental is implicit in the non-mental, which eventually will transform into the mental. The opponent's assertion, unfortunately, entails the "pre-existence" of a result in a cause, and therefore the extreme consequence that we ought to be able to see on a blade of grass the hundred elephants into which that grass eventually will be "transformed."[448] For the Buddhist, we have seen, cause and result always are successive, never simultaneous or coexistent; the *pariṇāmavāda*, or "transformation-theory," whether Sāṃkhya or Jaina, invariably is rejected for the absurdities it would supposedly entail.

Furthermore, Dharmakīrti notes, if beings are conceived or born without defilements that are carried over from some previous life, it is entirely possible that they be born *de*tached rather than *at*tached, since their mental dispositions are not based on previous homogeneous causes. The opponent replies that beings are born attached because of their elements. The elements do not change their nature, so attachment never can be transcended. Dharmakīrti responds that if the elements alone are the cause, then all beings should display the same degree of attachment, because the elements are equal in all. The opponent notes that fire, although unchanging in nature, has various degrees of the intensity of its heat; therefore, although the elements do not change nature, their "intensity" can vary,

and so, therefore, can attachment and the other defilements. Dharmakīrti replies that, once again, the opponent has cited an inappropriate example, because fire and its heat are substantially identical, and a variation in the one always will entail a variation in the other; the elements and defilements, on the other hand, are substantially *different*, and need not be invariably connected. Indeed, defilement is no more intrinsic to the elements than the specific "tertiary" quality of white is intrinsic to a pot or blanket. Just as a pot or blanket need not be white (although it must be colored), so the elements need not be "defiled." The analogy Dharmakīrti has cited does not hold in every way, because even the tertiary qualities of material objects have the elements as their material cause, while the defilements do not: tertiary qualities still are material, while defilements are mental.[449]

Dharmakīrti concludes his refutation of the idea that the elements are the invariable basis of the defilements by noting that if the elements *are* the cause, then it would follow (a) that all beings might be born detached, because there is no previous mental moment of attachment to provide a basis for subsequent attachment, and (b) that if all sentient beings are, in fact, born attached, then attachment should be ever-present and of the same intensity in all beings, because its cause, the elements, is ever-present in

the same quantities in all beings.[450]

Finally, Dharmakīrti briefly discusses the four aspects of suffering: suffering is impermanent because it arises occasionally, it is suffering because it is under the control of karma and the defilements, it is selfless because it is itself not a permanent substantial self, and it is empty because it is not under the control of an extrinsic permanent substantial self. The aspect of selflessness emphasizes the fact that suffering itself cannot be a permanent result, because it has been shown to arise occasionally, and thus to be impermanent. The aspect of emptiness emphasizes the fact that suffering, itself impermanent, cannot result from any sort of permanent cause, because a permanent entity, such as God, cannot have causal efficiency, and cannot ever be absent--while one of the defining characteristics of a "cause" is a factor that sometimes is present and sometimes is absent, and whose presence or absence makes a difference to the arising or non-arising of the result.[451]

As we noted at the outset of this section, Dharmakīrti's proof of the truth of suffering is equivalent to a proof of the validity of the Buddhist concept of saṃsāra, whose meaningfulness, in turn, rests upon the existence of past and future lives and the general correctness of the Buddhist account of the mind-body problem. Therefore, the

comments we made in section 6 about Dharmakīrti's attempted refutation of materialism can be applied to his attempt to prove the truth of suffering. Generally, we may conclude that Dharmakīrti effectively demolishes his materialist opponents' rather unsophisticated attempt to explain defilements (and therefore suffering) on the basis of either the humors or the physical elements, and that his own explanation of the defilements in terms of propensities, karma and previously-developed mental complexes is a marked improvement. Dharmakīrti, of course, assumes that his explanation of the origin of defilements entails the existence of a multiplicity of lives, since (a) mind and body are so obviously distinct that one cannot be invariably concomitant with the other and (b) there are no better explanations than those that <u>do</u> entail a multiplicity of lives. We have seen, on the other hand, that (a) the physical and the mental are not, perhaps, so utterly different that an attempt to explain the "mental" in "physical" terms is by definition doomed to incoherence and (b) mental qualities in general--and therefore defilements and suffering in particular--are <u>not</u> necessarily inexplicable in terms limited to just one life, since most mental phenomena can be accounted for by a judicious weighing of genetic, environmental, physiological and psychological factors. Dharmakīrti's proof of the truth of suffering, then, is no more ultimately con-

clusive than his attempted refutation of materialism. As a result, he cannot establish with absolute certainty that defilements are beginningless, or, consequently, that the notion of saṃsāra from which so much Buddhist religious discussion begins ultimately corresponds to the way things really are in the cosmos.

10. The truth of origination

Having established the truth of the truth of suffering, i.e., the beginningless, karma- and defilement-impelled affliction of the aggregates that sentient beings take on, Dharmakīrti next turns to a determination of what, if anything, is the cause for the origination of that suffering. Dharmakīrti's analysis, though quite brief, is crucial, for the identification of the cause of suffering--if possible--will establish the basis for the truths of cessation and path, since once a cause has been identified, it should follow logically that the removal of the cause is possible and that that removal should be possible through the application of whatever methods are available for counteracting the cause.

Dharmakīrti begins by reiterating his contention that suffering must have a cause, because suffering is seen to arise occasionally, and that which arises occasionally must have varying factors whose presence or absence determines

its presence or absence. Suffering cannot, as a consequence, have a permanent cause, because a permanent entity cannot be a cause, nor can it be a permanent result, because a permanent "result" cannot arise occasionally, but must be ubiquitous. Nor can suffering arise without a cause, i.e., "naturally," as the materialist Svabhāvavādins believe, for the qualities that they assert to arise causelessly, like the sharpness of a thorn or the roundness of a pea, are found on closer inspection actually to have causes, because their presence or absence is dependent on the presence or absence of the same causes and conditions that determine the presence or absence of the substances of which they are qualities. Thus, the origination of suffering is shown to have the aspect of cause.[452] Furthermore, suffering is manifold and various, so it cannot possibly arise from a unique cause--especially not a permanent entity like God--and must, rather, arise from a complex of causes. Thus, the origination of suffering is shown to have the aspect of origination.[453]

Having established the necessarily causal nature of suffering, Dharmakīrti identifies the specific factor that is, in fact, responsible for the continual generation of suffering and the suffering aggregates: a craving for continued existence, which entails a subsequent grasping at a continuation of this life or the attainment of a new life

after death. This grasping, in turn, entails that one will, in fact, become that which one craves for and grasps at, and that one will, therefore, continue to take rebirths. To an opponent's possible objection that by identifying the craving for existence as the root of suffering he is ignoring two other types of suffering that often are mentioned, the craving for sense-pleasure and the craving for annihilation, Dharmakīrti replies that the craving for existence is the craving for whatever goals or objects we may seek (although the craving for particular rebirths is most important to the question at hand), and the other two can be subsumed under this: the craving for sense-pleasure is the craving to take up that which is conducive to happiness, while the craving for annihilation is the craving to avoid that which is conducive to suffering. The latter two, in short, might be considered the "positive" and "negative" aspects of the craving for existence. By his identification of craving as the major factor contributing to the perpetuation of suffering, Dharmakīrti has established that the truth of origination has the aspect of generation--i.e., that there exists a generator of suffering.[454]

Dharmakīrti goes on to specify the way in which craving actually conditions the perpetuation of suffering. Craving, he says, acts as the indispensible cooperative condition for the taking of a future rebirth. It is based

on the mistaken assumption that what is, in fact, further suffering--continued rebirth--somehow will be conducive to happiness, and its search for happiness is based on the even more fundamentally mistaken assumption that there exists a self to which happiness might pertain. This assumption leads to an attachment to self, which leads to a quest for the self's happiness, which leads to the various defilements that incite one to actions that assure further rebirths. Thus, there is positive concomitance between craving and further suffering; there also is negative concomitance, because an Arahant, in whom all craving has been extinguished, does not take rebirth, and therefore suffers no more. (The use of an Arahant as an example proving negative concomitance seems to beg the question, since the possibility of an attainment like that of an Arahant is what is in question.)

The materialist objects that if craving, or attachment entails suffering, and not taking another body is correlative with the absence of attachment, then he can argue--as he has attempted to do before--that it is the body that is the cause of attachment (as well as of suffering). Dharmakīrti replies that, certainly, the body is _a_ cause of attachment, because it sometimes serves as an assistant cooperative condition for attachment--but it has been shown _not_ to be either the material cause or the indispensible

cooperative condition, so it cannot be described as _the_ cause of attachment. The materialist's argument is self-defeating, because it is based on a uniquely Buddhist example that he does not accept, the Arahant, and because all he really succeeds in establishing is that, generally, the body is _a_ cause. If the body and attachment are asserted to be simultaneous, then neither one can be the cause of the other (or the one can as easily as the other be asserted to be the more fundamental) and the causes of each must be sought in previous instances of the same type of phenomenon. Another opponent--a Buddhist, most likely--notes that in identifying craving as the cause of continued suffering, Dharmakīrti contradicts those passages in Buddhist scripture where the cause of suffering is said to be threefold: craving, ignorance and karma. Dharmakīrti explains that each of these does play a causal role in the perpetuation of suffering, but that it is craving that is the immediate, indispensible cooperative condition projecting subsequent instances of suffering; it is craving, in short, that actually is the efficient cause of suffering. Ignorance is, of course, the root of craving, but it is not the _immediate_ cause of suffering, so Dharmakīrti does not list it as _the_ cause. Karma creates the "seeds" that eventually will fructify in various rebirths whose nature is suffering, but there is no certain concomitance between karma and craving,

since a being who still has various unripened karmas, such as an Arahant before his parinirvāṇa, may have no craving, and since the removal of craving is the removal of the indispensible cooperative condition for the ripening of those karmas, they will forever be present and forever unripened. Thus, the origination of suffering is shown to have the aspect of conditionality.[455]

Thus, just as the essence of suffering is taking rebirth after unsatisfactory rebirth, so the basis of that suffering is craving rooted in ignorance. As Dharmakīrti succinctly expresses it in two earlier verses,

> (Beings) take lower (i.e., saṃsāric) births because of attachment to self, without being led by any other sentient being, through a desire to obtain pleasure and avoid pain. They are utterly bound by the distorted mind that (takes) suffering (for happiness), and by craving. 456

A more detailed explanation of this process is provided in the section on the truth of path, where Dharmakīrti notes that

> In someone who sees a self, there constantly arises attachment (based on the thought of) "I." Since one is attached (to the self), one craves its happiness, and since one craves (its happiness), its faults are hidden. When one seeks good qualities (in the self), one craves it utterly and seeks to accomplish (actions springing from the notion) of "mine." Attached thus to the self, one will (be attached to existence), and so will continue (to be born) in saṃsāra. Since (one thinks that) there is a self, one thinks (also) that there are others, and from the distinction between self and others (will arise) grasping and anger. From connection with these two, all faults arise. 457

rGyal tshab's paraphrase of this analysis, in his section

on the truth of cessation, further adumbrates the process:

> ...craving for non-separation from self is drawn by its own power from grasping at a self of persons. It is proven by authoritative perception that from that (arises) craving for the pleasures of the self. From that (arises) craving for the sense-organs and externals such as food and clothing, which accomplish the pleasures of the self. From that, in order to accomplish the pleasures of the self, there (arise) the complexes tending toward karma of the three doors. From that are generated the suffering feelings of not obtaining desired objects and of obtaining undesired objects. (Thus,) we have proven by authoritative perception that present suffering and self-grasping are result and cause. 458

Left simply at this, Dharmakīrti's proof of the truth of origination turns out to be a powerful psychological description of what may, in fact, be the process whereby sentient beings undergo many of the physical and mental pains or dissatisfactions that we conventionally associate with the word "suffering" (the Buddhist suffering of suffering and, perhaps by extension, the suffering of change). Certainly, a materialist whose views have been influenced by biological or systems theories might find Dharmakīrti's analysis another way of explaining how the instinct for survival in optimal conditions is the fundamental force motivating organisms, and that an organism's various capacities for adaptive self-stabilization and adaptive self-modification, out of which most evolutionary developments spring, are rooted precisely in an instinctive notion of "self" (either of individual or species) not unlike that described by Dharmakīrti and other Buddhists. We have seen, however,

that when Dharmakīrti talks about suffering he has something more in mind than the miseries of this or that organism: his definition of suffering is intimately tied up with the concept of saṃsāra, and therefore with the existence of past and future lives. Certainly, if past and future lives do exist, and his analysis of the fundamental motivating power of craving rooted in self-grasping is correct, then it follows that a death-time mind that craves continued existence will be able to connect to a subsequent suffering mind that belongs to another life. We have seen, however, that Dharmakīrti's attempt to prove the existence of past and future lives issues, at best, in uncertainty. Therefore, we can be assured of the correctness neither of Dharmakīrti's broad definition of suffering nor of his confidence in craving's capacity to engender suffering outside the limits of the single life of which we can be certain.

If we limit our considerations to a single life, then the usage of "suffering" and "craving" in the pervasive sense in which Dharmakīrti intended them must be called into question. If there only is one life, and we wish to maintain the usefulness of the concepts of happiness and suffering, then we only realistically will be able to consider the suffering of suffering to be suffering--since the suffering of change, what we ordinarily call happiness, only can be regarded as suffering in the light of its likeli-

hood to be replaced by suffering and in the light of its occurrence in the aggregates of a being whose nature is suffering. It is possible, perhaps, to argue that suffering _is_ the lot of every organism or sentient being, but the suffering is unalloyed in very few cases--certainly we would not consider every single moment of sentient existence to be shot through with suffering, as a Buddhist does on the basis of his contrasting ordinary sentient existence with the ultimate and undecaying happiness of nirvāṇa. Similarly, if craving, or self-grasping, however endemic they may be to sentient beings, are not the impelling forces of a cosmic process of endless rebirth, then we are not likely to regard every single sentient act of body, speech or mind as ultimately motivated by self-grasping or craving. In order to maintain the meaningfulness of the distinction among selfish, neutral and selfless acts, we would have to admit that there _are_ acts that are not necessarily shot through with self-grasping. Even if we side with the cynic and admit that virtually all sentient acts _are_ ultimately selfish, we need not concede that they have a causal force sufficient to ensure continuous "suffering," let alone to engender other lives after this one. Thus, in order to be able to use the concepts of suffering and craving in the sense in which Dharmakīrti uses them, we must accept the existence of past and future lives and the validity of the

bifurcation of the cosmos into saṃsāra and nirvāṇa. Since it is uncertain that this bifurcation must be accepted, it is uncertain that the concepts "really" have the meaning that Dharmakīrti assigns to them; at the same time, however, it must be admitted that <u>if</u> we grant the validity of Dharmakīrti's proof of the existence of saṃsāra, then his analysis of the cause of saṃsāra, encoded in the truth of origination, makes great sense not only psychologically, but "cosmologically," as well.

11. The truth of cessation

Even if the existence and mode of operation of saṃsāra are securely established, i.e., we can be certain of suffering and its cause, it does not automatically follow that the cause of suffering can be removed and suffering thereby stopped. The purpose of proving the truth of cessation, then, is to remove any doubt about the possibility and nature of a cessation of saṃsāric suffering. In short, Dharmakīrti seeks to prove that there does exist an alternative to saṃsāra: nirvāṇa.

Dharmakīrti's actual proof of the truth of cessation is brief and to the point: "(Suffering) is not external because it is possible to stop its cause." rGyal tshab explains that the cause of suffering can be stopped, or made to cease, by the presence of a contradictory condition,

which, because it is contradictory, entails the absence of the conditions conducive to suffering.[459] The remainder of Dharmakīrti's discussion of the truth of cessation is concerned with refuting various criticisms that might be brought against Buddhist notions of the possibility or nature of nirvāṇa, so at this point in his commentary, rGyal tshab interpolates a useful expansion of Dharmakīrti's abbreviated proof, attempting to show in somewhat greater detail how it can be maintained that (a) liberation and (b) omniscience are possible. rGyal tshab's discussion is drawn chiefly from both explicit and implicit passages found elsewhere in the _pramāṇasiddhi_ chapter or elsewhere in Dharmakīrti's writings.

The proof that liberation is possible begins with a reiteration of the basic assertion that there _does_ exist an antidote or contradictory condition with the power to counteract the cause of suffering, just as we know that there does exist a contradictory condition, warmth, that can counteract cold and therefore stop the horripilation that is caused by the cold. Fundamentally--if not immediately--the cause of suffering is a distorted view of the way things exist, for suffering results from our not attaining our goals, and non-attainment of our goals results from mistaken understanding--just as attainment of our goals results from correct understanding. Just as the mistaken no-

tion that there is no fire on a smoky hill can be corrected, however, so can the more fundamental mistake in the way most of us view the reality of ourselves and other entities. The specific distorted view about reality that is at the root of suffering is the notion that there exists a self of persons. The notion that there exists a self of persons leads naturally to a desire for non-separation from that self, which leads to a desire for the pleasures of that self. The desire for the pleasures of the self leads to a craving for objects that will provide pleasure to the self, such as one's sense-organs, and various externals, such as food and clothing. The craving search for objects of pleasure leads us to create karma of body, speech and mind, which, in turn, projects us into various circumstances, in many of which we do not obtain what we seek, or do obtain what is undesirable. This, conventionally, we call suffering. Thus, the causal sequence whereby belief in a self of persons leads to suffering has been shown to have general appositeness within this life. Since craving based on ignorance has the capacity to ensure a suffering result in this life, and since it has already been established that an attached death-time mind can connect to a subsequent mind of the same type, it can further be concluded that the belief in a self of persons is the basis of suffering in other lives, as well.[460]

rGyal tshab continues his proof of the possibility of liberation with a discussion of why the belief in a self of persons is a distorted view of reality. First, he analyzes just what is meant by the "self of persons." The self of persons belief in which is at the root of saṃsāra is not the self that is posited by various philosophical systems; it is, rather, the innate grasping at the existence of a self that is neither coextensive with the aggregates nor with one particular aggregate. The fact that we do not instinctively identify our "self" with either the collection of aggregates or with a single aggregate is shown by the fact that we can conceive of exchanging all our aggregates for "better" ones, such as those of a god; and also can conceive of exchanging just one aggregate, as when we wish we might "trade in" our present rather limited mind for an omniscient mind, without necessarily abandoning our present body. However instinctive our belief in an independent self, however, such a self cannot be established by philosophical analysis. Such a self must be either identical with or different from the aggregates. It cannot be different, because the analysis of the person into aggregates is, in fact, exhaustive of all qualities out of which a "self" might be constructed. It cannot be identical with the aggregates, because the aggregates are known to be impermanent, while the self is posited as permanent, and contra-

dictory qualities cannot exist on the same locus. Similarly, we see that the aggregates, as impermanent entities, are affected by extrinsic causes and conditions; a permanent entity cannot be thus affected. An entity that cannot be affected by extrinsic causes and conditions cannot, in short, fulfil the definition of existence, because the fundamental criterion of existence is ability to cause and be caused--an ability no permanent entity can possess. Reasoning such as this, then, is able to "stop" or counteract the innate belief in an independent self. Applied assiduously and eventually combined with meditative stabilization, the realization of selflessness is able actually to root out the assorted defilements that result from self-grasping, until no defilements remain. When no defilements remain, suffering ceases, and one has attained liberation.[461]

As noted earlier, the concept of omniscience is, at best, only implicit in Dharmakīrti's writings. Nevertheless, rGyal tshab extends his analysis of the truth of cessation to include a demonstration that omniscience is, in fact, possible. He begins with the observation that a powerful counter-agent exists in simultaneous combination with the elimination of whatever conditions it has the power to eliminate, and the more powerful it is the more thoroughly it will mark the elimination of that condition. Thus, the application of heat is synonymous with the elimination of

cold, and the application of a great amount of heat is synonymous with the elimination of a great amount of cold. In principle, a "total" application of heat will entail the elimination of all cold. Similarly, a realization of the Four Noble Truths, and particularly of selflessness, is the "powerful counter-agent" that exists in simultaneous combination with the elimination or destruction of defilements and their lingering stains. In order to destroy both defilements and their lingering stains, one must realize not only the selflessness of persons, but the selflessness of dharmas. When the realization of selflessness has been applied to every possible object of knowledge, then there remains no object of knowledge about which any ignorance remains, and there will be in one's mindstream no more obstacles of any kind. When one's mindstream has been thoroughly cleansed of all obstacles, one is, by definition, omniscient.[462] Thus, by taking the basic idea that a contradictory condition's presence entails the removal of its opposite, rGyal tshab is able to prove that the specific application of the wisdom realizing selflessness to the self-grasping that is the root of saṃsāra enables one to be certain that both liberation and omniscience are possible.

To the notion that there does indeed exist a cessation of saṃsāric suffering, Dharmakīrti's opponent now makes a number of objections, which Dharmakīrti answers. The oppo-

nent first insists that no being whose nature is saṃsāric, or bound, can possibly be liberated, precisely because it is his nature to be bound. Dharmakīrti agrees that a saṃsāric person is not liberated; the person who is liberated is one who has transformed his nature so that he no longer is bound. He who is bound is not freed, and he who is freed is not bound. (If the opponent's objection is taken to mean that the nature of all beings' minds is essentially stained and defiled, Dharmakīrti's answer would be that the mind is not fundamentally impure; on the contrary, it is fundamentally pure, and its stains are only adventitious.)[463] The opponent next objects that if, as the Buddhist insists, there is no self that is bound and freed, then there is no point in striving for liberation, since there is no one to liberate. Dharmakīrti replies that it is precisely because the mistaken view that there is a self is the root of suffering that we must strive to realize the true nature of things, which is selflessness, for only thus will we be able to counteract the basis of our suffering. Alternatively, Dharmakīrti might argue, with Nāgārjuna, that it is precisely because there is no permanent self that liberation is possible, since a permanent self could not be altered in the least by any spiritual efforts, and thus never could be freed.[464] The opponent argues that an Arahant should cease to have anything to do with the world as soon

as he has eliminated all his defilements through the realization of emptiness, that he cannot, in short, be a *jīvanmukta*. Dharmakīrti replies that one who *has* eliminated all defilements does not, *ipso facto*, disappear from the world scene, for he may continue to be embodied for one of two reasons: the body created by previous karma has not yet exhausted its allotted span, or benevolence impels the Arahant, or Buddha, to continue to exist so that he may benefit others. But then, the opponent objects, it must be that an Arahant or Buddha must take birth again. Dharmakīrti replies that this is not so, because the indispensible cooperative condition of rebirth, craving, has been eliminated. In the Mahāyāna, of course, a high-level Bodhisattva or a Buddha may take rebirth out of compassion, but he is not compelled to do so by force of karma or defilement, as are ordinary beings.[465]

The opponent next questions the degree to which the various defilements actually can be rooted out or good qualities present in an Arahant or other enlightened being. He first asks how it is possible for a being who lacks any concept of self to regard other beings benevolently--since there is no one to regard benevolently. Dharmakīrti replies that benevolence and compassion arise from observing the sufferings undergone by beings who fail to understand that they have no self, and also from the development of equani-

mity and from the absence of the contradictory condition of benevolence, anger. The opponent argues that an Arahant must be described as "attached," because he "desires" to help others attain their spiritual goals. No, replies Dharmakīrti: attachment arises from the distorted (viparyāsa) view that takes the impure for pure, the impermanent for permanent, the suffering for pleasure and the selfless for a self, while the benevolence that is the basis of the Arahant's desire to aid others is rooted in an understanding of selflessness and a pitying recognition of the gap between reality and sentient beings' perceptions of it, and the role that their misperceptions play in their own suffering. Well, then, the opponent contends, an Arahant must sometimes be guilty of anger, because he will become upset when he sees the objects of his benevolence, particular sentient beings, injured. Dharmakīrti points out that anger is based on ignorance about the nature of the self, and since an Arahant no longer has any such ignorance, ipso facto he cannot become angry. The opponent next raises an objection similar to one raised earlier: that an Arahant cannot be considered free from suffering before his parinirvāṇa because he continues to exist in a karmically-created suffering body. An Arahant does not suffer, replies Dharmakīrti, because suffering is based on craving, and the Arahant has eliminated craving. He may experience physical

discomforts from his "leftover" body, but he will not identify those discomforts with a "self," and so cannot be said to "suffer" them. From the Mahāyāna point of view, the "impurity" of the Buddha's body is only apparent--it is, in fact, a pure form body, generated from the accumulation of all possible merit. It is not, therefore, a body that the Buddha will seek or need to shed, for it fulfills his purposes admirably. The opponent next maintains that if one is impelled by compassion to take birth after birth, one will remain forever in saṃsāra. Dharmakīrti agrees that Bodhisattvas, whose compassion is virtually infinite, will continue to take birth among saṃsāric beings until every last one is liberated--although their rebirths are taken by choice, not compulsion, and they do not suffer as ordinary beings do. Śrāvaka and Pratyekabuddha Arahants, on the other hand, do not have compassion sufficiently developed to assure their continual rebirth; they will, sooner or later, exhaust their compassion and pass out of existence.

If belief in a self (satkāyadṛṣṭi, 'jig tshogs lta ba) is the root of saṃsāra, the opponent asks, then should not a practitioner pass out of saṃsāra as soon as he has realized selflessness, i.e., become a Streamwinner who has completed the path of seeing? No, replies Dharmakīrti: the path of seeing may utterly uproot the philosophical belief in a self, such as that arrived at through following cer-

tain systems of tenets, but the root of saṃsāra is the _instinctive_ belief in a self that we all have had since birth. The process of uprooting this begins with the path of seeing, but only can be completed through long and assiduous meditation on the path of development. There are, perhaps, some beings who are sufficiently advanced that they _can_ eliminate even the instinctive belief in a self at the conclusion of the path of seeing. If there are such, they will pass into nirvāṇa in the shortest possible time. Most beings, in any case, require more time and effort to eradicate all instinctive belief in a self than is available on the path of seeing. When the opponent attempts to argue that our belief in a self _is_ actually philosophical acceptance of the tenets taught by others, Dharmakīrti replies that acceptance of a philosophical concept of the self is dependent on our instinctive belief in an independent self, not the other way around, for we instinctively desire to attain happiness and avoid suffering, and this happiness or suffering is believed to pertain to an "I." Without seeing an "I," no one will be attached to a self, innate or conceptual, and without craving for the self's pleasures, one no longer will have the cooperative condition for further rebirth.[466] rGyal tshab adumbrates this last analysis by pointing out what the innate belief in a self is _not_: it is not the same as the verbal designation

"I," since we see that the Buddha and various Arahants, whose behavior demonstrated that they had eliminated the instinctive belief in a self, continued to use the word "I" in a conventional sense when referring to themselves, without implying belief in any metaphysical entity that corresponded to the word "I." Simply thinking in a conventional sense about a person, then, does not entail that one believes in a self of persons. Furthermore, the word "I" may be used in the expression of virtuous thoughts, such as "I will give charity," or "I will practice morality." In short, the innate belief in an "I" is more than just a designation of one's aggregates (as all of the aforementioned are): it is the belief in an "I" that is not exhausted by the aggregates, but is somehow independent of them.[467]

An opponent may object that if liberation is considered to be "sublime," there must be a self of which such sublimity can be predicated, so there must exist a permanent person that is the basis of bondage and liberation. Dharmakīrti replies that a permanent person cannot be either bound or freed, because a permanent entity cannot undergo the changes necessary to move from bondage to freedom; nor can it be a binder or a liberator, because a permanent entity cannot effect in another entity the changes involved in movement from bondage to freedom. A Vatsiputrīya, or Pudgalavādin, a Buddhist "personalist," may point

out that the self <u>he</u> describes can be predicated as neither permanent <u>nor</u> impermanent, and so is exempt from Dharmakīrti's criticism. Dharmakīrti scornfully replies that the Pudgalavādin does <u>not</u> escape his criticism: on the one hand, he has asserted among other things that the self is not impermanent. If it is not impermanent, it cannot be either a cause or a result, so it still cannot be bound or freed. Further, the Pudgalavādin considers the self "indestructible," and indestructibility is synonymous with permanence. Thus, the self posited by the Pudgalavādin is a crypto-permanent self, and cannot escape the criticisms applied to more honest proponents of the self-view.[468]

Like the truths of suffering and origination, the truth of cessation only will be true in the full sense in which most Buddhists mean it if past and future lives exist, for if there is only this life, and the mental continuum ends at death, then whatever cessation of suffering one may have attained during one's lifetime (and one of the aspects of that cessation is "sublimity"--it is not just a negative state) will come to an end at death. A nirvāṇa that lasts only until death is hardly the sort of eternal bliss claimed by the Buddha or most Buddhists since. Furthermore, whereas the truths of suffering and origination are susceptible of psychological interpretations that might make them in some ways acceptable to those who do not believe in

past and future lives, the truth of cessation (although in principle realizable even if there are no past or future lives) is more resistant to such interpretations. The truth of cessation, after all, is the assertion that a termination of _all_ one's suffering is definitely possible. A sceptic is likely to admit that while we may be able to eliminate a certain amount of suffering through one or another type of mental self-modification, we have no reason to think that any human being has ever eliminated _all_ suffering, let alone attained omniscience. The key to a sceptic's disagreement with the Buddhist lies in his doubt that the wisdom realizing selflessness, asserted to be the path to the cessation of suffering, actually is a sufficiently powerful counter-agent that it can eliminate all the defilements that are based on ignorance. The Buddhist claims that the relationship between the wisdom realizing selflessness and self-grasping is like that between heat and cold: it is asymmetrical (unlike, say, that between day and night), because once heat has eliminated the cold to which it is proximate, that cold cannot return; similarly, once self-grasping has been eliminated by the wisdom realizing selflessness, self-grasping--the basis of suffering--cannot return, because selflessness is true while the self-view is false, and falsity cannot survive where truth once has been applied.[469] Whether or not selflessness is true, the scep-

tic is likely to question that a realization of it ever can become so utterly ingrained in a person that not the slightest negative disposition or emotion will occur. He is likely, thus, to conceive of the relationship between the views of selflessness and self-grasping as more like that between day and night, with one inevitably succeeding the other. The heart of his scepticism is his doubt that truth ever can do more than merely suppress falsehood; it can replace it, but it cannot eliminate it entirely and forever, leaving no chance that it will ever arise again. The Buddhist, on the other hand, maintains that there is a specific point on the spiritual path, the path of seeing, where a realization of the truth begins utterly to destroy falsehood, and that beyond that point, falsehoods that have been destroyed never will return, because the constant application of truth will, as it were, give falsehood no soil in which to grow. This belief, in turn, rests in part on assumptions about the mind's inherent capacity to know objects "truly" (about which more below) and in part on assumptions about certain extraordinary states of mind in which one can "do things" not normally possible. Such states of mind are beyond the pale of ordinary subjective experience--let alone intersubjectively observable--and so are epistemologically problematic--although the fact that they are problematic makes them neither impossible, nor e-

ven unlikely, in principle.

12. The truth of path

The truth of cessation does not necessarily entail the truth of path, i.e., it is conceivable that there exists a cessation of suffering but no practicable method of attaining it. On the other hand, the truth of cessation will not be very meaningful if there is no path capable of eliminating suffering. The Buddhist path, of course, involves a great many different types of practices, sometimes divided into those related to wisdom and those related to method. Ultimately and essentially, however, the path is synonymous with the wisdom realizing selflessness, since it is that wisdom that is said directly to eradicate defilements and therefore lead to liberation. Dharmakīrti's proof of the truth of path is primarily concerned with establishing (a) that the wisdom realizing selflessness is, indeed, the path to freedom from saṃsāric existence, (b) that self-grasping is the root of craving, hence of saṃsāric existence and (c) that no spiritual practice that does not involve abandoning self-grasping can lead to freedom from saṃsāric existence. Dharmakīrti's discussion in the first part is directed chiefly against those who are sceptical about the possibility of liberation; his arguments in the third part are directed chiefly against non-Buddhist be-

lievers in liberation, such as the Vaiśeṣikas, Sāṃkhyas, Naiyāyikas and Jainas.

Dharmakīrti begins his discussion of the truth of path by asserting simply that the path to freedom is the wisdom directly realizing selflessness, because it is the antidote to the self-grasping that is the root of saṃsāra and because through it one undergoes a fundamental transformation (aśraya paravṛtti) whereby all faults to which it is applied will be permanently eliminated. A sceptical opponent objects that there is no reason to suppose that "wisdom" does anything more than suppress faults, and that when it no longer is being applied, they will reappear, not having been truly uprooted. Dharmakīrti replies that such is not the case, since cessation and the path have the aspects, respectively, of definite release and definite removal--in other words, because the fundamental mental transformation that one undergoes when one directly realizes selflessness is such that one's flaws will be uprooted, not just suppressed, since where wisdom is sufficiently powerful, defilement has no soil in which to grow. Dharmakīrti adds that it is the nature of the mind to cognize things correctly, as they are, and that correct cognition, once operational, cannot be supplanted. The opponent objects that if that is the case, then we all should be freed effortlessly, since it is the nature of the mind to grasp objects

correctly. That obviously is not the case, Dharmakīrti points out: although by nature the mind's function is to cognize objects correctly, it is prevented from doing so by such beginningless conditions as self-grasping.[470]

The opponent reasserts his thesis that faults are renewable, just as water left standing on a stove can be made to boil again. Dharmakīrti again denies the thesis, maintaining that once self-grasping has been eliminated by the wisdom realizing selflessness, there remains no further basis for the generation of defilement, just as, once one has realized that a rope thought at first to be a snake is in fact just a rope, one no longer can think of it as a snake (or, he might have added, once the water in a pan has been boiled away it no longer can be brought to a boil). The mind, Dharmakīrti adds, quoting the familiar description, is fundamentally pure, and its stains merely adventitious. If the stains were natural to the mind, he claims, then the view that there exists a self would be true. In fact, however, the stains are only there because of a consistently and instinctively held false view. They are based, in short, on a falsehood, and once that falsehood has been replaced by truth, i.e., with the recognition that there is no self, they will have lost their basis, and thus will themselves disappear. Nor will they be able to return, for in the presence of a powerful, consistently applied anti-

dote, self-grasping will not be able to return; neither, therefore, will the stains. Or, if a few stains or flaws are conceded to remain at first, they will not last long, because they cannot exist in the presence of their antidote, any more than a fire can last long on damp ground. Once the wisdom realizing selflessness has become "intrinsic" or natural to one's mindstream, self-grasping cannot possibly arise, so whatever one's external circumstances, one no longer will generate the defilements or karma that conduce to further rebirth. The opponent attempts to argue again that since self-grasping and wisdom are opposites, self-grasping ought to be able to counteract wisdom as effectively as wisdom counteracts self-grasping, just as attachment and anger come and go in an endless cycle. Dharmakīrti rejects the argument on the grounds that the analogy is inappropriate, since anger and attachment are not mutually exclusive and destructive opposites, but, rather, contrasting defilements that both are based on self-grasping. Wisdom and self-grasping, on the other hand, are mutually exclusive opposites, one of which (wisdom) has the power utterly to eradicate the other (self-grasping), because it is true and its opposite false.[471]

Next, an opponent familiar with Buddhist meditational practices asks whether the four immeasureables (love, compassion, sympathetic joy, and equanimity) are antidotes to

saṃsāric suffering. Dharmakīrti maintains that they are not, because, although positive and beneficial, they do not destroy the ignorant self-grasping that is the root of saṃsāra. An opponent next argues that ignorance and self-grasping cannot be considered the same, since the one is "mental unclearness," while the other is a particular way of grasping phenomena. Dharmakīrti replies that they are, in fact, synonymous, for ignorance, just as much as self-grasping, is more than merely privative: it is a specific mental factor that--like self-grasping--is the opposite of the wisdom realizing selflessness, and involves the explicit or implicit belief that there exists a permanent self that is independent of the aggregates. In short, ignorance is wrong knowledge, not mere "non-knowledge," and wrong knowledge about the self is the same as self-grasping. Ignorance and self-grasping cannot be identical, argues the opponent, because they are both described as being mental factors that are "concomitant" with a main mind in terms of basis, time, aspect, object and substance, and a main mind only can be associated with <u>one</u> such mental factor. Thus, ignorance and belief in a self are distinct, although the former entails the latter. Dharmakīrti replies that their concomitance is general, not specific in the way the opponent maintains. Nor is the concomitance exact: although every instance of self-grasping is an instance of ignorance,

not every instance of ignorance involves ignorance about the self, for there is ignorance about permanence, suffering and other aspects of existence, too. Similarly, a "*palāśa* forest" may contain trees other than just *palāśas*, but the predominance of *palāśas* justifies our calling it a *palāśa* forest. Thus, there are objects of ignorance other than the self, but the self is the most important one, and ignorance regarding it is the basis of all defilements. Well, the opponent asks, if the four immeasureables do not counteract ignorance, then what does? Dharmakīrti's answer is, by now, not surprising: ignorance is counteracted only by the wisdom realizing selflessness, which is a way of cognizing phenomena that is opposite to and powerfully destructive of the self-grasping that is the basis of all our faults. Application of the wisdom realizing selflessness, therefore, will remove all our faults.[472]

The sceptical opponent encountered earlier now resumes his attack, arguing that mental faults cannot be eradicated because they are as natural to living beings as is form to a pot. Dharmakīrti replies that at best this argument is unproven, for Buddhists have observed that, in fact, faults to which the wisdom realizing selflessness has been applied are utterly destroyed, eradicated forever. The opponent argues that even if they are removed temporarily, they *can* return, just as the solidity of gold can be restored after

it has been melted down. Dharmakīrti rebuts this argument by maintaining that a mind that has been fundamentally transformed consistently and naturally partakes of wisdom. Since wisdom is constantly present, there never is a moment when self-grasping could arise, and thus never a moment when faults could arise. Besides, the analogy of gold is inappropriate, for gold's transformations are reversible, while the transformation wrought by wisdom is irreversible, as is the charring of wood, which cannot be reversed, regardless of whether the fire that caused it still is being applied or not.[473]

Dharmakīrti next briefly demonstrates that self-grasping is the root of all faults (an anlysis at least as appropriate to the truth of origination as to the truth of path). He points out that we instinctively have a sense of self-existence, encoded in the word "I." From the sense of "I" or of our "self" arises a desire not to be separated from the self, to avoid pain for the self and to obtain pleasure for the self. Because we instinctively--if deludedly--associate the self with pleasure, we do not recognize the faults that actually spring from belief in and attachment to it. Craving pleasure for the self, we apply the concept of "mine" to all that does or might belong to the self, and strive to obtain more and more objects that might be "mine." In striving for these objects, we inevitably en-

counter "others," whose presence and competition enhances our own attachment to ourselves and generates anger and an assortment of other negative emotions toward those others and their interests. Since all faults can be reduced to instances of attraction, aversion or ignorance, and since attraction (attachment, etc.) and aversion (anger, etc.) are based on ignorance, ignorance is the root of all faults.[474]

Dharmakīrti next turns to a criticism of the paths to liberation asserted by non-Buddhist Indian schools, both orthodox and non-orthodox, seeking to establish that they cannot logically be demonstrated to lead to liberation and that, indeed, no path to liberation that does not involve an application of the wisdom directly realizing selflessness really _is_ a path to liberation.

The first view criticized by Dharmakīrti is not clearly identified. It seems to represent Ātmavādin views in general. It upholds the existence of a flawless, ultimate self (ātman), and considers that the path to liberation consists of a recognition that saṃsāric existence springs from flawed attachment to this flawless self. Dharmakīrti begins with the general observation that as long as one believes in the existence of a self, one will not become free, because one will not recognize that belief in such a self is false and is the basis of our being bound in saṃsāra. The opponent maintains, by contrast, that the self

short, simply meditating on the suffering of what pertains to the self, as advocated by the Vaiśeṣikas, will not guarantee our liberation, because as long as we maintain that a self exists, we will not give up self-grasping in any of its guises, and will not, therefore, attack saṃsāra at the root.[478]

Next, Dharmakīrti turns to a critique of Sāṃkhya soteriology. The Sāṃkhya argues that the basis of saṃsāra is seeing Puruṣa (the permanent, flawless, cognitive "person") and Prakṛti (the non-cognitive, eternally self-transforming "nature") as essentially connected, and that the basis of nirvāṇa (or mokṣa) is recognizing that Puruṣa in fact is utterly unconnected to Prakṛti and must be liberated from it. Dharmakīrti argues in response that the belief that Puruṣa is independent of Prakṛti hardly can be conducive to liberation, since all beings instinctively believe that there exists a permanent self (= Puruṣa) that is independent of their aggregates (= Prakṛti), and this belief is, in fact, the basis of saṃsāra, not nirvāṇa. Dharmakīrti supports his contention that we all believe instinctively in a self that is something other than just the aggregates by pointing out that we sometimes wish that "we" could have another person's aggregates, and that although our experiences come and go, we still consider that they all pertain to "us." If seeing Puruṣa and Prakṛti as separate is not,

therefore, the basis of nirvāṇa, we have no reason to believe the converse, namely that seeing them as connected is the basis of saṃsāra.[479]

The opponent next resumes the argument that a meditation on suffering can be the basis of detachment, because one wishes to leave behind that which is seen to cause suffering. Dharmakīrti replies that the mind that wishes to leave behind its suffering is not detached; it is simply attached to the avoidance of pain, and has not transcended the self-grasping that is at the root of our desire to attain happiness and avoid suffering. But, claims the opponent, we see that when aversion arises there cannot be attachment (since attraction and repulsion are mutually exclusive); thus, aversion to one's suffering must represent detachment. Dharmakīrti points out that mere aversion may not, strictly speaking, be attachment, but it is not detachment, since it almost always is succeeded by attachment--it is caused by a suffering feeling, and once the feeling has gone away, so does aversion, and in its stead generally arises attachment to the maintenance of one's sense of well-being. Asked how then he would define detachment, if not in terms of aversion, Dharmakīrti replies that detachment is marked by equanimity in all situations, whether pleasurable or painful, and is based on an indifference to what is ordinarily regarded as acceptable or unac-

ceptable to the "self"--since there no longer is any notion of a self on which such concerns could be based. Why, then, the opponent wants to know, did the Buddha teach meditations on suffering? In order, Dharmakīrti replies, to help us understand the defiled aggregates that are the "basis" of our suffering. Those aggregates are to be recognized as nothing like a permanent flawless self; on the contrary, they are impermanent, their pleasures fleeting. Since their happiness is impermanent, they have a fundamentally suffering nature. That which is impermanent and has a fundamentally suffering nature cannot be identified with that which is permanent and flawless. Since, however, the aggregates are exhaustive of the qualities we usually associate with a "person," there can be no such thing as a permanent, flawless self. The aggregates, in short, are selfless. Thus, although meditation on suffering (i.e., the aggregates) is not itself the path to liberation, it can lead us onto that path, because it can lead us to a realization of selflessness.[480]

Dharmakīrti concludes his attack on the Sāṃkhyas with the observation that, from a Buddhist point of view, the "self that is freed" still will have craving, because it will not be freed from attachment to self. Since it still is attached to the self and has craving, it will, in fact, continue to be born in saṃsāra, and therefore cannot actu-

ally be described as a "freed" self! If one attempts to argue (as an Advaita Vedāntin might) that only the self is real, and that what pertains to the self is unreal, then it will follow that the self, too, must be unreal, because the self is considered the "enjoyer" of what pertains to it, but without any real objects of enjoyment, the enjoyer cannot be real, either. Thus, Dharmakīrti advises, those who desire freedom should seek to remove the beginninglessly planted seeds of saṃsāra: the view that there exists an independent self in the perishable aggregates.[481]

Next, Dharmakīrti seeks to prove, in rGyal tshab's words, "the impossibility of the word of God as a path to freedom." Those who believed that divinely-bestowed rituals lead to liberation are not specifically identified, even by rGyal tshab, but they probably are Naiyāyikas and/or Vaiśeṣikas, who, like, e.g., Mīmāṃsakas, believed in the efficacy of ritual, but unlike them believed in both God and liberation. Dharmakīrti begins with the general observation that we cannot be certain that divinely-bestowed rituals are a path to freedom because it remains to be established that the scriptures from which those rituals are taken are not, in fact, in error. The opponent replies that what <u>is</u> certain is that mantras can be observed to, e.g., prevent a seed from sprouting, and there is no reason, therefore, to doubt that they can prevent suffering from occurring, too.

Dharmakīrti agrees that mantras sometimes can prevent a seed from sprouting, but denies that this enables us to conclude that they also can prevent suffering or rebirth from occurring. If they could, then smearing the body with unguents or exposing it to extreme heat should work just as well, for they are the same sorts of rituals. In fact, however, a practice like that of exposing the body to extreme heat may succeed in reducing the weight of the body, but it will not in the least reduce the weight of one's defilements, which are non-material, and so cannot be affected by physically-based practices. Rebirth, of course, results from a mistaken belief that what is ultimately suffering is actually happiness. This mistaken belief leads to craving, which leads to the creation of karma conducive to further rebirth (karma actually is regarded as a mental action (_cetanā_) concomitant with ignorance and craving). The elimination of ignorance and craving (= karma) is seen to eliminate further rebirth. Rituals, thus, have little to do with the actual causes of rebirth, so they cannot be asserted to prevent it.[482]

The opponent argues that actually the ultimate cause of rebirth is a non-mental "unseen" (_adṛṣṭa_), for the unseen is the basis of our organs, and organs are the basis of all motions, including physical movements, psychological attitudes and destiny after death. Since the unseen is

non-mental, i.e., physical, it can be affected by rituals. Since there are rituals capable of eliminating it altogether, there are rituals capable of eliminating the basis of rebirth and therefore rebirth itself. Dharmakīrti replies that the truth of such an assertion is uncertain, because, on the one hand, it is the experience of Buddhists that mental factors are responsible for rebirth and, on the other hand, rituals do not invariably lead to an end to rebirth--indeed, they are more likely to perpetuate it. The opponent concedes that the basis of rebirth may be mental, but maintains that there is an initiation, or bestowal (abhiṣeka) that stops mental action. When mental action is stopped, ignorance will be, too, and so, therefore, will be rebirth. Dharmakīrti points out that if the initiation described actually has the powers claimed, then as soon as one has participated in it, one should stop mentally or physically wandering after any object whatsoever. Such behavior is not observed, so the initiation must not have the powers claimed for it. The opponent counters with the contention that it is not until death-time that mental action, hence ignorance, will be stopped--the initiation has a delayed reaction. Dharmakīrti holds, as he has before, that as long as thought is defiled, it has the power to generate a homogeneous result, so if the death-time mind is not already free of craving, it will not become so at that time.

The opponent replies that the initiation specifically counteracts a craving mind's ability to generate a subsequent homogeneous result at death-time. Dharmakīrti points out that if the initiation has such power, then it must effect its result as soon as it is granted, while we are still alive, for a cause that has the capacity to generate a result must do so immediately.[483]

Dharmakīrti next criticizes the idea (held my most Ātmavādin schools) that a permanent self can be both the creator and the experiencer of bondage and liberation. On the one hand, it cannot be the successive producer of bondage and liberation, because it is permanent, and thus independent of the sorts of causes and conditions in response to which it can successively generate two different types of results. Indeed, it is utterly non-successive, so it cannot be considered a cause at all. If it is asserted to be the cause of both bondage and liberation, the self must change, since at one time it is the cause of bondage and at another it is the cause of freedom--yet a permanent entity cannot thus change. If the self is asserted to be both the creator _and_ experiencer of bondage or liberation, then it would be both cause _and_ result, yet it is impossible that cause and result be identical. The opponent claims in response to this last remark that cause and result are, in fact, _different_ from the self that is their basis. Dharmakīrti re-

plies that if the self is <u>not</u> identical to cause and result, then it must be unconnected to them, so it cannot be the producer and experiencer of bondage and freedom. Furthermore, a permanent self cannot even be a cooperative condition for the generation of a particular result, since, as permanent, it never can be absent, yet a cause is, in part, defined as a factor whose presence <u>or absence</u> affects the presence or absence of the result. The opponent argues that if there is no self to "unite" experiences, then one person will create karma, while someone entirely different will experience the result. Dharmakīrti replies that, on the one hand, a <u>permanent</u> self cannot "unite" experiences because it is irrelevant to causal processes, incapable of being a cause or result, let alone both a cause <u>and</u> a result; on the other hand, in the Buddhist view, there is no self uniting experiences--nor any need for one: the ordinary functioning of impermanent selfless aggregates entails the generation of a succession of homogeneous mental and physical events, the carrying over from moment to moment of particular mental complexes and propensities, and the experience of objects or conditions like those whose traces have been carried over. Hence, there is memory and, in a conventional sense, personal continuity; our sense that we actually have a self independent of our perishable aggregates arises from our predisposition toward the sixteen

distorted views that are the opposites of the sixteen aspects of the Four Noble Truths, and our ability to be rid of the notion of a self is dependent on our realization of those sixteen aspects, particularly selflessness.[484]

Finally, Dharmakīrti undertakes a criticism of the Jaina view that liberation is to be attained simply by shedding either karma or the body (usually through severe austerities). The Jaina first maintains that if one is able to transcend either the body or karma, no craving will be generated, so one will be freed. Dharmakīrti replies that if one eliminates craving first, the body and karma can be eliminated too, because their cooperative condition will have been removed. On the other hand, if one has not eliminated craving, one cannot eliminate the body and karma, because they themselves have no specific antidotes: craving is the basis of karma, which is the basis of the body, and neither of the latter two terms can be eliminated unless an antidote has been applied to their cause, craving. The Jaina replies that it must then be necessary to destroy craving and karma both. Dharmakīrti counters with the observation that there is no need specifically to counteract either karma or the many different types of defilements to which one's mind is prey, since the effective elimination of one basic defilement, ignorant craving, will entail the elimination of all other karmas and defilements. On the o-

ther hand, the attempt to eliminate all karma through austerities that eliminate one type will be fruitless, since karmas are various and virtually infinite. We know that karmas are various because we observe that we experience many different sorts of results: good experiences must come from "good" karmic seeds, bad experiences from the "bad," and mixed experiences from the mixed. Austerities like those prescribed by the Jainas cannot possibly deal with the great range and number of karmic seeds we all have waiting to ripen, so their spiritual potency can be limited at best--the foolishness of the Jaina concentration on eliminating karma rather than craving quite aside. The Jaina replies that, in fact, one act of severe austerity has the capacity to eliminate many types and many instances of karma. Dharmakīrti replies with a dilemma: if the austerities described by the Jaina are different from the suffering they entail, then there really is no need to undergo severe austerities, since mild austerities would work as well; if the austerities are identical with the suffering they entail, then they simply are ineffective, since they merely are the result of previous negative karma.[485]

The Jaina next tries to trap Dharmakīrti in a contradiction, pointing out that Buddhists (a) have admitted the efficacy of dhāraṇīs, hence of ritual practices, in purifying karma and (b) have claimed that the end of karma is en-

tailed by the end of craving, and so have allowed that karma has a specific antidote, namely the antidote to craving. Dharmakīrti replies that the application of wisdom opposed to ignorant craving is able to prevent the generation of new karma, but that it cannot eliminate karmic results that have already been experienced, such as one's body and its various flaws. The use of dharaṇīs can affect the way in which karmic results are experienced, but it cannot utterly prevent the experiencing of those results unless craving has been eliminated. (rGyal tshab notes here that there is no contradiction between the idea that the elimination of craving will ensure that karmic seeds yet unripened need never ripen and the idea that one inevitably must experience the results of the karma one has created--for the implied sense of the latter idea is that one must experience all karmic results as long as the antidote to the creation of karma has not been applied. The most powerful antidote, obviously, is the wisdom directly realizing selflessness.) The Jaina now argues that although craving leads to the creation of karma, it also can be said that karma predisposes one to craving, so the two must be attacked equally, since the one is not necessarily more responsible for suffering than the other. Dharmakīrti denies this "chicken-and-egg" description, noting that karma will not lead to craving if craving has been eliminated; indeed, neither karma

nor craving will result where craving has ended. Thus, attacking both karma and craving is unnecessary, since attacking craving alone will ensure that both are eliminated. Finally, the Jaina attempts to argue that since an Arahant's happiness arises as the result of previously-created positive karma, he will seek to perpetuate that happiness; therefore, he must be described as attached to that happiness, and he cannot, therefore, trutly be free. Dharmakīrti replies that while an Arahant may experience happiness, that happiness does not become the basis of craving for further happiness, because the craving for further happiness in ordinary beings is based on mistaken assumptions about the loci of happiness and suffering. An Arahant has no such mistaken assumptions, having abandoned the self-view, so he will not crave further happiness, although his liberated condition assures that he will, in fact, experience it.[486]

With his refutation of Jaina soteriology, Dharmakīrti completes his discussion of the truth of path. We will not analyze it in detail, but merely make several general observations.

(1) Like other truths, the truth of path will be most meaningful if beings have more than one life, since if there are future lives then there will sooner or later be opportunities for all beings to travel the path, while it

is obvious that if there is only one life, there are countless beings who never even are aware of the Buddha's teachings, let alone realize selflessness and attain the cessation of suffering. On the other hand, just as with the truth of cessation, even if there is only one life, realization of the truth of path will not be ruled out in principle, since a direct understanding of selflessness is attainable by human beings in the course of a single life. A path thus traveled to its end would not, of course, bring release from saṃsāra, since the full meaningfulness of saṃsāra is dependent on the existence of past and future lives; it would, however, bring release from all psychological torment as long as one lived.

(2) Dharmakīrti's criticisms of the paths to liberation espoused by other Indian schools that accept the possibility of liberation seem to vary in their effectiveness. The most heartfelt and convincing are those that attack the idea that one ever can attain liberation as long as one believes in and is attached to a permanent independent self, for Dharmakīrti points out that the concept of such a self is not only philosophically incoherent but psychologically damaging. His attacks on Naiyāyika ritualism and Jaina asceticism are somewhat less convincing, if only because his criticisms are based mainly on his opponents' failure to describe the bases of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa just as a Bud-

dhist would. In most cases, one has the suspicion that Dharmakīrti is not necessarily representing the opponent's position as fully and fairly as possible. Over the centuries, through a process of intersystemic debate, most schools refined their positions, and later representatives of the schools Dharmakīrti criticizes might well have been able to answer many of his criticisms. On the other hand, the gulf between Buddhist and non-Buddhist views of the nature of reality and the way to salvation is considerable, and there is no reason why later developments in non-Buddhist schools should ultimately be any more acceptable to a Buddhist than earlier, less subtle formulations were. Thus, a post-Dharmakīrtian Buddhist should fully expect to be able to refute not only the late, developed views of Indian non-Buddhists, but the soteriological views of <u>any</u> school that did not base its path to salvation on the realization of selflessness--thus, the soteriological views of Western religions also would ultimately be rejected, since they would be shown to rest on philosophical mistakes, i.e., falsehoods, and because it is assumed that any human action that is successful in the sense that one attains what one expects to attain must be based on correct understanding of reality, i.e., on truth. This last point is one that might be questioned, particularly by those who exalt faith above wisdom as a road to salvation, but it is hard to see how e-

ven traditions that downplay the intellect can fail to care whether or not their religious assertions are actually true. To the degree that every religion rests on a presumption of the ultimate truth of certain of its assertions, every religion rests on philosophical ideas that must, like any ideas, be open to questioning and testing. Thus, intersystemic debate and discussion is quite justifiable--as long as the participants are willing to attempt to understand each other fully before beginning the process of criticism.

(3) Dharmakirti's defense of the effectiveness of the wisdom realizing selflessness as a path to liberation against those who doubt that liberation is possible at all rests, as we have already seen (in the section on the truth of cessation), on the assumption that truth and falsehood in general are related in such a way that once truth is established falsehood cannot arise, and that the wisdom realizing selflessness in particular, once established and "natural" to the mind, no longer permits the generation of any self-grasping, or, therefore, any fault at all. The belief that the wisdom realizing selflessness can be thus effective depends, in turn, on observations drawn from extraordinary meditative states, whose evidential force is weak precisely because the states are so extraordinary, and therefore incapable of observation by others and suscepti-

mental by the mental. Since the mental is always preceded by the mental, we can trace the mental series back to the beginning of this life and infer that the first mental moment had to be preceded by a mental moment, and that that moment had to be associated with another life. Similarly, we can trace the mental series forward until this life's final thought, and infer that--as long as it is tainted by attachment--that final thought will engender another thought, and that that thought must be associated with another life. Thus, past and future lives must exist.

Dharmakīrti's arguments for interactionism seem, finally, to be inconclusive, for two reasons: (1) all interactionists have difficulty explaining how the mental can on the one hand be non-physical and on the other hand be capable of interacting with the physical body, for it is difficult to see how something that is non-physical is capable of producing effects, i.e., of interacting, and if it is asserted that the mental <u>does</u> produce effects and interact, then it is being given characteristics that are generally considered physical. (2) The materialism of Dharmakīrti's day was not sophisticated, for it was unaware of the strong correlation between neurophysiological and mental events. As a consequence, its arguments were mostly crude and unsatisfactory attempts to account for the body's generation of mind, effectively refuted by Dharmakīrti. Modern understan-

ding of neurophysiology in particular and the structure and functioning of biological and other systems in general has made a satisfactory materialist account of mind more of a possibility. Indeed, many today argue that the mental and physical are ontologically, if not semantically, identical, for physical systems now are understood to have many complex properties, among which may be that advanced capacity for responding to internal and external events that we call "mind." Dharmakīrti's arguments are inconclusive and problematic, but they are not impossible in principle. Still, the best arguments for a dualism of the sort advocated by Buddhists seem to come not from logic but from the existence of experiences so far inexplicable materialism, such as memories of past lives, out-of-the-body experiences, etc. These experiences, even if well-authenticated, do not necessarily entail dualism or the existence of past and future lives, for they still may be explicable naturalistically. On the other hand, such experiences may eventually force a shift in the parameters of what is "naturalistic," to the point where what once was considered "metaphysical" will be perfectly acceptable. "Naturalism," thus, may eventually entail the disproof of a dualism like Dharmakirti's, or, it may eventually come to include it and--undoubtedly in different terms--justify it.

The inconclusiveness of Dharmakīrti's arguments for

interactionism makes his establishment of the truth of suffering uncertain, and also threatens to undermine the certainty of the three other truths, whose full meaningfulness is dependent on the adequacy of the Buddhist analysis of the cosmos in terms saṃsāra and nirvāṇa.

The truth of origination is the assertion that suffering has an identifiable cause, and that that cause is craving for existence rooted in the ignorant belief in a self, in relation to which one must seek happiness and avoid suffering. The general analyses involved in demonstrating the truth of origination are psychologically compelling. They harmonize well with a biological or systems explanation of behavior, in which an organism's every act can be explained in terms of an attempt to maintain equilibrium in the face of the flux of internal and external events; nor are they incompatible with Freudian or other psychological models, where human behavior ultimately is regarded as more or less selfish. On the other hand, without the background of the existence of past and future lives, the truth of origination is little more than another incisive description of the way in which greater or lesser suffering may be correlated with greater or lesser selfishness--it will not have eschatological overtones, since the craving that motivates so much of an organism's behavior will <u>not</u> be capable of surviving the death of the organism of which it is a mental

quality. Craving may help to engender further craving during one's life, but it is always and ultimately dependent on (rather than the cause of) the survival of the body, and so cannot continue past death. On the other hand, of course, should interactionism and the existence of past and future lives eventually be justified naturalistically, the truth of origination would have to be considered a serious and compelling explanation of the way in which such processes operate.

The truth of cessation is the assertion that saṃsāric suffering can be stopped because its causes can be eliminated, i.e., (1) because defilement is not intrinsic to the mind and (2) because there exists a specific antidote to the self-grasping that is at the root of suffering, the wisdom directly realizing selflessness; and the application of that wisdom can result in the utter elimination of defilements and their traces, which is liberation and omniscience. The argument that a cessation of suffering is possible does not directly depend on the existence of past and future lives, but it will be considerably strengthened if they do exist, since the two assertions that it entails are at best problematic if we examine the evidence of just one life.

(1) That the mind is essentially pure and defilements adventitious seems uncertain, since (a) we cannot ascertain

that <u>any</u> cognition gives us more than a useful approximation of "reality" and (b) all we are able to observe in ourselves or others is a series of mental states in which suffering is replaced by happiness, then happiness by suffering, and a series of acts motivated usually by selfishness and only occasionally by altruism. Certainly we do not observe anyone in whom total clarity is manifestly present and suffering and selfishness manifestly entirely absent. Thus, it is by no means obvious that there is any being who is actually free of defilement and suffering--let alone in possession of omniscience, a quality whose assertion entails quite a different set of problems from the "mere" assertion of liberation. Obviously, arguments about the "actual" mental states and accomplishments of others are problematic, for they are invariably based on incomplete evidence, but if we judge on the basis of the evidence available to us--behavior--there is little reason to suppose that anyone has a completely purified mind or that the mind is fundamentally pure.

(2) Nor is it certain, even if much or all of our suffering is based on the belief in an independent permanent self, that the understanding that no such self exists is "powerful" enough utterly to uproot that instinctive belief. Buddhists contend that a "direct" realization of selflessness is capable of permanently uprooting self-grasping

and the multitude of defilements that spring from it, but there is no reason why such an understanding should *necessarily* uproot rather than merely suppress self-grasping. It is argued that wisdom uproots self-grasping because it is *true*, whereas self-grasping is false, but there is no certainty that the truth ever does more than *suppress* falsehood. The observation that the truth *does*, in fact, uproot falsehood, and that wisdom is the sort of antidote whose consistent application will utterly eliminate its contradictory condition (as strong heat utterly eliminates cold), is based on certain special experiences claimed by Buddhist yogis. Religious claims based on such experiences are not, *ipso facto*, false, but they are epistemologically problematic, since they cannot be proven by appeal to common experience and since--precisely because they are so extraordinary--they are more easily susceptible of misunderstanding. The optimistic view of sentient potential expressed by the truth of cessation may be a psychologically valuable way of indicating the degree and direction of one's potential for mental self-modification, but its assertion in the full sense intended by most Buddhists does not seem unarguably to be warranted.

The truth of path is the specific assertion that the way to nirvāṇa is the application of the wisdom realizing selflessness. That this wisdom is, indeed, soteriologically

(as opposed to merely psychologically) effective is based on the two assumptions just discussed: that the mind is intrinsically pure and that wisdom is capable of utterly eradicating suffering and its causes. As we have seen, neither of these is certain. Dharmakīrti's discussion of the truth of path also involves the disproof of the effectiveness of other paths to liberation, such as those of the Vaiśeṣikas, Sāṃkhyas, Naiyāyikas and Jainas. It is not certain that Dharmakīrti is entirely fair in his representation of his opponents' positions, but it is nevertheless true that we are more likely to have confidence in a path or system that is not sublated by perception or inference. Dharmakīrti, of course, believes that all other philosophical systems ultimately will be sublated by perception and inference, whereas Buddhism will not, and that Buddhism thus is the only view of the world in which confidence ultimately is justified.

In short, Dharmakīrti displays a great epistemological sophistication and a willingness to include religious questions as the objects of legitimate philosophical inquiry, since the assertion that "all human accomplishment is preceded by correct cognition" covers all situations, including the religious. He believes that Buddhism can be proven to be soteriologically authoritative, but we have been forced to the conclusion that the Buddhist world-view, al-

though by no means impossible in principle, involves problematic assertions, and that attempts to establish it with utter certainty do not seem to succeed.

CHAPTER 5: SELF-CRITICISM, SELF-DEFENSE AND FINAL REMARKS

In this part of the study, I have tried to present a variety of Buddhist arguments that either directly or indirectly bear on the question of whether enlightenment, as traditionally conceived by Indian Buddhists, is possible. At the same time, I have attempted to evaluate those arguments. The reader, thus, has had to endure a number of rather opinionated passages--whose demarcation, I hope, has at least been clear.

I readily admit that there are a number of dangers inherent in employing the analytical-critical approach that I have: (1) There always is a danger in cross-cultural analysis that one is misunderstanding one or the other or both of the traditions involved in the comparison, drawing parallels where they do not exist or failing to appreciate the differing problematics that animate differing philosophical and religious traditions. In short, there exists the possibility in cross-cultural philosophical analysis that one will--to employ two Wild West metaphors--shoot first and ask questions later or be caught in a no man's land from which neither side is clearly visible. (2) There is, further, the distinct possibility that my criticisms--regardless of inter-cultural considerations--simply do not

stand up, and that further information or more cogent reasoning will expose their inadequacy. (3) Even if my criticisms are in some cases valid or suggestive, I want to emphasize that although an examination of Buddhist arguments does not lead us to overwhelming certainty that enlightenment is possible, the shortcomings of the Buddhist arguments do not lead us to the opposite certainty that enlightenment is _im_possible. It remains possible in principle--but its possibility rests on the truth of certain assertions--particularly about the mind--that are rather more problematic than Buddhists usually have been willing to admit.

While recognizing the dangers inherent in it, I do believe that my approach is defensible: (1) While cross-cultural misunderstanding always is possible, in the realm of philosophy there seems to be a common meeting-ground between the Western and Indian traditions, for both traditions accept the same sorts of confirmatory procedures (perception and inference) and the Buddhist tradition--like that of the contemporary West--has produced a number of thinkers who recognize that the ultimately philosophical nature of religious assertions makes them liable to the same sort of rigorous analysis to which non-religious philosophical assertions invariably are exposed. Furthermore, Buddhists from the time of the Buddha on have actively in-

sisted that Buddhism, in fact, be examined by commonly-accepted checking procedures. The vast majority of Buddhists throughout the ages undoubtedly have not exposed their tradition to such close scrutiny, but the fact remains that the tradition does invite such scrutiny, and that the greatest Buddhist thinkers have subjected their beliefs to a fundamental examination. Furthermore, the critical temper of the modern age makes such examination inevitable. Thus, to undertake a critical analysis of Buddhist arguments seems both fair and reasonable. (2) Even if some or all of my observations and criticisms are insufficiently compelling or rigorous, I hope that I have at least been able to lay bare the fundamental philosophical problems faced by religious Buddhism, and therefore to have provided the groundwork for further discussions by those with a better understanding than I of either the Buddhist or Western philosophical traditions. (3) Although I do not contend that enlightenment can be shown to be impossible, I hope my analyses have made it clear that it is by no means certain that it is possible, and that the question is at best moot, given the problematic nature of Buddhist assertions about the nature and functions of the mind, on which most arguments ultimately rest.

The two basic soteriologically-significant Buddhist assertions about the mind are: (1) Mind is substantially

different from and ultimately independent of particular physical bodies. The mental, not the physical, is the indispensible cause of mind. As a result, past and future lives exist. (2) Mind is of a nature such that it cognizes phenomena as they actually are; false cognitions--and the defilements and stains that result from them--are adventitious. Since all mental faults are based on the mistaken view that there exists a permanent self independent of the aggregates that are coextensive with the "person," once that mistaken view has been dispelled, mental faults will no longer arise. The mistaken view about the self is specifically dispelled by the "correct view" of the wisdom directly realizing selflessness. That wisdom grows more and more natural to the mind from the path of seeing on, and the more "natural" it becomes, the greater its power to prevent the arising of any instance of self-grasping--and without self-grasping there cannot be a mental fault.

In addition, most Buddhists make several tangential assertions about the mind that also have soteriological implications: (3) The assertion that universal omniscience is possible is a corollary of the view that the mind is naturally pure and independent of the physical. Without the limitations and obstacles imposed by defilements, stains and physical constrains, the mind naturally cognizes <u>all</u> phenomena of the past, present and future, in all possible de-

tail. (4) The assertion that there exists a universal moral "law," karma, represents a moral application of the principle of cause and effect to the mental realm. Acts of body, speech and mind leave impressions or seeds in the mental continuum, and eventually ripen into various general and particular circumstances, mental, physical and environmental. (5) The assertion that every act of a being who has attained a particular spiritual level is by definition motivated by compassion and guided by wisdom, and therefore an exercise of skill-in-means, is important both in itself and for its corollary, that the moral quality of an act is to be determined not by the overt behavior of the person committing it, but by the motive from which it springs.

Another, more familiar way of encoding these assertions is in the basic propositions of Buddhism, the Four Noble Truths: (1) there is suffering on a cosmic scale, as beings are compelled by karma and defilement to take rebirth after unsatisfactory rebirth; (2) suffering originates in a craving for continued existence rooted in the instinctive ignorant belief that there exists a self distinct from the perishable aggregates; (3) suffering can be made to cease, because the causes for its continued origination can be utterly removed; and (4) there is a path, the wisdom realizing selflessness, that leads to the cessation of the origination of suffering. The truths of suffering

and origination are the fact and explanation of saṃsāra; the truths of cessation and path are the fact and explanation of nirvāṇa.

In seeking to establish the truth of their assertions about the mind and its place and destiny in the cosmos, Buddhists rejected the use of some types of arguments, while accepting others.

(1) By and large, they rejected *a priori* attempts to establish the truth of religious assertions on the basis of scripture or faith alone, for they recognized that scripture is not by definition inerrant, and that faith that lacks understanding is blind. Neither scripture nor faith can be considered authoritative unless its assertions accord with what can be known through perception and inference.

(2) Some Buddhists attempted to argue that from the fact that the general law of dependent origination (equated by Mādhyamikas with emptiness) is valid it necessarily follows that there are past and future lives, that saṃsāric processes occur just as described by the Buddha, that the mind is perfectible and that there is a logical path issuing in that perfection. In fact, however, the statement of a general law, such as that causality obtains throughout the universe, does not tell us whether particular cases said to be instances of the law do or do not obtain. What

events or kinds of events are and are not permitted by causal law must be determined by statements that go beyond a mere repetition of the general law. The possibility of a certain occurrence must be demonstrated by recourse to specific principles and facts confirmable through perception and inference.

(3) Many Buddhists, reflecting an attitude particularly pronounced in the Pāli canon, have attempted to argue that, independent of philosophical considerations, Buddhist truths are verifiable through personal experience, much as a scientific hypothesis is confirmable through the application of specified checking procedures. The problem with such arguments is that religious experience, unlike a scientific procedure, is non-intersubjectively observable, and thus not as open to testing and checking by others. Furthermore, because religious experience often is extraordinary, it is possible that facts or attainments "ascertained" in religious experience may in fact merely be projections of misunderstandings, desires or expectations. Although the facts and attainments ascertained in religious experience are not by definition false, they are on shaky epistemological ground, particularly if one does not assume to begin with that extraordinary states of mind are more likely to reveal "true" understanding than ordinary states, or, for that matter, that it is the nature of mind to cog-

nize reality with utter fidelity.

(4) The weakenesses inherent in the foregoing types of arguments leave a final recourse: the attempt to demonstrate the truth of religious assertions as a particular part of a more general philosophical search for the "correct cognition" that must precede any human accomplishment. The truth of philosophical assertions in general, and thus of religious assertions in particular, rests on their confirmation by commonly-accepted empirical and logical tests. Religion, thus, must be justified not by appeal to any special revelation, but by rigorous demonstration of the fact that religious propositions correspond to states-of-affairs. If they correspond to states-of-affairs, then they are expressions of "correct cognition," and if they are expressions of correct cognition, then they must precede the accomplishment of the aims of which they speak. Thus, the assertion that enlightenment is possible, since it is based on a cognition confirmed to be true, will entail that enlightenment is, in fact, possible.

In the face of philosophical analysis and criticism, the basic Buddhist assertions regarding the nature and functioning of the mind, outlined above, prove to be problematic, if not utterly unwarranted.

(1) The belief in the mind's ultimate independence of the body and in the existence of past and future lives is

problematic because the fundamental assumption that the mental and physical are radically different yet interacting realms is open to the observation that if mind is described as causally efficient we are investing it with characteristics usually reserved for the physical, while if it is said to be radically different from the physical, we undermine its chances of being considered causally efficient. Furthermore, the attempt to explain the mental as an aspect of the physical is not doomed to incoherence, as it was in Dharmakīrti's day, since growing scientific understanding of physical and biological systems has led to naturalistic explanations of "mind" as a function of a biological system and a property of the brain. These explanations are not conclusive, but they are coherent, and do not presuppose that the common-sense division of the person into mental and physical components necessarily has an ontological correlate in the existence of "two worlds."

(2) The belief that the mind's nature is the true cognition of its objects is problematic because it is uncertain that the Buddhist account of cognition is correct. At the very least, alternatives are conceivable. It is, for example, possible that cognition is <u>not</u> ultimately "pure," and that it is, rather, inevitably determinate, i.e., shaped by the interpretive needs, categories and expectations of an organism. Thus, although beings may be capable

of gaining useful approximations of reality, they never cognize reality "itself." This throws into question whether the "faults" involved in cognition ever can be completely eradicated, even by the comprehension and internalization of so seemingly fundamental a principle as selflessness. At best, the assertion that the wisom realizing selflessness is such that it utterly destroys--rather than merely suppresses--self-grasping and the defilements based on self-grasping, is problematic; that such can and does happen is not obvious on the basis of observing the behavior of beings, even "spiritually advanced" ones; and the assertion that it <u>is</u> possible is based in part on beliefs about the soteriological power of true cognition that have been formed on the basis of religious experience. As we have seen, religious experience, while not necessarily misleading, is more susceptible than is the intersubjectively-observable realm of being misunderstood and granted ontological or soteriological significance where, strictly speaking, only reports of experiences are involved.

(3) A belief in the possibility of omniscience is problematic because, quite apart from whether one can defend the assertion that the mind is fundamentally pure and accurate in its cognition of reality, it remains to be satisfactorily shown that omniscience is a coherent concept, since an omniscience that directly knows every detail of

past, present and future seems to conflict with three commonly-accepted notions about cognition. First, it seems a truism that congition involves a point-of-view, yet it is difficult to see how an omnisicient mind, cognizing everything everyplace and in every time with total immediacy, can be described as enjoying a "point-of-view." Second, it is generally accepted nowadays that some physical events are subject to chance and thus in principle unforeseeable, so one must give an account of how an omniscient mind could possibly foresee the movement of every electron, the outcome of every roll of the dice.[488] Third, the past and future, while useful concepts, do not have ontological status such that they are causally efficient in the way the present clearly is; yet Buddhist believers in omnisicience argue that a Buddha can directly cognize all that ever was and will be, without simply inferring backward and forward from the present.

(4) The concept of karma is problematic because it is uncertain that karma, like the "God of the gaps" of Western theology, is anything more than an extra principle invoked to explain the otherwise inexplicable. Given the basic Buddhist acceptance of the law of cause-and-effect, and given science's increasing ability to provide naturalistic explanations for previously inexplicable physical and sentient phenomena, karma seems less and less necessary as an expla-

natory principle. Furthermore, since every human event, whatever its other causes, has a karmic element, karma is involved in every case. Thus, it is never absent, and its causal role becomes suspect--certainly it is unfalsifiable, and its explanatory power is therefore questionable. Finally, the assertion that <u>everything</u> that happens to a person is ultimately a result of his actions and his actions alone, and that even the external, non-sentient world is ultimately arranged on the basis of the karma of sentient beings, may simply reflect a deep-seated human need to find a moral and meaning in everything--it may not reflect the causal forces actually at work in the cosmos. It certainly is questionable that the external world arises through the fruition of anything quite so ghostly as karma--a rather sentient-centric notion. It also is questionable that everything that happens to us can be traced to some specific past action--particularly if the existence of past and future lives is problematic. It further is open to question whether our every action has a specific moral quality to it and that that action eventually will bear fruits commensurate with its moral quality.

(5) The concept of skill-in-means is problematic because, although it frees moral judgements from strictly behavioral norms by stressing the greater importance of motive in the determination of the moral quality of an act,

when taken to its logical extreme it entails a complete divorce of morality from behavior, for the moral quality of an action always and ultimately is dependent on the motive from which it springs. Since motive is a private, unobservable factor in most cases, it is very difficult to determine. If the motive is difficult to determine, the act is difficult to judge. This fact, in turn, can lead either to an extreme ethical relativism or to the dogmatic assertion that certain beings, e.g., Bodhisattvas and Buddhas, because they are by definition compassionate and wise, always will act with the best interests of other beings at heart, while other beings, who do not have the wisdom and compassion of the Bodhisattva or Buddha, cannot truly display skill-in-means, but must, rather, abide by behaviorally-based moral norms. Since, however, that there is a clearly-demarcated spiritual attainment that guarantees that one's every action will be compassionate and wise, or which particular beings have, or have not, gained that attainment, cannot be determined without recourse to epistemologically-problematic religious and meditative observations, one is hard-pressed to accept Buddhist definitions of who is and is not ultimately "moral," and to fall back, instead, on more conventional behavioral criteria, with motive being a consideration, but by no means one that entails the "transcendence" of those behavioral criteria.

The difficulties faced by these basic Buddhist assertions about the mind, in turn, make the traditional Buddhist bifurcation of the universe into saṃsāra and nirvāṇa, as elucidated by the Four Noble Truths, problematic. (1) If there are no past or future lives, then the concept of saṃsāra in general and the truth of suffering in particular lose the meaning that most Buddhists, throughout the ages, have attached to them. (2) If the mind is not necessarily fundamentally pure and wisdom an antidote utterly destructive of suffering, then the truths of cessation and path are thrown into doubt. (3) Problems with the concept of omniscience throw into doubt whether the ultimate goal of sentient striving as described by most Mahāyānists and Theravādins is attainable, or even intelligible. (4) Problems with the concept of karma throw into doubt whether everything that happens to us ultimately is our own responsibility, and therefore whether we are able to control every factor in our destinies (as implied by the truths of origination and path). (5) Problems with the concept of skill-in-means leave us unable to judge who is liberated, who is "spiritually advanced" and who is "defiled," let alone whether such hard-and-fast divisions of beings ultimately are justified.

If, as Potter maintains, the basic goal of Indian philosophers is "to find a mapping scheme, a set of catego-

ries and relationships, in terms of which they can plot a route from here to complete freedom,"[489] then we must conclude that such a scheme has not decisively been shown to exist. As Robinson remarks,

> ...the mokṣa (release) philosophies failed in that they did not find the efficacious ways to the goal which they purported to discover. But they succeeded in that they rendered the concept of release intelligible and articulated a satisfying contemplative world-view around it. They succeeded in that they drew out most of the possible consequences from the axioms and data at their disposal, and exhausted their problematic. They failed in that they did not examine and get behind their axiomatic, did not open up new sources of factual knowledge, and did not renew their problematic. 490

The various arguments based on religious experience and philosophical analysis are, thus, individually inconclusive, with no single argument being free from problematic assumptions or consequences, no single experience incapable of alternative naturalistic explanation at least in principle. Can we then maintain with Donovan that despite their individual weaknesses the arguments add up to a coherent vision that is somehow more convincing as a whole? Donovan argues that while analyses of religious experiences and beliefs are undertaken piecemeal, the religious explanation itself

> ...treats the experiences not just one by one, but as part of a pattern. It offers a comprehensive world-view, linking a personal life-story with similar experiences of countless other people and with the ideas and concepts of whole traditions of thought and belief. Through religion the meaningfulness of one person's experiences is related in the end to purposes embracing the whole cosmos and human life within it. 491

Donovan's argument is not really convincing, because although religion may present a comprehensive and existentially significant vision of the universe, it may, in fact, be wrong, and the _philosophical_ acceptability of the vision will only be as strong as the various arguments that are offered in its defense. Thus, if there is no single argument that seems utterly convincing, it is difficult to maintain that the vision itself can be convincingly proven, although it may be admirably defended and justified. Of course, the fact that individual arguments are problematic and that they therefore do not add up to a convincing case for, e.g., the Buddhist world-view, does not mean that the world-view is actually false, but only that attempts to prove it irrefutably probably are doomed to inconclusiveness. After all, there may, in fact, actually be past and future lives, the mind _may_ ultimately be pure, and the wisdom realizing selflessness _may_ have the power to destroy the roots of all suffering. The assertion, made by most Buddhists, that these propositions are true, is not necessarily false; it simply is problematic philosophically.

Although most Buddhist religious assertions are problematic in one way or another, they are not so inextricably intertwined that the failure of one automatically entails the failure of another. Thus, the fact that there may not be any past or future lives does threaten to undercut the

traditional Buddhist account of saṃsāra, but it does not automatically entail that enlightenment is impossible, since enlightenment can, in principle, be attained in the course of a single life. At the same time, of course, the problems inherent in asserting the possibility of an utter cessation of suffering make the possibility of enlightenment a moot question even in terms of a single life.

Still, the fact that most Buddhist religious assertions may be philosophically problematic, and that Buddhism may not provide the answer to every conceivable human problem and need, does not mean that Buddhists should give up their world-view, for it must be admitted (a) that the Buddhist world-view is coherent and comprehensive, providing its adherents with an existentially significant set of principles and attitudes with which to approach the world, and (b) that the exposure of a degree of philosophical uncertainty in a set of beliefs does not automatically entail that those beliefs are false, only that they cannot be proven conclusively; many beliefs for which there is insufficient empirical and rational warrant may in fact be true, and certainly can be useful and positive forces.

Furthermore, the philosophically problematic nature of Buddhist religious assertions does not mean that even an "unbeliever" may not find in Buddhism much of philosophical and psychological value. Philosophically, among Buddhism's

most significant contributions are (1) its theory of language, which clearly distinguishes linguistic conventions from the actual world that is merely described by language; (2) its analysis of the "self," God, universals and other "metaphysical" entities, which provide an Indian version of Occam's razor, a law of parsimony that can be directed against any number of philosophical and religious concepts; (3) its analysis of the mind chiefly in terms of dispositions, propensities and patterns of behavior, which antedates aspects of the Western philosophy of mind by two millenia; and (4) its recognition of the universality of the law of dependent origination, i.e., of the concept of causality, and its attempt to draw psychological and spiritual consequences from that law.

Psychologically, Buddhism provides a number of important insights and practices--from the richly symbolic "psychodramas" of tantra to the austere "present-awareness" of Zen--all of them arising from the vital assumption that, regardless of its ontological or eschatological status, "mind" is capable of determining both individual and collective reality to a far greater degree than often conceded by Western psychology. Buddhism's stress on the virtues of non-violence and compassion is an important counterweight to individual and collective cynicism and the jaded acceptance of violence and stupidity as the quotidian. Perhaps

the most distinctive of Buddhism's psychological contributions is its general recognition (encoded in the concept of karma) of our own ultimate responsibility for much that happens to us, and a specific awareness of the "liberating" potential inherent in the realization that much or all of our suffering arises ultimately from our grasping at a phantom self that we instinctively project onto our own changeable aggregates, onto others and the world; and that once we truly realize that there is no such self, much of our anxiety, fear, anger and desire will be alleviated. One does not have to accept that suffering and delusion can be _utterly_ eradicated to recognize that there is value in conditioning the mind to a more altruistic, less selfish way of conceptualizing and interacting with ourselves and the world. Although Buddhism is not unique in enjoining beings to a life guided by a combination of compassion and wisdom, it has elucidated the issues with the unusual clarity and unsentimental concern for philosophical rigor that makes its _style_ nearly as important a contribution to human culture as its substance.

A traditional Buddhist may feel that a catalogue of Buddhism's "enduring contributions to world culture" is damnation by faint praise, and may protest with Prufrockian alarm, "'That is not it at all, / That is not what I meant, at all.'" He may feel that a Buddhism robbed of the literal

truth of its cosmological and soteriological assertions is hardly Buddhism at all, but mere hollow mythology, a "colorful" adjunct to a materialistic humanism to which it ultimately is opposed--for Buddhism speaks of suffering and freedom on a far greater scale in time and space than the ever-cautious humanist will consider warranted, and Buddhists will tend to be correspondingly less passionately embroiled in the melodrama of this one life on this one planet.[492]

On this point, perhaps, there is no easy reconciliation, no sudden harmonization of the opposites in a flash of light or the plop of a frog in an old pond: there is only the hope that humanists and scientists will not close themselves to the possibility that a world-view like that of traditional Buddhism may eventually be justified naturalistically; and that Buddhists will continue with the unsentimental honesty characteristic of their tradition to examine both their own beliefs and their place in a world much like--yet so very different from--that of the Buddha.

NOTES TO PART I

A note on notes

Both here and in the notes to Part II, I have limited citations to author and title--the latter often abbreviated. Full information on a given work may be found in the Bibliography, in which all works cited in the notes are listed.

Abbreviations

A. = *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, Pali Text Society ed.

AK = Vasubandhu, *Abhidharmakośa*

BL = F. Th. Stcherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic*

D. = *Dīgha Nikāya*, Pali Text Society ed.

GT = rGyal tshab, *rNam 'grel thar lam gsal byed*

JIABS = *The Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies*

M. = *Majjhima Nikāya*, Pali Text Society ed.

MMK = Nāgārjuna, *Madhyamakakārikā*

PTT = *Tibetan Tripiṭaka, Peking Edition* (Suzuki ed.)

PV = Dharmakīrti, *Pramāṇavārttika* (Shastri ed.)

S. = *Saṃyutta Nikāya*, Pali Text Society ed.

SP = *Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra* (Vaidya ed.)

TS = Śāntarakṣita, Tattvasaṃgraha

VV = Nāgārjuna, Vigrahavyāvartanī

Notes to Part I

[1]From sutta no. 26, M.i,170-71. Translations are found at Henry Clarke Warren, Buddhism in Translations, pp. 342-43; The Majjhima Nikaya, tr. Bhikku Sīlācara, 2nd ed., pp. 153-54; and Further Dialogues of the Buddha, tr. Lord Chalmers, I, p. 121. For an analysis of the relative antiquity of sutta no. 26, cf. G.C. Pande, Studies in the Origins of Buddhism, 2nd rev. ed., pp. 123-24. On Ājīvikas, cf. K.N. Jayatilleke, Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, pp. 195-230.

[2]Warren, p. 344; M.i,172.

[3]M.i,172-75

[4]S.v,420. There are many translations of this seminal sutta, e.g., The Book of the Kindred Sayings, tr. F.L. Woodward, V, p. 350; and Walpola Rahula, What the Buddha Taught, pp. 92-94.

[5]"Noble" may not be the most felicitous translation of ariya, which conveys the rather stronger sense of "sublime" or "holy," but the expression "Four Noble Truths" as a translation of caturariyasaccani--coined, I believe, by F. Max Müller--is so common now that I see no need to quibble with it.

[6]Rahula, p. 94.

[7]There are, in fact, other statements of doctrine that have been considered more concise, e.g., such elementary statements of the law of dependent origination as "this being, that arises; from the cessation of this comes the cessation of that." Some Mahāyānists have considered the Heart Sūtra, or even the letter a to be expressive of emptiness, and therefore of the core of the Buddha's teaching. Some Ch'an/Zen traditions consider the Buddha's silent smile while holding a flower--understood only by Mahākaśyapa--to

be the supreme eloquence. Each of these formulations is, indeed, concise, but each leaves a great deal to be said about what Buddhism asserts to be true in the conventional sense--the sense in which it must first be understood by those interested in its message.

[8]Vasubandu, L'Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu, tr. & annot. Louis de la Vallée Poussin, VII, pp. 38-39. The relevant verse is AK vii,13a. For a further discussion of the sixteen aspects, particularly as analyzed by Asaṅga and Tsong kha pa, cf. Alex Wayman, "The Sixteen Aspects of the Four Noble Truths and Their Opposites," JIABS, 3,2, pp. 67-76. Cf. also Part II, pp. 686-89 .

[9]Anthony Flew, A Dictionary of Philosophy, p. 73.

[10]John Hospers, An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis, 2nd ed., p. 116.

[11]Walter Kaufmann, Critique of Religion and Philosophy, p. 181.

[12]Ibid., p. 190.

[13]Ibid., pp. 261-63.

[14]Ibid., p. 267.

[15]John, 8:32.

[16]Alan W. Watts, Psychotherapy East and West, p. 67.

[17]Ibid., p. 76.

[18]Chögyam Trungpa, Cutting Through Spiritual Materialism, p. 131.

[19]Ibid., pp. 152-53.

[20]Karl H. Potter, Presuppositions of India's Philosophies, p. 11.

[21]Ibid., p. 10

[22]Herbert V. Guenther, The Life and Teaching of Nāropa, p. 235.

[23]Ibid., p. 247.

[24]Cf. e.g., Paul Demiéville, Le Concile de Lhasa; Giuseppe Tucci, Minor Buddhist Texts II; and G.W. Houston, Sources for a History of the bSam yas Debate.

[25]In the lhag mthong (vipaśyanā) section of his Lam rim chen mo.

[26]From the Heart of Perfect Wisdom Sūtra (Prajñāpāramitā Hṛdaya Sūtra), generally known as the Heart Sūtra.

[27]VV 29. Cf. Frederick Streng, Emptiness: A Study in Religious Meaning, p. 224; and Nāgārjuna, The Dialectical Method of Nāgārjuna (Vigrahavyāvartanī), tr. Kamaleswar Bhattacharya, p. 23, and Johnson and Kunst's critical edition in the same volume, 2nd part, p. 29.

[28]Quoted in Peter Donovan, Religious Language, p. 25.

[29]Quoted, ibid., p. 27.

[30]I am reminded here of the American poet Wallace Stevens' concept of a "Supreme Fiction." In a post-religious age, Stevens believed, the place of God or the gods will be taken by non-factual poetic myths and symbols, which can give structure and meaning to our lives in the same way that religious myths and symbols once did.

[31]Quoted in Donovan, Religious Language, p. 27.

[32]Ibid., p. 4.

[33]Ibid., p. 27.

[34]Quoted in Kaufmann, p. 119.

[35]Bertrand Russell, Mysticism and Logic and Other Essays, p. 31.

[36]Kaufmann, p. 104.

[37]Donovan, Religious Language, p. 97.

[38]Ninian Smart, "Understanding Religious Experience," in Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis, ed. Steven T. Katz, pp. 17-18.

[39]Peter Moore, "Mystical Experience, Mystical Doctrine, Mystical Technique," in Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis, pp. 101, 105.

[40]Renford Bambrough, "Intuition and the Inexpressible," in Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis, p. 212.

[41]Quoted in Donovan, Religious Language, p. 17.

[42]Donovan, p. 20.

[43]W.V. Quine and J.S. Ullian, The Web of Belief, p. 39.

[44]Ninian Smart, The Philosophy of Religion, p. 55. It should be pointed out in fairness that Smart beleieves there are serious limitations to the application of the falsifiability criterion to religious assertions, the limitations resulting from the limitations of empiricism and its observational techniques. Cf. p. 56; and R.W. Ashby, "Verifiability Principle," in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Paul Edwards, vol. 8, pp. 240-47.

[45]Donovan, Religious Language, p. 24.

[46]For the most lucid discussion to date of the avyākatas, cf. Jayatilleke, Early Buddhist, passim.

[47]Found at M.i,429, in sutta no. 63, the Cūḷamālun̊kya; tr. Further Dialogues, I, p. 306.

[48]Found at M.i,134, in sutta no. 22, the Alagaddūpama; tr. Further Dialogues, I, pp. 90-100.

[49]Jayatilleke, Early Buddhist, p. 358.

[50]A.D. Woozley, quoted ibid.

[51]M.i,395; tr. Further Dialogues, I, pp. 282-85. Cf. also D.iii,135, sutta no. 29; tr. Dialogues of the Buddha, III, tr. T.W. and C.A.F. Rhys Davids, pp. 126-27. Cf. also Jayatilleke, Early Buddhist, pp. 351-52.

[52]Jayatilleke, Early Buddhist, pp. 358, 359.

[53]Ibid., p. 352.

[54]M.i,402-3; tr. Further Dialogues, I, pp. 289-97 and Jayatilleke, Early Buddhist, pp. 352-53.

[55]AK i,1; Poussin tr., I, pp. 2-3.

[56]Supposed inconsistencies among the Buddha's teachings are, of course, explained by recourse to the hermeneutical theory that he taught sūtras of "direct meaning" (nītārtha) and "interpretable meaning" (neyārtha). The latter are not literally true, but are taught to accord with the understanding of less intelligent disciples. Sūtras of interpretable meaning, then, are an example of skill-in-means, compassionately taught by the Buddha because--regardless of their ultimate truth--they are useful.

[57]SP, p. 53; Saddharma-Puṇḍarīka or the Lotus of the True Law, tr. H. Kern, pp. 75-76.

[58]D.i,191, in sutta no. 9, the Poṭṭhapāda; tr. Dialogues, I, tr. T.W. Rhys Davids, p. 256. Cf. also Jayatilleke, Early Buddhist, p. 279.

[59]Jayatilleke, Early Buddhist, p. 371.

[60]M.iii,71-72, in sutta no. 117; tr. Further Dialogues, II, p. 194. Other references include D.i,27 & 58, and M.i,402. It is found in shorter form at, e.g., D.ii, 316, in the Pāyāsi Suttanta, where only three items are mentioned: "there is no other world, there are no miraculously-born beings, there is no ripening of the fruit of karma that tends toward happiness or suffering." It is specifically noted at A.i,268 that wrong view overlaps the beliefs attributed to Ajita Kesakambalī, a materialist con-

temporary of the Buddha's. Cf. The Book of Gradual Sayings, tr. F.L. Woodward, I, pp. 247-48.

61AK iv,78b-c; Poussin tr., III, pp. 167-68.

62Saddharmalaṅkāvatārasūtram, ed. P.L. Vaidya, p. 19. Cf. also "The Lankavatara Scripture," tr. D.T. Suzuki, in A Buddhist Bible, ed. Dwight Goddard, p. 283.

63Tsong kha pa, Lam rim chen mo, in PTT, vol. 152, p. 38, folio 90a.

64Wrong view (mithyadṛṣṭi) must be distinguished from ignorance (avidyā), which is most often the term employed for failure to comprehend the ultimate nature of all phenomena: selflessness (anātma) or emptiness (śūnyatā). In this sense, avidyā might be considered ontological ignorance, while mithyadṛṣṭi is cosmological ignorance.

65Dhammo sandiṭṭiko akāliko ehipassako opanayiko paccattam veditabbo viññūhīti. M.i,37, in sutta no. 7, the Vatthūpama. Cf. also, e.g., S.i,8; A.i,156.

66Cf. GT, p. 228; tr. below, Part II, p. 542. Cf. also Lati Rinbochay, Mind in Tibetan Buddhism, p. 78.

67The Lion's Roar of Queen Śrīmālā, tr. Alex and Hideko Wayman, p. 100.

68A.iv,203; tr. Gradual Sayings, IV, p. 139.

69I speak of the "mainstream" because there have, of course, been "mystical" minorities (not always small minorities, either) preaching perfectibilist doctrines among both Greeks and Christians. The extent of Indian influence on these groups is problematic, but influence in some cases there undoubtedly was. Cf. John Passmore, The Perfectibility of Man, for a discussion and critique of the Western perfectibilist tradition. For a lucid summary of the contemporary humanist position, c.f., e.g., Corliss Lamont, The Philosophy of Humanism. For a discussion of Buddhism vis à vis the Western tradition, cf., e.g., Richard Robinson, "Implications of Human Sciences for Buddhism," in World Buddhism, October 1971-April 1972.

[70]Robert Lawson Slater, Paradox and Nirvana, pp. 63, 70. Of course, nirvāṇa is the gospel of all Buddhists only if we take it in its broadest possible sense, as including not only the liberation of an Arahant but the full enlightenment of a Buddha.

[71]Cf. Vinaya iii,3-6; tr. Buddhist Texts Through the Ages, ed. Edward Conze, pp. 60-62.

[72]Cf. D. sutta no. 70 and Karel Werner, "Bodhi and Arhattaphala: From Early Buddhism to Early Mahāyāna," JIABS, 4,1, p. 71. Throughout Part I, I will employ the term "enlightenment" for the general class of possible states lying beyond saṃsāra.

[73]D.iii,101, in sutta no. 28, the Sampasādaniya; tr. Dialogues, III, pp. 95-96.

[74]This is the view of virtually all Western scholars; the Theravādin tradition, of course, holds that the suttas of the nikāyas actually were delivered as they were written, and were established authoritatively at the council of Rajagāha (S. Rājagṛha), immediately after the Buddha's parinirvāṇa.

[75]Joseph Campbell, The Masks of God: Oriental Mythology, pp. 183-84.

[76]Cf. ibid., p. 168.

[77]Stephan V. Beyer, "The Background to Buddhism," in Buddhism: A Modern Perspective, ed. Charles S. Prebish, pp. 4-5. It must be stressed that although "the yogic ideal... cannot easily be traced to Indo-European antecedents," it cannot easily be traced to non-Indo-European (e.g., Egyptian, Mesopotamian or Indus) antecedents, either. Its origins, ultimately, evade us.

[78]Campbell, p. 212.

[79]Ibid., p. 144.

[80]A.L. Basham, The Wonder That Was India, p. 232.

[81] J.A.B. van Buitenen, "Vedic and Upanisadic Bases of Indian Civilization," in Chapters in Indian Civilization, ed. Joseph W. Elder, I, pp. 32-33.

[82] Jayatilleke, Early Buddhist, chapter I. My main sources for this rather synthetic account are Jayatilleke, van Buitenen, Basham, Beyer, and Campbell, as well as Étienne Lamottes's Histoire du Bouddhisme Indien and Pande's Studies in the Origins of Buddhism.

[83] D. sutta no. 1, D.i,1-46; tr. Dialogues, I. Cf. also The Discourse on the All-Embracing Net of Views (Brahmajāla Sutta) and its Commentarial Exegesis, tr. Bhikku Bodhi.

[84] For example, in the Samaññãphala Sutta, D. sutta no. 2, found at D.i,52-59; tr. Dialogues, I.

[85] The most thorough study of these teachers and their doctrines is found in Jayatilleke, Early Buddhist.

[86] M. sutta no. 26. Cf. above, p. 12.

[87] M.i,167; tr. Further Dialogues, I, p. 165.

[88] For complete references on the four formulas, cf. T.W. Rhys Davids and William Stede, The Pali Text Society's Pali-English Dictionary, p. 77. Cf. also Jan T. Ergardt, Faith and Knowledge in Early Buddhism, pp. 1-8; and I.B. Horner, The Early Buddhist Theory of Man Perfected, pp. 134-35.

[89] D.i,12.

[90] A.i,27; tr. Gradual Sayings, I, pp. 25-26.

[91] S.i,138.

[92] D.iii,113; tr. Dialogues, III, p. 107.

[93] A.iii,8; tr. Gradual Sayings, III, tr. E.M. Hare, p. 6.

[94] Udāna, p. 80; tr. The Minor Anthologies of the Pali

<u>Canon</u>, tr. F.L. Woodward, II, p. 98. The statement also is translated in most standard anthologies of Buddhist texts.

[95]D.ii,223; tr. <u>Dialogues</u>, II, p. 261.

[96]Cf. above, note 4.

[97]Cf. Nyanatiloka's synoptic account of the eightfold path in <u>A Buddhist Bible</u>, pp. 33-60. Cf. also Lama Anagarika Govinda, <u>The Psychological Attitude of Early Buddhist Buddhist Philosophy</u>, pp. 67-75, which contains an interesting attempt to relate schematically the Four Noble Truths, the eightfold path and the twelve links, or factors, of dependent origination.

[98]D. <u>sutta</u> no. 2, at D.i,51ff.; tr. <u>Dialogues</u>, I, pp. 68ff.

[99]D.ii,120, <u>sutta</u> no. 16; tr. <u>Dialogues</u>, II, pp. 128-30.

[100]For an account of "the doctrine of the Buddha" in terms of the thirty-seven limbs, cf. A.K. Warder, <u>Indian Buddhism</u>, 2nd ed., chapter 4.

[101]Ibid., p. 106.

[102]A.i,71; tr. <u>Gradual Sayings</u>, I, p. 67.

[103]Rhys Davids (<u>Dialogues</u>, I, p. 200) translates <u>sotāpanno</u> as "converted man," which hardly seems adequate to the attainment described. If one must use analogies from Christianity, it might be better to describe the Streamwinner as "saved." Cf. also below, Part II, notes 555 and 556.

[104]D.i,156; tr. <u>Dialogues</u>, I, pp. 200-201. Other ways of dividing <u>ariyas</u> in the Pāli tradition are to be found in Buddhaghosa's <u>Visuddhimagga</u>, xxi,74 and xxii,1-31; cf. Bhadantācariya Buddhaghosa, <u>The Path of Purification</u>, tr. Bhikku Ñāṇamoli, II, pp. 770-71 and 785-92. It should be noted that the definitions I have supplied for the first three types of <u>ariya</u> are "maximal," in that they describe the very most that each type of <u>ariya</u> will undergo. In fact, Streamwinners (for example) need not take any more rebirths if their intelligence is such that they can pass

through the Once-Returner and Non-Returner stages before death.

[105]Werner, pp. 74-75.

[106]D.i,62; tr. Dialogues, I, p. 78.

[107]Cf. above, p. 64.

[108]S.iii,82; tr. Kindred Sayings, III, pp. 69-70.

[109]Francis H. Cook, "Nirvāṇa," in Buddhism: A Modern Perspective, p. 135. Cf. A Buddhist Bible, pp. 31-33, for a selection of descriptions of nirvāṇa.

[110]M.i,69ff.; tr. Further Dialogues, I, p. 47ff. and Sīlācara, p. 67. For a somewhat different, Mahāyāna, list, cf., e.g., Tenzin Gyatsho, The Opening of the Wisdom Eye, tr. Bhikku Khantipalo et al., pp. 128-29.

[111]Jayatilleke, Early Buddhist, p. 381.

[112]D.i,17-18; tr. Dialogues, I, p. 29.

[113]Jayatilleke, Early Buddhist, pp. 203-204.

[114]D.iii,134; tr. Dialogues, III, p. 126.

[115]M.i,482, in sutta no. 71; tr. is Jayatilleke's, Early Buddhist, p. 468.

[116]tapācchedācca nikaṣāt suvarṇamiva paṇḍitaiḥ / parikṣya bhikṣavo grahyam madvaco na tu gauravāt // (T. dge slong dag gam mkhas rnams kyis / bsregs bcad brdar ba'i gser bzhin du / legs par brtags la nga yi bka' / blang bar bya yi gus phyir min). Found at TS 3587; verse no. 3588 in The Tattvasaṃgraha of Śāntarakṣita, tr. Ganganatha Jha, II, p. 1558; and Jayatilleke, Early Buddhist, p. 391. Cf. also Tsong kha pa, Drang nges legs bshad snying po, p. 3.

[117]A.i,190; tr. is Woodward's, Gradual Sayings, I, p. 173.

[118] D.i,238, *sutta* no. 13; tr. *Dialogues*, I, pp. 303-5.

[119] M.ii,164-77, *sutta* no. 95; tr. *Further Dialogues*, II, pp. 93-100.

[120] Cf. Jayatilleke, *Early Buddhist*, pp. 184, 187.

[121] Ibid., p. 382. Jayatilleke (pp. 427-28) speculates that the Buddha's opposition to testimony and espousal of experience as the basis for accepting propositions shows that his epistemology was influenced more by the materialists--with their emphasis on perception--than by the Vedicists, who tended to emphasize "hearing" (*śruti*).

[122] Ibid., p. 234.

[123] Ibid., p. 206.

[124] M.i,520, *sutta* no. 76; tr. *Further Dialogues*, I, p. 369.

[125] Jayatilleke, *Early Buddhist*, pp. 436-37.

[126] D.i,12; tr. *Dialogues*, I, p. 26.

[127] M,i,71; tr. *Further Dialogues*, I, p. 47.

[128] Jayatilleke, *Early Buddhist*, p. 404.

[129] M.ii,211; tr. *Further Dialogues*, II, pp. 120-23. Cf. Jayatilleke, *Early Buddhist*, p. 171.

[130] A.i,254; tr. *Gradual Sayings*, I, p. 236. Cf. also Jayatilleke, *Early Buddhist*, p. 437. The six superknowledges are mentioned above, p. 68.

[131] Jayatilleke, *Early Buddhist*, p. 437.

[132] D.ii,317ff., *sutta* no. 23; tr. *Dialogues*, II, p. 349ff. Cf. also Jayatilleke, *Early Buddhist*, p. 409.

[133] George Mavrodes, "Real vs. Deceptive Mystical Expe-

riences," in Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis, p. 237.

[134]Russell, Mysticism, p. 12.

[135]D.iii,28-34, sutta no. 24; tr. Dialogues, III, pp. 26-31.

[136]D.i,40; tr. Dialogues, I, p. 53.

[137]M.iii,207-15, sutta no. 136; tr. Further Dialogues, II, pp. 272-78. Cf. also Jayatilleke, Early Buddhist, pp. 462-63.

[138]Vinaya,iii,90; cf. Horner, pp. 112-13.

[139]Sutta Nipāta 134; tr. The Sutta Nipāta, tr. V. Fausböll, p. 23.

[140]Kaufmann, p. 110.

[141]M.i,317-20, sutta no. 47; tr. Further Dialogues, I, pp. 227-30.

[142]M.i,353-59, sutta no. 53; tr. ibid., pp. 254-59.

[143]Cf. above, p. 13.

[144]Kaufmann, p. 131.

[145]Smart, Philosophy of Religion, p. 117. What keeps the argument from being totally circular is the fact that: "first a religion needs to show that it at least has the power to produce the fruits that it values; and second, the fruits tie in with moral insights which men may have independently of commitment ot a particular tradition."

[146]Donovan, Religious Language, p. 40.

[147]Cited, ibid., pp. 67-68.

[148]M.i,281-84, sutta no. 40; tr. Further Dialogues, I, pp. 199-201 and Silācāra tr., pp. 47-50.

[149] M.ii,9ff., sutta no. 77; tr. Further Dialogues, II, p. 5ff.

[150] M.iii,29-37; tr. ibid., pp. 173-76.

[151] M.iii,291-93; tr. ibid., pp. 320-22.

[152] Above, p. 69.

[153] A.ii,66; tr. Gradual Sayings, II, p. 2.

[154] Buddhaghosa,i,98; Ñāṇamoli tr., p. 36.

[155] Ibid.,vii,115; tr. p. 243.

[156] Ibid.,iii,75; tr. p. 103.

[157] Jayatilleke, Early Buddhist, p. 394.

[158] Ibid., pp. 386-87.

[159] Quoted, ibid., p. 388.

[160] Buddhaghosa,iv,47; tr. p. 135.

[161] Jayatilleke, "Buddhism and the Scientific Revolution," in Pathways of Buddhist Thought, ed. Ven Nyanaponika, p. 100.

[162] Jayatilleke, Early Buddhist, p. 391.

[163] Frits Staal, Exploring Mysticism, p. 128.

[164] M.i,402-04; tr. Further Dialogues, I, p. 290ff. Cf. Jayatilleke, Early Buddhist, pp. 405-6. Kaufmann, p. 122, argues that Pascal's Wager is not a good bet, because the indefinability of divine values and grace makes it uncertain that God will punish those who are critical of untested beliefs and reward those who accept beliefs without evidence, on the basis of "enlightened" self-interest. Indeed, perhaps God will reward the critical and punish the blind believer. Karma is supposed to provide a more ration-

al ethical explanation of things than divine grace, but it too is subtle and, in any case, we must accept the Buddha's characterization of what _would_ happen in a future life as a result of belief or disbelief before we can consider the wager, i.e., we must accept his characterization of karmic values. Faith in this characterization is required before the wager can be made.

165 Jayatilleke, _Early Buddhist_, p. 389.

166 Above, pp. 79-80.

167 Jayatilleke, _Early Buddhist_, p. 403.

168 M.i,71; tr. _Further Dialogues_, I, p. 47; and _Buddhist Texts_, p. 112.

169 _Ye dhammā hetuppabhavā tesaṃ hetuṃ tathāgato āha, tesañ ca yo nirodho evaṃvādī mahāsamaṇo_. Found at _Vinaya_,i, 23; tr. Warren, p. 189. Cf. Jayatilleke, Early Buddhist, p. 454.

170 _Imasmiṃ sati idam hoti_ / _imassa uppādā idam upajjati_ // _Imasmiṃ asati idam na hoti_ / _imassa nirodhā idaṃ nirujjhati_. M.i,257-71, _sutta_ no. 38; tr. _Further Dialogues_, I, pp. 183-91. Cf. also _sutta_ no. 79, the _Culasakuludāyi_ (M.ii,29-39), tr. _Further Dialogues_, II, pp. 16-21.

171 Jayatilleke, _Early Buddhist_, p. 454.

172 S.ii,18. Cf. David J. Kalupahana, _Buddhist Philosophy_, p. 27.

173 M.i,191, _sutta_ no. 28; tr. _Further Dialogues_, I, p. 138.

174 _Itivuttaka_ 91; tr. _Minor Anthologies_, p. 181.

175 Kalupahana, _Buddhist Philosophy_, p. 116.

176 D.iii,211, sutta no. 33; tr. _Dialogues_, III, p.204.

177 Kalupahana, _Buddhist Philosophy_, p. 30.

[178] Ibid., p. 64.

[179] Cf., e.g., S.ii,28 and Kalupahana, Buddhist Philosophy, pp. 31-32.

[180] M.iii,138-44, sutta no. 126; tr. Further Dialogues, II, pp. 236-39.

[181] S.i,104; tr. Kindred Sayings, I, p. 131.

[182] A.i,81; tr. Gradual Sayings, I, p. 75.

[183] Russell, Mysticism, p. 28.

[184] Ergardt, p. 17.

[185] Jayatilleke, Early Buddhist, p. 391.

[186] Staal, p. 51.

[187] Douglas M. Burns, "Nirvana, Nihilism and Satori," in Pathways of Buddhist Thought, p. 176.

[188] D.i,177, sutta no. 8; tr. Dialogues, I, p. 240.

[189] M.i,501, sutta no. 74; tr. Further Dialogues, I, p. 353.

[190] Therīgāthā,V,xliii; tr. Psalms of the Sisters, p. 59.

[191] Theragāthā,VII,lxi; tr. Psalms of the Brethren, p. 62.

[192] S.i,194; tr. Kindred Sayings, I, pp.246-47.

[193] This is, in fact, the position adopted by most Mahāyāna schools, which hold that an unbroken line of realized masters and disciples has existed from the Buddha's time right up to the present day.

[194] Donald D. Evans, "Differences Between Scientific

and Religious Assertions," in Philosophy of Religion: Contemporary Perspectives, ed. Norbert O. Schedler, pp. 326-7.

[195]Steven T. Katz, "Language, Epistemology and Mysticism," in Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis, pp. 26-30.

[196]Ibid., p. 64.

[197]Moore, p. 116.

[198]Ibid., p. 110. It must be noted that the epistemology applied by Katz and Moore, which will not admit of "pure" experiences, is very different from that of the Buddhist, who believes not only in the initially unmediated nature of all cognition, but in the mind's ultimate clarity of all obscurations. This epistemology will be considered in somewhat greater detail in Chapters 3 and 4.

[199]A.v,320-21; tr. Gradual Sayings, V, p. 203.

[200]I will not deal here with the notion that mystics all experience the same ultimate reality, but express it differently. The notion presupposes a "pure" experience of the sort we have rejected, and relies to an extraordinary degree on linguistic juggling that reveals little understanding of specific religious contexts and little respect for the mystics' ability to say what they mean.

[201]Donovan, Religious Language, p. 39.

[202]Russell, Religion and Science, p. 188.

[203]And even, it might be added, if experienced "intersubjectively" by a large number of people, as in collective visions of the Virgin Mary at, e.g., Fatima, or less reliably reported cases in which Buddhist meditators have made "mentally-created" objects (such as deities) visible to others. Such cases are intriguing, but epistemologically problematic as long as even one person present with normally-functioning senses does not perceive the alleged theophany. It must be said in defense of such claims that it *is* possible that there are phenomena in the universe that only can be perceived under certain subjective and environmental conditions, but that this by definition excludes such phenomena from the kind of relatively stable ascertainment we can accord phenomena that do not require "special condi-

tions."

[204]Quine and Ullian, p. 19.

[205]Katz, p. 45.

[206]Donovan, Religious Language, p. 44.

[207]Anthony Flew, "Theology and Falsification," in The Existence of God, ed. John Hick, p. 227. Falsifiability as a central criterion of meaningfulness was introduced in the context of the philosophy of science by Karl R. Popper, e.g., in his Conjectures and Refutations. For a discussion of the interrelated problems of verifiability, confirmability and falsifiability, cf. Hospers, chapter 14 and Ashby, op. cit. For a critique of the falsifiability criterion, cf. Jonathon Lieberson, "The 'Truth' of Karl Potter," The New York Review of Books, Nov. 18, 1982 and Dec. 2, 1982.

[208]R.B. Braithwaite, "Religious Language as Ethically but not Factually Significant," in The Existence of God, p. 232.

[209]Agehananda Bharati, The Ochre Robe, p. 237.

[210]Russell, Mysticism, p. 3.

[211]Quine and Ullian, p. 20.

[212]Donovan, Religious Language, pp. 38-39. For a survey of current research into altered states of consciousness, cf. Judith Hooper, "Mind Tripping," Omni, Oct., 1982, p. 72+. Among the most disinterested and insightful explorers and analysts of altered states has been John Lilly, who believes that the safest position to take regarding them is that the human biocomputer "itself generates all of the phenomena experienced." Cf. his The Human Biocomputer.

[213]Warder, Indian Buddhism, p. 299.

[214]Cf., e.g., Nalinaksha Dutt, Buddhist Sects in India, p. 24.

[215]Warder, Indian Buddhism, p. 300.

[216]Cf. ibid., pp. 300-301 and Points of Controversy, tr. Shwe Zan Aung and Mrs. (C.A.F.) Rhys Davids, p. xlviii.

[217]Points of Controversy, pp. 64-70.

[218]Cf. Warder, Indian Buddhism, p. 330 and Maurice Winternitz, A History of Indian Literature, 2nd ed., II, p. 174ff.

[219]The Questions of King Milinda, tr. T.W. Rhys Davids, I, pp. 65-66.

[220]Ibid., I, p. 108.

[221]Ibid., p. 109.

[222]Ibid., pp. 109-110.

[223]Ibid., p. 110.

[224]Ibid., II, pp. 103-07.

[225]Ibid., pp. 181-85.

[226]Ibid., pp. 186-97.

[227]Ibid., pp. 195-201.

[228]Ibid., pp. 202-05.

[229]Cf., e.g., D.i,303-05; D.ii,328.

[230]Questions, I, pp. 301-02.

[231]Ibid., II, pp. 24-25.

[232]Ñāṇamoli tr., pp. 578-79.

[233]Ibid., pp. 579-81.

[234]The contention of such "Buddhist modernists" as Jayatilleke and Kalupahana that Buddhist truths are considered empirically verifiable in a sort of "extended positivist" sense has recently been attacked. Cf. A.D.P. Kalanasuriya, "On the Notion of Verification in Buddhism and Logical Positivism: A brief philosophical study," in _Buddhist and Western Philosophy_, ed. Nathan Katz, pp. 287-305. Kalanasuriya maintains that (a) because of the association of the superknowledges with the cessation of perception and feeling, one cannot describe them as "empirical" and (b) Buddhism is a path, not a series of propositions, and one cannot, therefore, discuss it in "true-false" terms. (a) rests in part on the notion of the Buddha's utter transcendence of worldly categories, which does not, I think, vitiate the probability that the superknowledges are, broadly, "empirical" types of knowledge. (b) ignores the centrality of the Four Noble Truths, which certainly are universal propositions that can be true or false, and ignores too the fact that a path is founded on propositions and presuppositions.

[235]The five paths are unique to Sanskritic Buddhism. Buddhaghosa divides the path into stages corresponding to morality (_sīla_), concentration (_samādhi_) and wisdom (_paññā_).

[236]These have been enumerated above, pp. 18-19.

[237]This latter equation is found at AK,vi,67; Poussin tr., IV, p. 282. The stages of the path I have summarized are covered in chapter vi.

[238]AK,vi,56-58; Poussin tr., IV, p. 282.

[239]In AK,ix; Poussin tr., V, pp. 254-55.

[240]Above, p. 70.

[241]Cf., e.g., AK,iii,44c-d; Poussin tr., II, pp. 137-138.

[242]Cf., e.g., AK,i,3; Poussin tr., I, p. 5.

[243]AK,iii,19d; Poussin tr., I, pp. 59-60.

[244]AK(Bhāṣya),vi,34a-b; Poussin tr., IV, pp. 305-06.

[245]AK,iv,1; Poussin tr., III, pp. 1-2.

[246]Mark A. Ehman, "The Saddharmapuṇḍarīka Sūtra," in Buddhism: A Modern Perspective, p. 102.

[247]SP, chapter 5.

[248]SP, chapter 7; Kern tr., pp. 181-83.

[249]SP, p. 93; Kern tr., pp. 135-36.

[250]SP 5, verse 51, p. 94; Kern tr., p. 137.

[251]Cf. above, pp. 38-41.

[252]SP 5, verse 74, p. 95; Kern tr., p. 140.

[253]Cf., e.g., Ratnagunasamcayagāthā,v,5-8; tr. The Perfection of Wisdom in Eight Thousand Lines and its Verse Summary, tr. Edward Conze, pp. 19-20. For a good discussion of various Mahāyāna themes, including bodhicitta, cf. Har Dayal, The Bodhisattva Doctrine in Buddhist Sanskrit Literature.

[254]Cf. E. Obermiller, Analysis of the Abhisamayālamkāra (2 fasc.) and Geshe Sopa, "Śamathavipaśyanāyuganaddhā: The Two Leading Principles of Buddhist Meditation," in Mahāyāna Buddhism: Theory and Practice, ed. Minoru Kiyota, pp. 46-65.

[255]There are, of course, a number of schools of Mādhyamika interpretation, most notably the Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika, which differ in (a) their preferred methods of argument, the former favoring the independent syllogism and the latter the reductio, and (b) their characterization of conventional truth, the Svātantrikas admitting that conventionally any phenomenon can be said to have an intrinsic mark (svalakṣaṇa), the Prāsaṅgikas denying such a basis even in conventional truth--which is said by them to be dependent origination (pratītya samutpāda). Generally, however, both schools agree that in an ultimate sense all phenomena are empty of true, independent existence. Cf. Geshe

Lhundup Sopa and Jeffrey Hopkins, Practice and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism, part 2, chapters VII and VIII; and Hopkins, Meditation on Emptiness, passim.

[256]While the Mādhyamikas may have exposed the "wisdom," or philosophical, side of the prajñāpāramitā most thoroughly, the "method" side, especially the path-structure implicit in the sūtras, was exposed most thoroughly by writers whose leanings were Yogācārin, e.g., Asaṅga. Cf. above, note 253, for references.

[257]Aṣṭasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā, ed. P.L. Vaidya, p. 20; tr. Eight Thousand, pp. 98-99.

[258]Cf. Eight Thousand, pp. 306-07 for references.

[259]Cf. Conze, Buddhist Wisdom Books, p. 89.

[260]Cf. ibid., p. 93.

[261]MMK,vii,34; text and tr. Nāgārjuna, text and tr. Kenneth K. Inada, p. 70; Streng, p. 192.

[262]MMK,xxv,4; Inada, pp. 154-55; Streng, p. 215.

[263]MMK,xxv,19; Inada, p. 158; Streng, p,217.

[264]Cf., e.g., MMK,xviii,4-5 (Inada, p. 114; Streng, p. 204); and MMK,xxvi,10-12 (Inada, pp. 162-63; Streng, p. 218).

[265]MMK,xxiv,1; Inada, p. 144; Streng, p. 212.

[266]MMK,xxiv,6; Inada, p. 145; Streng, p. 213.

[267]MMK,xxiv,8-9; Inada, p. 146; Streng,ibid.

[268]MMK,xxiv,14; Inada, p. 147; Streng, ibid.

[269]MMK,xxiv,19; Inada, p. 148; Streng, ibid.

[270]Among the lucid brief expositions of Mādhyamika are: Warder, Indian Buddhism, pp. 373-92; Tenzin Gyatsho

(Dalai Lama XIV), The Key to Madhyamika; and Douglas D. Daye, "Major Schools of the Mahāyāna: Mādhyamika," in Buddhism: A Modern Perspective, pp. 76-96. For criticisms of the Mādhyamika procedure, cf., e.g., Richard Robinson, Classical Indian Philosophy, pp. 71-79; and Ben-Ami Scharfstein, Mystical Experience, pp. 57-58.

[271]VV 30ff.; Johnson and Kunst ed., p. 30ff.; tr. Streng, pp. 224-25.

[272]Peter Fenner, Liberative Philosophy--A Madhyamika View, pp. 10-22.

[273]VV 70; Johnson and Kunst ed., pp. 52-53; Bhattacharya tr., p. 47. Cf. also MMK,xxiv,14 and 40 for a similar sequence of argument; Inada, p. 147, 152; Streng, p. 223, 225.

[274]Stefan Anacker,"Major Schools of the Mahāyāna: Yogācāra," in Buddhism: A Modern Perspective, p. 97.

[275]Cf. John Keenan, "Original Purity and the Focus of Early Yogācāra," JIABS, 5,1, pp. 7-18.

[276]The Large Sutra on Perfect Wisdom, tr. Edward Conze, parts II and III, pp. 645-46.

[277]Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra, ed. and tr. Étienne Lamotte, esp. chapters 6 and 8.

[278]Saṃdhinirmocana,v,3; tr. pp. 184-85.

[279]Asaṅga, Mahāyānasaṃgraha, chapter I, in La Somme du Grand Véhicule d'Asaṅga, II, p. 12ff.

[280]Hopkins, Meditation, p. 332.

[281]Saṃdhinirmocana,v,5; tr. pp. 185-86.

[282]"The Laṅkāvatāra Scripture," p. 324.

[283]For the best discussion in any language of the concept of gotra, cf. David Seyfort Ruegg, La Théorie du Ta-

thāgatagarbha et du Gotra, part one.

[284]Quoted in sGam po pa, The Jewel Ornament of Liberation, tr. Herbert V. Guenther, p. 3.

[285]Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra,iii,11, in S. Bagchi's ed., p. 13. Cf. also sGam po pa, pp. 3-4.

[286]Tibetan tradition counts the Ratnagotravibhāga, which it usually calls the Uttaratantra, as one of the five great works conveyed by Maitreya to Asaṅga. Chinese tradition regards it as a work of Sthiramati (an earlier Sthiramati than the great Yogācārin commentator). Warder, Indian Buddhism, pp. 403-13, sides with the Chinese view, and considers not only the Ratnagotravibhāga, but also the Abhisamayālaṃkāra, to predate Asaṅga and represent a transitional phase between Mādhyamika and Asaṅgan Yogācāra.

[287]Ratnagotravibhāga,i,94-95, p. 59ff.; English translation of the Tibetan translation, The Sublime Science of Maitreya, tr. E. Obermiller, in Acta Orientalia, IX, p. 213ff.

[288]Sublime Science, pp. 220-21. Cf. also Lion's Roar, p. 107.

[289]Ratnagotravibhāga,ii,6-7, p. 80; Sublime Science, p. 243.

[290]Ratnagotravibhāga,i,40, p. 35; Sublime Science,i, 39, p. 176. Cf. also Lion's Roar, p. 105.

[291]Ratnagotravibhāga,i,36 com., pp. 30-31; Sublime Science,i,37 com., p. 173.

[292]Suzuki tr., p. 314.

[293]Sublime Science, p. 113, note 1. This observation is reminiscent of that at Udāna 80, which asserts that there is an unconditioned realm, nirvāṇa, because if there were not, there would be no deliverance from the conditioned.

[294]Sublime Science, ibid.

[295]Cf. above, note 289.

[296]An idea that has its roots in the Pāli canon (at A.i,10), and also seems to have been held by the Mahāsaṅghikas,and perhaps the Vibhajyavādins. Cf. Ruegg, part 4; and L'Enseignement de Vimalakīrti, tr. & annot. Étienne Lamotte, pp. 51-59.

[297]This is a notion that seems to date from the very earliest period of Jainism. It is not impossible that Jaina ideas exercised an influence on Buddhism, though there is ample basis for the development of the concept of omniscience within the Buddhist tradition itself. Cf. Ram Jee Singh, The Jaina Concept of Omniscience.

[298]Potter, p. 53.

[299]The point, first made explicitly by Candrakīrti in the first chapter of the Madhyamakāvatāra, seems well taken, for if there only can be one profound, transforming truth (that of all dharmas' emptiness of inherent or natural existence), and if it is admitted that, e.g., those on a Śrāvaka path are profoundly transformed, then they must realize that one truth also; the difference between their attainments and those of a Bodhisattva is explained in terms of the different methods employed.

[300]i,1: samyagjñānapūrvikā sarvapuruṣārthasiddhir. The original and Dharmottara's commentary are found at Dharmakīrti, Nyāyabindu, ed. Chandrasekara Sastri, p. 1; these are translated at BL, II, pp. 1-11. For a translation of the verse and Vinītadeva's commentary, cf. Vinītadeva's Nyāyabindu-ṭīkā, ed. & tr. Mrinalkanti Gangopadhyaya, pp. 79-86.

[301]Warder, Indian Buddhism, p. 449.

[302]Cf. A Sourcebook in Indian Philosophy, ed. Sarvapalli Radhakrishnan and Charles A. Moore, p. 356ff.; and Satischandra Vidyabhusana, A History of Indian Logic, section II, chapter 1.

[303]For surveys of the development of Indian epistemology and logic, cf., e.g., Vidyabhusana; Jwala Prasad, History of Indian Epistemology, 2nd ed.; and Esther Solomon, Indian Dialectics (2 vol.).

[304]Robinson, Classical, pp. 63-65.

[305]Ibid., p. 65.

[306]Ibid., p. 96.

[307]Cf. Potter, pp. 78-84; Solomon, I, chapter 12, esp. pp. 485-87 and 496-98.

[308]For more detailed discussions of formal inference, cf., e.g., BL, I, part III, chapter II; Potter, pp. 59-78; Solomon, I, chapter 10; Vidyabhusana, entire; and Shah, chapter VII.

[309]For the best modern discussion along the lines suggested by the last two paragraphs, cf. Potter, chaps. 1-4.

[310]To the best of my knowledge, the earliest incidence of the epithet pramāṇabhūta is in the Lalitavistara, where the earth-goddess tells the triumphant Buddha, "You alone, O Blessed One, have become the supreme seer of this cosmos of gods (and men); you have become the standard (pramāṇa)." Here, pramāṇa seems to convey its more general sense of "standard," or "measure," rather than its technical sense of "authoritative" person or cognition--the latter sense probably was not well-established at the time the Lalitavistara was written. Cf. Vaidya's edition, p. 233.

[311]Cf. Sopa and Hopkins, pp. 92, 111.

[312]Cf. Warder, Indian Buddhism, pp. 448-49.

[313]Cf., e.g., Warder, Outline of Indian Philosophy, p. 202ff.

[314]The best single account of the doctrine of momentariness remains that in BL, I, pp. 79-203--despite Stcherbatsky's confusion over the Sautrāntika notion of ultimate truth. Cf. also Leonard Zwilling, Dharmakīrti on Apoha; Zwilling's article, "Some Aspects of Dharmakīrti's Ontology Reconsidered," Kailash, III,3 (1975); and John Koller, Oriental Philosophies, pp. 154-55.

[315]Shah, chapter II.

[316]For discussions of Buddhist causal theory, cf., e.g., BL, I; Zwilling, Dharmakīrti on Apoha; Kalupahana, Causality: the Central Philosophy of Buddhism; and Alfonso Verdu, Early Buddhist Philosophy in Light of the Four Noble Truths, part II.

[317]Cf., e.g., the beginning of the pratyakṣa chapter of PV, and the first chapter of the Nyāyabindu (q.v. BL, II).

[318]Cf. BL, both vols.; also, Geshe Rabten, The Mind and its Functions, pp. 11-17; and Lati Rinbochay, pp.49-75.

[319]Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind, p. 213.

[320]Cf., e.g., Shah, pp. 270-71; Vidyabhusana, pp. 312-315.

[321]Cf. Shah, chapter III.

[322]Potter, pp. 194-96, argues that Dharmakīrti uses yogic perception to bolster conventional perception, and vice versa, and thus commits the fallacy of reciprocal dependence (cf. above, p. 217), but I do not think that this is the case, for the reasons just noted.

[323]Dharmakīrti was not a direct disciple of Diṅnāga, but of the latter's student, Iśvarasena. Cf. BL, I, p. 34. Cf. ibid. for biographical information on Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti.

[324]Those of Dwarikas Shastri (Varanasi, 1968), with which I have worked; and of Y. Miyasaka, in Acta Indologica, 2-4 (1972-77), with which I have not worked.

[325]There are reasons for each version. Cf. below, Part II, note 1; also cf. BL, I, pp. 38-39; and Masatoshi Nagatomi, "The Framework of the Pramāṇavārttika, Book I," Journal of the American Oriental Society, 79, 1959, p. 263, note 1. Throughout, I have referred to chapters by name rather than number, thereby, I hope, eliminating one samll source of confusion.

[326]Hence the ambiguity of the term pramāṇasiddhi

(tshad ma grub pa): one establishes the definition of authoritativeness in general, then proves that the Buddha is authoritative because he has attained a stste wherein he is the very embodiment of authoritativeness.

[327]Warder, Indian Buddhism, p. 470.

[328]The Pramāṇasamuccaya is lost in the Sanskrit, but this verse was preserved by the 12th-century commentator Vibhūticandra. It runs: pramāṇabhūtāya jagaddhitaiṣine pranamya śāstre sugatāya tāyine / pramāṇasiddhyai svamatāt samuccayaḥ kariṣyate viprasṛtād ihaikataḥ. The Tibetan is: tshad mar grub pa 'gro la phan bshed pa / ston pa bde gshegs skyob pa phyag 'tshal nas / tshad ma bsgrub phyir rang gi gzhung kun las / btus te sna tshogs 'thor rnams 'dir gcig bya. Cf. Part II, note 5 for references.

[329]Cf. Part II, note 14, for different views on which of Dharmakīrti's verses are covered by the forward system and which by the reverse. I am inclined to side with the Tibetan commentators, because if the reverse system is to begin with a proof that the Buddha is the Savior, it must establish the basis of his Saviorhood, which is the validity of the Four Noble Truths.

[330]Cf. Nagatomi, "Framework," for a discussion of Dignāga's autocommentary; cf. also Part II, note 417.

[331]Cf. BL, I, pp. 39-47; and Vidyabhusana, passim, for discussions of Dharmakīrti's commentators. Only two commentaries are extant in Sanskrit: Pramānavārtikabhashyam or Vārtikālaṃkāra of Prajñākaragupta, ed. Rahula Sankrityayana; and the Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti of Manorathānandin, contained in Shastri's edition of the PV. Devendrabuddhi's -pañjikā exists in Tibetan translation, PTT no. 5717(b), vols. 130-131. Śākyabodhi's subcommentary is PTT no. 5718, vol. 131; and also has been published as: Acharya Sakyamati, Tshad ma rnam hgrel gyi hgrel pa. Ravigupta's commentary is PTT no. 5722, vol. 136; and Yamāri's is PTT no. 5723, vols. 134-35.

[332]Sa skya paṇdita's discussion is found in his Tshad ma rigs pa'i gter, in The Complete Works of Pandita Kun-dGa'-rGyal-mTshan, compiled by bSod-nams-rGya-mTsho, vol. 5 of The Complete Works of the Great Masters of the Sa-skya Sect of Tibetan Buddhism. rGyal tshab's rNam 'grel thar lam gsal byed has been published in two volumes by the Tibetan

Monastery, Sarnath. mKhas grub's rGyas pa'i bstan bcos tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi rgya cher bshad pa rigs pa'i rgya mtsho is found in vols. tha and da of his collected works (gsung 'bum), presently being issued from New Delhi by Mongolian Lama Gurudeva.

[333]PV 3a: pramāṇamavisaṃvādi jñānam arthakriyasthitiḥ / avisamvādanam.

[334]For a discussion of some of the issues involved in nondeceptiveness, especially that of optical illusions, cf. BL, II, pp. 10-11; and Shah, pp. 188-89.

[335]GT, p. 229; tr. below (Part II), p. 545.

[336]PV 3b-4; GT, pp. 229-30, tr. below, pp. 545-7.

[337]PV 5a; GT, p. 230 and 234, tr. below, p. 547 and pp. 554-5.

[338]PV 5b-6a; GT, pp. 230-31, tr. below, pp. 547-8.

[339]The argument is somewhat similar to the one made by Nāgārjuna in the VV. Cf. above, p. 176ff.

[340]PV 6b-7a; GT, pp. 231-33, tr. below, pp. 548-53.

[341]PV 7b-8; GT, pp. 233-36, tr. below, pp. 553-7.

[342]GT, pp. 236-38, tr. below, pp. 558-62.

[343]PV 10-11a; GT, pp. 239-40, tr. below, pp. 564-6.

[344]PV 11b; GT, p. 240, tr. below, p. 566.

[345]PV 12; GT, p. 241, tr. below, pp. 567-8.

[346]PV 13; GT, pp. 241-42, tr. below, p. 569.

[347]PV 17-22; GT, pp. 244-47, tr. below, pp. 573-8.

[348]PV 23-30; GT, pp. 247-48, tr. below, pp. 578-81.

[349]Cf., e.g., Narendra Nath Bhattacharyya, Jain Philosophy: Historical Outline, pp. 93-108; Ninian Smart, Doctrine and Argument in Indian Philosophy, chapter XI; and Gunapala Dharmasiri, A Buddhist Critique of the Christian Concept of God.

[350]GT, p. 251, tr. below, p. 586.

[351]Cf. above, pp. 154-58.

[352]PV 32-35; GT, pp. 249-51, tr. below, pp. 284-6.

[353]Beings who strive for freedom are often compared to a sick person, and the Four Noble Truths to the diagnostic process. Hence, we read in the Ratnagotravibhāga: "The disease is to be identified, the cause of the disease to be removed, health to be obtained and the medicine to be relied upon. Similarly, suffering, its cause, cessation and the path are (respectively) to be identified, removed, realized and used" (iv,52, p. 106). Cf. The Sublime Science, IV, 55, p. 279, for another translation.

[354]PV 35; GT, p. 251, tr. below, pp. 585-6.

[355]Cf. my paper, "Dharmakirti's Attitude Toward Omniscience," forthcoming in Pandit Bacherdas Doshi and Pandit Dalsukh Malvaniya Felicitation Volume (tentative title). Cf. also below, Part II, note 116, note 673.

[356]PV 36a; GT, p. 252, tr. below, pp. 587-8.

[357]PV 36b; GT ibid., tr. below, p. 588.

[358]PV 37-38; GT, pp. 253-54, tr. below, pp. 591-2.

[359]PV 39-42; GT, pp. 254-56, tr. below, pp. 592-4.

[360]PV 49-50a; GT, pp. 259-60, tr. below, pp. 601-2.

[361]PV 43-46; GT, pp. 256-57, tr. below, pp. 594-6.

[362]PV 47-50a; GT, pp. 257-60, tr. below, pp. 597-602.

[363]PV 50b-52; GT, pp. 260-61, tr. below, pp. 602-4.

[364]The divisions are those noted in GT.

[365]PV 53-55; GT, pp. 261-63, tr. below, pp. 605-7.

[366]PV 56-61; GT, pp. 263-64, tr. below, pp. 608-11.

[367]PV 62-64; GT, pp. 264-65, tr. below, pp. 611-12.

[368]PV 65-74; GT, pp. 265-67, tr. below, pp. 612-617. On the basis-based relation, cf. also PV 161-164a; GT, pp. 312-13, tr. below, pp. 702-3.

[369]PV 75-79; GT, pp. 267-69, tr. below, pp. 618-20.

[370]PV 81; GT, p. 269, tr. below, p. 621.

[371]PV 163b-164a; GT, p. 313, tr. below, p. 703.

[372]PV 84-85; GT, p. 270, tr. below, pp. 622-3.

[373]PV 86-89; GT, pp. 271-74, tr. below, pp. 624-30.

[374]PV 90-104; GT, pp. 274-79, tr. below, pp. 629-40.

[375]PV 105; GT, p. 280, tr. below, p. 641.

[376]PV 106-15; GT, pp. 28-82, tr. below, pp. 642-7.

[377]TS 1939-41 (Jha tr., pp. 926-27) and TS 1948-53 (Jha tr., pp. 930-31). For other discussions of the mind-body problem in Indian philosophy, cf., e.g., Smart, _Doctrine and Argument_, chapter XII; Satkari Mookerjee, _The Buddhist Doctrine of Universal Flux_, chapter XV.

[378]GT, p. 284 (tr. below, p. 650), finds this argument implicit in Dharmakīrti's assertion that one's mind "follows on some previous mental complex that has been developed" (PV 80; GT, p. 268, tr. below, p. 620).

[379]Daniel Dennett, _Brainstorms_, pp. xiii-xiv.

[380]Jerome Shaffer, "Mind-Body Problem," in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. 5, p. 336.

[381]Cf. above, p. 289.

[382]TS 1909-10; Jha, tr., p. 915.

[383]Charles Sherrington, The Integrative Action of the Nervous System, p. xxi.

[384]Cf. Karl Popper and John C. Eccles, The Self and Its Brain, especially chapter P2.

[385]Douglas R. Hofstadter and Daniel C. Dennett, The Mind's I, p. 388.

[386]Robinson maintains (Classical, p. 50), that Buddhism escapes the net of Ryle's criticism because it is not a substance-oriented philosophy, but Ryle's criticisms can be directed just as easily at a mind conceived of as a series of events. It is not mind's "permanence" that makes its causal efficiency questionable, but its non-physical nature.

[387]Cf. Ryle, esp. chapter 1. Interestingly, Buddhism's emphasis on the importance of "propensities" (vasanā) to certain types of action anticipates Ryle's analysis of mind into "dispositions to behave," but Buddhism continued to insist that one still could speak of a "mind" that is ontologically distinct from one's propensities to act.

[388]Shaffer, p. 336.

[389]Cf. ibid., p. 338.

[390]U.T. Place, "Is Consciousness a Brain-Process?" in Body, Mind, and Death, ed. Anthony Flew, p. 276.

[391]Ibid., pp. 276-77.

[392]PV 163b-164a and 166b.

[393]Shaffer, p. 336.

[394]For one attempt to explain mental processes in neurophysiological terms, cf. Colin Blakemore, Mechanics of Mind.

[395]PV 178.

[396]Flew, Dictionary of Philosophy, p. 150.

[397]Place, p. 280.

[398]Shaffer, p. 339.

[399]Cf., e.g., Dennett, p. xiv ff.

[400]Hofstadter and Dennett, pp. 197-98. Again, the language used is suggestive of Buddhist analyses of propensities to act, but without the connection of those propensities to an ontologically distinct "mind"--propensities can be explained as properties of physical systems.

[401]Ibid., p. 199.

[402]Ibid.

[403]Ibid., p. 200. The "self" refuted here can as easily be the Buddhist "mind" as the Hindu "soul"--for each, regardless of its permanence or impermanence, is ascribed the same function as the "self" described by Hofstadter.

[404]Cf., e.g., Ervin Laszlo, Introduction to Systems Philosophy; John C. Lilly, The Human Biocomputer; and Gregory Bateson, Mind and Nature: A Necessary Unity.

[405]For discussions of AI, cf. Dennett, and Hofstadter and Dennett. The latter has an especially good annotated bibliography.

[406]Hofstadter and Dennett, p. 192.

[407]Ibid., p. 193.

[408]Ibid., p. 196.

[409] It is interesting that this argument of Hofstadter's is very similar to that used by Dharmakīrti in refuting the Vaiśeṣika concept of a whole substantially different from its parts--only Hofstadter uses it against a concept that Dharmakīrti accepts, that of a mind substantially different from its physical organ. These arguments, as well as those refuting the existence of a soul and those based on the non-necessary relation between words and entities, might have led the Buddhist to criticize the concept of mind, but such criticisms never were launched, so important was dualism to the Buddhist world-view.

[410] Cf. Dennett, chapter 1; p. 271, etc.

[411] Gregory Bateson, Mind and Nature. The quote is found on the dust-jacket, but I have been unable to locate it in the book itself.

[412] I have chosen not to discuss Dharmakīrti's "idealism," i.e., his presumed Yogācārin belief that, ultimately, the epistemological subject and object are substantially identical. It is a complex view that, whatever its implications, does not eliminate the ontological dualism that Buddhists accept as the relation between the mental and physical. Substantial identity need not entail ontological identity. In any case, the view Dharmakīrti defends in the pramāṇasiddhi chapter, that of the Sautrāntikas, is clearly dualistic, and certainly is consistent with the Buddhist contention that there exist past and future lives.

[413] Cited, Shaffer, p. 339.

[414] Steven Rose, The Conscious Brain, p. 340.

[415] Flew, Dictionary of Philosophy, p. 101. An epiphenomenon is defined, ibid., as "A secondary or added accompaniment to a process, considered as merely incidental and having no part in the further development of the process."

[416] Cf. Popper and Eccles, pp. 554-58.

[417] Just as, in certain Yogācārin discussions, the subjective and objective realms are said to be substantially or essentially identical because they coexist and arise from the same seed in the the ālayavijñāna, so, in certain

tantric contexts, the subtle mind and wind (prāṇa) that reside at the heart, and are the basis of all name-and-form, are said to be substantially or essentially identical. This "identity" entails a universal concomitance between instances of mind and instances of wind, but it does not vitiate the mind-body dualism that is so essential to Buddhist cosmology, for although the mind and wind are "identical," the one cannot be the material cause of the other. Thus, mind only follows from mind and wind only follows from wind. Further, mind and wind may be substantially identical, but we cannot quite say that ontologically "mind is nothing but wind," or vice versa. A Western identity theorist, on the other hand, will say that ontologically (though not semantically) mind is nothing but a metaphorical description of brain processes.

[418]For a good general discussion, c.f., e.g., C.J. Ducasse, A Critical Examination of the Belief in a Life After Death; C.D. Broad, The Mind and Its Place in Nature, section D.

[419]Cf. Brain Mind Bulletin, 6, 13, Aug. 3, 1981. For similar discussions, cf., e.g., Michael Talbot, Mysticism and the New Physics, to my mind the clearest exposition of the possible connections between the insights of quantum physicists and Eastern "mystics."

[420]PV 82-83; GT, pp. 269-70, tr. below, pp. 621-2.

[421]PV 116-17; GT, pp. 285-87, tr. below, pp. 652-5.

[422]PV 119; GT, pp. 287-88, tr. below, pp. 656-7.

[423]PV 122; GT, pp. 288-89, tr. below, p. 658.

[424]PV 123-28; GT, pp. 289-91, tr. below, pp. 658-61

[425]PV 129-30; GT, p. 291, tr. below, pp. 662-3.

[426]PV 131-33; GT, pp. 291-93, tr. below, pp. 663-5.

[427]PV 134-138a; GT, pp. 293-96, tr. below, pp. 666-9.

[428]PV 140b-141a; GT, pp. 296-97, tr. below, pp. 671-2.

[429] PV 141b-144; GT, pp. 297-99, tr. below, pp. 672-6.

[430] This is the implicit sense of PV 143b; GT, p. 298, tr. below, p. 675.

[431] PV 145a; GT, p. 299, tr. below, pp. 676-7.

[432] PV 145b-147a; GT, p. 300, tr. below, pp. 677-8.

[433] PV 147b-148a; GT, pp. 300-302, tr. below, pp. 678-80.

[434] GT, p. 302, tr. below, p. 682.

[435] GT, pp. 302-03, tr. below, p. 683.

[436] GT, pp. 303-04, tr. below, pp. 683-6.

[437] GT, pp. 304-05, tr. below, p. 686.

[438] GT, pp. 305-06, tr. below, pp. 686-9.

[439] GT, pp. 307-08, tr. below, pp. 689-91.

[440] PV 149a; GT, p. 308, tr. below, pp. 691-2.

[441] GT and tr. ibid.

[442] PV 149b; GT, pp. 308-09, tr. below, p. 693.

[443] PV 150-51; GT, pp. 309-10, tr. below, pp. 693-5.

[444] Semen is used in the broad "hormonal" sense here, and thus is not a property just of males. Cf. below, Part II, note 475.

[445] For previous two paragraphs, PV 152b-158a; GT, pp. 310-12, tr. below, pp. 695-700.

[446] PV 158b-160a; GT, p. 312, tr. below, pp. 700-701.

[447] PV 160b-164a, GT, pp. 312-13, tr. below, pp. 701-3.

[448] PV 164b-169a; GT, pp. 313-15, tr, below, pp. 703-6.

[449] PV 169b-176; GT, pp. 315-17, tr. below, pp. 706-10.

[450] PV 177b-178a; GT, p. 317, tr. below, pp. 710-11.

[451] PV 178b-181a; GT, pp. 317-18, tr. below, pp.711-12.

[452] PV 181b-184a; GT, pp. 318-19, tr. below, pp.712-13.

[453] PV 185a; GT, p. 319, tr. below, pp. 713-14.

[454] PV 185b-187a; GT, pp. 319-20, tr. below, pp.714-15.

[455] For previous two paragraphs, PV 187b-192a; GT, pp. 320-21, tr. below, pp. 715-18.

[456] PV 82-83a; GT, pp. 269-70, tr. below, pp. 621-2.

[457] PV 219b-222a; GT, pp. 340-41, tr. below, pp.752-4. Cf also Part II, note 532.

[458] GT, p. 323, tr. below, p. 721.

[459] PV 192b; GT, p. 322, tr. below, p. 719.

[460] GT, pp. 322-23, tr. below, pp. 720-23.

[461] GT, pp. 323-25, tr. below, pp. 720-25.

[462] GT, pp. 325-26, tr. below, pp. 726-7.

[463] Cf above, p. 195 ff., and PV 209b.

[464] Cf. above, pp. 174-76.

[465] The objections and answers in the foregoing paragraph are interpreted by rGyal tshab as completing the dis-

cussion of the aspect of cessation of the truth of cessation. PV 193-196a; GT, pp. 326-28, tr. below, pp. 727-30.

466 For previous two paragraphs (said by rGyal tshab to cover the aspect of peace of the truth of cessation), PV 196b-204a; GT, pp. 328-32, tr. below, pp. 730-38.

467 GT, pp. 331-32, tr. below, pp. 735-9.

468 PV 204b-207a; GT, pp. 332-33, tr. below, pp. 738-9. The objections and answers in the foregoing paragraph are said by rGyal tshab to cover the aspect of sublimity of the truth of cessation. He has noted earlier (p. 332) that the aspect of definite release is covered by the later discussion of the aspect of definite removal of the truth of path. He also notes that Dharmakīrti's discussion of the truth of cessation may also be construed as a discussion only of the aspect of cessation. This is Devendrabuddhi's view (cf. GT, pp. 306-07).

469 Cf. PV 143; GT, p. 298, tr. below, p. 675.

470 PV 207b-210a; GT, pp. 333-35, tr. below, pp.740-43. Cf. also Kamalaśīla's <u>pañjikā</u> to TS 3338 (Jha tr., II, pp. 1474-82), for a concise discussion of the soteriological power of the wisdom realizing selflessness.

471 PV 210b-214a; GT, pp. 335-36, tr. below, pp. 743-6.

472 PV 214b-217a; GT, pp. 336-39, tr. below, pp.746-50.

473 PV 217b-219a; GT, p. 339, tr. below, pp. 750-51.

474 PV 219b-222a; GT, pp. 339-40, tr. below, pp. 752-4.

475 PV 222b-228a; GT, pp. 340-43, tr. below, pp. 754-8.

476 PV 228b-235; GT, pp. 343-45, tr. below, pp. 758-63.

477 PV 236-245a; GT, pp. 345-48, tr. below, pp. 763-8.

478 PV 245b-249a; GT, pp. 348-49, tr. below, pp.768-70.

[479]PV 249b-251a; GT, pp. 349-50, tr. below, pp. 771-2.

[480]PV 251b-256a; GT, pp. 350-52, tr. below, pp. 772-6.

[481]PB 256b-259a; GT, pp. 352-53, tr. below, pp. 776-7.

[482]PV 259b-264a; GT, pp. 353-55, tr. below, pp.778-80.

[483]PV 264b-269a; GT, pp. 355-56, tr. below, pp.780-83.

[484]PV 269b-274a; GT, pp. 356-57, tr. below, pp. 783-5.

[485]PV 274b-280a; GT, pp. 357-60, tr. below, pp.786-90.

[486]PV 280b-282a; GT, pp. 360-61, tr. below, pp.790-92.

[487]PV 282b-287; GT, pp. 361-65, tr. below, pp. 793-8.

[488]The Buddhist would perhaps reply with a non-theistic paraphrase of Einstein: "The universe does not play dice."

[489]Potter, p. 53.

[490]Robinson, Classical, p. 96.

[491]Donovan, Interpreting Religious Experience, p. 115. A similar argument is eloquently made by John H. Whittaker in his Matters of Faith and Matters of Principle: Religious Truth Claims and Their Logic.

[492]Passmore (chapter 14) argues that all mysticism, because it teaches us "not to care" about the world, is destructive of the sorts of concerns that shape human civilization, both for better and for worse. I think this criticism is more easily directed against "Hīnayāna" Buddhism, which, in its strong emphasis on the transcendence of suffering, failed to provide a vision of man as a social being. The Mahāyāna, on the other hand, idealized the Bodhisattva, who is no longer "of the world," but remains in it out of compassion, for he has learned "to care and not to care" (T.S. Eliot, "Ash Wednesday," VI).

PART II

A TRANSLATION OF RGYAL TSHAB'S COMMENTARY ON THE *PRAMĀṆASIDDHI* CHAPTER OF DHARMAKĪRTI'S *PRAMĀṆAVĀRTTIKA*, FROM THE *RNAM 'GREL THAR LAM GSAL BYED*

PREFACE TO THE TRANSLATION

rGyal tshab dar ma rin chen (1364-1432) is, with mKhas grub dge legs bzang po, counted as one of the two greatest disciples of Tsong kha pa, the founder of the "reformed" tradition of Tibetan Buddhism, the dGe lugs pa, which eventually, under the Dalai Lamas, came to dominate both religious and political life in Tibet.

Like mKhas grub, rGyal tshab originally was a Sa skya pa, a learned student of the great Red mda' ba. Accounts of his first meeting with Tsong kha pa stress his arrogance and pride. In one version, he and mKhas grub go to a hall where Tsong kha pa is to lecture. When they enter, mKhas grub is immediately struck by Tsong kha pa's aura of holiness and erudition, and removes his pandit's hat and sits at Tsong kha pa's feet. rGyal tshab, however, insists not only on keeping his hat on, but on sitting on the throne with Tsong kha pa. As Tsong kha pa's lecture proceeds, however, rGyal tshab begins to recognize that he is in the presence of genius. By the end, he too has removed his pandit's hat and is sitting at Tsong kha pa's feet.

In another version, rGyal tshab and mKhas grub have decided to go to hear Tsong kha pa, but do not know where to find him. Walking along the road, they encounter a woman drawing water. They approach her and ask derisively where they might find "the big-nosed Khampa." The woman does not

answer, but goes to her house, and returns a minute later reverently holding incense between folded palms. She points down the road and says, "The holy one can be found there." Amused, but hardly chastened, mKhas grub and rGyal tshab proceed to the small hall where Tsong kha pa is to speak. They decide ahead of time not to remove their pandit's hats. mKhas grub enters first and, in stooping to go under the low doorway, he loses his hat. rGyal tshab, following, remembers to duck, but has his hat knocked off by the door curtain, which slaps him in mKhas grub's wake. The symbolism is not lost on them, and they listen respectfully to Tsong kha pa, eventually becoming his greatest disciples.

Before Tsong kha pa's death in 1419, he passed on his robe and hat to rGyal tshab, who succeeded his guru as the head of the dGa' ldan monastery, near Lhasa. rGyal tshab remained as dGa' ldan 'khri pa until his death at the age of 68. He was succeeded by the younger mKhas grub. The two are now so closely identified with Tsong kha pa, and so thoroughly said to embody his teachings, that they invariably are pictured with him on tankas and in statuary in dGe lugs pa temples. Little biographical information on rGyal tshab is presently available in either English or Tibetan. Readers are, however, referred to A Short Biography and Letter of Je Tzong k'a pa (Dharamsala, 1974) and Ngagwang Gelek Demo's edition of The Collected Works (gSuṅ 'Bum) of rGyal-

tshab rje dar-ma rin-chen, Preface to vol. I (New Delhi, 1980).

rGyal tshab's rNam 'grel thar lam gsal byed (Elucidating the path to liberation according to the Pramāṇavārttika) is considered one of his greatest works (indeed, in the Tibetan temple in Sarnath, India, the text held on the lap of the statue of rGyal tshab is the rNam 'grel thar lam gsal byed). It certainly is considered the greatest of Pramāṇavārttika commentaries by the dGe lugs pa tradition; it has served as the basis of the yig chas, or scholastic textbooks, later developed in the various dGe lugs pa monasteries, and thus remains the basis of Pramāṇavārttika study for a considerable portion of Tibetan Buddhist monks. In attempting to expose the pramāṇasiddhi chapter of the Pramāṇavārttika to readers of English, I have settled on translating rGyal tshab's commentary for a number of reasons:

1. Dharmakīrti's root verses are terse in the extreme, and simply cannot be read without a commentary to provide needed interpolations and explanations. Masatoshi Nagatomi translated the pramāṇasiddhi chapter as his dissertation for Harvard in 1957, but his occasional interpolation of glosses from the commentaries of Manorathānandin and Prajñākaragupta does little to make the translation very accessible. Prof. Nagatomi has been working on a translation of the entire Pramāṇavārttika for many years now. Undoubtedly, when it is issued, it will be a landmark in Buddhist studies; but those

of us who are interested in issues raised by the _Pramāṇavārttika_ cannot in the mean time hold our collective breath--we must contribute what we can from our own perspectives and hope that it will complement rather than merely duplicate Prof. Nagatomi's work. Thus, a translation of _some_ commentary on the _Pramāṇavārttika_ seems desirable.

2. rGyal tshab's commentary has the specific virtue of having been written after all the great Indian commentaries, and with all of them at hand and under consideration. Thus, rGyal tshab was able to separate the wheat from the chaff in the commentarial tradition and to give the most weight to the explanations that seemed to him most reasonable. He has relied most heavily on the commentaries of Devendrabuddhi and Prajñākaragupta. Devendrabuddhi wrote his _Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti_ under the direct supervision of Dharmakīrti himself, and thus can be assumed closely to have captured Dharmakīrti's own intention; Prajñākaragupta's _Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra_, besides being a knowledgeable exposition of the text, is important for its spelling out of many of the Mahāyāna themes left implicit in the _pramāṇasiddhi_ chapter by Dharmakīrti.

3. Unlike most of the Indian commentaries, rGyal tshab's commentary structures the _pramāṇasiddhi_ chapter along the lines of an extremely detailed outline. The Tibetan scholastic habit of providing elaborate textual divisions (_sa bcad_) for commentaries undeniably has proven a mixed

blessing. There are times when the sa bcad threaten fairly to strangle the work under study, particularly when the work is not perhaps as neat and systematic as the scholastic mind would like to imagine. There is the further danger, of course, that the sa bcad will represent not the intentions of the work's author but the imagination of the commentator. These dangers must be borne in mind, but sa bcad do, in the right hands, possess the enormous advantage of laying bare the structure of a work whose meaning would be far less accessible without such structural elucidation. I believe that the pramāṇasiddhi chapter of the Pramāṇavārttika is such a work, and that rGyal tshab's division of the text, while by no means the only one possible (and while clearly going beyond Dharmakīrti's explicit intention in a number of instances) is a considerable boon to anyone who wishes seriously to study the chapter.

4. Unlike any other Tibetan commentary that I have seen, rGyal tshab's commentary not only elucidates the meaning of Dharmakīrti's root verses, but provides in addition extremely helpful summaries and/or extended discussions at a number of points. Of particular interest are the discussion of the compatibility between the notion that a pramāṇa must be "new" and the Mahāyāna concept of omniscience, the summary of arguments on the mind-body problem, and the proofs of liberation and omniscience interpolated into the

discussion of the truth of cessation. Of other Tibetan commentaries, I have looked most closely at those of dGe 'dun grub (15th century) and Mi pham (19th century). The former has the virtue of being a concise, syllogistically-framed gloss on Dharmakīrti's verses; the latter--despite its prolixity--spells out Dharmakīrti's possible meaning in considerable detail. Neither of them, however, digresses as interestingly as rGyal tshab's, so neither, ultimately, is quite so clear.

5. Also of importance is the fact that rGyal tshab's commentary is a commentary on meaning (don 'grel) rather than a word-by-word commentary (tshig 'grel). Thus, it can be read to some extent independently of the root-text. It does, of course, make occasional explicit references to the root-text, and should not be studied without it, but it can stand meaningfully on its own.

6. Finally, precisely because the rNam 'grel thar lam gsal byed is the basis of dGe lugs pa Pramāṇavārttika interpretation, it is part of a large, living philosophical tradition that still has many knowledgeable exponents. Students who ask dGe lugs pa teachers for proofs of rebirth or enlightenment or the Four Noble Truths sooner or later will be referred to rGyal tshab's commentary, and it has been my good fortune to be able to study the work with Tibetan teachers to whom its details and meaning are very familiar.

Before unleashing the reader on the translation--or perhaps it is better expressed the other way around!--I want to point out a number of stylistic and other idiosyncracies worthy of brief mention.

1. I have not included the Tibetan text of rGyal tshab's commentary, because it is available in book form in an in-print edition published by the Tibetan Monastery, Sarnath, India.

2. I have tried to translate rGyal tshab's Tibetan into English as readable as possible, but I fear that it still has a considerable turgidity. This is unavaoidable, for both the subject-matter and style of rGyal tshab's discussion are quite technical. The structuring of a large percentage of the material in either syllogistic or _reductio_ form makes mellifluous rendering rather difficult, as does the considerable amount of specialized vocabulary. My translation, I hope, is at least coherent--in order to make it _comprehensible_, I have supplied a rather extensive apparatus of notes. Without detailed explanation much of what rGyal tshab (not to mention Dharmakīrti!) is trying to say will be lost, and a translation rendered pointless. With explanation, rGyal tshab's and Dharmakīrti's thought can become something less than totally arcane.

3. In my translation of Tibetan terms and words into English, I have tried to maintain an overall but by no means

slavish consistency. Some single English words may translate any of a number of Tibetan terms, as, e.g., "mind," which variously translates the Tibetan *blo*, *yid*, *rtogs*, *sems*, etc.; and "nature," which translates, among others, the Tibetan *rang bzhin*, *bdag nyid*, and *chos nyid*. Conversely, some single Tibetan words have been given different English equivalents in different contexts, as, e.g., *bde ba*, which can be either "happiness" or "pleasure"; *rtogs pa*, which denotes either "cognition" or "realization"; and *don*, which is either a "goal," an "aim," or an "object." By and large, different translations should be evident from the cross-listing in the Glossary.

4. I have translated into their Sanskritic forms a number of words that are most familiar thus, e.g., saṃsāra, nirvāṇa, Arahant, sūtra, Mahāyāna, and the names of Indian philosophical schools. Words found in Webster's New Third International Dictionary are assumed to be English, and so have not been underlined. Their diacritical marks, however, have been retained.

5. Much of rGyal tshab's commentary is in "dialogue" form, with questions or objections from real or hypothetical opponents setting the stage for an exposition of the "correct" position on a given matter. Some of the opposing points actually are contained in Dharmakīrti's root verses; most of them must be supplied by commentaries. I have demar-

cated the sections that almost invariably conclude with the Tibetan zhe na as (Opponent:), with the understanding that many of the views expressed by "opponents" are merely possible positions, rather than positions actually held by Dharmakīrti's or rGyal tshab's contemporaries. I have demarcated the "reply" sections as: (rGyal tshab:). I realize that in the vast majority of cases rGyal tshab is simply fleshing out Dharmakīrti's meaning, but the phrasing nevertheless remains rGyal tshab's, and it seems fairer to attribute the "correct" side of the dialogue to him. In those places where rGyal tshab clearly has expanded upon Dharmakīrti's root-verses, I have attempted so to indicate in the notes.

6. Parentheses in the course of the translation indicate either interpolations that clarify the meaning of a sentence or nominal phrases that replace pronouns and thereby clarify their antecedents.

7. In the first part, I was attempting to speak mostly of the Indian tradition, so Sanskrit terms or phrases were used first or exclusively; in this second part I am translating from Tibetan, so I have generally given the Tibetan first and the Sanskrit second.

8. As a study aid to the translation, I have supplied in an Appendix the complete Tibetan translation of Dharmakīrti's pramāṇasiddhi chapter. I have divided the verses so that each segment corresponds to one or rGyal tshab's text-

divisions. I have numbered them to correspond to the most widely-available Sanskrit edition, that of Shastri. Thus, while reading the translation, a reader who knows Tibetan may refer to the appropriate root-verse to see what it is that rGyal tshab is commenting on. If he has the Sanskrit edition, he may refer to that, too.

9. The _pramāṇasiddhi_ chapter presupposes an understanding of a great deal of Indian philosophy, both Buddhist and non-Buddhist, touching as it does at various times on theology, causal theory, the structure of inference, soteriology, epistemology and metaphysics. My knowledge of these areas is woefully inadequate, but I have nevertheless attempted to supply what clarification I could, in many cases on the basis of explanations provided by my adviser, Geshe Sopa. Whatever imperfections inevitably will occur in both the translation and the notes are my own fault, and I hope that they eventually will be eliminated, but that, in the meantime, they not be taken as negating the value of such correct translations and interpretations as I may have provided.

CONTENTS OF RGYAL TSHAB'S COMMENTARY

rGyal tshab's complete text-divisions for his commentary to the *pramāṇasiddhi* chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika* follow. The *TR* column indicates the pages of the translation that a given section covers. The *GT* column indicates the pages in the Sarnath edition of the *rNam 'grel thar lam gsal byed* that the same section covers. The *PV* column indicates the verses in the Shastri edition of the *Pramāṇavārttika* that the same section covers. Verse numbers preceded by an asterisk (*) correspond to the basic "verses" to be found in the Tibetan PV in the Appendix. In listing the titles of the sections, I have eliminated the parentheses that set off my own interpolations. These interpolations are, however, parenthesized in the course of the translation.

Section Title	TR	GT	PV
A'. Refuting the idea that it is impossible to develop compassion through many lives	589-658	252-88	36c-121
1'. A brief demonstration	589-90	252-3	*36c
2'. An extensive explanation	590-658	253-88	37-121
a'. Setting forth proof of the existence of past and future lives	591-6	253-7	37-46
i'. Setting forth the Reason	591-4	253-6	*37-42
ii'. Disposing of the objection that that proof is faulty	594-6	256-7	*43-46
b'. Refuting proofs of their non-existence	596-658	257-88	47-121
i'. A brief demonstration	596-604	257-61	47-52
X'. Showing that the Reason is uncertain	596-7	257	*47a
Y'. Showing that the example is unproven	597-604	257-61	47b-52
p'. Showing that there is no authoritative cognition proving the example	597-600	257-9	*47b

Section Title	TR	GT	PV
b''. Summary.........	620	269	*80
B''. Refuting the idea that body and mind are substantially identical...........	621	269	*81
C''. Identifying the cause of saṃsāra....	621-3	269-70	82-85
1''. Identifying the cause of taking birth in a womb...	621-2	269-70	*82-83
2''. Disposing of objections to that..	622-3	270	*84-85
q'. Refutation through an analysis of the essential aspect of body that is the basis of mind........	623-47	270-82	86-115
I''. Refuting the idea that there is a partless gross body that is the special basis of mind.	623-40	270-79	86-104
A''. Refuting the idea that there is a partless whole......	624-6	271-2	86-88a
1''. Proving the Reason	624-5	271	*86-87
2''. Setting it forth..	625-6	271-2	*88a

Section Title	TR	GT	PV
B''. Disposing of objections alleged to damage that refutation..........	626-40	272-9	88b-104
1''. Disposing of the alleged consequence that an external object cannot be cognized by sense-cognition........	627-9	272-3	*88b-89a
2''. Refuting other syllogisms through that.....	629	273-4	*89b
3''. Refuting the existence of a whole and, in particular, the qualities based on it............	629-40	274-9	90-104
a''. Extreme consequences if it is necessary that there be a substantially different whole for there to be seeing by sense-cognition	630-32	274-5	*90-92

Section Title	TR	GT	PV
b''. Refuting the existence of a substantially different Number based on that...........	632-40	275-9	93-104
i''. Setting forth the Reason...	633	275	*93
ii''. Disposing of objections alleged to damage that.	633-40	275-9	94-104
X''. Refuting the idea that since we apply different words there exist substantially different objects....	633-5	276	*94-96

Section Title	TR	GT	PV
Y''. Disposing of the idea that if that is unproven it follows that applying different words is pointless.......	635-40	276-9	97-104
p''. Disposing of the consequence that applying different words is pointless	635-6	277	*97-98
q''. Disposing of the consequence that it is unacceptable that there be a sixth, genitive case....	637-40	277-9	99-104

Section Title	TR	GT	PV
A''. Refuting the idea that atoms collectively are necessarily the cause of mind	641	279-80	*105a
B''. Refuting the idea that they are able to act individually as the basis of mind	641-7	280-82	105b-115
1''. Setting forth the consequences	641	280	*105b
2''. Refuting the reply to that	642-7	280-82	106-115
a''. Refuting the idea that the breath as condition would not generate many minds simultaneously	642-6	280-82	104-114
i''. Refuting the idea that mind is generated from a permanent breath	642-3	280-81	*106-108

Section Title	TR	GT	PV
ii''. Refuting the idea that mind is generated from an impermanent breath.	644-6	281-2	109-113
X''. Refuting the idea that just individual minds are generated by many successively arising breaths....	644-5	281	*109-111
Y''. Refuting the idea that one mind is generated by many simultaneously arising breaths....	645-6	281-2	*112-113

Section Title	TR	GT	PV
I''. Setting forth the consequences.........	694	309	*150a
II''. Refuting the reply to that.............	694-5	309-10	*150b-152a
q'. An extensive explanation	696-701	310-12	152b-160a
I''. Showing that because their increase and decrease do not have similar causes, humors and defilements are not cause and result...............	696-700	310-12	152b-158a
A''. Setting forth the Reason.............	696	310	no Skt.
B''. Proving that the Reason is correct in all three ways..	696-700	310-12	*152b-158a
II''. Extreme consequences if humors and defilements are cause and result..........	700	312	*158b-159a
III''. Disposing of the objection that the consequences apply equally to us......	700-701	312	*159b-160a

Section Title	TR	GT	PV
2''. The unacceptability of the other system's Reasons.	761-3	344-5	231b-235
a''. The unacceptability of Inherence and other relations as a cause generating desire....	761-2	344	*231b-232
b''. Refuting the reply to that..	762-3	344-5	*233-235
B''. Refuting the meaning.................	763-70	345-9	236-249a
1''. The impossibility of a permanent person's meditating on suffering	764-6	345-6	236-240a
a''. The consequence that the self is impermanent.	764	345-6	*236-237a
b''. Showing that if the self exists there can result no reliable antidote to desire.........	765-6	346	*237b-240a

TRANSLATION

I bow down to the holy gurus.

Second[1]: An explanation of what is to be cognized (logically)[2]: liberation and omniscience and the path leading to them

(Chapter Two is divided into:) (I) The general meaning and (II) The particular meaning.[3]

I. The general meaning (no verses, GT 226-8)

(This is divided into:) (A) Setting forth the explanation of ācārya Dignāga, (B) The way (Dignāga's) meaning was arranged by the author of the *Pramāṇavārttika* and (C) The intention of (Dignāga and Dharmakīrti).

A. Setting forth the explanation of ācārya Dignāga (no verses, GT 226-7)

To one who became authoritative,[4]
Who desires to benefit transmigrators,
The Teacher,
The Sugata,
The Savior,
I bow down.

From benevolence toward transmigrators
Deluded by bad logic
I must explain the way
In which he became authoritative.[5]

THE SUMMARIZED MEANING OF THIS:

The first half shows the homage; the second half shows the promise to explain. The homage praises the Teacher for his excellence in causes and excellence in results.

Excellence in causes is divided into two: excellence of thought and excellence of application.[6] Thought is the great compassion that desires to benefit transmigrators to the utmost. Application is the "Teacher"[7] that for the sake of others develops the wisdom realizing selflessness.

(Excellence in) results is also divided into two: excellence of one's own aims and excellence of others' aims. (Excellence of) one's own aims is one's possession of the three special qualities of the "Sugata,"[8] whose nature is abandonment and realization. (Excellence of) others' aims is one's having the characteristics of one who is a Savior of transmigrators, through showing to others the path that one has seen by oneself.

Therefore, the Buddha, the Blessed One, who from excellence in causes has arisen as an authoritative one who has as his nature excellence of the two resultant aims, must be described as perfectly authoritative.

THE PHRASE "BECAME AUTHORITATIVE":

The intended meaning is that (Dignāga) will explain (the phrase) in order to lead the way for transmigrators

who are mistaken about reality because they apply distorted definitions of "authoritative," etc., (arrived at through) bad logic.

B. The way (Dignāga's) meaning was arranged by the author of the Pramāṇavārttika (no verses, GT 227-8)

The first half of the verse is summarized in five topics: the one who became authoritative, the one who desires to benefit transmigrators, the Teacher, the Sugata, and the Savior. Furthermore, the first is the basis of the four particular qualities that are to be established; the remaining (four) are the particular qualities that establish that (authoritativeness predicated of the Buddha).

The way of explaining that is divided into the forward system of explanation, which accords with the order of the verse, and the reverse system of explanation, which is the reverse of that.

There is a reason for making such a division. (Some, e.g., Mīmāṃsakas), saying "Because there is no proof[9] of an authoritative one who cognizes hidden phenomena,"[10] object that the development of a method of obtaining omniscience that becomes authoritative is not a cause generating the omniscience that becomes (authoritative). (Others object that) there is no cause domonstrating omniscience in such (Buddhist) statements as "There is such omniscience because we see its results or (we see something indicating

a cause of) similar nature."

The forward system of explanation is promulgated in order to refute the distorted cognition in the first objection. The reverse system of explanation is promulgated in order to refute (the distorted cognition in) the second.

Excellence of thought is directly shown by (Dharmakīrti's) first proof to be great compassion (and shown) by implication to be the thought of enlightenment.[12] Excellence of application has as its chief activity the development for the sake of others of the wisdom realizing selflessness; it is shown by implication to be the training in generosity, morality, etc.[13]

The first way of explaining demonstrates the way the Teacher arrived (at his goal) via some path. The second way of explaining first establishes the Four Noble Truths; then, having proven by reasoning that because of them (the Teacher) must have excellence of realization, and from that that there must be preceding (causes), (the second way) also perfectly shows how he arrived (at his goal) by way of that path.[14]

C. The intention of (Dignāga and Dharmakīrti) (no verses, GT 228)

The purpose of proving the Teacher, the Blessed One, to be authoritative, through proving that his teaching is

flawless, is (to effect) the accomplishment of the goal manifestly desired by those who strive for freedom.

(Opponent:) It follows that it is pointless to prove the Muni to be authoritative in order (to effect) the accomplishment of a person's desired goal, because (goals) are accomplished through authoritative perception and inference.

(rGyal tshab:) The Muni is proven to be authoritative not for the sake of the accomplishment of just any goal, but in order to show that the Muni is authoritative in having the method for (accomplishing) high rebirths and the definite good.[15]

(Opponent:) Even if it is for the sake of those goals, it (still) follows that it is pointless to prove the Muni to be authoritative, because you accept that past and future lives, the Four Noble Truths, etc., are proven by objectively impelled inferences.[16]

(rGyal tshab:) There is no flaw (in our position). Without relying initially on the scriptures of the Blessed One, one will not even think of selflessness or subtle momentariness, not to mention understand them inferentially, so when one sees initially that the Blessed One's teachings on high rebirths and the definite good, and the Reasons proving them, are connected in an uninterrupted (series of inferences that lead finally) to worldly authoritative per-

ception,[17] then those with investigative powers will investigate whether (things) exist just as they are taught or whether they do not, and they will understand inferentially the way in which those (teachings are true).

II. The particular meaning (PV 3-287, GT 228-366)

(This is divided into:) (A) Proving the Muni to be authoritative and (B) The purpose of praising him for his authoritativeness.

A. Proving the Muni to be authoritative (PV 3-284, GT 228-363)

(This is divided into:) (1) Showing through the forward system the way in which the Teacher arrived (at his goal) via some path and (2) Demonstraing through the reverse system that he arrived at such (a goal).

1. Showing through the forward system the way in which the Teacher arrived (at his goal) via some path (PV 3-148, GT 229-302)

(This is divided into:) (a) Identifying the definiendum, the authoritative person, through explaining the meaning of "became authoritative," and (b) Defining the authoritative person through the four remaining (epithets) and identifying the path that leads to that (authoritativeness).

a. Identifying the definiendum, the authoritative person, through explaining the meaning of "became authoritative" (PV 3-35, GT 229-51)

(This is divided into:) (i) The general definition of authoritativeness and (ii) Showing that the Muni also possesses the characteristics (of authoritativeness).

i. The general definition of authoritativeness (PV 3-8, GT 229-36)

(This is divided into:) (X) The essential definition and (Y) Particulars.

X. The essential definition (PV 3-7a, GT 229-33)

(This is divided into:) (p) The definition, (q) The definiendum and (r) Ascertaining the definition in the definiendum.

p. The definition (PV 3-5a, GT 229-30)

(This is divided into:) (I') Identifying nondeceptiveness, (II') Disposing of (the objection that the definition is) too narrow and (III') Disposing of (the objection that the definition is) too broad.

I'. Identifying nondeceptiveness (PV 3a, GT 229)

(Opponent:) Since cognizing objects of authoritative cognition--such as high rebirths and the definite good, to-

gether with the method (of attaining them)--depends on authoritativeness, and since only the Muni is authoritative regarding every such object, what then are the general characteristics of authoritativeness such that by possessing those characteristics one becomes authoritative?

(rGyal tshab:) An authoritative perception grasping blue is authoritative, because it is a new, nondeceptive cognition.

(Opponent:) If cognition is authoritative, it follows that discussions of the characteristics of authoritativeness (found) in the śāstras are pointless, because when a cognition is established by apperception, the nondeceptiveness that exists (simultaneously) with, and is substantially identical to, (that cognition) is already proven.[18]

(rGyal tshab:) It does not follow that an object of knowledge is completely and nondeceptively cognized merely by an experience of its own essence, because (the fact that) the efficiency of cooking, burning, etc., exists as we comprehend it (is due to) nondeceptiveness regarding (potential confirmatory) action. (Nondeceptiveness) definitely is not cognized merely by an experience of (a cognition's) own essence.[19]

II'. Disposing of (the objection that the definition is) too narrow[20] (PV 3b-4, GT 229-30)

(Opponent:) Since nondeceptiveness regarding (poten-

tial confirmatory) action has the meaning of (cognitive) attainment of an object, and since no one can attain (anything by) sound, etc., ear-cognition does not fit the definition of authoritativeness.

(rGyal tshab:) The ear-cognition that arises from objectifying a sound that has been grasped does not have the flaw of unsuitability as authoritative, because it is a cognition that newly obtains a manifestly desired object (i.e., the sound) as its object of authoritative cognition.[21] The word "also" (indicates) the inclusion of the visual perception of lightning, etc.[22]

(Opponent:) Since the śāstras are authoritative regarding all objects of knowledge, they should (effect the) accomplishment of one's goal. What then is gained by proving the Muni to be authoritative?

(rGyal tshab:) It follows that the meaningful words in the śāstras, etc., are not perfect resultant Reasons[23] that demonstrate (the reality of) high rebirths and the definite good, which are the real objects expressed (by the words), because meaningful words are authoritative--i.e., they are perfect Reasons--in bringing about in the mind of the listener a clear (appearance of the) object that is the object the speaker desires to express; (that object) is the (logical) Subject that is the basis of the Reason's presence in the Subject.[24] Alternatively, the meaning of the previous

(interpretation) should be applied so as to accord with the words of the latter.[25]

III'. Disposing of (the objection that the definition) is too broad (PV 5a, GT 230)

(Opponent:) It follows that a subsequent cognition also is authoritative, because it is nondeceptive.

(rGyal tshab:) A conventional mind, a memory, a subsequent cognition, cannot be accepted as really authoritative, because it is a cognition that by memory grasps again an object already grasped and cognized by a previous authoritative (cognition) that induces (the memory) and does not diminish.[26]

q. The definiendum (PV 5b-6b, GT 230-31)

(Opponent:) Because one attains objects in dependence upon them, are not functioning eyes and other organs authoritative?

(rGyal tshab:) Only a mind that is new and nondeceptive about the arisen aspect of its own object is authoritative, because it is cognition that chiefly accomplishes indirect and direct results, through authoritativeness.

An authoritative (cognition) accomplishes indirect results, because it is the chief cause of a person's adopting or rejecting entities that are to be adopted or rejected. That authoritative (cognition) accomplishes direct results,

because if that (definition is true), then one is able to prove directly the (definition of) authoritativeness (as) cognition of an object.[27] This follows, because the different aspects of the object appearing to a mind that is able newly to cut off superimposition[28] enable one to establish different (authoritative) cognitions of mental objects.

<u>r. Ascertaining the definition in the definiendum</u> (PV 6b-7a, GT 231-3)

(<u>Opponent</u>:) An authoritative (cognition), defined as a new, nondeceptive (cognition) is either (a) ascertained by itself or (b) dependent on another, subsequent authoritative (cognition). If (a), then no one will be confused in distinguishing authoritative from non-authoritative (cognitions). If (b), that ascertaining authoritative (cognition) will also require ascertainment as nondeceptive by another, subsequent (authoritative cognition), and since that (authoritative cognition) will depend on still another, there will be an infinite regress.

(<u>rGyal tshab</u>:) It is not the case that all authoritative (cognitions) are ascertained exclusively by themselves or (exclusively) by another (subsequent authoritative cognition), because (some authoritative cognitions) are ascertained by themselves and some, too, can be ascertained by another (subsequent authoritative cognition). This follows, because we see that when a self-experiencing authoritative

apperception cognizes its own essence, by its own power it induces certainty of the part of nondeceptiveness that exists simultaneously with and is substantially identical to it; and because we see that some authoritative (cognitions) require ascertainment as nondeceptive authoritative (cognitions) by an authoritative designation that arises subsequent to the (original) cognition of the object of authoritative cognition.[29]

Alternatively, in the direct cognition that investigates the ultimate, one cannot distinguish between authoritative and non-authoritative (cognitions), because it is a non-dual experience that experiences its own essence, cognizing only the emptiness of substantial difference between subject and object. If (there is no distinguishing in that cognition), it follows that there is no flaw such that it cannot be accepted that one makes distinctions, because an authoritative (cognition) that functions <u>without</u> analyzing (the ultimate) <u>is</u> proven to distinguish authoritative from non-authoritative (cognitions).[30]

(Some) assert that the first (part of the) passage[31] shows that (authoritativeness) is proved by apperception of the part that experiences its own essence; and that the second (part of the) passage[32] shows that authoritativeness is proven with regard to its own object of authoritative cognition by a subsequently-arising authoritative (cogni-

tion) that shows (the object's) efficiency. This is not a complete definition of self-ascertainment and other-ascertainment.[33]

Alternatively, one can apply the explanation of ācārya Devendrabuddhi: Even if through a self-experiencing apperception one cognizes merely the existence of a perceptual cognition like that that grasps blue, it does not follow that there is certainty that one cognizes the part of authoritativeness that is simultaneous with and substantially identical to it, because we see that the authoritative part must be cognized by an authoritative designation that has an apparent object that arises at a later time.[34]

(Opponent:) What is (the meaning of) the terms "self-ascertaining" and "other-ascertained"? There are objects and there are cognitions. In relation to objects, one distinguishes either (a) by virtue of whether a cognition does or does not draw independent certainty toward its object or (b) by (virtue of an apperceptive) subject.[35] If (a), it follows that the (other-ascertained) authoritative (cognition) will be a subsequent cognition, and the (self-ascertaining) authoritative (cognition) will not draw independent certainty toward even a part of its own object, so there will only be doubt. If that is the case, because neither is suitable (to be considered) authoritative, not even a little perplexity will be cut off.

(b) In relation to subjects, it is ascertained that there are three (topics): the definition, the definiendum and the example. An example of authoritativeness, such as the (cognition) grasping blue, is either able or unable to ascertain itself independently, (yet) it is unreasonable to distinguish between these two, because it is impossible that an externally-directed cognition, such as (the cognition) grasping blue, know itself; and because unless a self-experiencing apperception that just exists (simultaneously with the cognition of blue) independently (ascertains the cognition as authoritative), that (cognition) will be unsuitable (to be considered) authoritative.

It also is unacceptable to distinguish between independent and non-independent ascertainment (through applying) the designation of an "authoritative" example in the definiendum, (because) inference will not be self-ascertaining in the mindstreams of fools and Lokāyatas,[36] who do not understand the term "authoritative."

Also, when one investigates whether the characteristic, "non-deceptiveness," is or is not independently ascertained, (one sees that) inference will not be self-ascertaining in the mindstream of a Lokāyata, because he necessarily asserts (inference) to be deceptive.[37]

(rGyal tshab:) There is no flaw (in our position). When one investigates the authoritative (cognition) that

ascertains the ("non-deceptive") characteristic of authoritativeness in the definiendum, (one sees that) it is impossible that an authoritative (cognition) not draw independent certainty toward some part of its own object of authoritative cognition. Therefore, when the nondeceptive part is ascertained independently, that is self-ascertainment; and when it is ascertained by the power of another (subsequent authoritative cognition), that is other-ascertainment.[38]

(Opponent:) Well, then, inference will not necessarily be self-ascertaining.

(rGyal tshab:) There is no flaw (in our position). When a Lokāyata understands authoritatively that there is fire in a smoky place from the Reason, smoke, it is well proven that he is undeceived about the object, because he draws independent certainty toward attaining the object he has cognized.[39]

(Opponent:) If authoritativeness and non-authoritativeness are, respectively, ascertained by an authoritative (cognition) itself and (an authoritative cognition) that arises later, then the composition of Śāstras will be pointless.

(rGyal tshab:) Śāstras are not pointless, because it is necessary to reverse the confused idea that the Vedas, etc., are authoritative methods of (attaining) liberation--

and it is for this that śāstras are composed. Alternatively, (the line) can be applied to the words of the Omniscient One.[40]

Y. Particulars (PV 7b-8, GT 233-6)

Merely "nondeceptive" does not fulfil the definition of authoritativeness. There must be the elucidation of an object not cognized before, because it is also necessary to speak of a first, or new, cognition as part of the definition of (authoritativeness). This shows in particular that the phrase "nondeceptive" or "new, nondeceptive" (must) first accord with the explanation of the etymological definition of the term, pramāṇa.[41]

Some say that ("nondeceptive") and ("new, nondeceptive") are the same definition of authoritativeness. This is unacceptable, because their respective arising generic images are dissimilar. (Therefore,) the (respective) definienda must have different opposites of the negative.[42]

It also is unacceptable to say that ("nondeceptive") shows a definition of conventional authoritativeness and ("new, nondeceptive") shows a definition of ultimate authoritativeness, for it follows (from this) that an ultimate authoritative (cognition) is conventionally authoritative, because it is a nondeceptive cognition. It also follows that a conventional authoritative (cognition) is ultimately authoritative, because it elucidates an object

not cognized (before).

(Opponent:) What (then) is the meaning of the statement, "It is ultimately authoritative, because it newly elucidates an ultimate not cognized before"?[43]

(rGyal tshab:) ("Nondeceptive") also is a definition of ultimate authoritativeness; it is sufficient to quote the statement, "It is authoritative regarding the ultimate, because it is nondeceptive regarding the ultimate."[44] Therefore, since it is necessary to accept that ("new, nondeceptive") also shows a definition of conventional authoritativeness, it is unacceptable to separate (the two phrases).

(Opponent:) Well, then, what about Prajñākaragupta's explanation to that effect?

(rGyal tshab:) He shows that the words of the definition (are applicable) to a definiendum that is ultimate, but he does not claim to show that the (two) phrases have opposite meanings, because merely by showing the general definition of authoritativeness he is able (to cite such a definiendum).

(Opponent:) If authoritativeness is the new elucidation of an object, then a subsequent cognition ascertaining blue also is authoritative, because it newly elucidates a generic image.[45]

(rGyal tshab:) There is (in our position) no flaw such

that it follows that a subsequent cognition is authoritative, because after a perception grasping blue has cognized the uncommon essence of blue, by the power of that (authoritative cognition) one attains the cognition grasping the generic image, but (that subsequent cognition) is powerless to judge the object on its own.

(Other Opponent:) That very cognition that arises to grasp the generic image, after the cognition of the essence of blue, attains (the status of) authoritativeness.

(rGyal tshab:) The following passage should be applied to this statement: "An authoritative (cognition) grasps either (a) a generic image that is not based on or connected to an own-mark[46] or (b) a generic image that is the arisen aspect of an own-mark. If (a), it follows that it is impossible that there be an authoritative (cognition) that grasps an independent generic image, because if (a cognition) is authoritative, it must necessarily be either a new cognition of an own-mark not cognized before or based on that (cognition). (b) If (a cognition) grasping a generic image is authoritative, it follows that there is no flaw such that it follows that a subsequent cognition is authoritative, (because) those who strive for a resultant object ultimately will attain a new cognition of an own-mark not cognized before, (and will attain) the object (of that cognition)."[47]

This quotation speaks (directly) of an authoritative (cognition) that grasps a generic image, and indirectly of the characteristic of authoritativeness that is elucidation of an object not cognized before. Those who strive for a resultant object ultimately have to attain the authoritative cognition that knows the own-mark, and (also have to attain that cognition's) object (i.e., the own-mark), because they must investigate (on the basis of) having analyzed the two positions, viz., that there is or is not an own-mark that is chiefly to be striven for.

In this regard, ācārya Devendrabuddhi says that the purpose of this passage is to criticize directly (the idea that) an object of knowledge of an authoritative (cognition) necessarily _is_ an own-mark, and (to accept the idea that) an authoritative (cognition) necessarily _is based upon_ an own-mark.[48]

(_Other Opponent:_) (If) the explanation runs thus, then since entities really exist as own-marks and generic images, and since subsequent cognition elucidates the nature of generic images, (then subsequent cognition) is authoritative.

(_rGyal tshab:_) There is this extract: "For one who cognizes the uncommon (characteristic of reality), there is no duality. (External objects are mentioned) because of (the Buddha's compassionate) thought. There is no duality,

because when one investigates, (one encounters) no duality."[49] It follows that there is no flaw such that it follows that (an authoritative cognition) encountering an independent generic image is authoritative, because when one investigates the own-mark of any cognition, one does not cognize two dissimilar (objects), but only the reality of the uncommon, abiding non-duality.[50]

(Opponent:) Well, then , how is it that we can speak of external objects, etc.?

(rGyal tshab:) There is a purpose in speaking thus, because (such ideas are) spoken by force of the (Buddha's compassionate) thoughts toward his disciples, in order to lead them to (a cognition of) reality. There are no two dissimilar uncommon realities, because when one investigates the abiding own-mark of entities, there is no reality other than the non-dual emptiness of a substantial difference between object and subject.

ii. Showing that the Muni also possesses the characteristics (of authoritativeness) (PV 9-35, GT 236-51)

(This is divided into:) (X) Applying (to the Muni) the meaning of authoritativeness already explained and (Y) Explaining the meaning of "became" (authoritative).

X. Applying (to the Muni) the meaning of authoritativeness already explained (PV 9a, GT 236-8)

The Muni, the Blessed One, is authoritative with regard to all conventional and ultimate objects, because he possesses and is (a possessor of) a new, nondeceptive cognition of all those (objects). If (the root-verse is read) as Devendrabuddhi (reads it), then one must apply to the example the words ("The Blessed One is authoritative) like that."[51]

AN INVESTIGATION:[52]

(Opponent:) An Omniscient One either is or is not authoritative regarding all objects of knowledge. If he is not, then all these exhausting (attempts) to prove that the Muni is authoritative through proving that his teaching is authoritative are pointless, and it is unacceptable to distinguish our own teacher from other teachers as (especially) worthy of being followed. If (the Muni is authoritative), then the first omniscience-moment is authoritative, because it newly sees by direct perception all objects of knowledge, but it follows (then) that the second and subsequent omniscience-moments are not authoritative, because there is nothing new to be cognized. If there is (something new to be cognized), then, since it is necessary (that the Muni) exert himself for the method of analyzing a new object of authoritative cognition that has not been cognized

before, then (he) will not already have eliminated the knowledge-obstacles,[53] because there is a new path to be accomplished. If you think that (the second-moment cognition) is authoritative merely because it is nondeceptive, then it is pointless to make the particular statement that (authoritative cognition is) "first, or new, and nondeceptive," and it also is impossible to refute the idea that a subsequent cognition is authoritative.

(rGyal tshab:) This is the reply to be made to that: The second omniscience-moment either (a) arises or (b) does not arise immediately after the first omniscience-moment. If (b), then it is necessary to accept (the first moment) as permanent. If (a), then since the second and subsequent moments cognize newly (what was cognized by the first moment), it is necessary to accept that they are authoritative.

(Opponent:) Since the first omniscience-moment cognizes (what will be cognized in) the second and subsequent moments as yet-to-arise, there is nothing to be cognized again (newly by the second and subsequent moments).

(rGyal tshab:) When there is such cognition, the second and subsequent moments either have or have not already arisen. If they have already arisen, then it is pointless to specify that they are yet-to-arise. If they have not yet (arisen), then since the part that has already arisen must

be newly cognized (as already-arisen, the idea that the second and subsequent moments) are not authoritative is undermined.

If it is impossible that there be new objects of knowledge after the first omniscience-moment has arisen, then every entity will be permanent. If it is possible, then since that new existent must be newly cognized, (the idea that the second and subsequent moments) are not newly-cognizing authoritative (cognitions) is undermined.

Also, an eighth-level Bodhisattva[54] either (a) is or (b) is not a Buddha. If (a), then there will exist a Buddha who has not abandoned the small and medium (defilements) to be abandoned by the path of development.[55] If (b), then it is either possible or impossible for him to become a Buddha. If it is impossible, then because it is impossible that a sentient being become a Buddha, there will be no new Buddhas, so it is pointless (to speak) in particular of a first omniscience-moment. If it is possible, then when (someone), not (a Buddha) before, later newly becomes a Buddha, it is definitely necessary to accept that it is a second or subsequent omniscience-moment (by which the "old" Buddha) cognizes the new (Buddha).

(Opponent:) When (an Omniscient One) directly cognizes the present, it is impossible that he not be able to cognize implicitly all past and future (phenomena) as the

cause and result (of the present), so we accept that it is impossible for second and subsequent moments to cognize a new object of authoritative cognition.

(_rGyal tshab_:) It follows that in the first moment of the Mahāyāna path of seeing[56] there will be no new _dharmatā_[57] to be newly cognized, because there is no diminution of the cognition of _dharmatā_ already effected during the path of application,[58] which is (the path of seeing's) cause. What is your answer (to this point)?

(_Opponent_:) Although there is nothing other than just _dharmatā_ to be newly cognized, the part of _dharmatā_ that is a manifest phenomenon[59] must be newly cognized, so (the first moment of the path of seeing) is authoritative.[60]

(_rGyal tshab_:) Well, then, even if the first omniscience-moment has already cognized an entity as yet-to-arise, that (entity) must be newly cognized as already-arisen by the second and subsequent moments.

(_Opponent_:) Since it is impossible that there exist in the past anything that is yet-to-arise, when there ("exists") something that is yet-to-arise, it necessarily must already have arisen.[61]

(_rGyal tshab_:) Well, then, it follows that a Bodhisattva on the path of application has already abandoned the seeds of the knowledge-obstacles, because he _will_ abandon them. It (also) follows that he is already a Buddha, be-

cause he will become a Buddha.

(Opponent:) In general, if there is (an entity) that is yet-to-arise, it necessarily must already have arisen, (but an entity) yet to arise in the mindstream of a (particular) person has not necessarily already arisen.[62]

(rGyal tshab:) Well, then, since there necessarily will later exist in the mindstream of that person an already-arisen (entity) that previously had not already arisen, there necessarily must be a new cognition. If it is possible that sentient beings eliminate new obstacles at a later time, then it is necessary that a second or subsequent omniscience-moment (of one already a Buddha) newly cognize that elimination of new obstacles, and (the idea that the second and subsequent moments) are not newly cognizing authoritative (cognitions) is undermined. Other (cases) should be known by implication (from this).[63]

However we consider within and without, we do not find an omniscient (cognition) that is not authoritative, or an authoritative (cognition) that is not by necessity a new cognition.

Y. Explaining the meaning of "became" (authoritative) (PV 9a-35, GT 238-51)

(This is divided into:) (p) The purpose of saying "became" and (q) Disposing of objections to that.

p. The purpose of saying "became" (PV 9a-b, GT 239)

Saying "became" (authoritative) in the verse of homage has a negative purpose,[64] because the purpose of saying that the Omniscient One "became" (omniscient) is to reverse (the idea that) he is not generated from his own causes. It has positive purpose,[65] because the purpose of saying that he "became" omniscient is to demonstrate that he has arisen as authoritative in dependence on the completion of the development of the special practice of method and wisdom. Also, it is reasonable that the Omniscient One (be considered) an Authoritative Person, because when we depend on the perfect reasoning that proves his omniscience, we see that he is one who became authoritative.

q. Disposing of objections to that (PV 10-35, GT 239-51)

(This is divided into:) (I') Refuting (the idea that someone) who knows how to create all objects of knowledge is omniscient and (II') Proving as omniscient the one who knows by perception how all (objects of knowledge) really exist.

I'. Refuting (the idea that someone) who knows how to create all objects of knowledge is omniscient (PV 10-28, GT 239-48)

(This is divided into:) (A') Refuting (the idea) that the nature of God is such that he is the maker of all (objects of knowledge) and (B') Refuting the proofs (of a creator-God's existence).

A'. Refuting (the idea) that the nature of God is such that he is the maker of all (objects of knowledge (PV 10-11, GT 239-40)

(This is divided into:) (1') Refuting (the idea) that he is permanent and (2') Refuting (the idea) that he is impermanent.

1'. Refuting (the idea) that he is permanent (PV 10-11a, GT 239-40)

(Opponent:) That God[66] who is the maker of all (objects of knowledge) is an Authoritative Person who is permanent and self-originated.

(rGyal tshab:) It follows that God cannot exist as a permanent authoritative (being), because if he were such, he necessarily would authoritatively cognize the existence of functioning entities.[67] The Reason pervades (the Predicate) because objects that are objects of knowledge are impermanent, so it is necessary that the authoritative (cog-

nition) that comprehends them be unstable.

Some presumptuous (commentators) on the Buddha's scriptures say that this (verse)[68] refutes (the existence of) permanent conventional authoritativeness, but does not refute (the existence of) permanent ultimate authoritativeness.[69] This is an opinion (whose proponents) have not the slightest mastery of the logical system that refutes (the existence of) permanent entities. If there exists a permanent conventional authoritative (cognition), then that authoritative (cognition) is a permanent entity. If that is the case, then you must consider: what ultimate or conventional distinction is there between the (permanent conventional authoritativeness) that is the object of refutation here and the ultimate (authoritativeness) asserted by you?[70]

(Opponent:) An eye, which remains motionless, grasps forms successively; the function of the eye does not change into something different. Just so, objects of knowledge are impermanent and God's cognition is unstable, but he (himself) is a permanent cognizer God.[71]

(rGyal tshab:) It follows that God's cognition cannot be accepted as being generated from a permanent God, because his earlier and later (cognitions) are generated according to the succession of objects.[72] (A permanent God) cannot generate (his cognitions) in dependence on condi-

tions, because it is unsuitable for a permanent (entity) to depend on conditions.[73] Also, if the function of the eye does not (change into) something different, it must already grasp a later (object) when it grasps an earlier one.[74]

2'. Refuting (the idea) that he is impermanent (PV 11b, GT 240)

(Opponent:) If God is impermanent, it is not the case that he has previously experienced attachment, etc., in saṃsāra and then depended on accomplishing the development of generosity, etc., as an antidote to that; it is the case that he has been generated beginninglessly from previous homogeneous (causes) as detached and omniscient.

(rGyal tshab): It follows that God is not an authoritative (being) proven to be an omniscient being generated from previous homogeneous (causes), because even if he (can) distinguish conditions on the side of defilement from those on the side of purification, at no previous moment of saṃsāra has he actually been harmed or helped by any aspect (on either side).[75]

Alternatively, according to Devendrabuddhi's explanation, these lines should be applied toward proving the previous (refutation, that of permanence).[76]

B'. Refuting the proofs (of such a God's existence) (PV 12-30, GT 240-48)

(This is divided into:) (1') Showing that the proofs are false and (2') Showing that the existence of a maker of all (objects of knowledge) is confuted by authoritative (perception and inference).

1'. Showing that the proofs are false (PV 12-22, GT 240-47)

(This is divided into:) (a') A brief demonstration and (b') An extensive explanation.

a'. A brief demonstration (PV 12, GT 241)

(Opponent:) "Worldly abodes, bodies and possessions are preceded by the mind of a maker, because they act intermittently, like an axe; because they have a particular shape, like a pot; and because they are efficient (in fulfilling human aims), like a battle-axe."[77] From these and other such statements, it is proven that (abodes, bodies and possessions) have a maker whose mind has preceded them, and also that that (maker) is God.

(rGyal tshab:) If it is proven in general merely that (abodes, bodies and possessions) are preceded by a mind, it follows that this is not a perfect proof (of a syllogism) not already proven by the Buddhists, because the Buddhists

have already proven--and not forgotten--that (abodes, bodies and possessions) are generated from mental actions that are their causes.[78] The word "or" refers to the following analysis.[79]

If it is proven that (objects of knowledge) are produced by a permanent mind, then it follows that the example of that Reason is unproven, because it is impossible that there exist a permanent functioning entity.[80]

Alternatively, if it is proven merely that (objects of knowledge) are preceded by another maker, it follows that pervasion is uncertain, because--since it is not ascertained that (creation is) specifically by God--there is doubt that there is pervasion.[81]

If you say that it is unproven that God acts intermittently, (we reply that) since we see that the results occur successively, it is proven that the direct cause of those (results) must be successive.[82]

Except by a specific analysis of the Predicate, it is impossible to damage all three fallacies simultaneously.

<u>b'. An extensive explanation</u> (PV 13-22, GT 241-7)

(This is divided into:) (i') A refutation through an analysis of the meaning (of the words used) in the proof, (ii') Refuting other similar (arguments) through that and (iii') The aim that is accomplished by those (refutations).

i'. A refutation through an analysis of the meaning (of the words used) in the proof (PV 13-18, GT 241-4)

(This is divided into:) (X') The unsuitability of the meaning of "shape" as a Reason and (Y') The unsuitability of the word "shape" as a Reason.

X'. The unsuitability of the meaning of "shape" as a Reason (PV 13-16, GT 241-3)

(This is divided into:) (p') (The fact that) particular shape is unproven in the Subject and (q') (The fact that) mere shape is uncertain.

p'. (The fact that) particular shape is unproven in the Subject (PV 13, GT 241-2)

It follows that a shaped object that follows on and does not exist without the assistance of a person who designs it is not a perfect Reason proving that worldly abodes, bodies and possessions have preceding (their creation) the mind of some person, because if everything exists as a pot does, we can infer (the above conclusion) from that reasonably, but (in fact) it is unproven that the Reason is present in the Subject of that proof.[83]

q'. (The fact that) mere shape is uncertain (PV 14-16, GT 242-3)

(This is divided into:) (I'') An example of uncertain-

ty, (II'') Extreme consequences if that is the case and (III'') Disposing of (the objection that) it follows that the argument rebounds.

I''. An example of uncertainty (PV 14, GT 242)

"Because the shape of a pot and mere shape are not different." It is not reasonable to infer from such a Reason that (mere shapes) are made by a person, because it is proven that those shapes are generated as entities having different kinds of causes from those shapes made by a person. As "mere shape" these latter are not different (from the former), since one can equally apply (to them) the word "shape." It is like inferring fire on the basis of the existence of a grey substance.[84]

II''. Extreme consequences if that is the case (PV 15, GT 242)

If (the preceding observation) is not so, it follows that an ant-hill can be proven to have been made by a potter, because (the ant-hill) and the pot made by the potter have some similarity in the (shaping of the) mud.

III''. Disposing of (the objection that) it follows that the argument rebounds (PV 16, GT 242-3)

(Opponent:) When you analyze the general and particu-

ular (aspects) of what (we) have set forth (above) as Reasons, (we find that) there is the express flaw of a rebounding argument, (because) your analysis (applies) equally to (the Reasons) you have asserted as probative.[85]

(rGyal tshab:) (The cases) are not equal. When one sets forth a general Reason that is able to prove a thesis, and that (proof) is confuted by a particular analysis, the applicability to the confuter of the fault (he has found) in the setting forth of the proof (makes his) a rebounding argument. Expressing a confutation of a fallacious proof that has been set forth is not a rebounding argument.

In proving that a conch-sound is a result, when one sets forth as a Reason "(because) it arises by effort," it can be objected: "If you set forth as your Reason '(because sound) clearly exists before the effort,' (the Reason is uncertain;[86] if you set forth (as your Reason) 'because it arises from a new, unprecedented (effort),' (the Reason) is unproven."[87] It is reasonable to assert this (objection) as a rebounding argument, because even though the Reason set forth to prove the conch-sound to be a result is "arises from effort" in general, (the objector has given) a wrong reply that has the express fault of (over-)differentiating through an analysis that (over-)differentiates (details of) the relator.[88] The (general) Reason is able to prove the thesis, because it pervades the Predicate and is proven in

the Subject.

When the Akṣipādins set forth the (above general) Reason, the Naiyāyikas undertake a particular analysis, and the Akṣipādins assert that this is the express flaw of a rebounding argument. Ācārya (Dharmakīrti) has also explained it (thus).

The meaning of the term "rebounding argument" is this: When one has made "is a result" the predicate and set forth just "arises from effort" as the Reason, and a confutation is expressed through a particular analysis, then the proof expressed by the confuter himself--such as "is the conch-sound a result of a fresh, unprecedented effort or does it clearly (arise) from pre-existent effort?"--can be applied equally to the analyzed and the analyzer. That, in brief, is the meaning of a "rebounding argument."

Alternatively, when (someone has made) a "perfect" confutation and the Reasons he has himself set forth have equally (damaging) results (to him), that is called a rebounding argument.[89] Accordingly, when one sets forth "(because it is) a product" as a Reason proving "sound is impermanent," someone else may object: "If you set forth 'the product of a (permanent) sound' as a Reason, it is a contradictory (Reason);[90] if you set forth 'the product of a pot' (as a Reason), it is an unproven (Reason);[91] and if you say 'that does not exist in a permanent existent ei-

ther,' there is the fallacy of an uncommon uncertain (Reason)."[92] This (objection) is a rebounding argument.

Y'. The unsuitability of the word "shape" as a Reason (PV 17-18, GT 243-4)

(This is divided into:) (p') An example of the unreasonableness of seeing the mere word "shape" as a Reason and (q') Extreme consequences.

p'. An example of the unreasonableness of seeing the mere word "shape" as a Reason (PV 17, GT 244)

It follows that (although) a particular Reason, "shaped object," (proves that) a pot, etc., (is made by a person), it is unreasonable to prove that abodes, bodies, etc., are made by a person (merely) from seeing that the general word "shape" is the same as the probative word "shaped object," because (the Reason's) pervasion (of the Predicate) is uncertain. For example, it is unreasonable to infer thus: "A word is a cow (lit., "horned one"), because we see that there is a word "go" (=cow and word).[93]

q'. Extreme consequences (PV 18, GT 244)

It follows that all persons should accomplish all desired goals without effort, because they (would) attain their objects (merely) by the existence of the words (for

the objects). (This Reason) pervades (the Predicate), because there is nothing for which there is not a verbal expression. This follows, because (words) are merely under the power (of someone's) desire to express.[94]

ii'. Refuting other similar (arguments) through that (PV 19, GT 244)

This reasoning confuting the Reasons (purporting to) prove (the existence of) God can, when relied upon, also investigate and refute other fallacious proofs, such as those of the Sāṃkhyas, Jainas, etc.[95]

The Sāṃkhyas say that mind, pleasure, etc., since they are non-mental, etc., are material, because, since they are impermanent, etc., they are generated. The Jainas say that a tree is a sentient being, because it dies when its bark is stripped. Analyzing these (syllogisms), we are able to refute them.[96]

iii'. The aim that is accomplished by those refutations (PV 20-22, GT 244-7)

AN EXAMPLE (SHOWING) THAT, OF THE GENERAL AND THE PARTICULAR, THE GENERAL IS THE PRIMARY:

Of general and particular Reasons, the general are primary, because if it is unproven that the way a general-entity Reason has been set forth in relation to a Subject one desires to know is appropriate, it is accepted that

this is a way of disproving (the Reason); but if (the general Reason) is proven (in relation to the Subject), then even if particular details are unproven in relation to the Subject, (the general Reason) is not damaged.

For example, if one proves that "(because it is) a product" is a Reason appropriately applied to (the Subject) sound in general, then even if it is unproven of the product sound that it is synonymous with a particular quality of space, (the general Reason) is not damaged. Alternatively, if ("product") is proven in relation to sound, then even if it is unproven in relation to a (particular) sound that depends on a particular space, (the general Reason) is not damaged.[97]

AN EXAMPLE (SHOWING) THAT OF WORD AND MEANING, MEANING IS PRIMARY:

A product, even if it unproven that the word ("product") is the object expressed by the verbal expression (of the Reason), can be proven to be a Reason present in the Subject of a proof that sound is impermanent, because it is proven that the actual meaning can be appropriately set forth (as a Reason) in relation to the Subject one desires to cognize, sound.[98]

For example, the Buddhists explain to the Vaiśeṣikas[99] (the following) proof: "The atoms of the four elements are impermanent, because they are physical," and it

is grasped that "tangible" (is implied). Although the word "physical" is applied by one of the disputants, it is unproven that it is commonly agreed upon by the disputants.

The Vaiśeṣikas assert that all objects of knowledge are collected into six categories: Substance, Quality, Generality, Particularity, Action and Inherence. Substance (is divided into) non-ubiquitous Substances, viz., the four elements and mind; and four ubiquitous Substances, viz., self, time, direction and space. Of the six categories, it is Quality (that includes) size. If we divide size, there are big and small and long and short. Big (is divided into) permanent and impermanent. The permanent big is a Quality based on the four (ubiquitous) Substances. The impermanent big is a Quality based on a Substance that has parts and is composed of three or more atoms. The small is divided (in the same way). The permanent small is the Quality characterized by an atom's appearing to the mind as round. The impermanent small is the Quality based on (a Substance) that has parts and is composed of (one or two) atoms. Long and short are similar to impermanent big and small.

It is accepted that the word "physical" is applicable to all the sizes except the permanent big. The meaning of "physical" is "touchable," which is accepted by both disputants as (a Reason) in relation to (the Subject), the four elements. Accordingly, although the Vaiśeṣikas assert

that atoms are unimpeded, they assert, like the Buddhists, that the meaning of "tangible" is (that atoms can) have their way blocked by other formed objects. The word "touchable" means "physical." Although, according to the Vaiśeṣikas, ("physical") is unproven in relation to the four elements, according to them there is no flaw such that ("physical") is unproven in the Subject of the proof that the atoms of the four elements are impermanent, because even if that (word) is unproven, according to them it is certain that the meaning of ("physical") is an appropriate Reason to set forth in relation to the Subject one desires to cognize, (and) which will be proven thus.

THE REASON THE MEANING OF THE TWO PREVIOUS VERSES[100] IS ACCEPTABLE:

If the meaning is mistaken or contradictory or unproven, etc., then (even) if the word is unmistaken, the proof must be known as flawed, because one can prove an actual pervading cause from an actual pervaded result, but one cannot prove an object from a mere word.[101]

For example, (one may) set forth the following proofs: "A variegated cow is a cow,[102] because it is a goer;" and "an elephant calf is an elephant, because it is an 'arm-possessor.'" The words "goer" and "arm-possessing," which are terms (for proving the Predicates) "is a cow" and "is an elephant," are not applied as terms (for proving those

Predicates merely) by reason of their being unmistaken in relation to the bovine and elephantine objects that are the (Subject) topics (about which one) wishes to know, but because they are applied by force of common opinion that is mistaken about its objects. "Goer" and "arm-possessing," which are asserted as (relevant) to the (Subject) topics are not unmistaken in relation to the (Predicates) "is a cow" and "is an elephant," because we see that there are living beings that are not those two (elephants and cows, yet have those qualities).[103]

2'. Showing that (the existence of) a creator of all objects of knowledge is confuted by authoritative (cognition) (PV 23-30, GT 247-8)

(This is divided into:) (a') (God's) unsuitability as a permanent cause and (b') Disposing (of the idea that our objections apply) equally to us.

a'. (God's) unsuitability as a permanent cause (PV 23-6, GT 247-8)

SETTING FORTH THE CONSEQUENCES:

It cannot be accepted for any reason that an entitative God be asserted as a non-cause at the same time as he is asserted to be a cause, because if that were the case, although he does not change from such nature as (makes him a cause), he is at the same time asserted sometimes to have

the nature of not being a cause.[104]

If this Reason does not pervade, then why, it follows, is it not reasonable to think that an unconnected post, not cognized as being the cause generating (the cure), heals a wound? It would be reasonable, because the former (Reason) does not pervade. It follows that this (latter) assertion is unreasonable, because it is accepted that the infliction and healing of a wound on the body of Nagpa (arise respectively) from connection with a weapon and medicine; it is not accepted otherwise.[105]

(God) is unsuitable as the maker of all results, because he (is asserted sometimes) not to generate results, and he cannot change his nature. It is difficult to understand how he could even be able to assist the cause (in bringing about) the result, because his absence as an assistant is not the basis for the prevention of the generation of the result, and because he is a permanent entity.[106] If he is a permanent entity, since it is impossible that he prevent (results from occurring), it cannot be ascertained that there is positive or negative concomitance (between God and particular results).

SHOWING AUTHORITATIVELY THAT THE (LAST) PERVADING REASON IS FLAWED:

It follows that there would be an infinite regress of causes for every result, because then it would be accepta-

ble to think that when some cause assists (a result) the cause of the result is something else which we do not see as being able to generate some result.[107]

b'. Disposing (of the idea that our objections apply) equally to us (PV 27-30, GT 248)

(Opponent:) Well, then, according to you, when earth, etc., do not generate a sprout, they cannot change their nature, so there will be no generation of a sprout.

(rGyal tshab:) It follows that earth, etc., while not changing, will not be the cause of the sprout, because when they change their nature from the time they are not generating a sprout, then they become a cause generating a sprout. This follows, because we see that when a field has been very well plowed and sown, it produces an excellent autumn harvest.[108]

(Opponent:) Just as object, organ, etc., are the cause of sense-cognition, even though they do not change their aspect between (the time) they have not met and (the time) they have, so too is God (both a non-cause and a cause, although he does not change his aspect).

(rGyal tshab:) It does not follow that the organs, etc., do not change, because sense-cognition changes according to the clarity or unclarity (of the sense-organs). If such is not the case, it follows that even when the three conditions have met, they will not be able to

generate sense-cognition, because they are not able (to generate it) individually when they have not met, and they do not change their nature at the time when they do meet. Therefore, it is proven that the three conditions have different natures when they have met and when they have not met, because we see the difference that they generate or do not generate sense-cognition when they have met or have not met.[109]

God, etc., is not the cause of all results, because he does not change his nature (from when) he does not generate results. It follows that (this Reason) pervades, because (factors) that are unable to generate a common result individually are, when they meet, the cause of that common result, since (when they meet) the quality of the result comes into existence.

II'. Proving as omniscient the one who knows by perception how all (objects of knowledge) really exist (PV 31-35, GT 248-51)

A'. Objections (PV 31, GT 248-9)

Some hedonists, Mīmāṃsakas, etc., say: As you have refuted (the existence of) God, so there is equal fault in your Omniscient One, because if he is an Authoritative Person, he must cognize every hidden object.

(A) Because there is not in the least a method for

proving[110] that one can become omniscient by some (sort of mental) development, there is no one who strives for that method.

(B) Not only is there no cause generating (such omniscience), but because there is not the least bit of proof that demonstrates it, there does not exist anyone who strives for the sake of cognizing it.

(A) Thus, it follows that one cannot accomplish omniscience by unimaginable mantras or medicines, because those are used by Buddhists and non-Buddhists (alike), and it would follow that everyone is omniscient.

(B) It follows that sense-cognition cannot cognize all hidden phenomena, because it is powerless to function where there are obstacles. It follows that mental cognition cannot be (omniscient), because it follows on sense-cognition. It follows that even if the mind relies on scripture it cannot cognize all hidden phenomena, because (words) are not necessarily related to meaning--and even if they are, one will not cognize (the meaning) directly.[111]

Moreover, it follows that it is unacceptable that one cognize all objects of knowledge successively, because if that is the case, you must accept that there is an exhaustive limit (to phenomena). If (all objects of knowledge are said to be) cognized simultaneously, it follows that there is a beginning to saṃsāra, because such a cognition is com-

pletely limiting.[112]

One cannot cognize the existence of such an Omniscient One through logical Reasons, because there are no Reasons apart from words and (because) since all persons are undeceived regarding some words, it would follow that if some person was undeceived regarding (the word) "all" he would be omniscient.[113]

If it is proven by perception, then the one (so proving) must also be omniscient, for without oneself cognizing all objects of knowledge, one cannot ascertain, "This being cognizes all objects of knowledge."

(In short,) there is neither a cause generating omniscience nor a Reason demonstrating (its existence).[114]

<u>B'. Refuting those (objections)</u> (PV 32-35, GT 249-51)

(This is divided into:) (1') The reason for seeking an Omniscient One, (2') The way of seeking him and (3') Identifying the Omniscient One.

<u>1'. The reason for seeking an Omniscient One</u> (PV 32, GT 250)

Not knowing the method of pacifying suffering, having taken as a teacher someone who (allegedly) teaches that (method), and being concerned that they are mistaken (in believing) that that person is a perfect teacher, those who

strive for freedom have a reason for seeking someone who knows well the method of pacifying suffering, because they are seeking for the sake of (discovering) what is to be done (to attain) the goal explained by such a person. The verse does not mean that when those who strive for freedom do not know (the method of pacifying suffering) they seek a virtuous friend (because) they are concerned that they will err when teaching others.[115]

2'. The way of seeking him (PV 33, GT 250-51)

One must consider whether this teacher knows or does not know (how) one enters into and exits from saṃsāra, proof of which is manifestly desired by those who strive for freedom. One must investigate whether or not he has the gnosis that knows that; one should not first investigate whether or not he knows how many insects there are, because for those of us who strive for freedom, the knowledge of how many insects there are is, for the time being,[116] not at all useful, because our striving is for freedom.

(Opponent:) Well, then, when we investigate thus, before taking him as a teacher, we either know or do not know that he has the quality of knowing the path to enlightenment and freedom. If we know, then since we ourselves already know the method of pacifying suffering, seeking (an Omniscient One) is pointless. If we do not know, then, un-

able to distinguish who is to be trusted from who is not to be trusted, we should trust the first (teacher) we meet.

(rGyal tshab:) There is no flaw (in our position). This is the way a virtuous friend is sought by the intelligent: From the very beginning, one knows an object[117] roughly through authoritative cognitions; also, one comes to know the existence of its subtle qualities by faith,[118] and one (also) will understand partially from questioning others, through reports, etc.

3'. Identifying the Omniscient One (PV 34-35, GT 251)

It is reasonable to assert that the Muni, the Blessed One, is authoritative for those who strive for freedom, because he has complete perceptual cognition of what is to be adopted and what rejected--(inversely,) the entry into and exit from saṃsāra--together with the methods thereto. Just by cognizing the number of insects there are, he does not fulfil the desires of those who strive for freedom, because that (knowledge) alone is not useful.[119]

Accordingly, (the Muni, the Blessed One) is reasonably (considered) the teacher of those who strive for freedom whether or not he can see a great distance, because he completely sees the reality of the Four Noble Truths, (realization of) which is the goal desired (by those who strive for freedom). Without that being the case, if one fulfils

the definition of an authoritative person merely by seeing a great distance, then it follows that it would be reasonable to instruct those who strive for freedom: "Come here! Trust the vulture as your teacher!"

Furthermore, others assert that the meaning of omniscience is knowing how to create all things, as we use the term "omniscient" in a conventional worldly sense in relation to those who know how do many things, such as painting, smithing, tailoring, etc. If someone who can make anything because of his knowledge of sciences is omniscient, then he also has made the sufferings of the lower realms, etc.--so one should take as one's teacher someone who is omniscient regarding karma and the defilements and who, having accomplished the elimination of every last fetter, is omniscient regarding how all objects of knowledge really exist.[120]

<u>b. Defining the authoritative person through the four remaining (epithets)</u>[121] (PV 36-148a, GT 251-302)

(This is divided into:) (i) Proving the four particular qualities and (ii) Showing from that that (the Buddha) is one who became authoritative.

<u>i. Proving the four particular qualities</u> (PV 36-147a, GT 251-302)

(This is divided into:) (X) Identifying the excellence

of thought, (Y) The way in which excellence of application is generated from (excellence of thought) and (Z) (Based on) those two, the way of proving excellence in results.

X. Identifying the excellence of thought (PV 36-133, GT 251-93)

(This is divided into:) (p) Showing initial proof of the excellence of thought and (q) Disposing (of the objection) that that is unproven.

p. Showing initial proof of the excellence of thought (PV 36a, GT 252)

When the Greatly Compassionate One accomplished (the state of) an Authoritative Person, (his accomplishment) necessarily first was preceded (by great compassion), because it was necessary that, having first generated the compassion that desires to free (beings) from all their sufferings, he then developed a method of pacifying suffering, and from that he became the Teacher.[122] Great compassion does not arise causelessly or from inappropriate causes, because it is accomplished through the development of previous homogeneous causes. Great compassion is accomplished at the beginning of meditation on the Mahāyāna path,[123] and (similarly) when one has made "he is the Savior" the thesis (requiring) a Reason, then (compassion) is the first (Reason used) in proving it.[124] The way in which this is neces-

sary will be explained below.

q. Disposing (of the objection) that that is unproven (PV 36b-133, GT 252-93)

(This is divided into:) (I') The objection and (II') The refutation of that.

I'. The objection (PV 36b, GT 252)

The Lokāyatas say: "Compassion is not accomplished by development through many lives, because those many past and future lives do not exist. This follows, because, since mind is based on body, when the body is destroyed, (mind) is also destroyed. For example, (mind) is a result of body, as light (is the result) of a lamp; or it is a quality of body, as intoxicating power (is a quality) of liquor; or it is naturally based (on body, and the relation is) like that between a wall and the drawing that depends on it."[125]

II'. The refutation of that (PV 36c-133, GT 252-93)

(This is divided into:) (A') Refuting (the idea) that it is impossible to develop (compassion) through many lives and (B') Refuting (the idea) that, even if such development is possible, its infinite increase cannot be accepted.

A'. Refuting (the idea) that it is impossible to develop (compassion) through many lives (PV 36c-121, GT 252-88)

(This is divided into:) (1') A brief demonstration and (2') An extensive explanation.

1'. A brief demonstration (PV 36c, GT 252-3)

Mind[126] does not have body as its basis as either material cause or special cooperative condition, because that (body) is the basis in such a way is refuted by authoritative cognition--and we will (show that it is) refuted. Alternatively, it does not follow that by giving Reasons for the non-existence of past and future lives (one proves that) it is unsuitable that compassion be developed in many lives, because (the Reasons given for) the non-existence of (past and future lives) are refuted by authoritative cognition--and we will (show that they are) refuted.[127]

Having well proven authoritatively that there are past and future lives, (Dharmakīrti) relies on (the concept of) karma and its result, which will be explained below, and proves just that (one can attain) a high-level rebirth in the next and subsequent worldly lives. Based on that, he establishes the reality of the Four Noble Truths, and from that he proves (the existence of) just the cause and result of the definite good, which are to be meditated upon in

common by beings of all three classes.[128] He proves that, after one has adorned those (Four Noble Truths) with an infinite increase in compassion, (there is) a way in which (that compassion is conjoined with) a complete realization of the reality of the Four Noble Truths, and from that, he proves omniscience.[129] Thus, the way of proving by objectively impelled reasoning just[130] that (it is possible to attain) a high rebirth in a future life, the definite good and omniscience, is extensively shown in this chapter.

The desire-realm gods in a particular heaven, such as Brahmā, etc., are very hidden phenomena, so they must be inferred in dependence upon scripture. The perfect Reasons proving them are shown in the first chapter.[131] The authoritative perception that confirms their existence is shown in the third chapter.[132] If one includes the subject-matter (of the Pramāṇavārttika) in three chapters, as (Dharmakīrti did) in the Pramāṇaviniścaya,[133] then this is included in the chapter on perception, because that is the part that extensively discusses yogic perception.

2'. An extensive explanation (PV 37-121, GT 252-88)

(This is divided into:) (a') Setting forth proof of the existence of past and future lives and (b') Refuting proofs of their non-existence.

a'. Setting forth proof of the existence of past and future lives (PV 37-46, GT 253-7)

(This is divided into:) (i') Setting forth the Reason and (ii') Disposing of (the objection that that proof) is faulty.

i'. Setting forth the Reason (PV 37-42, GT 253-6)

A just-conceived ordinary being's breathing, sense-clarity and particular mental inclinations are not, when he is conceived, independent of their previous homogeneous causes, because they are breathing, etc.[134] It is proven by the ascertainment of positive and negative concomitance that the mental inclinations, etc., are generated from the development of their own causes.[135] If we do not (know positive and negative concomitance), then there follows the extreme consequence that there is no cause and effect, because no authoritative cognition could ascertain them.[136]

Also, (mental inclinations, etc.) are not generated from the elemental body alone, because they are generated from previous homogeneous mental and other causes. If such is not the case, there follows the extreme consequence that all the elements are living beings, because mind is generated from the elements alone.[137]

It also is unacceptable (to assert) by any reason that later, at the time of an ordinary being's death, his sen-

ses, etc., do not connect with a subsequent homogeneous result because of the lack of some part of the cause, because at that time the homogeneous causes are complete; and in the past we have seen that a previous homogeneous cause is able to connect with a subsequent (homogeneous result) and that it is unacceptable that there exist any other additional cause.[138]

In summary, the mind of a just-conceived ordinary being follows on previous homogeneous causes, because it is a mind.[139] The death-time mind of (an ordinary being) connects with a subsequent mind, because it is an attached mind.[140]

(Opponent:) All the elements are not living beings, because those that are unable to generate sense-organs and mind in stone, etc., are not living beings.[141]

(rGyal tshab) It follows that all the elements have the nature of being seeds of living beings, because there is not any part of the earth an other elements that could not generate a moisture-born being, etc.[142] Since something is a living being merely by being the cause of a living being, the same extreme consequences still remain.[143]

Alternatively, it follows that when one has filtered uncontaminated water, it could not be accepted that there be inside that living beings with red heads and yellow bodies and those born differently, with opposite characteris-

tics, because they are generated from a cause that is just the element.[144] Our system does not have the flaw of (this) unacceptable (consequence), because (we hold that) all living beings have the nature such that they have karma as their seed (cause).[145]

Therefore, it follows that just as one element is a living being, so must they all be (living beings), because (if) sense-organs, etc., arise without depending on homogeneous causes, then they arise merely from elements. It follows that this (Reason) pervades, because if (sense-organs, etc.) arise thus, there can be no specification of the causes and conditions that generate or do not generate living beings.[146]

(Opponent:) Well, then, do you or do you not also assert that mind is generated continually from the sense-organs?

(rGyal tshab:) In general, something that is merely assistant is not the special indispensible cause. When mind is absent, it is the basis of the absence of the sense-organs. Mind does not have the eye and other sense-organs as its special basis, because when each of these is damaged by, e.g., cataracts, (mind) is not damaged.[147] (On the contrary,) mind is the special basis of the eye and other sense-organs, because we see that when (mind) is (afflicted) by sorrow, etc., based on other of its objects, (the

senses) also are afflicted.[148]

(Opponent:) Well, then, what is the special basis of mind?

(rGyal tshab:) There is no flaw such that a present fruitional mind exists without a (special) basis, because a present fruitional mind has as the basis of its existence some previous mental karma that is based on a previous mind of the same type.[149] The sense-organs arise from mind because some previous mental action craving the body is the projecting cause of the eye and other sense-organs.[150] Later, the death-time sense-organs of an ordinary being will connect with a subsequent homogeneous result that is similar to the preceding (homogeneous cause), because there exists a similar projecting cause of the same type.

ii'. Disposing of (the objection that that proof) is faulty (PV 43-6, GT 256-7)

DISPOSING (OF THE OBJECTION THAT) IT CONTRADICTS SCRIPTURE:

(Opponent:) Well, then, this contradicts the Teacher's explanation that mind depends on body, (when he says) "Body and mind are mutually successive."[151]

(rGyal tshab:) There is no flaw (in our position). There is a reason why the scripture explains that mind is based on body: it is said that it means that body-cognition assists the mind; it does not mean that (body is mind's) direct special basis.[152]

DISPOSING (OF THE OBJECTION THAT) IT CONTRADICTS REASON:

(Opponent:) Since mind does not arise without sense-organs, it must be based on body.

(rGyal tshab:) It follows that the sense-organs also are based on mind, because the sense-organs do not arise without mind.[153] Also, if you assert that, it follows that they continually act as mutual causes, because they are mutually assistant. If you assert that, it follows that they have causes that are continually mutually dependent, because of that (prior) assertion.[154]

Alternatively, if (mind) is based on body, it must be based on either (a) a permanent or (b) an impermanent body. (a) is unacceptable, because it follows (from it) that body cannot have mind arising from it successively, because it is permanent and non-successive.[155] (Mind) also cannot be generated successively (by a permanent body) in dependence on successive conditions, because (a permanent body) cannot be changed by conditions.[156]

(Opponent:) (Mind) is generated not from a (permanent) body alone; rather, later minds arise successively from a (permanent) body that is associated with a previous mind.[157]

(rGyal tshab:) It follows that it is clearly demonstrated that body has earlier and later stages, because it is demonstrated that body generates a later mind in depen-

dence on a previous mind. If you assert that, it follows that the previous body-moments that are the cooperative conditions of mind are the cause of each subsequent, later moment of (both) mind and body, because of that assertion and the (previous) objection. If you assert that, it follows that at death-time, just after conception, and at all times, we should see body and mind as mutually causitive, because of what you have asserted.[158]

b'. Refuting proofs of their non-existence (PV 47-121, GT 257-88)

(This is divided into:) (i') A brief demonstration, (ii') An extensive explanation and (iii') Summary.

i'. A brief demonstration (PV 47-52, GT 257-61)

(This is divided into:) (X') (Showing that) the Reason is uncertain and (Y') (Showing that) the example is unproven.

X'. (Showing that) the Reason is uncertain (PV 47a, GT 257)

(Opponent:) "A death-time mind necessarily does not connect with a subsequent homogeneous result, like a Detached One's (Arahant's) death-time mind. An ordinary being's death-time mind is also a death-time mind (with no sequel)."[159] The non-existence of past and future lives is

proven through Reasons like the above-quoted. If you claim that it is not a (correct) Reason because it can be damaged by its opposite, then we reply that the opposite equally is not a (correct) Reason, because it can be damaged by (our Reason).[160]

(rGyal tshab:) It follows that such Reasons are not perfect Reasons with inverse pervasion, because it is not in any way contradictory that an ordinary being's death-time mind connect to another (subsequent) mind of the same type.[161]

Y'. (Showing that) the example is unproven (PV 47b-52, GT 257-61)

(This is divided into:) (p') (Showing that) there is no authoritative cognition proving the example and (q') Refuting (the idea) that there exists an authoritative cognition (proving the example).

p'. (Showing that) there is no authoritative cognition proving the example (PV 47b, GT 257-9)

It follows that "an Arahant's final mind" cannot reasonably be asserted as a perfect accordant example, possessing both a Reason and a Predicate,[162] and proving that an ordinary being's death-time mind does not connect with a subsequent homogeneous result, because that (Arahant's ex-

istence) is unproven (for the opponent) by any authoritative cognition. If that last (Reason) is unproven, then any effort to refute (our assertion of the existence of liberated beings) is contradictory.[163]

Now[164] in our system, we either (a) accept or (b) do not accept that there is a final mind of an Arahant. If (a), then (the syllogism) "The death-time mind of an ordinary being connects with a subsequent mind because it is a mind" has an uncertain Reason.[165] (b) is unreasonable, because it contradicts what is stated clearly in the _Pramāṇaviniścaya_.

There is (however) no flaw (in our system). In our system it is not the case that we do not accept that there is a final mind of an Arahant. If the Buddhist writings of ācārya Devendrabuddhi and Ravigupta[166] are authoritative, then it is necessary to accept that the death-time mind of an ordinary being connects with a subsequent homogeneous result. If those writings are not authoritative, then, since the final mind of an Arahant is also unproven, it is unsuitable as an accordant example.[167]

It is not the case that in our system we do not accept that there is a final mind of an Arahant. When the _Pramāṇaviniścaya_ sets forth the definition of "entitylessness that is empty of efficiency," it expresses (the idea) that an Arahant's final mind is an uncertain (example). (An Ara-

hant's final mind) is final because it is not the material cause of any other moment that is counted as a sentient-being-moment. It is not the case that it does not produce even the slightest result, because it is explained as assisting in (the production of) the gnosis of the Omniscient One, etc.[168] (The passage says,) "Since it is not the material cause of a mind that counted as a sentient being, it is clear (why) it is explained that it does not connect with a subsequent homogeneous result."[169]

Ācārya Prajñākaragupta explains that "In our system of tenets, it is shown only that an Arahant's final mind contradicts (the idea of) connection (with a subsequent homogeneous result); not all death-time minds are (thus contradictory)."[170]

Ravigupta (explains that) "on the basis of the acceptance of (the existence of) external objects, one explains the termination of the physical and the mental as being like the extinction of a lamp.[171] Since we do not accept (external objects, we assert that) minds purified of defilement will connect only with subsequent homogeneous results."[172]

All those (above) commentators (adhere to) the system that explains that there are three final vehicles, and if one asserts that these passages definitely show that there is one final vehicle, then (one's) assertion shows no fami-

liarity with systems of tenets.[173]

Well, then, how can we avoid (the objection) that the Reason proving a future life is uncertain?[174] As it says in the Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā of ācārya Kamalaśīla, "'Any attached mind[175] is able to generate another mind that is its material effect, (because), just like any previous attached mind, the death-time mind of an ordinary being is an attached mind.' This statement is a Reason (based on) identity."[176]

q'. Refuting (the idea) that there exists an authoritative cognition (proving the example (PV 48-52, GT 259-61)

(This is divided into:) (I'') The unacceptability of proof through scripture and (II'') The unacceptability of proof through reasoning.

I''. The unacceptability of proof through scripture (PV 48a, GT 259)

(Opponent:) A Faultless One's death-time mind is established (and therefore is an appropriate example) because it is explained in your own scriptures.

(rGyal tshab:) What, are you a follower of the Buddhist system of tenets? (This objection) is unsuitable for proving (the appropriateness of the example), because you assert (a) that it is a Subject unproven by authoritative

cognition and (b) that Buddhist scriptures are an object of refutation (for you).[177]

II''. The unacceptability of proof through reasoning (PV 48b-52, GT 259-61)

(This is divided into:) (A'') Refuting the Reason, (B'') Disposing of objections and (C'') Identifying the special cause indispensible to the result.

A''. Refuting the Reason (PV 48b-50a, GT 259-60)

(Opponent:) An Arahant's death-time mind does not connect with a homogeneous result, because it is separated from breathing, the sense-organs, etc., which are its cause.

(rGyal tshab:) Why don't you express this (Reason) as proof that an ordinary being's death-time mind does not connect (with a homogeneous result)? It follows that it is reasonable to do so, because you want to assert this Reason (in) either this or the previous (syllogism), and the Reason is uncertain (in the) previous (syllogism).[178]

SHOWING THAT IF (THE LATTER)[179] IS ASSERTED, (THE REASON) IS UNPROVEN:

If the eye and other sense-organs are the special indispensible causes of mind, they cannot be either the material cause or the principal condition. (That they are) the

former will be refuted below. If (as you say) they are the principal condition, it follows that mind is not generated from a principal condition that is the body together with the sense-organs, because if such were the case, (the body) would clearly grasp a form just as an eye-cognition grasps a form.[180]

It also necessarily is not the case that (mind) is ascertained to be generated from a principal condition that is the collection of sense-organs, because the sense-organs have differing abilities, which are the principal conditions for generating cognitions of their respective objects. The word "also" means that (a further) Reason (must be applied) to the foregoing thesis, viz., "because it would follow that if even one sense-organ were not present, (mind) could not be generated."[181]

Since mind clearly grasps all six (types of) objects, if it is generated by (just) one sense-organ, the other sense-organs are pointless.

Mind also cannot be generated with a dead body as its principal condition, because the material cause (of mind), mind, does not exist in that.

B''. Disposing of objections

(PV 50b, GT 260)

(*Opponent*:) Well, then, what about the co-existence (of mind and the sense-organs)?[182]

(rGyal tshab:) It is suitable that the resultant organs and mind of a single collection co-exist, because they are generated from a single cause, previous karma. For example, the five senses also co-exist without being (related) as basis and based, as do form and taste.[183]

(Opponent:) Because the mind is also sometimes affected by poison, etc., body is its principal condition.

(rGyal tshab:) The mind is not (affected) through the body as a principal condition, because it is (affected) merely through having made those objects (poison, etc.) its intentional objects.[184]

C''. Identifying the special cause indispensible to the result (PV 51-52, GT 260-61)

(Opponent:) What is a special indispensible cause?

(rGyal tshab:) Lamp-light has the lamp as its special indispensible cause, because the light is directly assisted merely by the replacement of some previous lamp(-moment). This follows, because (light) always succeeds its direct material cause, the lamp.[185]

Therefore, the reason the sūtra says, "When x exists, y arises," (using) the seventh, locative case, and "Because of the generation of x, y is generated," (using) the fifth, ablative case, is because it is explained (thus) so that we may know, "The special indispensible cause is like x."[186]

Therefore, when there exists an attached mind, there

necessarily definitely will arise a subsequent homogeneous (result); if one proves that this applies to the death-time mind of an ordinary being, one has definitely proved a future life, and one cannot by any possible inference entertain the objection that the existence of a future life is not definitely proved.[187]

It is easy (to see) that the body sometimes assists the mindstream. It does not follow, merely from that, that by virtue of the absence of body mind will be absent, because (one entity) cannot have as its special indispensible cause (an entity) substantially different from it. For example, fire, etc., assist the clay pot (when it is being made).[188]

ii'. An extensive explanation (PV 53-121, GT 261-88)

(This is divided into:) (X') Refuting (the idea) that body is the special basis[189] of mind and (Y') Disposing of (the attempt to) damage our refutation.

X'. Refuting (the idea) that body is the special basis of mind (PV 53-115, GT 261-85)

(This is divided into:) (p') Refutation through an analysis of the way in which body acts as the basis of mind and (q') Refutation through an analysis of the essential aspect of body that acts as the basis (of mind).

p'. Refutation through an analysis of the way in which body acts as the basis of mind (PV 53-85, GT 261-70)

(This is divided into:) (I'') Refuting (the idea) that it acts as the material cause and (II'') Refuting (the idea) that it is the special cooperative condition.[190]

I''. Refuting (the idea) that it acts as the material cause (PV 53-74, GT 261-7)

(This is divided into:) (A'') Refutation through an analysis of their (alleged) successive (existence) and (B'') Refutation through an analysis of their (alleged) simultaneous (existence).

A''. Refutation through an analysis of their (alleged) successive (existence) (PV 53-64, GT 261-5)

(This is divided into:) (1'') Setting forth the consequences, (2'') Refuting the reply to that and (3'') Explaining the definition of material cause.

1''. Setting forth the consequences (PV 53a, GT 261)

(By your view,) it does not follow that in a dead body mind is absent, because the body, the material cause (of mind), remains complete.

2''. Refuting the reply to that (PV 53b-61, GT 261-2)

(This is divided into:) (a'') Refuting the reply that the appropriate conditions are not complete and (b'') Refuting the reply that there is destruction by a contradictory condition.

a''. Refuting the reply that the appropriate conditions are not complete (PV 53b-55, GT 262-3)

(Opponent:) Although body, the material cause of mind, exists (in the case of a dead body), since such conditions as breath are absent, it is not the case that (the appropriate conditions) are not absent (from the dead body), just as (the appropriate conditions are absent) in a fainting spell.[191]

(rGyal tshab:) It follows that the breathing that arises from mind is not the special principal condition of mind, because breath exists by virtue of the existence of mind, and because its strength and weakness is under the power of (mind's) efforts at movement. This follows, because a person's exhalations and inhalations arise preceded by (mental) exertion, and it cannot be accepted that they arise from any cause without (such mental exertion).[192]

(Opponent:) It follows that during deep sleep there is no breathing, because there is no mental effort.

(rGyal tshab:) There is not even the slightest fault (in our position). Although there *is* breathing during deep sleep, it necessarily is projected by what is known as previous mental karma.[193] (It is accepted that) if there is smoke, it necessarily is preceded by fuel; but why should it follow that at the time when smoke exists fuel must necessarily exist there?[194]

If you claim that the increase and decrease of mind is obtained through the increase and decrease of breath because (breaths) are the special principal condition of (mind), then it follows equally (from your assertion) that breath is not absent from a dead body, because the material cause (of breath), the body, remains complete.[195] Therefore, the consequence remains that, since the (appropriate) conditions are present, mind is not absent (from a dead body).

(Opponent:) Well, then, it follows that according to your position, too, mind is not absent from a dead body, because of the existence of (mind's) material cause, the mind.

(rGyal tshab:) It does not follow that it follows equally that if mind is the cause of mind then (mind) is not absent from a dead body, because it is asserted that other karmas projecting the coexistence of body and mind are the cause of the coexistence of the two.[196]

b''. Refuting the reply that there is destruction by a contradictory condition (PV 56-61, GT 263-4)

(This is divided into:) (i'') Setting forth the consequences and (ii'') Refuting the reply to that.

i''. Setting forth the consequences (PV 56, GT 263)

(Opponent:) You cannot apply those consequences, (for) just as fire cannot ignite a stick-pile charmed by a mantra, so, since there are (diseased) humors of wind, bile (and phlegm),[197] a dead body, which is incompatible with the persistence of mind, has no cause of mind (in it); you also accept that a result (cannot) be generated when it is destroyed by a contradictory condition.[198]

(rGyal tshab:) It follows that a dead body will be revived, because its material cause, the body, remains, and the contradictory conditions, the humors, are altogether equally non-existent. Alternatively, one can add as a Reason to the prior consequence, "because the (diseased) humors degenerate (in a dead body)."[199]

ii''. Refuting the reply to that (PV 57-61, GT 263-4)

(Opponent:) Just as the absence of fire does not imply the absence of the transformation of fire (ash) that is ge-

nerated by it, so the absence of the cause transformed by sickness, the humors that are the contradictory conditions, does not (imply the) absence of the great transformation of sickness, death.[200]

(rGyal tshab:) It follows that it is not unsuitable that the transformation of sickness (death) be absent, because there is a point to applying cures to sickness. It follows that the transformation of wood (ash) wrought by fire and the transformation of sickness (death) are not equivalent examples, because when, as (in the example of the transformation) of wood wrought by fire, it is reasonable (to assert) that some transforming agents generate irreversible transformations, then it is impossible to reverse even a small transformation; and because when, as (in the example of the transformation) of gold (wrought) by fire, it is reasonable (to assert) that some (transforming agents generate) a reversible (transformation), then it is reasonable (to assert) that even a great transformation is reversible.

If wood is an equivalent example, then it is impossible that the slightest transformation wrought by a disease be reversible. It follows that the first transformation, even if small, cannot be reversed, because if wood has even just been blackened it cannot turn back into wood. It is reasonable (to assert) that a reversible transformation,

even if great, can be reversed, because solid gold, even if it has been liquefied, can be turned back into a solid.[201]

(Opponent:) Well, then, it follows that the great transformation of sickness (death) necessarily is reversible, because (even) a small transformation is reversible. If you assert that, it contradicts the explanation (to the effect) that there are incurable sicknesses.[202]

(rGyal tshab:) A sickness said not curable in the slightest is not explained to be thus by reason of its incurability, but because the medicinal preparations and doctor are difficult to acquire, or because it is explained to be thus by force of the (karmic) exhaustion of the life-span of the sick person.[203]

If the cause of death is only sickness of the humors of wind, bile (or phlegm), without (having as a cause) the non-presence of such appropriate conditions (for cure), then it follows that there is no incurable sickness, because if the appropriate conditions (for cure) are present without other contradictory conditions, then the sickness definitely can be cured.[204] It follows that it is unacceptable that a body killed by poison not be revived, because the material cause, the body, remains, and the contradictory conditions for (the occurrence of) death, poison, etc., can be removed by mantras, etc.; or because the cause of the transformation of sickness (death) can also

be extracted by cutting the poisoned wound of a person who has been bitten by a poisonous snake.[205]

3''. Explaining the definition of material cause (PV 62-4, GT 264-5)

(This is divided into:) (a'') The definition of material cause and (b'') (Showing that) body is not (the material cause) of mind.

a''. The definition of material cause (PV 62, GT 264)

A lamp is the material cause of lamp-light, because without an essential transformation of (the lamp) there cannot be an essential transformation of the material result, the lamp-light, (and because the lamp) directly establishes an uncommon imprint of just its essence upon the light. For example, without a transformation of the mud-clay, there cannot be a transformation of a pot, etc.[206]

b''. (Showing that) body is not (the material cause) of mind (PV 63-4, GT 264-5)

It follows that body and mind are not (related as) material cause and material result, because a change in a cow does not follow accordingly from a change in (something that is) not a cow.[207] This (Reason) pervades, because without a transformation of some causal entity it is unreasonable to classify (something) as the material cause

of the transformation of some resultant entity, as (something that is) not a cow (cannot be the material cause of) a cow.[208]

(Opponent:) Well, then, it is contradictory that (body and mind) subsist in the same collection.

(rGyal tshab:) It is suitable that body and mind be co-existent results, because each of those two is generated with the material cause of the other as its cooperative condition, as in the case of fire and molten copper.[209]

B''. Refutation through an analysis of their (alleged) simultaneous (existence) (PV 65-74, GT 265-7)

(This is divided into:) (1'') Refuting (the idea) that (body) is the simultaneous basis (of mind), (2'') Refuting other syllogisms through that and (3'') Summary.

1''. Refuting (the idea) that (body) is the simultaneous basis (of mind) (PV 65-70, GT 265-6)

(This is divided into:) (a'') Setting forth the consequences, (b'') Refuting the reply to that and (c'') Disposing (of the objection that our position) contradicts perception.

a''. Setting forth the consequences (PV 65a, GT 265)

Mind does not have body as its simultaneous basis, because whether a substance is existent or non-existent, there is no point in its having a simultaneous basis that is substantially different (from it).[210]

b''. Refuting the reply to that (PV 65b-68a, GT 265-6)

(Opponent:) That is not so; the meaning of "basis" is the cause of the abiding of an already existent mind.

(rGyal tshab:) An already existent (mind) does not have body as the basis of its abiding, because the abider is generated from itself, in its own nature from its own cause, without another (cause).[211]

(Opponent:) The Reason is unproven; (the abider) is substantially different (from the abiding).[212]

(rGyal tshab:) How, then, could body act in any way (to effect) the abiding of the entity (mind)? It follows that it cannot be accepted that it could act, because body is (posited as) the cause of an abiding that is objectively separate from it.[213] It will follow that (mind) is indestructible, because it already exists, and abides in a second moment.[214]

(Opponent:) Since we assert that (mind) is destroyed by a destructive cause, it is not permanent.

(rGyal tshab:) It follows that it is unacceptable that an already existent and abiding (mind) be destroyed by a destructive cause acting later, because when we analyze whether the destructive cause of (mind) is substantially identical to or different from (mind), the flaw is the same as in the previous consequence.[215] What, it follows, can a cause of abiding do? It is pointless, because if (mind) does not meet a destructive cause, it is already existent and abiding; if its does meet (a destructive cause), a cause of abiding cannot make it abide.[216]

(Opponent:) If there is no cause of abiding, then before meeting its destructive cause (mind) already will have been destroyed; since the cause of abiding makes (mind) abide until it meets its destructive caue, there is no flaw (in our position).[217]

(rGyal tshab:) It follows that no damage is done to (our asserttion of) the natural destructibility of entities, because it is possible that they already be destroyed without meeting a destructive cause. If that is asserted, then what, it follows, can a cause of abiding do? It cannot make an already existent (mind) abide, because of that assertion.[218]

c''. Disposing (of the objection that our position) contradicts perception (PV 68b-70, GT 266)

(Opponent:) Just as it is proven by perception that land is the support[219] for the abiding of already existent water, so also is body (the support) of mind.

(rGyal tshab:) It follows that already existent water is not made to abide by a vessel, because this assertion possesses equally the faults cited in the previous case.[220]

(Opponent:) Well, then, why is it common worldly opinion that (a vessel) is the support (of water)?

(rGyal tshab:) (A water-vessel) is the support of the water inside it, because at each moment it is the cause of the subsequent continuation of the naturally destructible water-entity inside it, in the same place as the previous (water-)entity. If it is not thus assistant, it follows that it is not reasonable (to assert) that there exists a support that is objectively separate (from what is supported).[221]

Although it is acceptable that an impermant (entity) have a support, it is unacceptable that a permanent entity have one. (A water-vessel) is the support of the water, etc., inside it, because it blocks it from spilling down. What, it follows, is the purpose in Quality, Universal or Action[222] having an objectively separate support? There is

no purpose, because they never proceed from previous to subsequent moments.[223]

2''. Refuting other syllogisms through that (PV 71, GT 266-7)

This reasoning, which refutes the existence of a basis for the abiding of an already existent entity,[224] is also able to clear away (the idea) that there is Inherence (connecting) Substance and Quality, and that Substance is the cause of the (co-)Inherence of Qualities, because it has been shown that something that already exists does not have a basis of its abiding.[225] It follows that it is unacceptable to say that if there is no cause of Inherence, then there cannot be Inherence, because even without Particulars, Universals do abide.[226]

Alternatively, one can apply the previous Reason to the statement, "The Particulars are not the basis of the abiding of an already existent Universal."[227] This also clears away (the idea) that there is a cause of Inherence (connecting) body and mind, (for) one can apply to that (idea) the Reason set forth in relation to Substance and Quality.[228]

3''. Summary (PV 72-4, GT 267)

WHEN WE ANALYZE A DESTRUCTIVE CAUSE THAT ARISES LATER, IT

IS UNACCEPTABLE THAT THERE BE A CAUSE OF ABIDING OF AN ALREADY EXISTENT (ENTITY):

What, it follows, can an (already existent) entity's cause of abiding do? It has no purpose, because its purpose is as a separate cause destroying the entity, but (the entity) has not been generated as essentially destructible. Since (an entity) is destroyed by its own nature, without some other cause, it follows that a cause of abiding is not able to make an already existent (entity) abide.[229]

IF THERE EXISTS A SUPPORT FOR THE ABIDING OF AN ALREADY EXISTENT (ENTITY), IT FOLLOWS THAT THERE IS NO DESTRUCTION:

It follows that no entity could be destroyed at any time, because all generated (entities) ultimately would possess a support that is a permanent entity, such as a self, etc. It follows that this (Reason) pervades, because all (entities) that have as their support a permanent entity necessarily abide without being destroyed.[230]

WHEN WE ANALYZE (HOW AN ENTITY EXISTS) IN ITS OWN NATURE, (WE SEE THAT) IT IS UNACCEPTABLE (THAT THERE EXIST A BASIS OF ABIDING):

If an entity has a nature such that it is itself naturally destructible, then it follows that no other (cause of) its abiding is able to make an already existent (entity) abide, because if that were not so, it would follow that no other (cause of) abiding would be necessary.[231]

II''. Refuting (the idea) that (body) acts as the special cooperative condition (of mind) (PV 75-85, GT 267-70)

(This is divided into:) (A'') The actual refutation, (B'') Refuting (the idea) that body and mind are substantially identical and (C'') Identifying the cause of saṃsāra.

A''. The actual refutation (PV 75-80, GT 268-9)

(This is divided into:) (1'') Refuting (the idea) that body is the principal condition of wisdom, etc., and (2'') Refuting (the idea) that it is the principal condition of attachment, etc.

1''. Refuting (the idea) that body is the principal condition of wisdom, etc. (PV 75-6, GT 268)

SETTING FORTH THE REASON:

Wisdom, benevolence, etc., do not have body as their special basis, because their increase and decrease takes place through specific previously-developed mental complexes, without following the increase and decrease of the body('s health).[232]

This (Reason) pervades, because this Reason (demonstrates) that (wisdom, etc.) do not exist dependent on the

body, as lamp-light, etc. (depend on) their material causes. Because we see that there is a change in wisdom when the body is strengthened through elixirs, etc., it is the case that wisdom, etc., change a little when the body changes, but it does not follow that the body is their special basis, because the body assists wisdom through directly assisting (in the production of) the body-cognition, but it does not (directly) assist (in the production of) mind.[233]

2''. Refuting (the idea) that it is the principal condition of attachment, etc. (PV 77-80, GT 268-9)

(This is divided into:) (a'') (Proof that) attachment, etc., are not directly generated from body, together with an example and (b'') Summary.

a''. (Proof that) attachment, etc., are not directly generated from body, together with an example (PV 77-79, GT 268-9)

(Opponent:) Attachment, etc., follow on the increase and decrease of body (strength, because) we see that attachment increases in a strong body and anger in a weak body.

(rGyal tshab:) The attachment (and anger) that increase through the strength or weakness of the body--(which occur) at some time when (the mind) is separate from

the wisdom that cognizes (reality)--do not have body as their direct principal condition, because they are directly generated from feelings of pleasure and pain. Also, these feelings of pleasure and pain do not have body as their principal condition, because they are generated from proximity to an internal tangible object that is a balance or imbalance of the elements.[234]

In this way, it is also explained how memory-loss, etc., arise from typhoid fever, etc., because they are just changed by a sense-cognition that is generated by an alteration in an internal tangible object. For example, the mental confusion arising in a timid person when he hears the words, "a tiger is coming!" or sees the blood of (a person) who has been killed, is not based directly on the body, because it is merely intensified by internal feelings.[235]

b''. Summary (PV 80, GT 269)

Mind is based on previous mind, because if that is not its material cause, then it will not arise. It is not based on the body as its material cause, because it definitely succeeds on some previous mental complex that has been developed.[236]

B''. Refuting (the idea) that body and-mind are substantially identical (PV 81, GT 269)

(Opponent:) Because we see that the child's body succeeds the parents' bodies, so (we say that the child's body) is generated from (the parents'); and mind also (is generated from body) because it is not different (from it). When you prove that (mind) follows previous mental complexes, you do not prove that it is not based on body.[237]

(rGyal tshab:) It follows that the complexes of listening, reflection, creativity, etc.--which are developed based on previous minds of their own type--will, when mind is examined, appear just as clearly in the body as they are clearly manifest (to the mind), because they are mental qualities, definitely suitable to be classified as mind, and body and mind are not substantially different.[238]

C''. Identifying the cause of saṃsāra (PV 82-5, GT 269-70)

(This is divided into:) (1'') Identifying the cause of taking birth in a womb and (2'') Disposing of objections to that.

1''. Identifying the cause of taking birth in a womb (verses 82-3, GT 269-70)

An ordinary being, by craving that desires to obtain happiness and avoid suffering, takes (birth in) lower a-

bodes, such as the womb, etc., because he takes those (births) because of attachment to self, independently, without being led by other sentient beings, such as God, etc.[239]

(Opponent:) (If rebirth occurs) because of a desire to attain happiness, it is unacceptable that one willingly take (birth in) a suffering abode.

(rGyal tshab:) It follows that there is no contradiction (in our position), because the distorted cognition that grasps suffering as happiness is the cause of a person's being completely bound, and the craving that desires to attain happiness is the cause of birth in saṃsāra. This follows, because an Arahant, who does not distortedly crave anything, by virtue of having utterly abandoned (that craving), does not take birth in saṃsāra.[240]

2''. Disposing of objections to that (PV 84-5, GT 270)

(Opponent:) There is no going to or coming from other lives, because we do not see them.

(rGyal tshab:) It follows that the fact that the Lokāyatas do not see (other lives) does not prove that they are non-existent, because the Lokāyatas have unclear sense-organs. For example, an unclear eye, even where there still exists a little smoke, will not see it.

(Opponent:) But (the smoke), even if it is not seen by

the eyes, can touch the body; since (other lives) are not intentional objects (of any sense-cognition), they are non-existent.

(*rGyal tshab*:) An embodied being in the intermediate state, etc., is an embodied being, but is intangible, because he has a body that is subtle and passes through (solid objects) without resistance. For example, water enters fresh clay and mercury (enters) gold without resistance. Therefore, it follows that it is not the case that (other lives) are non-existent just because the Lokāyatas do not see them, because even if they do exist, it is impossible that the Lokāyatas see them.[241]

q'. *Refutation through an analysis of the essential aspect of body that is the basis of (mind)* (PV 86-115, GT 270-82)

(This is divided into:) (I'') Refuting (the idea) that there is a partless gross body that is the special basis of mind and (II'') Refuting (the idea) that subtle atoms are that (special basis).

I''. *Refuting (the idea) that there is a partless gross body that is the special basis of mind* (PV 86-104, GT 270-79)

(This is divided into:) (A'') Refuting (the idea) that there is a partless whole and (B'') Disposing of (objec-

tions alleged to) damage that refutation.

A''. Refuting (the idea) that there is a partless whole (PV 86-88a, GT 271-2)

(This is divided into:) (1'') Proving the Reason and (2'') Setting it forth.

1''. Proving the Reason (PV 86-87, GT 271)

IT IS CONTRADICTORY ON THE BASIS OF ACTION:

If the hand of a person's body, to which the whole is proven to be connected, moves, it follows that the whole body moves, because those two (hand and body) are a partless One. It follows that this Reason (pervades), because it is unsuitable that a partless One be an appropriate basis for the contradictory actions of movement and non-movement. If the Reason is unproven, then it follows that (the body) is proven to have different parts, because it combines the contradictory (actions) of movement and non-movement.[243]

IT IS CONTRADICTORY ON THE BASIS OF SEEING:

If just a person's face is covered by cloth, it follows that the whole body will appear to be covered by cloth, because (the body) is one whole, without two parts.[244]

(Opponent:) The word "or" (in the root-verse refers)

to covering a part with a cloth, but since the whole is not covered, it cannot have two parts, covered and uncovered.[246]

(rGyal tshab:) Well, then, it follows that at that time the whole face will be seen as uncovered, because it is suitable that it be seen as uncovered.[246]

IT IS CONTRADICTORY ON THE BASIS OF QUALITIES:

If just the face is painted blue, it follows that the entire body will appear to be painted, because (the body) is one whole, without two parts.[247]

(Opponent:) The word "or" (in the root-verse means) that the part is painted, but the whole is not.[248]

(rGyal tshab:) Well, then, it follows that we simultaneously cognize two faces, one that has been painted blue and one that has not been painted, because when we see by perception the face painted blue it is also suitable that we see as unpainted the whole face, which is the basis of the connection (of the parts).[249]

2''. Setting it forth (PV 88a, GT 271-2)

A person's body-collection does not exist as a gross, partless One, because (the body) combines many contradictory qualities, such as movement and non-movement, etc.

If, as the Vaiśeṣikas (assert), there exists a gross external object having parts, then when one investigates

the division of parts, (one sees) that (the gross external object) is nothing more than a mere collection of subtle atoms. If that is the case, then since it is impossible that (the atoms) be a resistant, tangible entity, it is accepted that any partless whole must be objectively separate from its parts.[250]

Some (Buddhists) assert that if there is a gross object, it necessarily does not exist substantially, or assert that a collection and the collection's (parts) are substantially different. (These assertions) only (reflect) the distorted understanding that misconstrues how a collection is formed.[251]

This whole is a fundamental assertion of the Vaiśeṣikas, but when the Lokāyatas assert that body is the special basis of mind, they are partly refuted by an analysis of the essential (aspect of) body that acts as a basis, (so) the Lokāyatas are the opponents in this verse.[252]

B''. Disposing of (objections alleged to) damage that refutation (PV 88b-104, GT 272-9)

(This is divided into:) (1'') Disposing of the (alleged) consequence that an external object cannot be cognized by a sense-cognition, (2'') Refuting other syllogisms through that and (3'') Refuting (the existence of) a whole and, in paricular, the Qualities based upon it.

1''. Disposing of the (alleged) consequence that an external object cannot be cognized by a sense-cognition (PV 88b-89a, GT 272-3)

(Opponent:) If a gross external object is not substantially different from its atoms, then it is nothing more than just an occasion of many atoms. If that is the case, then it follows that just as the previous, separate atoms are not (visible), (so) a subsequent external object (composed of those atoms) cannot be cognized by a sense-cognition, because (a) the previous, separate atoms are not (visible) and (b) the atoms are extremely subtle.[253]

(rGyal tshab:) (a) is unproven. It is unproven that the form that acts as the objective condition of a sense-cognition does not change from when it is not acting as the objective condition, because it is necessary that the forms that become the objects of sense-cognition become (visible) after a previous moment.[254]

(b) is unproven. It follows that a pot is not its atoms, because it is an object that can draw certain knowledge independently, by authoritative sense-perception.[255]

Ācārya Devendrabuddhi says in his commentary on this that "At that time those atoms are not the designated object." The explanation of this is that (the atoms) are not objects that are cognized and designated by an independent sense-cognition, because a sense-cognition designates

roughly, saying "this is form," etc.[256]

According to those who assert that if there exists a gross object it does not exist substantially, this verse shows that it is impossible that atoms be seen by sense-cognition. This statement is very unreasonable, because it follows then that blue is atoms, because an external object (need) not be gross. If the Reason is unproven, then the previous (assertion) is contradicted. If it is asserted, then it it follows that blue is not atoms, because it is seen by a sense-cognition. You must, then, accept that eye-cognition does not see blue.[257] If there is an object of a sense-perception, it follows that it is contradictory that it be an (efficient) entity, because it is impossible that its atoms be an object, and if it is a gross object, it is contradictory that it be an (efficient) entity.[258]

Alternatively, (if) the phrase "if they are many" is set forth as the objection, (then) the phrase "as before" is made the answer. If this body is many atoms, since it is impossible that it be gross, it follows (by the Vaiśeṣika view) that when there exist separate atoms (before, then subsequently) sense-cognition will cognize atoms individually.[259]

You may think that if it is impossible that there be a partless whole, then since (an object) is nothing more than its atoms, it follows that the atoms are cognized individu-

ally. We say that because of the above refutation of a partless whole, it follows that (according to _you_) one does cognize thus.[260]

2''. Refuting other syllogisms through that (PV 89b, GT 273-4)

This proof of (the aggregate visibility of) atoms--aince a partless gross object is impossible--also clears away the idea that external objects are unable to cover (each other), etc., because although there are no (partless gross objects), there are collections of atoms, and it is shown that they act (in such a way as to cover each other.[261]

3''. Refuting (the existence of) a whole and, in particular, of the Qualities based upon it (PV 90-104, GT 274-9)

(This is divided into:) (a'') Extreme consequences if it is necessary that there be an objectively separate whole for there to be seeing by sense-cognition and (b'') Refuting (the existence of) an objectively separate Number that is based on that.

a''. Extreme consequences if it is necessary that there be an objectively separate whole for there to be seeing by sense-cognition (PV 90-92, GT 274-5)

How, it follows, could mercury appear to sense-cognition mixed with gold or a stone (appear) painted? It is unacceptable that they could, because they are objectively separate wholes, and because they are collections of inharmonious types of atoms.[262]

Based on this, it is unreasonable to assert that, when iron is molten red, the fire and the iron are substantially different, because it is proven in the Pramāṇviniścaya that those two are substantially identical, and Dharmottara extensively explains in his commentary (on the Pramāṇaviniścaya) that the case of (the painted stone and mercury-gold) and that of (molten iron) are quite dissimilar.[263]

How, it also follows, could the meeting of the three conditions, organ (object, and cognition) generate even the common result, the cognition of form? It is unacceptable that it could, because they are unable individually to (generate it) when they have not met, and even when they do meet, there is no objectively separate whole.[264]

(Opponent:) Sense-cognition is generated from the Conjunction among the three conditions when they meet.[265]

(rGyal tshab:) It follows that it also is unacceptable

that the three conditions generate the Conjunction, because although you assert here the generation of the Conjunction, the consequences are the same whether (the three conditions) meet or do not meet.[266]

(Opponent:) In the case of the mixture of gold and mercury, although there is no whole, the Conjunction appears to sense-cognition when inharmonious types of atoms meet.

(rGyal tshab:) It follows that it is impossible that sense-cognition directly cognize any meeting of what is based on atoms, because it does not see the atoms that are the basis. This well refutes those who say that sense-cognition does not see atoms (but) sees collections of atoms.[267]

It follows that it is contradictory that drinks made of various inharmonious types of substances possess such qualities as sweet taste and good color, because there is no objectively separate whole that is the basis of their possessing (such qualities).[268]

(Opponent:) Even if there is no objectively separate whole, we assert that it is from imputation on the taste and color parts that we designate that it is a sweet-tasting drink, etc.

(rGyal tshab:) It follows that when the individual tastes and colors are not mixed into the drink, they will

be generated as different mental appearances, but it is impossible that there be generated a cognition of taste and color arising from their (mixture), because the imputation (that the taste or form) is sweet-tasting, etc., is merely (made) when the taste and color parts are not mixed into the whole.[269]

Alternatively, it follows that it is unacceptable that in a drink made of various substances one experience another taste different from the mentally experienced taste of particular drinks (that comprise the mixture), such as milk, etc., because one merely imputes that a part's taste is "sweet-tasting," not that the whole's taste is.[270]

How, it follows, can one say that a properly arranged garland of a hundred flowers is a "long garland"? It is unacceptable that one can, because there is no objectively separate whole; and even if there is (alleged to be) Conjunction, a second Quality cannot be based on a Quality.[271]

b''. Refuting (the existence of) a substantially different Number based on that (PV 93-104, GT 275-9)

(This is divided into:) (i'') Setting forth the Reason and (ii'') Disposing of (objections alleged to) damage that.

<u>i''. Setting forth the Reason</u> (PV 93, GT 275)

There are no essences of the Number, Conjunction, Action, etc., of the pot that exist as substantially different from the pot that possesses number, etc., and (from) the words expressing the pot, because if such (entities) existed, they should appear to an unmistaken mind, but they do not appear to an unmistaken mind.[272]

<u>ii''. Disposing of (objections alleged to) damage that</u> (PV 94-104, GT 275-9)

(This is divided into:) (X'') Refuting (the idea) that since we apply different words there exist substantially different objects and (Y'') Disposing of (the idea that) if that is unproven, it follows that (applying) different words is pointless.

<u>X''. Refuting (the idea) that since we apply different words there exist substantially different objects</u> (PV 94-96, GT 276)

(<u>Opponent</u>:) There exist Number, etc., that are objectively separate from the pot, because we see that there are words for "one pot," "two pots," etc.

(<u>rGyal tshab</u>:) Merely because we see that there are different words and cognitions, it does not follow that there exist substantially different objects, because al-

though there is no "one" of the pot that is objectively separate from the pot, there is a subject that is imputed by a conceptual cognition that follows on clearing away (the idea) of any other entity that is a non-one pot.[273]

For example, although there is no second Quality that is based on the Quality blue, etc., we see that we say "one blue thing"; or, although there is no separate Quality to a pot that has been destroyed or not yet generated, we see that there are such designations (for those pots) as "one," "two," etc.[274]

(Opponent:) In applying the designation of number to past and future (objects), we assert that one (applies) an imputed name.[275]

(rGyal tshab:) Then why not assert that (an imputed name) designates all entities? It follows that it is reasonable to so assert, because when there is no special Quality that is objectively separate, the term "number," etc., as applied to past and future (objects) is asserted to be an imputed name, and that number, etc., which are not objectively separate, should apply equally to all entities.[276]

(Opponent:) One does not apply an imputed name to all entities, because then it follows that it is impossible that there be an objective name. Thus, when one speaks principally of the existence of a particular substantially

different Quality, that is an objective name; the name applied to what is not that is an imputed name.

(rGyal tshab:) It follows that it is not acceptable for any reason to say that an objective name is the name applied to a particular substantially different Quality and that an imputed name is applied to what is not that, because this is merely imputed without reason by the Vaiśeṣikas.[277]

Y''. Disposing of (the idea that) if that is unproven it follows that (applying) different words is pointless (PV 97-104, GT 276-9)

(This is divided into:) (p'') Disposing of the consequence that (applying) different words is pointless and (q'') Disposing of the consequence that it is unacceptable that there be a sixth (genitive) case.

p''. Disposing of the consequence that (applying) different words is pointless (PV 97-98, GT 277)

(Opponent:) When there is no substantially different object that is to be expressed, applying different words is pointless, because even if they are applied, they will merely be redundant.[278]

(rGyal tshab:) If there are different words for topics that are not objectively separate, then it follows that

they necessarily are not redundant, because there is no reason for(positing) a Number that is objectively separate from a white object, for there are number-words expressing one white object, two white objects, etc., and the words for the white object that possesses number are not redundant.[279]

(Opponent:) A white object possesses an objectively separate "one"-ness.

(rGyal tshab:) It follows that there is no distinction netween Substance and Qualities, because of the basing of some second substantially separate Quality on a (first) Quality.[280]

Therefore, because we apply different words to different cognitions, it follows that it is not necessarily ascertained that there are different Substances, because even though there does not exist an objectively separate Substance, one does apply different words, merely through a differentiation of opposites. For example, although there is in Action no objectively separate Quality "non-Substance" and in Substance (no objectively separate Quality) "non-Action," there are the phrases "this Substance is not action," and "Action is not Substance."[281]

q''. Disposing of the consequence that it is unacceptable that there be a sixth (genitive) case (PV 99-104, GT 277-9)

(This is divided into:) (I''') Distinguishing between predicate-expressions and subject-(expressions) and (II''') Distinguishing between genus-expressions and collection-expressions.

I'''. Distinguishing between predicate-expressions and subject-(expressions) (PV 99-101, GT 277-8)

(Opponent:) Well, then, it is unacceptable (to use) the expression "the number of the pot," because there is no number that is objectively separate from (the pot).[282]

(rGyal tshab:) (The reply is as follows:)

THE PURPOSE OF APPLYING THE SIXTH (GENITIVE) CASE:

The word "entity" (in the root-verse), which means the predicate, and makes it seems as if number, etc., are (substantially) different from the pot that possesses them, has a purpose, because it is applied in order to demonstrate the distinction between the number of the pot and the other particular predicates of the pot.[283]

SHOWING THAT PREDICATE-EXPRESSIONS EXCLUDE OTHER (POSSIBLE) PARTICULAR (PREDICATES):

The expression "the conjunction of fingers" has the purpose of expressing it as if the fingers were a (substan-

tially) different quality than "the conjunction of fingers," because when someone desires to know just the row of fingers, (the words "the conjunction of fingers") express just that in order that he may know it, without projecting as a mental object any other opposed (predicate).[284]

SHOWING THAT BY EXPRESSING THE SUBJECT ONE DOES NOT EXCLUDE OTHER PARTICULAR (PREDICATES):

The expression "the fingers are conjoined" is known to express the subject, because although from among the many particular predicates of "fingers" it expresses the single meaning of a row (of fingers), it is an expression that (can) project as mental objects all other particular predicates of fingers, and does not exclude them.[285]

Therefore, although there are no objectively separate particular predicates, there is a purpose in employing different expressions for one object, because one does so in order to (generate cognition) through excluding or not excluding other particular (predicates) of a single object.[286]

<u>II'''. Distinguishing genus-expressions and collection-expressions</u> (PV 102-104, GT 278-9)

(<u>Opponent</u>:) If there merely exist parts, without there being an objectively separate whole, then one merely can

use the expressions "the pot is formed" and "the form of form," etc., but it will not be suitable to use the expression "the form of the pot."[287]

(rGyal tshab:) The expression "a pot" is not applied to some objectively separate whole, because the expression "a pot" is applied as an objective name to the collection that is cut off from being the non-cause of the water-holding that is the common result of (the conjunction of) the eight atomic substances of the pot.[288] In the expression "the form of the pot," "the pot" and "the form of the pot" have two bases; it is not an expression (meaning) that they (in the words of the root-text) "have one," i.e., that they have the same basis, because the expression "pot" excludes as topics (other) particular (predicates) with the uncommon ability to generate a self-grasping cognition of the form, smell, etc., of the pot.[289]

Therefore, since the expression "a pot," from the point of view of "the form of the pot," etc., expresses a collection, and, from the point of view of "a golden pot," etc., expresses a genus, the former excludes (other particular predicates) as topics, while the latter does not exclude (other particular predicates).[290]

Therefore, one must apply the "four-cornered" (analysis) to collection-expressions and genus-expressions. There is (1) collection without genus, as in the expression "Mt.

Vindhya";[291] (2) genus without collection, as in the expression "form";[292] (3) both collection and genus, as in the expression "a pot";[293] and (4) neither collection nor genus, as in anything not covered by (the above).[294]

Therefore, it does not definitely follow that an objectively separate genus is the topic of a genus-expression and a substantially separate whole (the topic) of a collection-expression, because a genus-expression does not exclude particulars, while a collection-expression does exclude parts--this is the specific (definition) of genus-expressions and collection-expressions.[295]

Although there does not exist any objectively separate whole, such expressions as "the form of the pot" have purpose, because they show that the particular basis is the form of the pot, and the particular predicate is the general collection, pot; and show as the mental object the particular (object) able to generate a self-grasping cognition of the form of the pot.[296]

The position just explained expresses (the idea) that even though there is no objectively separate whole in such expressions as "the smell of sandal," there is nothing contradictory in the expression "the smell of sandal." When (one employs) such an expression, sandal is the particular predicate and its smell is the particular base.[297]

II''. Refuting (the idea) that subtle atoms are that (special basis of mind) (PV 105-115, GT 279-82)

(This is divided into:) (A'') Refuting (the idea) that atoms collectively are necessarily the cause of mind and (B'') Refuting (the idea) that they are able individually (to act as the basis of mind).

A''. Refuting (the idea) that atoms collectively are necessarily the cause of mind (PV 105a, GT 279-80)

Also, if even one subtle part is (missing), it follows that (the collection cannot) generate mind, because it definitely would be necessary that the cause have every single part (present).[298]

B''. Refuting (the idea) that they are able to act individually (as the basis of mind) (PV 105b-115, GT 280-82)

(This is divided into:) (1'') Setting forth the consequences and (2'') Refuting the reply to that.

1''. Setting forth the consequences (PV 105b, GT 280)

It follows that many minds will arise simultaneously in the mindstream of one person, because individual atoms are able independently to generate minds.[299]

2''. Refuting the reply to that (PV 106-115, GT 280-82)

(This is divided into:) (a'') Refuting (the idea) that the breath as condition would not generate many (minds) simultaneously and (b'') Refuting (the idea) that even if (mind) is generated simultaneously from the body at first, later it is only generated individually from its homogeneous causes.

a''. Refuting (the idea) that the breath as condition would not generate many (minds) simultaneously (PV 106-114, GT 280-82)

(This is divided into:) (i'') Refuting (the idea that mind) is generated from a permanent breath, (ii'') Refuting (the idea that mind) is generated from an impermanent breath and (iii'') Refuting (the assertion of) fault in our position.

i''. Refuting (the idea that mind) is generated from a permanent breath (PV 106-08, GT 280-81)

It follows that a breath not having many parts is not ascertained to generate only individual minds, because (a breath) has as many atomic portions as the body.[300]

(Opponent:) (The Reason) is unproven; there *is* a single, permanent breath.

(rGyal tshab:) It follows clearly that there are many simultaneous minds, because their permanent cause is always present.[301]

(Opponent:) (A permanent breath) is the cause of just one mind at a time; it is not the cause of many.

(rGyal tshab:) It follows that the (permanent) breath is not the cause of many minds even successively, because something that cannot (generate) simultaneous (minds) does not change so that it has a dissimilar ability.[302] Even if a permanent breath is possible, it is unacceptable that it be the cause only of individual minds, because (if) a breath is (capable of generating a mind grasping) just one object, then it (can) generate many minds grasping many earlier and later objects.[303]

(Opponent:) One mind can cognize many earlier and later objects, but there are not many minds.

(rGyal tshab:) Well, then, mind cognizes many earlier and later objects either (a) with their aspects, or cognizes them (b) without their aspects. If (a), it is proven that there are many minds. If (b), it follows that mind cognizes many past and future objects simultaneously, because there is nothing contradictory in its cognizing thus. Alternatively, it follows that (mind) also cannot cognize (the aspects) successively, because there is no differentiation by aspects.[304]

ii''. Refuting (the idea that mind) is generated from an impermanent breath (PV 109-113, GT 281-2)

(This is divided into:) (X'') Refuting (the idea) that just individual minds are generated by many successively arising breaths and (Y'') Refuting (the idea) that one mind is generated by many simultaneously arising breaths.

X''. Refuting (the idea) that just individual minds are generated by many successively arising breaths (PV 109-111, GT 281)

(Opponent:) The many moments of breath that arise successively from body when they do not arise from a previous homogeneous cause are known to be the direct causes of individual minds that arise earlier and later; many minds do not arise simultaneously.

(rGyal tshab:) How, it follows, can those breaths arise even in (temporal) succession of earlier and later? It is unacceptable that they can, because they do not have a cause that can generate them in order, because they are generated from a permanent body.[305]

(Opponent:) (The Reason) is unproven; they do arise from previous homogeneous causes.

(rGyal tshab:) It follows that no breath will arise at first immediately after conception in the womb, because at that time the previous homogeneous cause does not exist. If

this is unproven, then (the assertion) that there are no past or future lives is contradicted.[306]

It follows that the breath immediately after conception, although it has a previous homogeneous cause, definitely has many parts, because it pervades many objects in different places. If that is asserted, (it follows that) many minds are generated simultaneously, because their material cause, the permanent body, and their condition, the many breaths, are present with undiminished ability.[307]

Y''. Refuting (the idea) that one mind is generated by many simultaneously arising breaths (PV 112-113, GT 281-2)

(Opponent:) Many breaths are the cause of one mind at one time, but not the cause of many (minds at one time).

(rGyal tshab:) Well, then, it follows that when breath is moving weakly, if even a single strongly moving breath is absent, then mind will not arise, because the collection of all those is necessary as the cause of mind.[308]

(Opponent:) What? (The Reason) is unproven; however strong or weak (breath is), it is the cause of mind.

(rGyal tshab:) It follows that the clarity or non-clarity of mental cognition will be altered by the force of the breath, because however weak or strong the breath is, it is the material cause of mind. (This Reason) pervades, because any result that is not altered through the differ-

ent increases and decreases of some (alleged material cause) is not the direct result of that (alleged material cause).[309]

iii''. Refuting (the assertion of) fault in our position (PV 114, GT 282)

(Opponent:) In your system, you assert that mind is generated from homogeneous causes, so many (minds) will be generated simultaneously.

(rGyal tshab:) One previous mental cognition is the direct cause of just one (homogeneous) result, because it is ascertained to be able to generate just individual homogeneous (results).[310]

This follows, because when mental cognition is strongly attached to some particular objective form, it does not simultaneously grasp the sound (emitted by) some other object. This follows, because at that time the ability of the immediately-preceding (mental) condition that would grasp that (other object) is diminished.[311]

b''. Refuting (the idea) that even if mind is generated simultaneously from the body at first, later it is only generated individually from its homogeneous causes (PV 115, GT 282)

(Opponent:) At first, immediately after conception in the womb, many minds are generated simultaneously from the

body. Later, it is ascertained, minds are generated individually from their own homogeneous causes; many (minds) are not generated simultaneously later.[312]

(rGyal tshab:) It follows that it is unacceptable that the body's ability to generate many minds simultaneously be absent even later--why should it?--because it is something that generates many (minds) simultaneously, and is permanent.[313]

Showing a summary of the foregoing explanations[314] (no PV, GT 282-5)

Mind either (a) does or (b) does not have a cause that generates it. (b) is unacceptable, as shown by such passages from the reverse system of explanation as "because something causeless does not depend on other (factors)";[315] "it does not (arise) accidentally";[316] and "If (attachment) arises without previous (homogeneous causes)."[317]

If (mind) has a cause, it is generated from either (a) a permanent (cause) or (b) an impermanent (cause). (a) is unacceptable. It is unacceptable that it be generated from a pervasive permanent(cause); it should be known implicitly from such passages as "God, etc.,"[318] that it is unacceptable that it be generated from an infinite and eternal (cause). It is unacceptable that it be generated from a non-pervasive permanent cause, as shown by such above passages as "something successive does not (arise) from some-

thing non-successive."[319]

If (mind) is generated from an impermanent cause, then the essence of mind is either (a) permanent or (b) impermanent. (a) is unacceptable, as will be shown extensively below, in the section where a permanent self is refuted.[320]

Since (mind's) essence is impermanent and it is generated from an impermanent cause, body and mind are either (a) substantially identical or (b) (substantially) different. (a) is unacceptable, as shown by such passages as "thus, those qualities will also appear in the body."[321]

If (b) is the case, (mind) must be either (a) generated from insensible matter or (b) generated from mind. If (a) is the case, then, since it is already established that body acts as the cooperative condition of mind, (that body and mind are so related) will not be refuted. If body acts as the special (indispensible) cause, then it acts as either (a) the material cause or (b) the special principal condition. (a) is unacceptable, as shown by the analysis of whether (body and mind) exist successively or simultaneously,[322] and then by such passages as "since the body abides, then mind (will not be absent from a corpse),"[323] and "whether a substance is existent or non-existent (it does not have a substantially different basis)."[324] (b) is unacceptable, as shown by such verses as "(mind) does not (change) with the increase and decrease of the body."[325] Alterna-

tively, this verse can be applied to the refutation of (the idea that body is) the material cause, because the Reason appears commonly in both (assertions).[326] If it refutes (the idea that body is) the principal condition, then it can be applied to the refutation of (the idea that body) is the basis (of mind) in the way that the eye-organ assists in (the generation of) eye-cognition.[327]

Also, the body that acts as the special basis of mind is either (a) possessed of sense-organs or (b) without sense-organs; and either (c) a gross, partless One or (d) many subtle (atoms). (a) and (b) are unacceptable, as shown by such passages as "(body) would grasp (objects) just as mind does."[328] (c) is unacceptable, as shown by such passages as "if the hand, etc., move (then the whole body must)."[329] Many reasons are shown there refuting the existence of a substantially (separate) whole. Ācārya Devendrabuddhi's discussion set forth in this connection is related to the refutation of an objectively separate Universal, which (refutation) is established in the first chapter, where the relation between word and concept is discussed. It is unacceptable (d) that the body of many atoms acts as the special basis of mind, as shown by such passages as "if they all are the cause (then if even one is absent, there will be no result)."[330]

Although the text does not directly and clearly teach

a refutation (based on) investigating whether the body (is generated) from its own bodily (causes) or the parents' bodies, it is implied. Thus, as soon as the parents' bodies exist, the previous life body (of the child) should exist.[331]

If mind is generated from previous homogeneous causes, one must ascertain whether (it is generated from) (a) its own previous mind(stream) or (b) the previous mind of another mindstream, such as the parents'. If (b), then since (the parents') minds act as either the material cause or the special cooperative condition, it follows that if the parents are creative or very learned, the child should also be thus, and that by virtue of the parents' being mentally unclear, the child should also be thus. This is the implicit meaning of such passages as "it follows on some previous mental complex that has been developed."[332] If (a), (mind) is generated from its own previous mind(stream), then our assertion is well proven.

A SUMMARY OF THAT:

The mind immediately after conception is preceded by a previous mind, because it is a mind. For example, it is said that we see that from present attachment anger will arise. The death-time mind of an ordinary being connects with a subsequent mind, because it is an attached mind; the previous example (also applies). Since it is well proven

that those two Reasons are (correct), it is proven that past and future lives exist.[333]

Y'. Disposing of the attempt to damage our refutation (PV 116-120, GT 285-88)

You may say, "If the body ceases, it follows that only mind remains, because body is not the basis of mind."[334] (This is divided into:) (p') Investigating that and giving an answer and (q') Identifying the material cause of a future life's body.

p'. Investigating that and giving an answer (PV 116-117a, GT 285)

A person of the desire realm who will be born in the formless realm immediately after death has a death-time mind that continues without being based on an elemental body, because the death-time mind that is the cause of the mindstream's subsequent continuation does not have the aspect of being a cooperative condition whose purpose is to enable the death-time body to be the cause of a subsequent body.

A person of the desire realm who will be born in the desire realm immediately after death does not have a mind that continues freely, without depending on a body, because his death-time body and mind are mutually assistant and generate the coexistence of the future body and mind.[335]

q'. Identifying the material cause of a future life's body (PV 117b-120, GT 285-8)

(This is divided into:) (I'') Identification, (II'') Disposing of damaging (objections) and (III'') Setting forth the proof.

I''. Identification (verse 117b, GT 285-7)

The final eye and other of the five āyatanas[336] at the time of a person's (death) into a subsequent life are the material cause generating the five āyatanas of the other, subsequent body, because, from between the essential and the particular, it is the uncommon (material) cause that directly applies the essential imprint.[337]

This must now be investigated.[338] When someone has (gone) from the desire realm to the formless realm and then (back) to the desire realm, it cannot be accepted that the death-time mind in the formless realm acts as the direct material cause of the form-possessing sense organs (arising) immediately after his (subsequent) conception (in the desire realm), because we have already refuted (the idea) that matter and mind are mutual material causes. It cannot be accepted that form acts (as the material cause of the subsequent desire-realm organs), because a formless-realm being is involved.[339]

(Opponent:) Well, then, the form-possessing sense-or-

gans at the (original) death-time in the desire-realm are the direct material cause.

(rGyal tshab:) Well, then, it follows that it is unacceptable that that person be born in the formless realm immediately after death, because his form-possessing organs at death-time are the direct material cause of subsequent desire-realm form-possessing sense-organs. If that is accepted, it follows that one takes birth in the desire realm and the formless realm simultaneously.[340]

(Opponent:) There is no flaw (in our position). If the direct cooperative condition of the direct material cause (of the subsequent desire-realm organs) were present, the final form-possessing sense-organs of the previous (desire-realm life would act) thus, but since the direct cooperative condition, the death-time mind in the formless realm, is not (present) at the previous (desire-realm death-time), they do not act thus.[341]

(rGyal tshab:) Well, then, the final form-possessing sense-organs of the previous desire-realm life remain until the generation of the death-time mind in the formless realm, and collect at the same time as that (mind) is generated. They either (a) directly generate the first-moment form-possessing sense-organs of the subsequent desire-realm life or (b) stop before the final mind of the formless-realm birth. If (a), then they are a permanent cause. If

(b), then it follows that the first-moment form-possessing sense-organs of the subsequent desire-realm life do not have the final form-possessing sense-organs of the previous desire-realm life as their direct material cause, because at the time of the generation of the direct cooperative condition that is (ready to generate the subsequent) life, (the final sense-organs of the previous desire-realm life) have (already) stopped.[342] If this (Reason) does not pervade, one should clearly interpret the passage found below: "because (the objective cause) is absent at that time, (the objective result) does not (arise) from that objective (cause)."[343]

(Opponent:) Since the final form-possessing sense-organs of the previous (desire-realm life) exist as (ready to generate) the first-moment form-possessing sense-organs of the subsequent (desire-realm) life, the Reason is unproven.[344]

(rGyal tshab:) Well, then, it is necessary to consider: How do you explain the fact that at the time of birth from the desire realm into the formless realm, the mind continues independent of the body, as demonstrated by (the fact that) that death-time body does not obtain a renewed direct ability to generate a subsequent body?[345]

(Opponent:) Therefore, the material cause of the subsequent (desire-realm) body still remains in doubt.

(rGyal tshab:) "Even if the (two desire-realm bodies) are interrupted by many different types of (non-physical moments of the formless realm), since they are not interrupted by any other types of (body-moments, the last body-moment of the previous desire-realm life must be the direct material cause of the first moment of the subsequent desire-realm life)"--even if one tries to answer thus, one cannot in the least avoid the damaging (objections cited) before.[346]

Thus, the material cause of the form(-possessing sense-organs of the subsequent desire-realm life) is the form-generating seed in the mind of the formless-realm being. Although there is no form in the formless realm, (because the seeds) are non-associated compositional factors, there is no (flaw in our position such that there would be) form in the formless realm.[347]

Likewise, one should accept that, as explained by the discerning Kamalaśīla, since there exists an unclear cognition during deep sleep that is the immediately-preceding condition of the (clear) cognition (arising) immediately after awakening from a deep sleep, (so it is with the formless and desire realms).[348]

II''. Disposing of damaging (objections) (PV 118, GT 287)

When they refute (the idea) that the death-time body

and mind are (respectively) the particular entity acting as the cooperative condition and the material cause of the mind of a subsequent life, the Lokāyatas' saying merely that they do not see things thus is not a perfect demonstration, because we have already explained that the fact that the opponents do not see things thus does not demonstrate that (such things) are not the case.[349]

Even "because they are sense-organs," etc., are not perfect Reasons refuting future lives, because there remains doubt about positive (and negative) concomitance.[350]

III''. Setting forth the proof

(PV 119-120, GT 287-8)

We see through authoritative cognition that the sense-organs of this life are able to be assisted by previous homogeneous causes, because we see that subsequent clear or turbid (organs arise) from previous clear or turbid organs. It also is proven that the sense-organs of (all) other subsequent (lives) are generated from homogeneous causes, because they are generated in the same way as the present life's organs.[351]

REFUTING (THE IDEA) THAT THEY ARE GENERATED FROM ANOTHER CAUSE:

(Opponent:) The fact that the sense-organs of this life are generated from the body does not prove that the sense-organs of a future life are generated from a body.

(rGyal tshab:) If we analyze that, it follows that it is unacceptable, because if (the sense-organs) arise from a body that has sense-organs, then it is proven that they are generated from a homogeneous cause; and if they are generated from a material cause other than that, then the faults (pointed out) earlier will follow.[352] The analysis of (body) with and without sense-organs is as before, in the brief demonstration.

(Opponent:) The sense-organs of this life are generated from mind.

(rGyal tshab:) It follows that the bodies of other subsequent (lives) will also be generated from mind, because the sense-organs of this life are generated from mind, and previous and subsequent bodies (must) have the same type of cause. If that is asserted, future lives are proven.[353]

iii'. Summary (PV 121, GT 288)

"Body is not the material cause or special cooperative condition of mind, so all final minds of ordinary beings and Arahants do not connect with subsequent homogeneous results, because they are separated from breath, which is the cause of connection, and because they are death-time minds." The Reasons set forth are imperfect, because it has been so proven above. Such statements as "because they are death-time minds" are correctly asserted to be doubtful

proofs, because the Reason is proven to exist in the Subject, (but) merely by the fact that we do not see the non-accordant, there is said to be doubt about the contrapositive.[354]

B'. Refuting (the idea) that, even if such development is possible, its infinite increase cannot be accepted (PV 122-133, GT 288-93)

(This is divided into:) (1') The argument and (2') The answer.

1'. The argument (PV 122, GT 288-9)

(Opponent:) Although by developing benevolence, wisdom, etc., a little one can attain excellence (in them), they cannot transcend their limited nature and increase infinitely. For example, although by developing jumping ability a little one can attain excellence, (the ability) will not increase infinitely, and boiling water will not ultimately ignite.[355]

2'. The answer (PV 123-133, GT 289-93)

(This is divided into:) (a') (Showing that) jumping ability and boiling water do not have the particular mark (such that they can increase infinitely), (b') (Showing that) benevolence, etc., do (have the particular mark such that they can increase infinitely) and (c') Disposing of objections to that.

a'. (Showing that) jumping ability and boiling water do not have the particular mark (such that they can increase infinitely) (PV 123-125, GT 289-90)

(This is divided into:) (i') Identifying the particulars of the mark and (showing that) they do not exist in the two examples and (ii') (Showing that) if there exist such particulars, it follows that there can be infinite development of them.

i'. Identifying the particulars of the mark and (showing that) they do not exist in the two examples (PV 123-124, GT 289)

Benevolence, wisdom, etc., do not have a nature such that they cannot increase infinitely, because if they were such that previous development generated subsequent moments dependent on repeated effort or (such that) they had an unstable basis, then their excellence could not increase infinitely; (but) they do not have such a nature.

Jumping ability, although it can be increased a little in excellence through development, does not have a nature such that it can be increased infinitely, because the effort that is able to assist it at a previous moment is unable to assist it at a later particular moment.

Boiling water, although it can increase a little in intensity, does not have a nature such that it can increase (its heat) infinitely, because when its basis, the water,

no longer remains, then it has dried up, and (the boiling) is terminated.[356]

<u>ii'. (Showing that) if there exist such particulars, then it follows that there is infinite development</u> (PV 125, GT 289-90)

It follows that it is possible that jumping ability and boiling water be increased infinitely, because once there has been development, a previous effort will make subsequent homogeneous efforts more and more excellent, without depending on the subsequent effort. If that Reason is accepted, then one can also take benevolence, etc., as the Subject and make an independent syllogism.[357]

<u>b'. (Showing that) benevolence, etc., do have (the particular mark such that they can increase infinitely)</u> (PV 126-128, GT 290-91)

A BRIEF DEMONSTRATION:

Benevolence, wisdom, etc., have a stable basis, because they are generated from the development of previous homogeneous causes, based on clear mental cognition. They are not dependent from moment to moment on a (new) different effort, because when they are developed they naturally enter the mind, as fire naturally enters wood until (the wood) is reduced to ashes, and well-refined mercury naturally enters gold. Alternatively, it is like well-refined mercury or gold, which naturally generate subsequent homo-

geneous (moments) free from tarnish, and (whose) purity from stains does not need to depend on a second application of a scouring shard.[358]

AN EXTENSIVE EXPLANATION:

A STABLE BASIS. Benevolence, etc., which are generated through being developed, have a stable basis, because that is a quality generated as the nature of mind.[359]

DEVELOPMENT INDEPENDENT OF REPEATED EXERTION. Benevolence, (etc.,) do not depend for their subsequent moments of development on a (new) different effort, because each subsequent effort at development produces a greater and greater growth in the excellence of many homogeneous (results).[360]

SUMMARY. It cannot be accepted that the minds of benevolence, wisdom, etc., if they are developed through the two applications,[361] remain at all limited, because they have the quality of mind that increases more and more from the seed of appropriate homogeneous causes.

<u>c'. Disposing of objections to that</u> (PV 129-133, GT 291-3)

(This is divided into:) (i') Disposing of the objection that (benevolence, etc.,) increase only through the development of conditions and (ii') Disposing of the objection that (benevolence, etc.,) increase only from (development of) a homogeneous material cause.

i'. Disposing of the objection that (benevolence, etc.,) increase only through the development of conditions (PV 129-130, GT 291)

(Opponent:) It follows that jumping ability, etc., also can be increased infinitely, because they increase through development.

(rGyal tshab:) It does not follow that later jumps, etc., arise from previous homogeneous jumps, as (is the case with) benevolence, etc., because however (great) one's physical strength and exertion, only that (great will the jump) be.

Therefore, a jump has a nature such that it is ascertained to be limited, because its causes, physical strength and exertion, are ascertained to be able to generate (only) a limited jump.[362]

(Opponent:) Well, then, no matter how much jumping is practiced, it is impossible that steadily applied physical strength can increase (ability) any more. If you assert that, then you contradict perception.

(rGyal tshab:) (When) an ordinary being first practices jumping, he cannot from the first jump as far as he later will (be able to) jump, because even if the appropriate conditions are fulfilled, physical weakness and imbalance are induced by (excess of) phlegm, etc. One clears away the phlegm through gradual effort, but even when one is puri-

fied of it, one will not be able to increase (one's jumping ability) infinitely, because even then one's (jumping ability) remains limited by the extent of one's physical strength.[363]

If jumping ability is generated from homogeneous causes, then it follows that merely by lifting one's foot to jump one will jump a long way, and it also follows that if mere practice is the cause of an infinite increase, then birds and monkeys should have equal jumping ability, since they are equally practiced.[364]

ii'. Disposing of the objection that (benevolence, etc.) increase only from (development of) a homogeneous material cause (PV 131-133, GT 291-3)

(Opponent:) It follows that all sentient beings have great compassion, because benevolence is beginningless and is generated from homogeneous causes.

(rGyal tshab:) There is no flaw (in our position). Benevolence and great compassion, which arise from homogeneous seeds, have a nature such that they naturally enter the mind of a Bodhisattva on the path of seeing, because compassion developed by the Bodhisattva on the path of seeing is the result of a homogeneous cause in his mindstream that is not damaged by such opposing factors as anger, etc. The consequential flaw that (benevolence, etc.) abide (always) in all sentient beings is not present, because although

(benevolence, etc.) are generated in the mindstreams of some sentient beings, they are destroyed by anger, etc. Taking as one's intentional object one's relatives who are born as ordinary sentient beings, and thinking "if only they could be free from suffering" is merely benevolence; it is not great compassion.[365]

It is impossible that each sentient being not experience in his mindstream (benevolence, etc.,) toward all other sentient beings, because it is impossible that there be a sentient being who has not experienced each (other) sentient being as his parents (at some point) in beginningless time. If (benevolence, etc.,) are not destroyed by anger, etc., it is impossible that there be a sentient being who will not at some point take all sentient beings as his intentional object and (generate) the great compassion that desires to free all sentient beings from suffering. Even if one has just generated benevolence toward one sentient being, that disappears when destroyed by anger.[366]

IF ONE IS NOT CUT OFF FROM DEVELOPING THE APPROPRIATE CONDITIONS, INCREASE CAN BE INFINITE:

Thus, the consequential flaw that there would exist in all sentient beings the mental dharmas of benevolence, detachment, etc., is not present, because (benevolence's) nature is generated from homogeneous causes, but the root of benevolence's generation toward greater and greater excel-

lence clearly is previous development and (development) even previous to that, and (such development) is not present in every sentient being.[367]

AN EXAMPLE:

One who possesses the two applications has a nature such that benevolence naturally enters (his mindstream) from his having developed it, because we see that in an Arahant's mindstream detachment arises naturally, and that in (the mindstreams of) the attached there (naturally arises) attachment and in (the mindstream of a yogi) meditating on ugliness (there naturally arises) aversion.[368]

SUMMARY:[369]

At first, taking all sentient beings as one's intentional object, one generates through effort a forceful compassion that desires to free them from suffering. When one has generated that (compassion) by great effort, each effort is able to generate many homogeneous (minds of) compassion. Through such development, one comes to have a nature such that great compassion naturally enters (the mindstream) without depending on such effort, but (such development) is not independent of effort from the first. Jumping (on the other hand) requires the assistance of effort for each moment the body is moving apart from the ground, and whenever the effort slackens, the body will fall to the ground.

Y. The way in which excellence of application is generated from (excellence of thought) (PV 134-141a, GT 293-7)

(This is divided into:) (p) A brief demonstration, (q) An extensive explanation and (r) Summary.

p. A brief demonstration (PV 134, GT 293-4)

It is reasonable for a benevolent Bodhisattva on the path of application initially to meditate by the two applications in order to see by direct perception the method of pacifying his own suffering, because he is an ordinary being who desires to destroy the suffering of all sentient beings.[370]

It follows that this (Reason) pervades, because if the truths of suffering and cessation, which arise from (causes),[371] and the truths of origination[372] and path, which are causes (of the first two), are hidden phenomena, they will be difficult to explain or cognize undistortedly.[373]

Also, (the existence of) a Bodhisattva on the path of application is proved by objectively impelled reasoning. The cognition of impermanence and (other of the) sixteen (aspects of the Four Noble Truths) by way of their generic images is divided in two: clear and unclear appearances (of the generic image). The clear appearances of the generic image are proved by objectively impelled reasoning to be two: those held by the generation of the Mahāyāna thought

(of enlightenment)[374] and those not held (by the generation of the Mahāyāna thought). A person who possesses a clear appearance of a generic image of selflessness through being held by the generation of the Mahāyāna thought is the specific (definition of a) Bodhisattva on the path of application.[375]

q. An extensive explanation (PV 135-140a, GT 294-6)

(This is divided into:) (I') The method of cognizing what is to be abandoned, (II') The way of cognizing the antidote and (III') The purpose of such an analysis.

I'. The method of cognizing what is to be abandoned (PV 135-136a, GT 294)

It is not the case that there is no method for investigating the reality of the Four Noble Truths, because, cognizing (them) initially through the wisdom of study, which is based on scripture, then through the wisdom of reflection, one is able to investigate the aspects (of the truths).[376]

Alternatively, one must investigate in terms of the methods (applied) to the three (types of) objects of authoritative (cognition), because one investigates very hidden phenomena by scripture that is (ascertained as) pure by the three tests, and (manifest and hidden phenomena) by reason-

ing that does not depend on scripture for its refutation or proof.[377]

When one has understood the nature of suffering, it is reasonable to (attempt to) cognize whether there is or is not a cause of suffering and whether the nature of the cause is permanent or impermanent, etc., because if suffering is causeless or the cause abides permanently, then someone who desires to destroy suffering will not see how to counteract the resultant suffering by virtue of the antidote.

When one analyzes thus, one is able to understand that suffering has a cause and that that cause is impermanent, because we can understand by a special way of seeing that suffering is generated occasionally and made to increase and decrease. That (verse, then,) demonstrates how one successively generates the mind that desires freedom from suffering, (the mind that) desires to abandon origination (of suffering) and the mind that desires to attain the cessation of suffering.[378]

<u>II'. The way of cognizing the antidote</u> (PV 136b-138a, GT 294-5)

It is reasonable to analyze the antidote that is the opposing factor to that origination (of suffering), because one desires to destroy (suffering) through reliance on the antidote to the originating cause of that suffering. When

one analyzes thus, one ascertains through authoritative cognition the opposing factors to that origination, because one cognizes how the essential cause is self-grasping, and that the antidote to that is the gnosis that grasps (phenomena) in a manner opposite to (self-)grasping. That (verse, then,) demonstrates that the path is to be relied on.[379]

The craving (mind) attached to suffering, which has as its intentional object the five composite aggregates that are made by grasping at "I" and grasping at "mine," is the cause of one's resultant suffering, because it is the cooperative condition.[380] The wisdom that directly sees selflessness is the antidote to that self-grasping, because it is able to eradicate that (self-grasping) through a manner of grasping (phenomena) contradictory to self-grasping.[381]

Alternatively, one sees that selflessness damages that craving, and (one) applies the words, "because it damages the cause (of suffering)."[382]

<u>III'. The purpose of such an analysis</u> (PV 138b-140a, GT 295-6)

(This is divided into:) (A') (The Buddha's) complete clarity about the flaws and good qualities of objects, (B') (How the Buddha) is a subject free from all faults and (C') (How the Buddha) acts specially for the liberation of others.

A'. (The Buddha's) complete clarity about the flaws and good qualities of objects (PV 138b-139a, GT 295-6)

(Opponent:) If the way of investigating through scripture and reasoning is thus, what is the way of directly (realizing) by meditation?

(rGyal tshab:) There is a reason why the Muni, the Blessed One, is the very ultimacy of mental clarity that has as its intentional objects the flaws to be abandoned and the good qualities of the antidotes, because he is thus from developing all the many methods of pacifying suffering in many repeated aspects through countless eons.[383]

(Opponent:) He has become a Detached One (Arahant) by abandoning self-grasping, but how does he become omniscient? If he is (omniscient), then all Detached Ones are omniscient.[384]

(rGyal tshab:) If one sets as the previous thesis, "there is a reason why (the Buddha) is omnisicient, with ultimate clarity regarding ultimate (objects)," then the Reason is: "because he is thus from developing for a long time many specific methods of transcending saṃsāra, having taken many births in saṃsāra by virtue of previously(-developed) compassion."[385]

B'. (How the Buddha) is a subject free from all faults (PV 139b, GT 296)

Therefore, (the Buddha) has also abandoned utterly the propensities to the cause of suffering, because he has complete mental clarity regarding cause and result. One must also counter (the idea) that his (ordinary) speech is impure.[386]

C'. (How the Buddha) acts specially for the liberation of others (PV 140a, GT 296)

The great Muni acts specially for the liberation of others, such as the rhinoceros(-like Pratyekabuddhas), etc., because he has completed the method of applying (himself) to the aims of others.[387]

r. Summary (PV 140b-141a, GT 296-7)

(Opponent:) It follows that it is unreasonable to explain as the Teacher someone who has developed methods, because the Ācārya (Dignāga) says, "application is the Teacher because it is the Teacher to transmigrators."[388]

(rGyal tshab:) The verse that (so) describes application does not show as the Teacher only the ultimate Teacher, because it was written thus with a desire to show as the Teacher the situation on the path where one develops the wisdom cognizing method and selflessness. There is a reason why the wisdom directly realizing selflessness du-

ring the training-path[389] that is developed for the sake of others is designated as the Teacher, because it is the objective cause of the ultimate Teacher. The reason why the two excellences explained before, of thought and application, are explained as causes of that ultimate Teacher, is because it is necessary that the Sugata who has accomplished the aims of others and the Savior arise from the prior development of methods arising during the path.[390]

Alternatively, "arising from accomplishment" and "arising first" mean that the excellences of thought and application are accomplished first and that they come first in the verses of homage; they are explained as the cause.[391]

Z. (Based on) those two (excellences), the way of proving the excellence of results (PV 141b-148a, GT 297-302)

(This is divided into:) (p) The excellence of one's own aims and (q) The excellence of others' aims.

p. The excellence of one's own aims (PV 141b-147a, GT 297-300)

(This is divided into:) (I') Showing that (the Buddha) is a Sugata with three special qualities and (II') Disposing of objections to that.

I'. Showing that (the Buddha) is a Sugata with three special qualities (PV 141b-145, GT 297-9)

(This is divided into:) (A') A brief demonstration and (B') An extensive explanation.

A'. A brief demonstration (PV 141b, GT 297)

The abandonment that is the abandonment of the cause of suffering together with the propensities thereto is the Sugata, because it is an ultimate abandonment, possessing three qualities.[392]

This chapter shows as the Sugata just the abandonment of the two obstacles, the defilement-obstacle and the knowledge-obstacle taken as non-defiled ignorance regarding impermanence and other of the sixteen aspects (of the Four Noble Truths). It does not teach (as the Sugata) the abandonment of the knowledge-obstacle taken as the cognition attached to a substantial difference between object and subject.[393] The reason for that is that (Dharmakīrti) wishes to show the definition of the common Teacher who is most necessary to all three lineages (of practitioners); he does not show the definition of the uncommon Mahāyāna Teacher. Therefore, the selflessness he teaches is just the selflessness of persons; the selflessness of dharmas will be explained below.[394]

(Opponent:) Well, then, it is unreasonable (to assert that) the Greatly Compassionate One is shown (here).[395]

(rGyal tshab:) Although he is the root-Teacher who is most necessary to those of the Śrāvaka lineage, it is also necessary to show that his accomplishment definitely (is generated) from his being the Greatly Compassionate One.[396]

B'. An extensive explanation (PV 142-4, GT 297-9)

(Opponent:) What are the three qualities?

(rGyal tshab:) That abandonment is a good abandonment, because it is an ultimate abandonment that is not the basis of (any further) suffering. The "mere" abandonments of non-Buddhists), since they are connected with suffering, are not good abandonments. That (good abandonment) is preceded by a good method, because there is a new direct perception of the selflessness of persons, and that is application, which is attained through development.[397]

The word "or" includes as abandonments the respective abandonments on the paths of seeing and development.[398] According to Ācārya Devendrabuddhi, when one draws on the quotation, "because one sees selflessness and (because of) reasoning," reasoning is praised because it is through the development of the wisdom realizing selflessness by the method that sees (selflessness) through reasoning, that (the Buddha) is the Sugata.[399]

(Opponent:) What is the irreversible abandonment by abandoning which one does not revert (to saṃsāra)?

(rGyal tshab:) A Streamwinner who will have seven (more) existences is explained as someone who will revert to saṃsāra, because it is explained that the suffering of continuous birth, and flaws such as attachment, etc., will arise for seven more existences. The aforementioned (ultimate) abandonment is irreversible, because (in it one) has utterly abandoned the seeds of the self-view, together with the propensities thereto.[400]

(Opponent:) How does the wisdom realizing selflessness damage self-grasping? If it is merely by contradicting (self-grasping's) manner of grasping, then self-grasping also should be able to damage (the wisdom realizing selflessness).[401]

(rGyal tshab:) The wisdom realizing the selflessness of persons directly damages the grasping at a self of persons, because (the self and non-self views) are directly contradictory by way of having the nature of different manners of grasping (reality), and (the non-self view) is (held by) a subject that has a true and right manner of grasping (reality).[402]

(Opponent:) What are the remaining abandonment-objects, by abandoning which an Arahant has abandoned every (obstacle)?

(rGyal tshab:) Śrāvaka and Pratyekabuddha Arahants have trace-faults of body, speech and mind, because they

possess trace-faults of the three doors that are not defilement-related. Therefore, they do not revert to saṃsāra, because there are no defilements, the cause (of saṃsāra), and because there is no sickness of a mind tormented by saṃsāric suffering. There also remains (in Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas) a lack of mental clarity on (how to) explain the path to liberation to others, because they have abandoned just the defilements; they have not utterly abandoned trace-faults. The aforementioned (ultimate) abandonment is an abandonment without remainder, because it is an abandonment that **is attainment** (of a goal) by a complete development of the antidote (to the cause of suffering).[403]

<u>II'. Disposing of objections to that</u> (PV 145-147a, GT 299-300)

Some rGyal dpog pas[404] and others say "The Muni has not eliminated (all) flaws, because he is a speaker, (or) because he has sense-organs, like people you meet on the road."[405]

SHOWING THAT THE REASON IS UNCERTAIN:

The Reason has a mistaken contrapositive, because it can be said that there is doubt about the opposite (of the Predicate). When they refute (the existence of) a person who has eliminated faults on the basis of whether he is a speaker or not, there is no proof at all, for our opponents are in doubt themselves, and even according to our oppon-

ents, one does not generate a perfect cognition if one has any doubt.[406]

(Opponent:) This Reason can be set forth for the Buddhists, because they have already proven, and have not forgotten, that a speaker may have eliminated faults. How is it that (the Reason) "induces doubt"?

(rGyal tshab:) Saying, "This Muni has not eliminated (all) flaws, because he speaks purely (only on the basis of) the Dharma taught him by past teachers," or "he has not eliminated flaws, as he speaks with attachment," our opponents have set forth doubtful Reasons. We answer that (the Reasons) do not prove with certainty that there is a contrapositive, other than by merely repeating (the assertion).[407] Those who say that the Buddha's physical form is not the Buddha are welcomed by the rGyal dpog pas.[408]

INVESTIGATING THE EXTREMES THROUGH REASONING AND REFUTING THEM:

The Reasons (adduced) for the impossibility of eliminating faults (are), e.g., (1) "because the flaws of attachment, etc., are permanent, they cannot be abandoned"; or (2) "even if they can be, (they will not be,) because there is no method of abandoning them"; or, alternatively, (3) "even if there really exists a method, (flaws cannot be eliminated,) because nobody knows (the method)"; or (4) even if (someone) knows (the method, faults cannot be elimi-

nated,) because it is impossible that one make others strive for their goals"; or (5) "even if one can generate (the desire to make) others strive for their goals, (one does not,) because one does not have the benevolence that (leads one) to explain how it is (to be done)."

Let us thoroughly analyze (these Reasons why) faults are (alleged to be) incapable of elimination. (1) The faults of attachment, etc., are not permanent, because they have causes that generate them. (2) It is not the case that there is no method of abandoning (faults), because one can eliminate them by developing the antidote to their cause, self-grasping. (3) It is also proven that someone knows the method for abandoning them, because there is someone who knows as it is the nature of the cause (of the faults). Reasons (4) and (5) and their answers are not set forth here, because they are understood from the earlier quote, "a benevolent (Bodhisattva)...." and from the section below on the Savior.[409]

q. The excellence of others' aims (PV 147b-148a, GT 300-302)

The Muni, the Blessed One, is the Savior of those who strive for freedom, because he himself has completely seen the path to liberation, and because he undistortedly teaches to others that path that he has seen, without regard to payment or fame. He has completely seen (the path), because

he has utterly abandoned stains. That (verse) shows the way of proving him the Savior from the fact that he is the Sugata.[410]

Well, then, (it might be argued that) he either (a) does not teach the path to liberation to others at all or (b) he teaches it distortedly. (a) is unacceptable, as proven by the explanation that the fact that he is the Teacher proves he is the Sugata.[411] If (b) is the case, then either (a) he claims to teach undistortedly, but (in fact) understands entities distortedly or (b) he desires to teach distortedly. (a) is unacceptable, as proven by the proof that (the fact that he is) the Sugata proves he is the Savior.[412] If (b) is the case, then either (a) like a bad doctor, he is attached to self and is perplexed as to whether he can accomplish his own desires or (b) he does not possess great benevolence that has others as its intentional object. (a) is unacceptable, as in the previous proofs. (b) is unacceptable, as proven by setting forth great compassion (as the Reason) proving he is the Teacher.[413]

Therefore, (the Muni) does not teach the path to liberation falsely or distortedly, because he directly sees that in teaching thus (he will bring about) no desirable result regarding either his own aims or others' aims. Those verses prove that he is the Savior, and shows ("Savior") as the Predicate of the two (Reasons), "Teacher" and "Compas-

sionate."[414]

(The Muni) undistortedly teaches others the path to liberation he has seen by himself, because earlier, on the training-path, all meditative undertakings regarding impermanence, selflessness, etc., were applied toward the aims of all other sentient beings, and he has completed (the path) that develops (those). This shows the way of proving him the Sugata from the fact that he is the Teacher.[415]

There is a reason why all undertakings were applied toward the aims of others, because earlier, on the training-path, he was in complete possession of the great benevolent compassion that has as its intentional object all sentient beings. This shows the way of proving him the Teacher from the fact that he is compassionate.[416]

Therefore, in this section on the forward system, "Savior" is made the Predicate of the Reason, and the other three (epithets) are proven in succession.[417] Compassion is the ultimate proof, and when one enters the path gradually in order to become an Authoritative Person, then that is the threshold for first entering the uncommon Mahāyāna path; since great compassion is the method and the proof, (Dharmakīrti) shows compassion as the proof by the words, "The proof, compassion...."[418]

ii. Showing from that that he is one who became authoritative (PV 148b, GT 302)

(The Muni) is an Authoritative Person with regard to those who strive for freedom, because through showing the path to liberation to those who strive for freedom, he becomes their Savior, and he has complete ability to save (them). If he cannot save them, then he does not fulfil the definition of a Savior, and if he does not save them, he does not accomplish what is needed by those seeking salvation. In this teacher, ability and necessity meet.[419]

2. Demonstrating through the reverse system that he arrived at such a goal (PV 148c-285a, GT 302-363)

(This is divided into:) (a) The way of proving the special dharmas from latter to former and (b) The way of proving from all those that (the Buddha) is authoritative.

a. The way of proving the special dharmas from latter to former[420] (PV 148c-284a, GT 302-363)

(This is divided into:) (i) Proving that (the Buddha) has the nature of a Savior, (ii) The way of proving from that that he is the Sugata, (iii) The way of proving from that that he is the Teacher and (iv) The way of proving from that that he is the Benevolent One.

i. Proving that (the Buddha) has the nature of a Savior (PV 148c-283a, GT 302-361)

(This is divided into:) (X) Showing that he is the Savior by showing independently the reality of the Four Noble Truths and (Y) Establishing the Four Noble Truths that are the object of scriptural teaching.

X. Showing that he is the Savior by showing independently the reality of the Four Noble Truths (PV 148c, GT 302)

Having shown by the forward system the way in which the Teacher proceeded (to liberation) via some path, we must show through the reverse system the perfect Reasons demonstrating that he proceeded thus (to liberation). The Muni, the Blessed One, is the Savior for those who strive for freedom, because for those who strive for freedom he is one who completely teaches undistortedly the reality of the Four Noble Truths.[421]

Y. Establishing the Four Noble Truths, which are the object of scriptural teaching (PV 149-283a, GT 302-361)

(This is divided into:) (p) The general meaning and (q) The particular meaning.

p. The general meaning[422] (no PV, GT 302-8)

(This is divided into:) (I') Ascertaining the number of the Four Noble Truths, (II') Ascertaining their order-

ing, (III') Examples and (IV') The authoritative (reasoning) that ascertains that.

I'. Ascertaining the number of the Four Noble Truths (no PV, GT 302-3)

The chief (matters) to be established for those who strive for freedom are ascertained to be classified on two sides, that of saṃsāra and that of nirvāṇa. It is ascertained that within saṃsāra there are two: the truth of origination, which is the binding cause; and the truth of suffering, which is the resultant bondage. Withing purification there are also two: the truth of path, which is the causal method that frees one from saṃsāra; and the truth of cessation, which is the essential result, freedom. Because this has been ascertained, the cause and result of entering or leaving saṃsāra can be ascertained as fourfold.[423]

II'. Ascertaining their ordering (no PV, GT 303-4)

(If the teaching were) based on objective succession, the truths of origination and path would be taught first and suffering and cessation would be taught later. In this case, (however, the truths) are taught in another order, that which accords with the succession in which they are cognized by a subject, i.e.: the truths of suffering, origination, cessation and path.[424]

Through initially thinking of the general and particular disadvantages of saṃsāra, one must generate the mind that desires to be free from that, because if that (desire) does not come first, it is impossible that one generate the desire to abandon the cause (of suffering).

When one has generated the desire to be free from suffering, one realizes that one either can or cannot be free from this suffering, and that (the suffering) either does or does not have a cause, and that, in relation to origination, that cause is considered either permanent or impermanent--one sees that one cannot dispose of the essence of suffering the way one pulls out a thorn.[425] When one analyzes thus, one uderstands that the cause of (suffering) is twofold, karma and defilements, and when one has generated a mind that desires to abandon those, that is origination, taught second.

When one sees that one is able to abandon the origination, then one sees that one is able (to effect) the cessation of suffering, and therefore, when one sees the active power of the cessation that stops suffering, this is cessation, taught third.

That which directly effects that (cessation) is taught as the path, and when one roughly sees (the method) that develops (that path), it is the path, taught fourth.

(<u>Opponent</u>:) One sees in the first place that one is a-

ble (to effect) the cessation of suffering. Since one necessarily sees the active power that stops suffering, it would be reasonable to teach cessation second, and when one has seen that one is able to abandon origination, since one must see that one is able (to effect) the cessation of suffering, it would be reasonable to teach (cessation) before suffering's origination. Since initially one is taught roughly that a cognition of selflessness is seen to enable one to abandon the origination (of suffering), then the ordering of truths as explained is uncertain.[426]

(rGyal tshab:) (The matter) is to be explained (thus). In general, one sees the benefits in entering into some actions and sees roughly the disadvantages in the reverse of that. When one thinks about the general and particular disadvantages of saṃsāra, then one sees saṃsāra as a fiery pit. One first generates just the mind that desires to be free from that, but one does not realize that one is able to be free feom it. Thus, secondly, one sees by authoritative cognition that one is able to abandon the origination. When one sees that, since one sees the active power of cessation, it is reasonable to teach origination second and cessation third. As before, path is to be taught last.[427]

Thus, when the path of seeing that has as its intentional object the Four Noble Truths is generated in the mindstream of a yogi, it is generated in accordance with

that ordering.[428]

III'. Examples (no PV, GT 304-5)

Now the feeling of pain, etc., in the kidneys is the suffering of suffering. The feeling (resulting) from the excessive craving of delicious food is the suffering of change. All contaminated aggregates on which are placed the imprints of karma and defilements are the suffering of complexes. All those are the truth of suffering.[429] All contaminated karma and defilements are the truth of origination. The freedom that is the stopping of suffering is the truth of cessation. The wisdom directly realizing selflessness is the truth of path.[430]

IV'. The authoritative (reasoning) that ascertains that (no PV, GT 305-8)

(This is divided into:) (A') Identifying the sixteen distorted ideas and (B') Identifying the sixteen aspects of the Four Noble Truths that contradict those.

A'. Identifying the sixteen distorted ideas (no PV, GT 305)

Distorted ideas about suffering are four: holding it to be (1) pure, (2) pleasurable, (3) permanent and (4) (related to) a self.

Distorted ideas about origination are two: (1) holding that suffering is causeless and (2) holding that the cause

is something inappropriate (to be a cause). With regard to the latter, (one may wrongly) (a) hold that (the result) is produced by only one cause; (b) hold that (the result) is produced when preceded by the mind of some other (being), such as God, etc.; and (c) hold that something whose nature is permanent can change (according to) circumstances.[431]

Distorted ideas about cessation are: (1) holding that liberation never comes about;[432] (2) holding as liberation some particular contaminated (state); (3) holding as liberation the sublimity (that is release from) some particular suffering and (4) holding that even if suffering is eliminated, it can return.

Distorted ideas about path are: (1) holding that the path to liberation never comes about; (2) holding that it is unreasonable (to assert) as the path the development of (the realization of) selflessness; (3) holding as the path to liberation some mere particular absorption and (4) holding that there is no Dharmic path that cannot revert to suffering.[433]

B'. Identifying the sixteen aspects of the Four Noble Truths that contradict those (no PV, GT 305-8)

The suffering of suffering is (1) impermanent, because it occurs occasionally.[434] It is (2) suffering, because it is dependent on karma and defilement.[435] It is (3) empty, because there is no objectively separate self that con-

trols it.[436] It is (4) selfless, because there exists (in it) no independent essential self.[437]

The aspects of origination: Contaminated karma and craving have the aspect of (1) cause, because they are the root of one's own resultant suffering.[438] They are (2) the origination of all (suffering), because they are generated in all their aspects again and again.[439] They are (3) (strongly) generated, because they are generated forcefully.[440] Craving for (saṃsāric) existence has the aspect of (4) condition, because it is the cooperative condition of one's own resultant suffering.[441]

The aspects of cessation: The freedom that is the elimination of the basis of suffering by force of the antidote has the aspect of (1) cessation, because it is a freedom that has abandoned suffering.[442] It has the aspect of (2) peace, because it is a freedom that has abandoned defilements.[443] It has the aspect of (3) sublimity, because it is a liberation that is beneficial and pleasurable.[444] It has the aspect of (4) definite emergence, because it is a Dharmic liberation that is irreversible.[445]

The aspects of path: The wisdom directly realizing selflessness has the aspect of (1) path, because it is a path that leads to liberation.[446] It has the aspect of (2) reasonableness, because it acts as a direct antidote to defilement.[447] It has the aspect of (3) accomplishment, be-

cause it is the gnosis that directly cognizes the ultimate reality of mind.[448] It has the aspect of (4) definite removal, because it is a Dharmic antidote that cannot revert to suffering.[449]

The eight aspects of suffering and origination are taught by individual division in the text. If one (wants to make) individual divisions of the eight aspects of cessation and path, it appears that one can do so, but Ācārya Devendrabuddhi explains that the aspect of cessation and the aspect of path are taught directly, while the remaining six (aspects of cessation and path) are not directly and clearly taught, (but) can be understood as intended.[450]

I will explain in brief the method whereby the intelligent contemplate the details of entering (saṃsāra) and the way of reversing the entry into saṃsāra, renounce all of saṃsāra, and generate a mind that strives for liberation. This chapter is one of the most important (of Buddhist texts), and those scholars who think about studying this text--without directing (their minds) only to externals--should contemplate well the general and particular disadvantages of saṃsāra, and they should generate a mind renouncing (saṃsāra)--and generate to an equal degree the mind that strives for liberation.[451]

When (those attitudes) have been generated, they are taken as the basis of the training in higher morality. Al-

so, having striven as much as is suitable to one's mind in higher mental training, one should establish through reasoning the selflessness of persons explained in this chapter and the selflessness of dharmas explained below, then meditate on it.[452]

If (practitioners) act thus, their study of and reflection upon the śāstras will be very meaningful, and they will "seize well the essential" in the (human existence) that is the basis of leisure and opportunity.[453] If they think otherwise, that they (should) obtain possessions and respect and fame, then their mindstreams will be considerably impaired by their non-virtues and the downfall (of their vows).[454] (Thus,) when they try to memorize, they cannot retain the words, when they try to refelct, they do not understand the meaning, and when they try to meditate, they cannot generate (the object) in their mindstreams. Therefore, even if they claim to have been striving to study and understand (the Dharma) for their whole lives, (in fact,) the way their minds ordinarily run will be no different as regards the degree of their desire and the degree of their renunciation of saṃsāra than the way (the mind of) a farmer ordinarily (runs). Not simply making the path an <u>object</u> of their minds, they should strive earnestly to generate (the path) as the <u>essence</u> of their minds.[455]

Having identified the four (paths) distortedly imputed

as paths to liberation by others, (which) are the opposing factors to the (real) path to liberation, the Ācārya will explain below the reasons refuting them, and the way of proving liberation and omniscience through objectively impelled reasoning.

q. The particular meaning (PV 149-283a, GT 308-361)

(This is divided into:) (I') The truth of suffering, (II') The truth of origination, (III') The truth of cessation and (IV') The truth of path.

I'. The truth of suffering (PV 149-181a, GT 308-18)

(This is divided into:) (A') Proving the example of the truth of suffering and (B') Explaining the definition (of the truth of suffering).

A'. Proving the example of the truth of suffering (PV 149-178a, GT 308-17)

(This is divided into:) (1') Proving that saṃsāra is beginningless and (2') Refuting (the idea that saṃsāra) has a beginning.

1'. Proving that saṃsāra is beginningless (PV 149-166a, GT 308-14)

(This is divided into:) (a') Identifying suffering and

(b') The Reason proving that it is beginningless.

a'. Identifying suffering (PV 149a, GT 308)

The five aggregates taken (through karma and defilements) are the truth of suffering, because they are saṃsāric defilements that are (taken) in saṃsāra under the power of karma and the defilements.[456]

Those who do not know how to establish collections and continuums say: "A person who has just died and enters the next life will be permanent, and it is unacceptable that the first cognition of the subsequent existence be saṃsāra, because that (cognition) has never occurred before. Therefore, so-called 'saṃsāra' is merely a mistaken appearance, and does not exist in the least."[457] Others assert a permanent person as saṃsāra.[458] These are the chief objects of refutation of the Reasons to be explained below.

b'. Proving that it is beginningless (PV 149b-166a, GT 308-14)

(This is divided into:) (i') Proving that it is generated beginninglessly from homogeneous (causes), (ii') Refuting (the idea) that it is generated causelessly and (iii') Refuting (the idea) that it is generated from inappropriate causes.

i'. Proving that it is generated beginninglessly from homogeneous (causes) (PV 149b, GT 308)

Attachment, anger, etc., are preceded by previous homogeneous (causes), because we that through their own development they naturally generate (their objects) with greater and greater clarity.[459]

ii'. Refuting (the idea) that it is generated causelessly (PV 149c, GT 308-9)

(Attachment, anger, etc.,) do not arise accidentally without depending on anything, because they arise occasionally. It follows that the (Reason) pervades, because if there is no cause, it is contradictory (to say that something) is generated.[460]

iii'. Refuting (the idea) that it is generated from inappropriate causes (PV 150-166a, GT 309-14)

(This is divided into:) (X') Refuting (the idea) that it is generated only from wind, etc., and (Y') Refuting (the idea) that it is generated only from the elements.

X'. Refuting (the idea) that it is generated only from wind, etc. (PV 150-160a, GT 309-12)

(This is divided into:) (p') A brief demonstration that (humors and defilements) are not proven (to fulfil the) definitions of cause and result and (q') An extensive

explanation.

p'. A brief demonstration that (humors and defilements) are not proven (to fulfil the) definitions of cause and result (PV 150-152a, GT 309-10)

(This is divided into:) (I'') Setting forth the consequences and (II'') Refuting the reply to that.

I''. Setting forth the consequences (PV 150a, GT 309)

(Opponent:) Attachment is generated from phlegm, anger from bile and ignorance from wind.[461]

(rGyal tshab:) It follows that attachment, etc., are not dharmas that are the direct result of wind, etc., because (the assertion of) positive or negative concomitance is mistaken, because we see that a phlegmatic person may have little attachment and much anger.[462]

II''. Refuting the reply to that (PV 150b-152a, GT 309-10)

(Opponent:) Because the bile that causes anger is naturally mixed with the phlegm, anger increases, and there is no flaw of a mistaken (assertion of concomitance).[463]

(rGyal tshab:) Well, then, why do we not see, in addition to the anger, that person's prematurely white hair, jaundice, perspiration and mental clarity, (other) dharmas that are the direct result of bile? It follows that it

would be reasonable to see them, because the direct cause, bile, is fully present.[464]

(<u>Opponent</u>:) Bile generates all three poisons, and so, accordingly, do the other two (humors).

(<u>rGyal tshab</u>:) It follows that all beings, who have the three humors in equal proportions, will have an equal amount of attachment, etc., because (the attachment, etc.'s) direct cause is the same in all. Therefore, it follows that all three poisons are not dharmas that are the direct result of all the faulty (humors), because of the consequential fault just explained.[465]

(<u>Opponent</u>:) There is no flaw (in our position), since this case is like that of people's unequal body sizes, which (result) even though (people) are generated from equal causes, the elements.

(<u>rGyal tshab</u>:) It follows that the previous objection, viz., that there is no (difference) in amount, can equally be applied in the case of a person's body size, because people's body sizes would be generated as the same from the equality of the direct causes, the elements--unless (one considers) the principal conditions, previous particular karmas.[466]

<u>q'. An extensive explanation</u> (PV 152b-160a, GT 310-12)

(This is divided into:) (I'') (Showing that) because

their increases and decreases do not have similar (causes, humors and defilements) are not cause and result, (II'') Extreme consequences if (humors and defilements are cause and result) and (III'') Disposing (of the objection that the consequences) apply equally to us.

I''. (Showing that) because their increase and decrease do not have similar (causes, humors and the defilements) are not cause and result (PV 152b-158a, GT 310-12)

(This is divided into:) (A'') Setting forth the Reason and (B'') Proving (that the Reason is correct in all three) ways.

A''. Setting forth the Reason (no Skt., GT 310)

The faults of attachment, etc., are not the direct result of wind, bile, etc., because even if there is an increase in particular humors of wind, etc., it is uncertain that those particular (defilements) will increase, because we see that (sometimes) when phlegm has increased and the body weakened, attachment decreases.[467]

B''. Proving (that the Reason is correct in all three) ways (PV 152b-158a, GT 310-12)

(Opponent:) (The Reason is) unproven, because when bile increases, then anger is generated through the discom-

fort of the body.[469]

(rGyal tshab:) It follows that it is not the case that the Reason is unproven merely by that, because we see that when any of the humors is transformed, then the transformation generates anger, so it follows that anger is the result of all of those (humors). Also, it follows that it is not the case that anger is generated from all those humors, because of the flaw that the three humors should then have an equilibrium (of attachment, ignorance) and anger.[470]

PROVING (THAT THE REASON) PERVADES (THE PREDICATE):

It follows that the previous basic Reason[471] pervades (the Predicate), because if there is an increase in the cause, phlegm, it is unsuitable that there be no increase--or a decrease--in the result, attachment. For example, when bile increases, the fever, etc., of a disease increase.[472]

(Opponent:) Well, then, what is the cause of those (defilements)?

(rGyal tshab:) The transformations of attachment, etc., are not generated directly just from the elements, because they are generated from the feelings of pleasure and pain that are their own cause.[473]

(Opponent:) (Your position has) extreme consequences: (according to you,) attachment is not generated, as it is blocked by the suffering feeling born of a disequilibrium among the humors. If we only see the non-generation of a

result because of the presence of a contrary condition, then (attempts to explain) cause and result are destroyed.[474]

(rGyal tshab:) Well, then, by way of an answer we ask: how is attachment generated?

(Opponent:) Attachment increases from an increase in semen, which comes from an equilibrium of the three humors.[475]

(rGyal tshab:) Well, then, it follows that attachment is a mistaken contrapositive in relation to the equilibrium of the humors, because we see that (attachment) is also generated when there is a disequilibrium of the humors. It follows that (attachment) is mistaken (if said to be a Reason with) positive concomitance, because we see that in the case of other men, who possess the wisdom realizing (the natures of) various phenomena, even when the three (humors) are in equilibrium, there is no generation of (attachment). It follows that (attachment) is a mistaken contrapositive for the increase of semen, because we see that there are other attached beings who generate attachment even though they lose blood from the depletion of semen. It follows that that attached being, when he sees a beautiful woman, will not have intense attachment to her, because when he (simply) sees that woman, it is not ascertained that his semen will increase.[476]

(Opponent:) In the case of physical beauty or charming behavior, it is (beauty) that is the factor that generates attachment, because we see that it is from the particular (attractive qualities) that particular attachments are generated.

(rGyal tshab:) It follows that (beauty,) too, is not a cause that is ascertained to be positively and negatively concomitant with attachment, because it is uncertain that (beauty) is the cause of all (attachment). It also follows that attachment would not arise without the ascertainment of physical beauty, etc., because it is necessarily ascertained that (physical beauty, etc.,) are the cause of attachment. It also follows that attachment will be generated even in someone who does not hold (an object to have) the qualities of physical beauty, etc., because merely by seeing physical beauty or (charming) behavior, he will generate attachment.[477]

(Opponent:) When one holds (an object to have) the qualities (of physical beauty, etc.), that (holding) is the factor that generates attachment.[478]

(rGyal tshab:) What need is there for that as a cause? If you say that the object just remains (beautiful), then it follows that all persons who see a woman's physical beauty and (charming) behavior should hold her as having the qualities (of physical beauty, etc.), because the cause

(i.e., object) of such holding would be the same (in every case) without exception.[479]

II''. Extreme consequences if (humors and the defilements are cause and result) (PV 158b-159a, GT 312)

In any case, it follows that a person like that in whom phlegm increases excessively will not then become intensely angry, because it is reasonable to assert that he is intensely attached. It follows that this (Reason) pervades, because it is contradictory that attachment and anger, essentially dissimilar ways of grasping (phenomena), coincide. It follows that the assertion (that a predominance of phlegm precludes anger) is unreasonable, because we do not see that anger definitely does not arise in (such) cases, because anger does arise occasionally (in such cases).[480]

III''. Disposing (of the objection that the consequences) apply equally to us (PV 159b-160a, GT 312)

It does not follow that the system of the rationalists[481] has the (above) fault whereby a phlegmatic person will not get angry, because (in the rationalist system) attachment, etc., come to be in dependence upon particular propensities that are appropriately homogeneous and inde-

pendent of external objective conditions.[482]

Y'. Refuting (the idea) that (suffering) is generated only from the elements (PV 160b-166a, GT 312-14)

(This is divided into:) (p') Giving a reminder of what has already been explained and (q') Showing other Reasons that refute (the idea) that body is the special basis of mind.

p'. Giving a reminder of what has already been explained (PV 160b, GT 312)

This reasoning that refutes (the idea) that attachment, etc., are the direct result of the three humors also refutes (the idea) that attachment, etc., have the nature of being the direct result of the elements, because it is proven that in that (latter case, the assertion of) positive and negative concomitance is mistaken. Nor are the four elements the basis of the abiding of already existent attachment, etc., because that has already been refuted where it says: "...whether a substance is existent or nonexistent, it does not have a basis (that is substantially different from it)."[483]

q'. Showing other Reasons that refute (the idea) that body is the special basis of mind (PV 161-166a, GT 312-14)

(This is divided into:) (I'') Refuting the example and (II'') Refuting the meaning.

I''. Refuting the example (PV 161-164a, GT 312-13)

(Opponent:) Just as you accept that secondary qualities are based on the elements, so (must you accept that) attachment is (based on the elements). Otherwise, there will be a contradiction in what you accept.[484]

(rGyal tshab:) The secondary qualities of whiteness, etc., are not based on already existent and abiding elements, because they are objectively separate from (the elements). Also, it follows that the meaning of the phrase "explained as based upon (the elements)" is that in a single simultaneous collection, the "basis" is only designated thus. That which is a previous generating cause is taught as the (actual) basis; that which already exists and abides cannot be accepted as a basis. This is so because unless the objective causes, the previous elements (are the basis,) then (we are left) with (a basis) that is merely designated as a basis, because it abides inseparably (with the based) in a simultaneous collection.[485]

(Opponent:) Just as liquor and its intoxicating power

are objectively separate basis and based, so also attachment, etc., are based on separately existing elements. Alternatively, there (can be) no basis and based where there is only an inseparable collection; liquor and its intoxicating power are a basis and based that exist separately.[486]

(rGyal tshab:) It follows that the intoxicating power is not objectively separate from the liquor-entity, because those two exist as substantially identical. Since that is the case, it follows that when liquor is heated, the liquor-entity will be destroyed, because its intoxicating power has been destroyed.[487]

(Opponent:) If the basis, the hot liquor, remains, it follows that the based, the intoxicating power, will not be destroyed or absent. The elements and mind equally are substantially different, in the same way as liquor and its intoxicating power.[488]

(rGyal tshab:) It follows that (the cases) are not the same, because the elements and mind are substantially different. This follows, because they are cognized by an unmistaken mind as different appearances, because they appear (respectively) as having the aspect of a tangible element and having the aspect of an (internal) feeling.[489]

II''. Refuting the meaning (PV 164b-166a, GT 313-14)

It follows that until the body is transformed, the es-

sential aspect of mind will be the same, because any mind is based on (body) as its special principal condition. It is just like the secondary qualities of form, etc., which increase and decrease following on the elements.[490]

(Opponent:) The (mental) aspect is transformed by the power of an objective condition.

(rGyal tshab:) It follows that it cannot in any way be accepted that conceptual thought is under the control of some (external) object, because it is generated only by the generic image. Thus, body and mind are unsuitable to be special basis and based; a subsequent cognition arises from a previous cognition without ever depending on bodily elements, because without ever depending on them, a subsequent cognition has as its cause the awakening of the propensity of a previous cognition.[491]

2'. Refuting (the idea that saṃsāra) has a beginning (PV 166b-178a, GT 314-17)

(This is divided into:) (a') Refutation by reason of the non-pervasion (of the Reason proving) that saṃsāra has a beginning and (b') Refutation by reason of the contradiction in pervasion.

a'. Refutation by reason of the non-pervasion of (the Reason proving) that saṃsāra has a beginning (PV 166b-169a, GT 314-15)

Saṃsāra can be proven beginningless by other Reasons, because it is not reasonable that sentient beings are newly born without previous (lives). Such is not the case, because it is unsuitable that the non-mental be the material cause of the mental.[492]

(Opponent:) Because all entities possess an unclear mind that has the power to be the material cause generating mind, we assert that it is proven that it is already established that the non-mental is not the material cause of the mental.[493]

(rGyal tshab:) It follows that it is unacceptable to argue--as who but a Sāṃkhya would?--that all results exist potentially in the cause, because you Lokāyatas pride yourselves on your sense of propriety.[494] It follows that (this Reason) pervades, because the bovine Sāṃkhya would assert that on the tip of a blade of grass--the prior cause--we could see a hundred elephants, the (eventual) result. The reason this is bovine is this: It follows that it is unacceptable that the result in any way exist essentially in the cause, because when (we seek the result that) exists essentially in the cause, then even if we divide the cause a hundred times and analyze it, that essence that is suita-

ble to appear as some essential result will not appear at the time of the previous cause.[495]

b'. Refutation by reason of the contradiction in pervasion (PV 169b-178a, GT 315-17)

(This is divided into:) (i') Expressing a consequential (syllogism) that entails an independent (syllogism) and (ii') Refuting the reply to that.

i'. Expressing a consequential (syllogism) that entails an independent (syllogism)[496] (PV 169b, GT 315)

It follows that it is possible that some ordinary sentient being just conceived might be conceived as a detached being, without being ascertained to arise as an attached being, because (by your argument) it is necessarily the case that all sentient beings have a genus that arises newly, without precedent. What is entailed by that is a Reason (based on) apprehension of contradictory pervasion.[497]

ii'. Refuting the reply to that (PV 170-178a, GT 315-17)

(This is divided into:) (X') Its unacceptability because of the impossibility of detachment (if) the material cause, the elements, are initially equal, (Y') Its unacceptability because of the impossibility of later detachment and (Z') Refuting the example of that.

<u>X'. Its unacceptability because of the impossibility of detachment (if) the material cause, the elements, are initially equal</u> (PV 170-71, GT 315-16)

(<u>Opponent</u>:) Because no persons transcend the nature of their causal elements, it is necessarily impossible that those (born) attached become detached.

(<u>rGyal tshab</u>:) It follows that the amounts of all attachment will be equal, because its material causes, the elements, are equal (in all beings).[498]

(<u>Opponent</u>:) The amount of attachment, etc., (derives) from variations in the amounts of the elements.

(<u>rGyal tshab</u>:) It follows that among living beings there will be a distinction between those who are living and those who are very living, because there are variations in the amounts of the elements that are their material cause. If that is asserted, it can be refuted by perception. Thus, it follows that whatever elements are the basis of the alteration in the amount of attachment, etc., attachment, etc., will increase and decrease as they increase and decrease, because in living beings in whom the elements that are the material cause are equal, one cannot distinguish the living from the very living, but one <u>can</u> distinguish the attached from the very attached. If that is asserted, it follows that it is possible that attachment, etc., which have precedent, become non-existent, because

of that assertion.[499]

Y'. Its impossibility because of the impossibility of later detachment (PV 172-3, GT 316)

(Opponent:) Even if there are different amounts of attachment, etc., in sentient beings, it is not possible that there is anyone in whom attachment, etc., become non-existent, because the nature of the equal causal elements necessarily is irreversible.

(rGyal tshab:) It still follows that the amount of attachment will be the same in all, because the material cause of the similar amount of attachment is the similarity in the nature of the elements.[500]

For example, it follows that the eye-cognition that grasps a cow does not successively grasp arising aspects that are specified as "cow," "very cow," "extremely cow," etc., because (that eye-cognition) is a cognition that arises from taking as its object the nature that is equivalent to the opposite of what is a non-cow. It follows that the word "or" (indicates that) in this case of the Lokāyata system, there will not be in the earth and other elements any levels of differentiation, such as living, very living, etc., because of the equality among the elements that are the material cause.[501]

Z'. Refuting the example of that (PV 174-178a, GT 316-17)

(This is divided into:) (p') The actual (refutation) and (q') The consequence that attachment is impossible.

p'. The actual (refutation) (PV 174-177a, GT 316-17)

(Opponent:) Although there are distinctions in the levels of intensity of fire, there does not exist any fire that is not hot. Similarly, in this case, although there are (distinctions in) the amount of attachment, it is impossible that attachment become non-existent.

(rGyal tshab:) It follows that the objects in the examples are not equivalent, because (the idea) that fire is substantially other than heat has been authoritatively refuted.[502]

It follows that it is possible that the qualities of attachment, etc., which exist as objectively separate from some body (can) be cut off in the case of some elements, because their variations of increase and decrease (come) from the elements' possessing variations in the levels of their (own) increase and decrease, (but) they are objectively separate and suitable for separation (from the elements), just like the white color of a blanket.[503]

It follows that attachment, etc., do not definitely abide in the elements as do such secondary qualities as

form, etc., because it is unsuitable that they be connected inseparably with the elements, (and because) they are objectively separate and suitable to be separated from (the elements).[504]

(Opponent:) Those two are equally unsuitable for connection with the elements.[505]

(rGyal tshab:) It follows that they are not equivalent (cases), because if (what you have asserted) were the case, it would follow that attachment, anger, etc., would be generated simultaneously (with the elements). It follows that they would be generated simultaneously and together, because they are generated from a single material cause, the elements.[506]

(Opponent:) They are generated by power of an objective condition, not simultaneously.

(rGyal tshab:) It follows that anger, attachment, etc., are sometimes ascertained not to be generated with external objects as their direct objects because they (are minds that) can grasp an object (merely) imputed by the mind.[507]

q'. The consequence that attachment is impossible (PV 177b-178a, GT 317)

It follows that attachment, etc., would become non-existent in some ordinary beings, because (those defilements) are separate from a corresponding cause.[508]

(Opponent:) The elements are the material cause.

(rGyal tshab:) It follows that the minds of attachment, etc., will be generated in all sentient beings at all times, because the permanent elements that are their cause are present.[509]

B'. Explaining the definition (of the truth of suffering) (PV 178b-181a, GT 317-18)

The first of the four particular qualities: suffering is impermanent, because it is an object that arises occasionally. Second: suffering is suffering, because it is based on present faulty collections and also because it is under the external power of previous causal karma and defilements.[510] The third: (suffering) is without an essential independent self, because it is impermanent and under external power. The fourth: (suffering) is empty, because it is not controlled by any independent self, either.[511]

The aggregates are not controlled by a self, because (such a self) is not their cause. This follows because (a self) is permanent. It follows that (this Reason) pervades, because it is unacceptable that a permanent (entity) in any way be a generator. It follows that it is unacceptable that the multiple aggregates be generated at different--earlier and later--times from one permanent self, because a permanent (entity) is not a cause.[512]

A sense-cognition that grasps form can be inferred to

have a cause other than (just) the organs and mind, because we see that in some instances when those causes, the organ and mind, are present, the result does not arise, and in some (other) instances it does arise. It follows that it is unsuitable that a permanent (entity) be a cause, because a permanent (entity) cannot be absent from (a causal situation).[513]

<u>II'. The truth of origination</u> (PV 181b-192a, GT 318-21)

<u>A'. The aspect of cause</u> (PV 181b-184, GT 318-19)

These suffering aggregates are proven to have a cause, because they arise occasionally.

PROOF THAT (THE REASON) PERVADES:

"It follows that (suffering) arises independent of other causes and conditions, because it is uncaused." If that is asserted, it follows that (suffering) is either a permanent existent or (something that) never exists, because of the assertion (that it is uncaused).[514]

Some Lokāyatas, Mīmāṃsakas, etc., say that just as the sharpness of a thorn and the roundness of a pea do not have any cause that is their producer, so these (suffering) entities arise causelessly.

It follows that the sharpness of a thorn, etc., <u>do</u>

have a cause, because (we see that) when some objectively separate (entity) existes previously then some subsequent (entity) arises; or, when some previous (entity) exists, then that previous (entity, when it) is transformed, is said to be the cause of the subsequent (entity that arises in its place). It follows through positive and negative concomitance that the sharpness of a thorn, etc., also have (a cause).[515]

(Opponent:) Well, then, it follows that the tangibility of a single composite is the cause of a sense-cognition that sees form, because if (tangibility) did not exist, there would be no (sense-cognition).

(rGyal tshab:) The tangibility of the elements does not directly bring about the sense-cognition that sees form; it merely is a condition for it, because it is the corresponding or simultaneously arising cause of that form. It is imputed merely as the simultaneously arising cause of a single simultaneous composite. Thus, the tangibility of the elements is a cause of the sense-cognition that sees a form, which is a secondary quality that is its own result, (only) because it is the corresponding cause of such form.[516]

B'. The aspect of the origination of all (suffering) (PV 185a, GT 319)

It is not possible that suffering arises from a unique

cause, such as God, because (God) does not have the ability to generate a result. This follows, because we have already refuted (the idea) that permanent (entities) can be causes. Having refuted (the idea) that individual sufferings have an independent (entity) as their cause, we have shown that they are necessarily all originated from a collection of causes.[517]

C'. The aspect of generation (PV 185b-187a, GT 319-20)

(This is divided into:) (1') The nature of generation and (2') Disposing (of the objection) that (our description) contradicts scripture.

1'. The nature of generation (PV 185b-186a, GT 319)

Because it is impossible that (anything) be generated without cause or from a permanent (entity), the cause of (resultant) suffering is the craving for existence that manifestly craves (saṃsāric) existence, because it is because of that that men grasp at particular objects, such as abodes, bodies and possessions, and they crave them with a thought desiring to obtain them. The expressions "utterly grasping" and "all-grasping" here refer to (actually) obtaining, so the phrase "obtained by the condition of craving" shows a cause and effect that directly accomplish (one another).[518]

2'. Disposing (of the objection) that (our description) contradicts scripture (PV 186b-187a, GT 319-20)

(*Opponent*:) This contradicts the scriptural (teaching) that the cause (of suffering) is the threefold craving, (indicated) in such passages as: "What is the noble truth of the origination of suffering? Whatever is craving...."

(*rGyal tshab*:) It follows that there is no contradiction between the scriptural (teaching) that the cause is the threefold craving and the explanation that the cause is (the desire) to obtain such objects as abodes, body and possessions, because we assert that the craving that strives for particular objects is the craving for existence that desires to obtain (saṃsāric) existence, while those cravings that relate to objects by way of living beings' desire to obtain pleasure and their desire to avoid suffering are, respectively, the craving for sense-pleasure and the craving for annihilation.[519]

D'. The aspect of condition (PV 187b-192a, GT 320-21)

(This is divided into:) (1') Showing that craving is a condition, (2') Setting forth a demonstration of that and (3') Disposing (of the objection) that (the consequences apply) equally (to us).

1'. Showing that craving is a condition (PV 187b-188a, GT 320)

Craving is the aspect of condition, because it is the cooperative basis of its own result, a subsequent (saṃsāric) existence. It follows that craving is thus, because by perceiving as pleasurable what is not pleasurable, those who are degenerate will enter lower abodes. That distorted perception is not causeless, because it arises from a cause that is attachment to self.[520]

2'. Setting forth a demonstration of that (PV 188b, GT 320)

It follows that craving is the cause of a subsequent (saṃsāric) existence, because we do not see a detached Arahant born into a subsequent (saṃsāric) existence, by virtue of his having utterly abandoned craving.[521]

3'. Disposing (of the objection) that (the consequences apply) equally to us (PV 188c-192a, GT 320-21)

(Opponent:) Well, then, attachment arises also from the body, because we do not see attachment in one who is bodiless. For example, (you yourself assert that) since we do not see a Detached One take birth, attachment (must be) the cause generating a (subsequent saṃsāric) existence.[522]

(rGyal tshab:) If you prove just that the body is a

cause of attachment, then you prove what is already proven, because the Buddha has aserted that it is just a cause. This follows, because we have already accepted that it is just a cooperative condition.[523]

(Opponent:) Well, then, this contradicts your previous refutation of (the idea that the body is) the cause.

(rGyal tshab:) We have not refuted (the idea) that the body is merely a cause of attachment, because we have cleared away (the idea) that (the body) is the material cause or the special cooperative condition.[524] It follows that the Lokāyatas themselves damage their own assertion that there are no past or future lives, because they are following the Buddhist reasoning (proving) that attachment is the cause of the body, and have set forth a perfect example and asserted body as the cause of attachment.[525]

(Opponent:) Because we do not see any other (source of) visible attachment in a body at birth, attachment that has not arisen before is simultaneous with the generation of the body, and so the body is not the result of attachment.

(rGyal tshab:) Well, then, it also follows that attachment is not the result of the body, because the two (are asserted to) arise simultaneously. If that is asserted, it follows that the attachment immediately after conception comes from previous attachment, because it is generated from its corresponding cause.[526]

(Opponent:) If (you assert that) craving alone is the cause, then you contradict the explanation that the cause of suffering is threefold: ignorance, craving and karma.

(rGyal tshab:) Nescience and ignorance are also a cause generating subsequent (saṃsāric) existences; the reason they are not explicitly called the cause in this case is because they are not the immediate cause of (subsequent saṃsāric existences)--thus, (ignorance) is not called (the cause here). The reason craving is explained as the cause of a subsequent (saṃsāric) existence is because it incites the continuum of a subsequent (saṃsāric) existence as its own result and is the projecting cause that projects (the subsequent saṃsāric existence); and because it is the efficient cause that effects the immediate (result). Nor is karma the principal cause of a subsequent (saṃsāric) existence, because if there is craving, then there automatically is karma, while if there is no craving, then even if there is karma there will be no birth into a (subsequent saṃsāric) existence, because if there is no craving, even a royal existence earned by karma will be avoided.[527]

III'. The truth of cessation (PV 192b-207a, GT 321-333)

(This is divided into:) (A') The aspect of cessation, (B') The aspect of peace and (C') The aspect of sublimity. The aspect of definite emergence is explained together with

the aspect of definite removal of the truth of path, so it is not directly discussed at this point.

A'. The aspect of cessation (PV 192b-196a, GT 322-8)

(This is divided into:) (1') Setting forth the Reason that proves the truth of cessation and (2') Disposing of objections.

1'. Setting forth the Reason that proves the truth of cessation (PV 192b, GT 322-6)

(This is divided into:) (a') The meaning of the word and (b') A detailed investigation.

a'. The meaning of the word (PV 192b, GT 322)

The aggregates of an ordinary being are not an (eternal) continuum fixed as unsuitable for cessation, because (the aggregates') own cause can (cease) through the stopping power of the contradictory condition and the incompletion of the appropriate conditions.[528]

b'. A detailed investigation[529] (no PV, GT 322-6)

(This is divided into:) (i') The way of proving liberation and (ii') The way of proving omnisicience.

i'. The way of proving liberation (no PV, GT 322-5)

There necessarily exists some type of elimination of one's own (suffering) continuum by the power of an antidote, since (there is an antidote) that is powerfully destructive of the type of cause (that causes) one's (suffering). For example, when we see (a cause) having the power to counteract a cold touch, we see that there is an elimination of the continuum of horripilation. Similarly, we see that (an antidote) is powerfully destructive of the type of cause that (causes) these aggregates of an ordinary being. This is a perfect, objectively impelled Reason; its pervasion is proven by authoritative perception.[530]

PROOF OF THE REASON'S PRESENCE IN THE SUBJECT:

It is necessarily the case that there exists (an antidote) that is powerfully destructive of the type (of attitude) that is a distorted attitude toward the reality of entities. For example, there is the (mistaken) superimposition that grasps that there is no fire at a smoky pass. Similarly, (the view) that grasps at a self of persons is a distortion of the reality of entities.[531]

(Opponent:) When we see that there is (an antidote) destructive of grasping at a self of persons, how does that prove that the cause of suffering can be destroyed?

(rGyal tshab:) From the authoritative cognition that

ascertains that those two are (respectively) cause and result.[532]

(Opponent:) How is that?

(rGyal tshab:) The passage, "in someone who sees a self...."[533] shows that it is proven by perception that craving for non-separation from self is drawn by its own power from grasping at a self of persons. It is proven by authoritative perception that from that (arises) craving for the pleasures of the self. From that (arises) craving for the sense-organs and such externals as food and clothing, which accomplish the pleasures of the self. From that, in order to accomplish the pleasures of the self, there (arise) the complexes (tending toward) karma of the three doors. From that are generated the suffering feelings of not obtaining desired objects and of obtaining undesired objects. (Thus,) we have proven by authoritative perception that present suffering and self-grasping are result and cause.[535]

If we (wish to) prove by objectively impelled inference that from death-time grasping there is connection to a subsequent homogeneous (result, then the argument is as follows:) Since we designate the subsequent homogeneous (result) to which there is a connection "suffering," it is ascertained by objectively impelled inference that the subsequent suffering is in a cause-result relation (with the

previous grasping).[535]

(Opponent:) Even if the subsequent homogeneous (result) has the meaning of suffering, how, on the basis merely of ascertaining that present karma and defilements and (a subsequent result) are cause and result, can you ascertain through objectively impelled (inference) that that (result) should have the name "suffering"?[536]

(rGyal tshab:) We can ascertain by objectively impelled authoritative (reasoning) that the meaning of suffering is that which is produced by karma and defilement. If you have not forgotten what has already been ascertained, it has been proven by authoritative perception that there exist up until death-time karma and craving. Since it has been proven by inference that from that (karma and craving) there is a connection to a subsequent homogeneous result, it is proven that that subsequent homogeneous (result) is under the power of karma and defilement, so it is well proven that (that result) has the meaning of suffering. (Therefore,) one can understand that it also can be designated (with the name, "suffering").[537]

(Opponent:) Well, then, how do you prove that grasping at a self of persons is a distorted attitude toward the reality of entities?

(rGyal tshab:) It is proven from the ascertainment that there is no self of persons. This is divided into: i-

dentifying the object of refutation, the reasoning refuting that (object of refutation), and the way of meditating on selflessness.

IDENTIFYING THE OBJECT OF REFUTATION:

This is as taught in a later verse, (where it says) "because he would obtain other, better (organs if he could)...."[538] Innate to one's mind there is desire for the ownership of an independent self of persons that is not the collection of aggregates, a single (aggregate), or the continuum. The desirous (mind) does not impute only this collection of aggregates as the person, because (we know that) if one could exchange one's present aggregates for special aggregates, such as (those) of a god, then clearly one would definitely desire to reject the former and adopt the latter. Nor, thus, does one impute just mental cognition as exhaustive of the person, because if one could exchange one's present unclear mind for something like an omniscient mind, then, like a merchant (trading) goods, one clearly would desire whatever exhange one could manage. If a merchant thinks that (the meaning of) "merchant" is exhausted merely by an imputation on his goods, and holds that it is not otherwise, then (there result) the contradictions that he will be perplexed as to whether he can extract the goods of another; and if he (should wish to) obtain the goods of another, which are superior to his own goods, he will be

perplexed as to whether he can substitute (the other merchandise for his own).[539]

Thus, there exists desire for an independent person that is not exhausted merely by its imputation on either the collection of aggregates or some single (aggregate), and that independent perosn for which there is desire, designated as "the self of persons," is the object of refutation.

THE REASONING REFUTING THAT (OBJECT OF REFUTATION):

The person does not exist as an independent (entity) that is not merely an imputation on the aggregates, because if it were, it would not be seen as other than suitable as the intentional object of an authoritative cognition. It is definitely proven by just this statement.[540]

Alternatively, (the Reason,) that which is neither naturally identical with or different from the aggregates, does not pervade (the Predicate), a naturally existing (entity), like the horns of a hare. It also should be known that there does not exist anywhere an independent person that is naturally identical with or different from the aggregates. It is easy to ascertain pervasion. As for the presence of the Reason in the Subject: there is no natural identity between an independent person (and the aggregates), because (the aggregates) are under the power of external causes. (The person) does not exist as naturally

different from (the aggregates,) because if it did, then it would not be seen as other than suitable as an intentional object.[541]

Based on those two Reasons, we have proven the emptiness and selflessness that are the special dharmas of the truth of suffering, and which cut off attachment grasping at an imputed self. Based on the fundamental Reason, we have proven the selflessness that cuts off the innate attachment grasping at a self.[542]

THE WAY OF MEDITATING ON SELFLESSNESS:

Having well identified the object of refutation, based on the appropriate reasoning one should contemplate one-pointedly again and again (the fact) that there is not the slightest existent (that exists) in the way of an independent self. When one has meditated thus, and rises from contemplation, by (the meditation's) power one should become mentally certain that the so-called "person" is merely an imputation on the aggregates. One should remind oneself of this again and again.[543]

Therefore, in summary, it is proven by objectively impelled reasoning that there is a total elimination of the continuum of suffering by virtue of an antidote. That elimination is called "the truth of cessation" and "liberation."

ii'. The way of proving omniscience

(no PV, GT 325-6)

There necessarily exists a type of powerful destroyer (that exists) in simultaneous combination with the (gradual) elimination of all destructibles of (the appropriate) type, just as we see that a powerful fire exists in simultaneous combination with the (gradual) elimination of all kinds of destructible cold to which it is proximate. The mind that realizes the reality of the Four Noble Truths, (in such aspects as) selflessness, etc., is a powerful destroyer. It is proven by reason of this statement that the mind that understands the reality of the Four Noble Truths exists in simultaneous combination with the (gradual) elimination of all destructible stains that (result from) straying from the reality of the Four Noble Truths. That mind that realizes the reality of the Four Noble Truths in combination with being devoid of all stains is known as omniscient.[544]

Since it also is proven that one can take as (a logical Subject) a mind realizing the selflessness of dharmas, it is proven that there is a mind realizing the selflessness of dharmas that exists in combination with the (gradual) elimination of all (instances of) self-grasping. That mind is omniscient. This (latter) discussion is incidental in this section.[545]

Inferring along these lines, one should (be able to) know extensively the way of proving liberation and omniscience through objectively impelled reasoning. (Some people) grow impatient if they see or hear even a little elaboration of words and meaning; since I want to satisfy even them, I have not elaborated.

<u>2'. Disposing of objections</u> (PV 193-196a, GT 326-8)

(This is divided into:) (a') Disposing of the consequence that liberation is impossible, (b') Disposing of the consequence that it is impossible to strive for liberation and (c') Disposing of the consequence that once liberation is attained it is impossible to abide in (saṃsāric) existence for even a moment.

<u>a'. Disposing of the consequence that liberation is impossible</u> (PV 193a, GT 326-7)

(<u>Opponent</u>:) If there is no permanent person who is objectively separate from saṃsāra and nirvāṇa, and if that person is a subject who has a saṃsāric nature, then it follows that there is no previous liberation or subsequent liberation, because that person is a saṃsāric subject.

(<u>rGyal tshab</u>:) This is argued by other schools that accept (the possibility of) liberation. Alternatively, those who are sceptical about liberation, such as the Mī-

māṃsakas, say: "There is no liberation from saṃsāra, because the mind is naturally stained, so a person cannot transcend being a saṃsāric subject."

Just because there is a saṃsāric subject, it does not follow that one can prove that there is no liberation, because we assert (liberation) regarding a different (kind of) person, and (because) the Reason is unproven. Alternatively, it follows that there does not exist a permanent person who is the basis of bondage and freedom, because we have replied to assertions regarding that person('s existence), and (shown that) the Reason is unproven.[546]

b'. Disposing of the consequence that it is impossible to strive for liberation (PV 193b-194, GT 327)

(Opponent:) If there is no self that first is bound in saṃsāra and (later) is freed, then it is pointless to exert oneself on the path to liberation.

(rGyal tshab:) An ordinary being, as long as he has not in the least destroyed his attachment to self, will not abide happily with a naturally liberated mindstream, because, having superimposed (on his aggregates) a suffering self, he will be tormented by suffering. Since there is no self that is liberated, there definitely is a purpose in striving on the path to liberation, because, since there is no (self), it is necessary to destroy the distorted super-

imposition of a self.[547]

c'. Disposing of the consequence that once liberation is attained it is impossible to abide in (saṃsāric) existence for even a moment (PV 195-196a, GT 327-8)

(Opponent:) If there is no self of persons, then an Arahant will not remain in saṃsāra for even a moment, because he has realized selflessness, and (thus) has no hope for the happiness of the self.

(rGyal tshab:) An Arahant who is free from attachment to the three realms has the cause for remaining a little while in (saṃsāric) existence, because he is under the power of benevolence that has sentient beings as its intentional objects; or, alternatively, because the body projected by previous karma has not completed the remainder of its life-span. There is no contradiction (in asserting) that a body projected by previous karma abides briefly, for the remainder of its life-span, because it abides (when the Arahant), without desiring immediately to turn away (from saṃsāra), sees some purpose (in remaining).[548]

(Opponent:) Well, then, since the Arahant is under the power of karma, that karma will project him into a subsequent (saṃsāric) existence.

(rGyal tshab:) An Arahant who is beyond craving for existence cannot be projected into another (saṃsāric) ex-

istence by the karma in his mindstream, because the cooperative condition of that (subsequent existence), craving, has been destroyed.[549]

<u>B'. The aspect of peace</u> (PV 196b-204a, GT 328-32)

(This is divided into:) (1') Disposing of the consequence that a Detached One does not eliminate faults, (2') Disposing of the consequence that he is not freed from (saṃsāric) existence and (3') Disposing of (alleged) extreme consequences in regard to self-grasping's being the cause of (saṃsāric) existence.

<u>1'. Disposing of the consequence that a Detached One does not eliminate faults</u> (PV 196b-199a, GT 328-9)

(DISPOSING OF) THE CONSEQUENCE THAT HE HAS NOT ABANDONED THE SELF-VIEW:

(<u>Opponent</u>:) It follows that an Arahant has not abandoned the self-view, because he has a view toward sentient beings. If he did not, it would be contradictory that he be benevolent.

(<u>rGyal tshab</u>:) The benevolence of an Arahant is not connected with the view that there are independently (existing) sentient beings, because there is no contradiction (in asserting) that he knows by perception that sentient

beings are tormented by suffering and generates a real mental quality that follows on a previous (mental) complex that represents the development of equanimity.

An alternative Reason for the foregoing thesis: (The benevolence of an Arahant is not connected with the view that there are independently existing sentient beings,) because he directly realizes the impermanence, etc., of suffering, and generates an actual mental quality that follows on a previous (mental) complex that (represents) the development in his mindstream of (benevolence) that lacks its own contradictory (condition), anger.

In brief, the meaning of the verse is that since (an Arahant) has abandoned all (instances of) grasping at a self of persons, he sees that what is imputed as a sentient being is merely the dharmas (referred to as the aggregates), and he generates compassion.[550]

DISPOSING OF THE CONSEQUENCE THAT HE IS ATTACHED:

(Opponent:) It follows that he is attached, because he strives for the sake of sentient beings.

(rGyal tshab:) It follows that compassion and attachment do not at all have the same causes and aspects, etc., because attachment is generated from holding as (pure, pleasurable, etc.,) those dharmas that do not have the nature of purity, pleasure, etc., and (generated) from the superimposition of a present self existing as something o-

ther than (the aggregates). Benevolence is generated just from the mindstream cognition of the suffering aggregates, those complex phenomena empty of self.[551]

DISPOSING OF THE CONSEQUENCE THAT A DETACHED ONE HAS ANGER:

(Opponent:) (An Arahant) must have anger, because when others harm the objects of his benevolence, he will generate anger.

(rGyal tshab:) An Arahant does not generate anger because of any fault, because he has not the slightest self-grasping. It follows that this (Reason) pervades, because ignorance is the root of the faults of attachment, (anger,) etc. (Ignorance) entails grasping at a self of persons (in relation to himself and) sentient beings. It is reasonable to assert that the benevolence in his mindstream is faultless, because he has removed all defilements.[552]

2'. Disposing of the consequence that he is not freed from (saṃsāric) existence (PV 199b-201a, GT 329-30)

(Opponent:) Since the Arahant's body, projected by karma, is (included in) the truth of suffering, he is not free from suffering.

(rGyal tshab:) It is not the case that (an Arahant) is not freed from (saṃsāric) existence, because, since he has eliminated the results of previous karmic complexes through utterly destroying the defilements, there will be no con-

nection to another (saṃsāric) existence. Although he has not eliminated this remaining aggregate brought about by previous karmic complexes, it is not the case that he is not free from (saṃsāric) existence, because his is an abandonment without even the slightest fault of defilement presently abiding.

Alternatively, as long as the Buddhas abide in (saṃsāric) existence, they are not covered by faults, as a lotus (is not covered with) mud, because the complete power of the two collections has not been exhausted and will not be (exhausted).[553]

(Opponent:) If he abides in (saṃsāric) existence because of compassion, then since the continuum (of compassion) is not cut, he will abide (in saṃsāra) forever.

(rGyal tshab:) Śrāvakas, Pratyekabuddhas and Arahants, even if they abide in (saṃsāric) existence for a little while, do not make a great effort to abide indefinitely, because even though they develop compassion, they develop it to a lesser degree. Those Bodhisattvas who dwell on the great stages will dwell there for the duration of the existence (of saṃsāra) for the sake of others, because they have developed great benevolence continually and have increased it infinitely.[554]

3'. Disposing of (alleged) extreme consequences in regard to self-grasping's being the cause of (saṃsāric) existence (PV 201b-204a, GT 330-32)

(Opponent:) If the view (that there is a self in) perishable composites is the root of saṃsāra, then it follows that as soon as a Streamwinner first generates the path of seeing, he should have no connection to a subsequent (saṃsāric) existence, because he is separated, without there being a remainder, from the view (that there is a self in) perishable composites.

(rGyal tshab:) This is an objection by those who do not assert (the existence of) an innate view (that there is a self in) the perishable. It follows that it is not the case that a Streamwinner does not obtain a subsequent (saṃsāric) existence by reason of his having utterly abandoned the view (that there is a self in the) perishable, because he has not utterly abandoned the innate view (that there is a self in the) perishable.[555]

If you say that Reason is unproven, and that (the Streamwinner) does utterly abandon (even the innate view that there is a self in the perishable), then it follows that he will not be born anywhere in (saṃsāric) existence. Alternatively, it follows that a Streamwinner who (has attained the path of) seeing and (will attain final) peace (in this lifetime) will not be born anywhere in (saṃsāric)

existence, because an Ārya, having utterly abandoned the view (that there is a self in the) perishable at the time of the path of seeing, will actualize nirvāṇa (in this lifetime).[556]

(Opponent:) There is (in such a Streamwinner) no (more) defiled ignorance that is the cause of (saṃsāric) existence, but that view (that there is a self in the) perishable is not the cause of (saṃsāric) existence. Since a conceptual (view) alone is generated from the teachings of another, it is impossible that one be born into a (further saṃsāric) existence without one's mind being changed by a system of tenets.[557]

(rGyal tshab:) It is not the case that there is no innate view (that there is a self in the) perishable, because when one desires the objects of the thoughts "may I be happy" and "may I not suffer," (that "I") is imputed without regard to systems of tenets; and any thought that grasps at the conception of an independent "I" without merely imputing on the aggregates (involves) the innate view that sentient beings have a self.[558]

The assertion that the view (that there is a self in the) perishable and grasping at a self of persons are merely the thought that there is an "I" in (sentient beings) is only the wrong idea that is sceptical regarding karma and its result, because an Arahant who has utterly abandoned

the view (that there is a self in the) perishable has the thought conceiving "I" when he says "my begging bowl" or "my teaching cloak." Since it is not the case (that an Arahant grasps at an "I"), it is impossible, (even) when an Arahant's begging bowl and teaching cloak are stolen, that he should become dejected. That is not all: the authors of the Vinaya Piṭaka and its commentaries cut off all doubt: when the wealth of the Teacher was stolen after he had shown the way to (reach) nirvāṇa, it is impossible that he was the least bit dejected. Since he said "I" and "mine" before showing the way to (reach) nirvāṇa, doubt in this matter can be cut off. I will leave this (matter) for the time being.[559]

Thus, the view (that there is a self in) perishable composites is an independent grasping at an "I" that is not (merely) imputed on any continuum of composite aggregates. Induced by the power of that are two (types of) grasping: grasping at an independent "I" and grasping at a "mine" to be controlled by that. The (sources of that are) two: conceptually imputing (grasping derived from) systems of tenets and the innate (grasping) generated without regard to (systems of tenets).[560]

Without that being the case, if the view (that there is a self in the) perishable is merely the holding of the conception of "I," then it follows that merely holding (the

conception of) a person is grasping at a self of persons. If that is asserted, then since thinking "that person is Devadatta" or "(that person) is Yajan" is grasping at a self of persons, that person (so named) will be a self of persons. If that is asserted, it follows that the aggregates are impossible, because a (permanent) person is impossible.[561]

If there is some flaw in holding the thought of "I," then it follows that there is some flaw in thinking "I give charity" or "I guard morality." Thus, if it is proven that the grasping at a self of persons is the mistaken cognition of a desired object, then the mere holding of "I" will be (mistaken), too. Thinking that if one accepts a mere "I" one must necessarily accept a self of persons, one's mind will be well-disposed toward the system that accepts a permanent self.[562] Objectifying another person, one has the desire to prove that it is independent, not just an imputation on the aggregates--that is grasping at a self of persons, but not the view (that there is a self in the) perishable.[563]

It follows that a Streamwinner is not attached to self, because he does not see an "I" as independent. If that is asserted, it follows that he will not move into a subsequent (saṃsāric) existence through desire for happiness, because there is no craving for (the happiness of)

the self.[564]

C'. The aspect of sublimity (PV 204b-207a, GT 332-3)

(Opponent:) If a self exists, then when one has been freed from prior bondage, one obtains a particular satisfaction of the self, so that liberation is sublime. Since it is impossible that there be such if selflessness is the case, there exists a permanent person who is the basis of bondage and freedom.

(rGyal tshab:) The defilements bind us in (saṃsāric) existence, because they are the cause generating their own result, the suffering of further (saṃsāric) existence. It follows that it is unacceptable that a permanent (entity) in any way be a binder of what is bound, because it is unsuitable to be a cause. The wisdom directly realizing selflessness is what liberates us from (saṃsāric) existence, because it is the supreme method that is the very reason for the non-generation of the suffering of further (saṃsāric) existence. It follows that it is unacceptable that a permanent (entity) in any way be a liberator or what is liberated, because it is unsuitable to be a result.[565]

(Vātsīputrīya Opponent:)[566] We are not at fault, since we assert that the person is not expressed as either permanent or impermanent.

(rGyal tshab:) It follows that that person is not the

cause of any result, because it has not been expressed as impermanent. It also follows that it does not exist in such a way that it is bound or freed, because it is not expressible as either permanent or impermanent. It follows that it is permanent, because it is the basis of bondage and freedom and is indestructible. It follows that (this Reason) pervades, because the wise call "permanent" that dharma whose own nature is indestructible. Having shown that it is acceptable that something lacking destrubtibility is permanent, this (reasoning) also well refutes the assertion that if something is permanent it must necessarily be a functioning entity and that a non-existent (entity) is permanent.[567]

It follows that the Vātsiputrīya should abandon this shameful view that accepts a third possibility where only (mutually exclusive) direct opposition is possible, and call that person "permanent"; it is reasonable that he so call it, because by (his reasoning) it is an indestructible entity.[568]

Alternatively, that (discussion of the truth of cessation) can be applied only to covering the aspect of cessation, without being divided individually into the two remaining aspects.[569]

IV'. The truth of path (PV 207b-282a, GT 333-361)

(This is divided into:) (A') Proving that the wisdom realizing selflessness is the path to freedom from (saṃsāric) existence and (B') Proving that self-grasping is the root of craving.

A'. Proving that the wisdom realizing selflessness is the path to freedom from (saṃsāric) existence (PV 207b-219a, GT 333-9)

(This is divided into:) (1') Identifying the path to freedom and (2') Disposing of objections to that.

1'. Identifying the path to freedom (PV 207b, GT 333)

The previously-explained path that is the direct realization of selflessness is the path to freedom from (saṃsāric) existence, because from developing it as the direct antidote to self-grasping, one eliminates all faults and attains a completely transformed state.[570]

2'. Disposing of objections to that (PV 208-219a, GT 333-9)

(This is divided into:) (a') Disposing of the objection that abandonments are reversible, (b') Disposing of the objection that stains are unsuitable to be removed and (c') Disposing of the objection that even if they can be

removed a little it is impossible that they be thoroughly removed.

a'. Disposing of the objection that abandonments are reversible (PV 208-217a, GT 333-9)

(This is divided into:) (i') The impossibility of a complete abandonment's being reversed, (ii') The impossibility of there being a method of reversing a (complete abandonment) and (iii') Disposing of (the idea that) the wisdom realizing selflessness is unacceptable as an antidote to self-grasping.

i'. The impossibility of a complete abandonment's being reversed (PV 208-212a, GT 334-6)

(This is divided into:) (X') The impossibility of generating faults in a mind in a transformed state and (Y') Even if there is (a fault), the impossibility of its remaining long.

X'. The impossibility of generating faults in a mind in a transformed state (PV 208-211a, GT 334-5)

(This is divided into:) (p') A brief demonstration, (q') An extensive explanation and (r') Summary.

p'. A brief demonstration (PV 208a, GT 334)

(Opponent:) Even if for a short time one transforms one's state so that faults become non-existent, still, just as an unprecedented path arises newly, so attachment and other flaws will arise again.

(rGyal tshab:) This is the objection that it is unacceptable that (the truths of) cessation and path (have, respectively, the aspects of) definite emergence and definite removal. A mind that is in a completely transformed state will not have faults arise again in it, because the wisdom realizing selflessness (renders) the power of generating faults (in the mind) non-existent.[571]

q'. An extensive explanation (PV 208b-210a, GT 334-5)

DEMONSTRATING THE NATURAL PURITY OF MIND:

The sense-cognition that grasps form has the nature of grasping the reality of that form just as the object exists, because grasping the reality of that object just as it exists is the dharma or nature of (cognition). Similarly, it is also the nature of form that it generates the cognition that grasps just as it exists the nature of the object that exists in reality, because such is the nature of form.[572]

(Opponent:) It is taught that stains are adventitious;

the real nature of objects is impermanence, selflessness, etc. If that is seen from the beginning by an unmistaken mind, then one will be freed without effort.

(rGyal tshab:) It follows that there is not the problematic consequence that sentient beings are freed without effort, because they are diverted from that reality by other conditions, such as self-grasping.[573]

(Opponent:) Since stains arise through sudden conditions, they will return, like the heat of water (reboiled).

(rGyal tshab:) It is not the case that faults will return, because their absence necessarily depends on development of the (contradictory) condition, the wisdom realizing selflessness. If one develops that, it is not the case that it will be unsuitable that (faults) be absent, because they will be baseless, since they have self-grasping as their root. It is like the mind that sees a rope as a snake.[574]

r'. Summary (PV 210b-211a, GT 335)

The nature of the mind is clear light, because however much it is covered by the darkness of self-grasping, etc., that (self-grasping, etc.,) does not partake of the nature of mind, and because mind has the nature of being perishable, etc.[575] The nature of mind is not an object that is not covered by stains, but the darkness of self-grasping

that has come over the mind does not partake of the nature of (mind). If it did so partake, then the manner of grasping that grasps a self would be in accord with how the mind really exists. If that were the case, there would be no selflessness, and a self would exist.[576]

The stains of attachment, etc., are adventitious, because they are (based on) minds that partake of the inverse of the real nature of mind. There is no power that can generate faults in a mind whose nature is the antidote that (prevents the arising) of flaws at a later time, because even earlier, when one is training in study and reflection about the aggregates, self-grasping has no power to destroy the wisdom realizing selflessness.[577]

<u>Y'. Even if there is (a fault), the impossibility of its remaining long</u> (PV 211b-212a, GT 335-336)

A Non-returner's mind, even if there exists in it the power of generating faults, does not have the power to make them remain a long time, because it exists as an entity that has the force and essence that is able to generate the wisdom realizing selflessness, which damages self-grasping. For example, fire cannot keep (burning) for a long time on damp ground.[578]

ii'. The impossibility of there being a method of reversing a (complete abandonment) (PV 212b-213a, GT 336)

An Arahant does not try to restore the faults of attachment, etc., and even if he does try, he is unable to restore them, because the thought in his mindstream that directly realizes selflessness perfectly adheres to its own nature in all respects, without being harmed at all by the proximity of its contradictory condition, saṃsāra. The literal meaning of that is as explained in the first chapter.[579]

iii'. Disposing of (the idea that) the wisdom realizing selflessness is unacceptable as an antidote to self-grasping (PV 213b-217a, GT 336-9)

(This is divided into:) (X') The unsuitability, as an antidote, of the mere opposite to the manner of grasping (that is self-grasping), (Y') Proving that defiled ignorance is not substantially different from the view (that there is a self in the) perishable and (Z') Showing that the wisdom realizing selflessness is the antidote through its opposition to the manner of grasping (that is self-grasping).

X'. The unsuitability, as an antidote, of the mere opposite to the manner of grasping (that is self-grasping) (PV 213b-215a, GT 336)

(Opponent:) If the manner of grasping (that is self-grasping) is damaged merely by its opposite, then self-grasping also will damage (its opposite, as) attachment and anger damage one another.

(rGyal tshab:) Although attachment and anger are merely mutually opposing manners of grasping, it follows that they are not (related as) destroyer and destroyed, because they are equally generated by the power of a single cause, self-grasping, and because those two are direct cause and direct result.[580]

(Opponent:) Isn't meditation on the four immeasureables, etc., another antidote?

(rGyal tshab:) It follows that love, (compassion, sympathetic joy and equanimity) are not the supreme direct antidotes that cut out faults from the root, because they do not directly oppose defiled ignorance and the manner of grasping (that is self-grasping). It follows that (this Reason) pervades, because attachment and all the (other) faults have as their root defiled ignorance, which is also of the nature of the view (that there is a self in) perishable composites.[581]

Y'. Proving that defiled ignorance is not substantially different from the view (that there is a self in the) perishable (PV 215b-216, GT 336-8)

(Opponent:) Ignorance is a mental factor that has the aspect of unclearness. The view (that there is a self in the) perishable is a mental factor that has the aspect of definite determination, so it is unacceptable that those have one essence.[582]

(rGyal tshab:) Defiled ignorance is a cognition that is an opposing factor to knowledge, the wisdom realizing selflessness. It follows that from among the three (types of opposing conditions), ignorance is neither the opposing factor of nescience nor some other opposing factor, because by the very fact that ignorance is a mental factor it must necessarily grasp an aspect of an intentional object.[583]

(Opponent:) (Only ignorance) is a contradictory opposing factor (to the wisdom realizing selflessness).

(rGyal tshab:) It follows that it is not reasonable that the view (that there is a self in) perishable composites, which is defined as the view of "I" and "mine," be other than ignorance, because a sūtra says that defiled ignorance is wrongly seeing (through) a manner of grasping (opposite) to the wisdom realizing selflessness, and because (the view that there is a self in the perishable, too,) is a cognition that is the opposing factor contradic-

ting that wisdom realizing selflessness.[584]

The *Candrapradīpa Sūtra* says, "What is it that is separate from ignorance? Whatever is separate from extra superimposition on the true, ultimate nature of dharmas."[585] Accordingly, it also says in the *Daśabhūmika Sūtra*: "All conventional faulty actions generated in the world arise from manifest desire for self. If there is separation from manifest desire for self, they will not arise."[586]

Since we have shown that defiled ignorance is the grasping of the direct opposite of the object of the wisdom realizing selflessness, it is clear that we have shown that self-grasping is ignorance, because it is impossible that one grasp the direct opposite (of wisdom) without grasping at a self.[587]

It follows that (the above passage from) the *Daśabhūmika Sūtra* also shows that self-grasping is ignorance, because if it were otherwise, then when the Teacher established the factor of ignorance among the twelve factors of dependent origination, he would have left it out, and there would be no connection (between ignorance and) his teaching on self-grasping. (Since he *did* specify that ignorance was self-grasping,) it is unreasonable (to attempt) to show that that sūtra has a view other than that ignorance is self-grasping.[588]

(*Opponent*:) Since ignorance and the view (that there

is a self in the) perishable are (said in the Daśabhūmika to be) concomitant factors, ignorance is shown as a concomitant factor by entailment. If it were otherwise, (the assertion that) those two (are simultaneous concomitant factors) would contradict the explanation of concomitant factors in scripture.[589]

(rGyal tshab:) Since we accept that the view (that there is a self in the) perishable is ignorance, it follows that when you argue that it is contradictory to the explanation that those two are concomitant factors, there is (in fact) no problem of contradiction, because the scriptural passage that shows them as "concomitant" does not show those two as separate objects; it is reasonable that it is to be explained as showing that the view (that there is a self in the) perishable partakes of ignorance, as when one says "a pālāśa forest." Although the view (that there is a self in the) perishable is pervaded by defiled ignorance, (ignorance) is not pervaded by the view (that there is a self in the) perishable, because the innate grasping at permanence, etc., are concomitant with ignorance.[590] Ācārya Candrakīrti also comments that it is the intention of the Protector Nāgārjuna (to assert) that the view (that there is a self in the) perishable is ignorance.[591]

Z'. Showing that the wisdom realizing selflessness is the antidote through its opposition to the manner of grasping (that is self-grasping) (PV 216b-217a, GT 338-9)

(Opponent:) If love, etc., do not oppose confusion, then what does oppose it?

(rGyal tshab:) It is to be explained here as whatever directly opposes defiled ignorance and the manner of grasping (that is self-grasping), because the view that realizes emptiness directly opposes the manner of grasping (that is self-grasping). The meaning of the first line must be explained in this way; if it shows only the avoidance of contradictions (rather than a contradictory condition), then it is unreasonable to make this the way of interpreting the words.[592] The wisdom realizing emptiness is proven to oppose and destroy the nature of ignorance and attachment and all the faults that are its results, because (wisdom) destroys that ignorance through directly opposing the manner of grasping (that is self-grasping).[593]

b'. Disposing of the objection that stains are unsuitable to be removed (PV 217b-218a, GT 339)

(Opponent:) The faults cannot be thoroughly eliminated, because they are natural to living beings, like form (is natural) to a pot.

(rGyal tshab:) It follows that it is not the case that

faults are unsuitable to be eliminated, because (the Reason) is unproven. It follows that this is so, because we have seen through authoritative cognition that when they have come into contact with the antidote, the wisdom realizing selflessness, they are utterly removed.[594]

c'. Disposing of the objection that even if they can be removed a little it is impossible that they be thoroughly removed (PV 218b-219a, GT 339)

(Opponent:) Even if the faults are eliminated for awhile, they can return, like the solidity of gold (that has been melted).

(rGyal tshab:) The faults are stopped and eliminated by the power of the antidote. It follows that they will not be generated again like the solidity of gold, because a mind that is in a completely transformed state is not separate from the wisdom realizing selflessness, and by the fact that that (wisdom) has become of one nature with the nature of that (transformed mind). It follows that there is no certainty that when the damager is removed what is damaged will return, because (your Reason) is uncertain, as (shown by the counter-example:) even when fire is removed, it does not follow that (ashes) will revert to wood.[595]

B'. Proving that self-grasping is the root of craving (PV 219b-282a, GT 339-61)

(This is divided into:) (1') Showing that self-grasping is the root of all faults and (2') The impossibility of being freed from (saṃsāric) existence when one develops other methods without abandoning self-grasping.

1'. Showing that self-grasping is the root of all faults (PV 219b-222a, GT 339-40)

(this is divided into:) (a') Showing that it is the root of suffering and (b') Showing that it is the root of all defilements.

a'. Showing that it is the root of suffering (PV 219b-221a, GT 339-40)

An ordinary being, saying "I," generates a craving desire never to be separated from the self, because he sees a self of persons and desires it. If that is asserted, (it follows that) he will crave the happiness of the self, since he desires not to be separated from the self. Therefore, (the craving) hides from the senses, etc., the flaws in (desiring) what pertains to the self. When one sees the good qualities of the non-existent (self), it follows that one craves them, since one craves the happiness of the self. Thus, saying "mine," one tries to obtain a means of (pleasing) that self, because of the prior consequence

(that one craves the good qualities of the self). Thus, one will circle in saṃsāra, because one is therefore an ordinary being attached to a self. It follows that (this Reason) pervades, because even if one is a little attached to a self, one will circle in saṃsāra as long as one has not abandoned (that attachment).[596]

Other schools (are guilty of) two contradictions, based on (their discussions of) (1) defilements and (2) purification. The first contradiction: It is contradictory to assert (on the one hand) that the continuum of suffering that comprises birth and death in saṃsāra is interruptible and to assert (on the other hand) that the root of those (sufferings) is a permanent self or principle, because without the cause being absent, it is impossible that the result be removed, and it is impossible that a permanent entity ever be absent. The contradiction based on purification: It is contradictory to assert (on the one hand) that one can attain a liberation that is the cessation of the suffering aggregates and to prove by reasoning (on the other hand) that (there exists) a self of persons, because when one grasps at a self of persons once forcefully generates the undesirable suffering of saṃsāra.[597]

<u>b'. Showing that it is the root of all defilements</u> (PV 221b-222a, GT 340)

It follows that (self-grasping) is the source of at-

tachment and all the defilements, because if there is even a little self-grasping, they will not be undermined. It follows that (this Reason) pervades, because when there is (self-grasping) there arises the perception of another (being). From that, one analyzes out separate categories and parts having the essence of self and other. From that, one's mindstream will come into contact with the attachment and anger that grasps at and is attached to one's own interests and has anger toward the interests of others.[598]

2'. The impossibility of being freed from (saṃsāric) existence when one develops other methods without abandoning self-grasping (PV 222b-282a, GT 340-61)

(This is divided into:) (a') The unacceptability, as a path to freedom, of accepting a self and merely abandoning desire for what pertains to the self, (b') The unacceptability, as a path to freedom, of just the word of God and (c') The unacceptability, as a path to freedom, of merely eliminating karma and the body.

a'. The unacceptability, as a path to freedom, of accepting a self and merely abandoning desire for what pertains to the self (PV 222b-259a, GT 340-53)

(This is divided into:) (i') The impossibility of being separated from attachment to what pertains to the self without abandoning self-grasping, (ii') If it is possible

(to be separated from attachment to what pertains to the self without abandoning self-grasping), the pointlessness of accepting that a self is freed and (iii') Showing that it thus is necessary to abandon the self-view.

i'. The impossibility of being separated from attachment to what pertains to the self without abandoning self-grasping (PV 222b-257a, GT 341-53)

(This is divided into:) (X') Setting forth the Reason, (Y') Disposing of objections to that and (Z') Summary.

X'. Setting forth the Reason (PV 222b-223a, GT 341)

A person who proves that there is a self of persons will not be freed from attachment to what pertains to the self without rejecting that tenet (that there exists a self), because even by virtue of the tenet there is attachment to and desire for the self that is ascertained. It follows that as long (as the tenet is held), the cause of separation from attachment to self will not exist, because the person (will see) in that self not the slightest fault for the harm wrought in saṃsāra.[599]

Y'. Disposing of objections to that (PV 223b-256a, GT 341-52)

(This is divided into:) (p') Even if the self is flawless, the unacceptability as a path to freedom of abandon-

ing desire for it and (q') The unacceptability, as a path to freedom, of meditating on the suffering of suffering.

p'. Even if the self is flawless, the unacceptability as a path to freedom of abandoning desire for it (PV 223b-228a, GT 341-3)

(This is divided into:) (I'') Refutation by replying to a question and (II'') Refuting the reply to that.

I''. Refutation by replying to a question (PV 223b-226a, GT 341-2)

(Opponent:) Although the self and what pertains to the self are flawless, if one desires them, one will be bound in saṃsāra, so one must think about attachment to self as flawed. From thinking that, what occurs? Seeing that desire and attachment are flawed, one will abandon desire and attachment.

(rGyal tshab:) It follows that this attachment to self cannot be abandoned merely by meditation on it as flawed, because that self that is the object desired is not eliminated without its being confuted by reasoning, because (attachment) arises from proving (the self) flawless. It follows that (this Reason) pervades, because as for abandoning the attachment and anger connected with seeing the good qualities and flaws in that object, one abandons them by not seeing in the object the flaws and good qualities that

have been grasped; one does not abandon them in the way one pulls out an external thorn.

It follows that attachment to self cannot be abandoned merely by its being viewed as flawed, because attachment does not arise merely because it is grasped as having good qualities; it arises because one sees as having good qualities the self that is its own object of desire. For example, one may see attachment to liquor as a flaw that interrupts Dharma(-practice), but since one grasps the taste of liquor as good, one will not reject attachment to it. It follows that a person who accepts a self will not be able to remove the resultant attachment to self by any method, because it is reasonable that he hold as flawless that self-view that is the direct cause without whose presence there is no (attachment).[600]

<u>II''. Refuting the reply to that</u> (PV 226b-228a, GT 342-3)

It follows that if (you claim that) someone sees flaws in attachment to self, it is (actually) impossible that he see them, because he yearns to strive for the freedom of the self.[601]

(<u>Opponent</u>:) Attachment to self is flawed, because it acts as the basis of the sufferings of (saṃsāric) existence.

(<u>rGyal tshab</u>:) It follows that although this attach-

ment to self acts as the basis of suffering, one cannot be freed from attachment, because one sees "my mind" as belonging to a self. For example, although the self is the basis of saṃsāric suffering, when one grasps at a self one is not freed from attachment. Alternatively, the Reason is "because one sees the subject as a flawless self."[602]

(Opponent:) There is no flaw in the self, since the self does not cause suffering independently, without desire and attachment and virtuous and non-virtuous karma.

(rGyal tshab:) It follows that desire for and attachment to the self, etc., would be as flawless as the self, because they do not cause suffering independently, without the self that is the foundation of bondage and freedom. If that is asserted, it follows that neither the self nor desire for it can be separated from attachment, because both are flawless.[603]

q'. The unacceptability, as a path to freedom, of meditating on the suffering of suffering (PV 228b-256a, GT 343-52)

(This is divided into:) (I'') Refuting the Vaiśeṣika system, (II'') Refuting the Sāṃkhya system and (III'') Disposing of (the idea that our position) contradicts (the Buddha's) teaching on the meditation on suffering.

I''. Refuting the Vaiśeṣika system (PV 228b-249a, GT 343-9)

(This is divided into:) (A'') Refuting the example and (B'') Refuting the meaning.

A''. Refuting the example (PV 228b-235, GT 343-5)

(This is divided into:) (1'') The acceptability of our own system's reason for rejecting desire for what pertains to the self and (2'') The unacceptability of the other system's (reasons).

1''. The acceptability of our own system's reason for rejecting desire for what pertains to the self (PV 228b-231a, GT 343-4)

(Vaiśeṣika Opponent:) According to us, just as (one becomes detached from) limbs, digits, etc., bitten by a poisonous snake, one will abandon (suffering) by meditating on attachment to what pertains to the self and the self in the organs as the cause of suffering. (Saying that) if one does not reject the object then one cannot abandon desire for it is an unproven Reason.[604]

(rGyal tshab:) This is the system that asserts as the path to liberation not meditation (that develops) a mind renouncing the suffering of complexes, but just (meditation that develops) a mind renouncing the suffering feeling of

suffering. It follows that just as one will not reject desire for the digits bitten by a poisonous snake other than through desirelessness toward what pertains to a self in them, one will not become detached from flaws merely by seeing them, because it is necessary to reject this desire for (self) by destroying the thought that grasps at what pertains to a self.[605]

It follows that, with reference to the eye and other organs, as long as one does not reject them as useful to the self, it is unacceptable that the grasping at what pertains to a self be removed by any method, because (the organs) are grasped as the very basis of the enjoyment of the pleasures of the self. Thus, it follows that it is unacceptable that one in any sense be detached from (the organs), because there is no reason for it.[606]

It follows that grasping at what is useful to the self is the cause of desire for what pertains to the self; while <u>not</u> grasping (something as useful to the self) does not (serve as) the cause of desire for (what pertains to the self), because it is proven by the perception of all people that we generate a renounced mind toward hair, nails, etc., that have been removed from the body and are not taken as useful to the self, while we generate a desirous (mind) toward other (hair and nails) still on the body, which are taken as useful.[607]

2''. The unacceptability of the other system's (reasons) (PV 231b-235, GT 344-5)

(This is divided into:) (a'') The unacceptability of Inherence and other relations as a cause generating desire and (b'') Refuting the reply to that.

a''. The unacceptability of Inherence and other relations as a cause generating desire (PV 231b-232, GT 344)

It follows that, even having seen what pertains to the self as suffering, one will not and cannot abandon desire, because the thought that the organs, etc., are "mine" is generated from the existence in the self of Inherence and other relations, and those relations remain permanent, of the same nature (as) before one meditated on (what pertains to the self) as suffering.[608]

(The Vaiśeṣikas) assert that there exist (1) Inherence, which (relates) happiness and suffering to the self; (2) the Conjunction Relation, which (relates) the ear-organ and the body; (3) Conjunction Inherence, which (relates) form and other (Qualities) to the body that is their basis; (4) Inherence in the Conjunction, which (relates general) form to (particular forms) and (5) the Conjunction-Relation in the Conjunction, which (relates) to the self the eye and other organs other than the ear.[609]

It follows that one will not generate the thought of

what pertains to the self in relation to external food, clothing, etc., because those (items are) not (included in) the two (types of relations that relate things) to the self.[610] Thus, it follows that only its being related to the self does not (make something) the cause of desire, because even if there is no relation of Inherence (connecting) all external food, clothing, etc., to the self, the thought (of "mine") is generated from seeing that there exists a benefactor of the self.[611]

b''. Refuting the reply to that (PV 233-235, GT 344-5)

(Opponent:) Because even though we see that the sense-organs, etc., benefit the self, they still generate suffering, the thought of self will not be generated (when they are removed), as (it is not generated regarding) a poisoned finger.

(rGyal tshab:) It follows that the sense-organs, etc., are not solely the cause just of suffering, because they sometimes act as the cause of pleasure.[612]

(Opponent:) Since, like poison in food, desire is mostly a cause of suffering, it can be rejected.

(rGyal tshab:) Although desire is mostly a cause of suffering, it does not necessarily follow that it will not be generated, because someone who is attached to a special pleasure will be detached from an ordinary pleasure that

contrasts with that, but we see that if he does not acquire (the special pleasure), he will be attached to the ordinary pleasure. It follows that this is so, because we see that if someone acquires food, etc., that generates special pleasure, out of craving for that he will abandon that which generates only a little pleasure. If one does not acquire (good food), one still (will eat) poisoned food (rather than starve).[613]

An ordinary being, if he does not acquire special (pleasures), will (seek) the cause of as much pleasure as he can acquire, because he does not have the intelligence to distinguish (as the supreme pleasure) the pleasure of liberation, and because he is a person who has not in the least abandoned attachment to the self. For example, we see that desirous (human males), if they do not acquire the female they desire, act desirously toward animals.[614]

<u>B''. Refuting the meaning</u> (PV 236-249a, GT 345-9)

(This is divided into:) (1'') The impossibility of a permanent person's meditating on suffering, (2'') Extreme consequences if one is freed merely by meditating on suffering and (3'') Showing a perceptually-based confutation (of the idea) that merely by seeing the sense-organs, etc., as flawed one (can) remove desire for them.

1''. The impossibility of a permanent person's meditating on suffering (PV 236-240a, GT 345-6)

(This is divided into:) (a'') The consequence that the self is impermanent and (b'') (Showing that) if the self exists, there can result no reliable antidote to desire.

a''. The consequence that the self is impermanent (PV 236-237a, GT 345-6)

How can a person who asserts a self of persons, no matter how much he meditates on suffering, be freed from attachment to self? It follows that it is impossible (that he be freed), because it is unreasonable that that self be asserted as destructible. How could the self that is freed be asserted by the Ātmavādins as like the self that is desired? It follows that it could not, because (the self that is freed) is not the basis of the experience of pleasure and pain, of conventions to be adopted and rejected, or of all good qualities, such as benevolence, wisdom, etc. It follows that this (Reason) pervades, because the Ātmavādins accept as permanent a basis of all bondage and freedom that is not the same as the self whose nature is desired.[615]

b''. (Showing that) if the self exists there can result no reliable antidote to desire (PV 237b-240a, GT 346)

It follows that that self that is freed will continue to desire what pertains to a self (even) when ("freed"), because (one cannot) change from grasping the self in all its aspects. It follows that (this Reason) pervades, because that (grasping) is the cause on which is based attachment to self, and because it is the potent seed of desire for what pertains to the self.[616]

It follows that a person who desires liberation, even if he exerts himself in meditation on the suffering of what pertains to the self, will not thoroughly eliminate attachment if he does not abandon self-grasping, because the power of the self-view in his own mindstream will prevent his detachment from what pertains to the self, because it covers up the flaws in (what pertains to the self). It follows that this is the case, because by power of that (self-view), based on seizing on the good-quality part of what pertains to a self, one engages in manifest attachment to (self), and will be reborn.[617]

(Opponent:) At the time of liberation, just as (one is freed from attachment to) what pertains to the self, so too one is freed from attachment to self.

(rGyal tshab:) It follows that at the time of libera-

tion there does not exist any self that is freed from attachment, because, since desire for it has been rejected, it is not cognized by anyone. If this is asserted, it follows that it is pointless to meditate on suffering for the sake of obtaining a freed self, because how could one who desires liberation even reject the self later, any more than what pertains to the self?[618]

2''. Extreme consequences if one is freed merely by meditating on suffering (PV 240b-245a, GT 346-8)

(This is divided into:) (a'') Actual extreme consequences and (b'') The impossibility of others being freed from attachment.

a''. Actual extreme consequences (PV 240b-243a, GT 346-7)

It follows that those (Vaiśeṣika) yogis, even if they know (suffering) by meditating on the suffering of what pertains to the self, will not thus become thoroughly detached by that (meditation) alone, because we see by direct perception that cognizance of suffering already exists before one meditates, as when one is sick.[619]

(Opponent:) Because we see that one becomes detached when one sees faults in that which has previously been a cause generating pleasure, meditation on suffering is the

cause of detachment.

(rGyal tshab:) It follows that a person who is attached to the self will not become thoroughly detached by seeing faults in that object, because even if the attached thought is absent just at the moment when one sees the fault, attachment to that (object) can be generated again. For example, although a desirous (male) is free from attachment at the time when he sees faults in one woman, he can generate attachment to another woman, and he will generate (attachment) to another (woman).[620]

It follows that that (person attached to the self) does not thoroughly eliminate attachment toward any object, because he has desire that changes (from) one extreme (to the other, depending on whether) an object is to be adopted or rejected. It follows that (this Reason) pervades, because when one has intended an object, then whatever attachment arises is the seed of all attachment that will result when the specified (appropriate) conditions are generated.[621]

b''. The impossibility of others being freed from attachment (PV 243b-245a, GT 347-8)

It follows that attachment to self absolutely does not act to free one from attachment, because the subject (involved) is striving for a flawless self, as when one

strives for Buddhahood. It follows that the sense-organs, too, must be flawless, because they accomplish the pleasures of that flawless self, as offerings to please the Conquerors. Now it follows that it is unacceptable that a Vaiśeṣika be free from attachment to anything, because the self, the (cognizing) subject, and what pertains to the self are all three flawless, and because it is (nevertheless) certain that just that (attachment) is the cause binding transmigrators in saṃsāra.[622]

(Opponent:) In the case of saṃsāra, what pertains to the self is flawed, because it generates suffering.

(rGyal tshab:) It follows that the self is also flawed, because it is equally the self that generates suffering. It follows that that person will not be freed from attachment to any object, because he sees the self as flawed in the case of saṃsāra, (but) does not act to free himself from attachment to that (self).[623]

3''. Showing a perceptually-based confutation (of the idea) that merely by seeing the sense-organs, etc., as flawed one (can) remove desire for them (PV 245b-249a, GT 348-9)

(This is divided into:) (a'') (Showing that) just seeing flaws is not the cause for removing desire and (b'') (Showing) the impossibility of seeing flaws as they are in the sense-organs, etc.

a''. (Showing that) just seeing flaws is not the cause for removing desire (PV 245b-248a, GT 348)

(Opponent:) Attachment to liquor, etc., will be destroyed and rejected when one sees that there absolutely are faults in liquor, because (attachment) is a desire that arises from seeing the good qualities of the liquor.

(rGyal tshab:) Thus, it follows that desire for the sense-organs, etc., does not arise simply from (one's) having seen their good qualities, because we see that even children, who do not know how to distinguish flaws from good qualities, have desire; because we have desire even for a flawed sense-organ; because we do not desire the good eyes, etc., of others when we have our own eyes; and because in those who are beyong grasping at what pertains to a self, there is no longer any desire for what pertains to the self, like hair, etc., which before (were thought) to have good qualities.

Thus, it follows that it is not the case that just seeing the good qualities of sense-organs, etc., is the cause of the mind desiring what pertains to the self, because (the assertion) that there is positive and negative concomitance is mistaken. If that is asserted, it follows that one will not abandon desire by seeing as faulty what does not have good qualities, because of that assertion.[624]

b''. (Showing) the impossibility of seeing flaws as they are in the sense-organs, etc. (PV 248b-249a, GT 348-9)

It follows that it is not certain that by meditating on the suffering of the sense-organs, etc., one will see them as flawed, because we see (the organs, etc.,) as having good qualities through attachment that superimposes good qualities that do not exist (in them) otherwise.[625]

SUMMARY:

How, by meditating on the suffering of suffering of what pertains to the self, can one damage the desire for what pertains to the self? It follows that it cannot be accepted that (one can), because that meditation is merely a practice that does not damage the root of that desire, because it does not damage self-grasping in the least.[626]

II''. Refutation of the Sāṃkhya system (PV 249b-254a, GT 349-51)

(This is divided into:) (A'') The unacceptability, as a path to freedom, of just knowing that Prakṛti and Puruṣa are different, (B'') The unacceptability, as a cause of detachment, of a mind afflicted by the suffering of suffering and (C'') Identifying the nature of detachment.

A''. The unacceptability, as a path to freedom, of just knowing that Prakṛti and Puruṣa are different (PV 249b-251a, GT 349-50)

(Sāṃkhya Opponent:) According to us, it cannot be accepted that seeing the sense-organs, etc., as having good qualities is the cause of saṃsāra, or that seeing them as flawed is the path to liberation. If you ask what (our view is, it is this:) Because the attached mind that grasps Prakṛti (Nature), which is pleasure, etc., and Puruṣa (the Person) as one is the cause of saṃsāra, and (because) by knowing those two as separate one rejects the (belief) that (Prakṛti is) Puruṣa, then since the Puruṣa is free from attachment, that direct knowledge that Prakṛti, which is pleasure, etc., and Puruṣa are different is the path to freedom.[627]

(rGyal tshab:) It follows that one is not freed from (saṃsāric) existence merely by direct knowledge that Nature (Prakṛti) and the Person (Puruṣa) are different, because (even) a foolish person inexperienced on the path knows that the Person has a different nature from his sense-organs and Nature, which is pleasure, etc. It follows that this is so, because (that foolish person), desiring to be a striver for the Person itself, will strive for senses, pleasure, etc., that are superior to those he has at present; and because, grasping the fact that the self is iden-

tical in earlier and later (moments), he has a mind that cognizes that his own pleasure, etc., are subject to generation and destruction. It follows that one is not attached to (saṃsāric) existence just by the mind's seeing Prakṛti and Puruṣa as identical and by desiring (their identity), because it is unacceptable that just knowing those two as different be the cause of freedom.[628]

Prakṛti is said to be chiefly a hidden phenomenon, but if one knows that Puruṣa and pleasure (and other qualities of Prakṛti) are different, one can also know that Prakṛti, which (has the qualities) of pleasure, etc., is different (from Puruṣa). The desirous mind and Prakṛti are both ascertained to be physical, and Puruṣa to be conscious.[629]

Thus, attachment to self is the cause of resultant saṃsāric suffering, because by its own power attachment is naturally drawn to the internal parts, the visual and other faculties that intend form, etc., and because it is drawn by the power of self-grasping itself.[630]

B''. The unacceptability, as a cause of detachment, of having a mind afflicted by the suffering of suffering (PV 251b-253a, GT 350)

(Opponent:) One will be freed by meditating on suffering, because we see that when one is afflicted by suffering and becomes renounced, having regretted (the suffering), one becomes detached.

(rGyal tshab:) It follows that a renunciation like that generated by some person's present feeling of affliction by the suffering of suffering is concomitant with anger, or it is the cause (of anger), but it is not detachment, because when that (renunciation) is generated, there exists attachment in the person whose mindstream (includes "renunciation"). It follows that this is so, because, greatly attached to another occasion for happiness, one seeks it.[631]

(Opponent:) When anger is generated continually, one will have destroyed (any possible) occasion for generating attachment, so one will be detached.

(rGyal tshab:) It follows that an angry person will not become detached merely by generating anger, because the anger remains only as long as the suffering feeling; when (the feeling) is absent, one will revert to one's own attached nature. It follows that the previous Reason (pervades), because (the anger) has the suffering feeling as its cause.[632]

C''. Identifying the nature of detachment (PV 253b-254a, GT 350-51)

(Opponent:) Well, then, what, according to you, is detachment?

(rGyal tshab:) An Arahant is said to be "detached," because he is a person who has gained equanimity through

utterly abandoning attachment and anger in all cases, whether he is respectfully anointed by sandal-paste or cut by an axe. It follows that this is so, because he is a person who has utterly abandoned attachment to what is to be adopted and what is to be rejected.[633]

III''. Disposing of (the idea that our position) contradicts the teaching on the meditation on suffering (PV 254b-256a, GT 351-2)

(Opponent:) Well, then, how is it that the Blessed One taught the meditation on suffering?

(rGyal tshab:) He did not teach it with only the suffering of suffering in mind, because he taught the meditation on suffering for the sake of the renunciation of all (saṃsāric) existence, with the pervasive suffering of the complexes in mind. The suffering of complexes is not based on a permanent self, because it is generated from its own causes and from defiled conditions.[634]

Also, the mind that meditates on suffering is not asserted to be a path that directly frees one from (saṃsāric) existence, because (freedom has as) its basis or highest method the generation of the view that realizes selflessness. It also is necessarily the case that the meditation (on suffering) is not the path that directly frees one from (saṃsāric) existence, because one is directly freed from (saṃsāric) existence by developing the view that realizes

emptiness, and (because) the remaining meditations, realizing composites to be impermanent and realizing contaminated phenomena to be suffering, must be contemplated for the purpose of effecting the wisdom realizing selflessness. Thus, the reason the Blessed One taught that from the realization of composites as impermanent arises the realization of contaminated phenomena as suffering, and that from the realization of suffering (arises) the realization of selflessness, is because--as just explained--he taught that the method and the result of the method exist thus. According to the sūtra: "'Oh monks, is form permanent or is it impermanent?' 'It is impermanent, Lord.' 'Is what is impermanent suffering or is it happiness?' 'It is suffering, Lord, and what is impermanent has the nature of changing to suffering.' 'Is it proper to say of that, "This is mine," "This is I," or "This is myself"?' 'It is not, Lord.'"[635]

THE REASON FOR ASCERTAINING THE ORDERING THUS:[636]

In the wake of the realization of the suffering (composites) as impermanent, one turns away from (the idea that those composites) are ultimately reliable for the accomplishment of one's own aims, and the realization of contaminated phenomena as suffering induces a renounced mind. Formerly, from the combination of grasping at the happiness of self as obtainable and grasping at it as permanent, one grasped at that happiness as unalterably reliable. When one

realizes that happiness is impermanent, the realization induces a suffering mind. Also, in the samādhi on the contamination of the upper realms, one generates the renounced mind that sees (birth in the upper realms) as like entering into a burning house--this definitely depends on the prior realization of subtle impermanence. When one sees that one is under the power of karma and the defilements, one also understands that there is no independent person. The ordering of rough impermanence, suffering, and selflessness is thus comprehensible.[637]

Z'. Summary (PV 256b-257a, GT 352-353)

It follows that the self that is "freed" has craving, because it has not been freed from attachment to self. If that is asserted, it follows that (the self) depends on all karmic efforts at attainment and avoidance. If that is asserted, it follows that (that self) is not freed from the defilements and karma, because of the two previous assertions. If (the latter) is asserted, it follows that such (a self) is called "saṃsāric," because that (is the sort of) person that has been asserted.[638]

ii'. If it is possible (that one be detached from what pertains to the self without abandoning self-grasping), the pointlessness of accepting that a self is freed (PV 257b-258a, GT 353)

It follows then that there also is no experiencer of what pertains to the self, because you do not assert that what pertains to the self exists to be experienced. If that is asserted, it follows that that self does not exist, either, because of that assertion. It follows that that (Reason) pervades, because that one permanent self is defined as the cause that creates karma and the enjoyer of the result.[639]

iii'. Showing that it thus is necessary to abandon the self-view (PV 258b-259a, GT 353)

We call benevolently: You who desire freedom! If you desire to attain liberation, you should dig out from the very root the view (that there is a self in) perishable composites. It follows that it is reasonable to dig it out, because the self-view is the root of saṃsāra and (because) it is proven that the wisdom realizing selflessness is the direct antidote to that. The self-view does not arise causelessly or from inappropriate causes, because it beginninglessly arises from the seeds of appropriate homogeneous results.[640]

b'. The unacceptability, as a path to freedom, of just the word of God[641] (PV 259b-275a, GT 353-8)

(This is divided into:) (i') Refuting the (attempt to) prove that a ritual bestowed by God as a path to liberation is (in fact) a path to freedom, (ii') Expressing (a further) rejection and (iii') Showing that the wisdom realizing selflessness is the path to freedom.

i'. Refuting the (attempt to) prove that a ritual bestowed by God as a path to liberation is (in fact) a path to freedom (PV 259b-262a, GT 353-4)

It follows that the statement that one is freed merely by a ritual explained by sacred authority does not at all satisfy the intelligent, because we do not see any reason why the sacred authority that teaches that one is freed merely by a ritual bestowed (by God) is such that it is not mistaken in its express meaning.[642] The plural marker implies alternative (objectors).[643]

EXTREME CONSEQUENCES:

(Opponent:) When the mantra explained by sacred authority affects a seed, the sprout is not generated, so we are not mistaken about our express meaning.

(rGyal tshab:) When we see that a ritual accomplishes the non-generation of a sprout by a seed, it does not follow that a person directly affected (by a ritual) bestowed

by God will be able (to accomplish) the non-generation of further (saṃsāric) existences, because if that were the case, it would follow that one could be freed by anointment with sesame oil or being burned by fire.

Likewise, it follows that mental non-virtues are not destroyed by a fire of burnt offerings, because (a person) who was heavy before will later be lighter because his body has been heated by the fire of burnt offerings, (but) it does not follow that merely through the lightening of part of the body of the person (making) burnt offerings the weight of non-virtue is lightened, too, because (non-virtue is) non-physical.[644]

ii'. Expressing (a further) rejection (PV 262b-272a, GT 354-7)

(This is divided into:) (X') (Showing that) just sacred words cannot damage the cause of future rebirths, (Y') Refuting the reply to that and (Z') Disposing of (the attempt to) damage our refutation.

X'. (Showing that) just sacred words cannot damage the cause of future rebirths (PV 262b-264a, GT 354-5)

The mental action concomitant with the attached craving to obtain happiness that arises from the distorted cognition grasping suffering as happiness, (when) cut by

the power of its antidote in some mindstream, will not lead to future rebirths, because it is by the compulsion of that (mental action) that one goes to the lower abodes that involve taking birth. When an ordinary being is born, he is assisted by that mental action concomitant with distorted cognition and craving, because (birth) occurs with just that as its cause.[645]

(Opponent:) Isn't karma also necessary as a cause of rebirth?

(rGyal tshab:) It follows that for rebirth into (saṃsāric) existence it is not necessary to have some karma objectively separate from that mental action, because the mental actions concomitant with distorted cognition and craving are themselves the karma that generates future rebirths.[646]

Thus, just rituals that have been bestowed are not the path to freedom from (saṃsāric) existence, because just by obtaining that bestowal, a person does not in the least undermine the cause of birth into (saṃsāric) existence.

Y'. Refuting the reply to that (PV 264b-266a, GT 355)

(Opponent:) It follows that a person who has obtained bestowal will not have future rebirths, because (when) a person moves toward some object, the basis of his moving toward some object and of his cognition of form, etc., is

visual activity, etc. That activity is generated from the Dharmic and non-Dharmic action of the Unseen, and the action of the Unseen is destroyed by the bestowal. Thus, karma is the complex of qualities of the self and not--as you have asserted--mental action.[647]

(rGyal tshab:) We see that mental actions concomitant with distorted cognition and craving can assist (in the generation) of sense-organs, etc., in the womb, but it follows that rituals, etc., do not, because only those (mental) actions are (proven) by positive and negative concomitance to exist as assistants (when present) and not to exist (as assistants when absent). How can those bestowals one has obtained not lead to future rebirths? It follows that they will lead (to them), because they do not undermine the cause (of future rebirths).[648]

Z'. Disposing of (the attempt to) damage our refutation (PV 266b-272a, GT 355-7)

(This is divided into:) (p') The unacceptability (of the idea) that the power of mind can be destroyed by a bestowal, (q') Extreme consequences and (r') A permanent self's unsuitability as a creator.

p'. The unacceptability (of the idea) that the power of mind can be destroyed by a bestowal (PV 266b-267a, GT 355-6)

(Opponent:) Because the bestowal has rendered distorted (cognition) and craving powerless to generate further rebirths, one who has obtained bestowal does not take rebirth.

(rGyal tshab:) It follows that persons who have obtained bestowal, immediately upon bestowal, will not willingly grasp objects of the eye and other organs, will not relate specifically to a desired object, and will not (mentally) wander from object to object or stop (wandering) through the appropriate conditions--(all of which occur) by virtue of mental actions in (the person's) own mindstream--because the power of the mental actions that (so) act was destoyed by the bestowal. Alternatively, (one will not, because of the bestowal, encounter a situation where) the sense-organs cannot relate to their objects because one is overly distracted and then are restored (to their objects) by means of (a mental action) that ends (the distraction).[649]

q'. Extreme consequences (PV 267b-269a, GT 356)

(Opponent:) What? At death-time, when there is no mind, saṃsāric dharmas will not arise.

(rGyal tshab:) The stains of attachment, etc., (adhering to) a dying person who has obtained bestowal will connect with a subsequent homogeneous mind, because of the presence of the uninterruptable direct cause able (to effect) that result.[650]

(Opponent:) Since the (final mind's) ability to connect with subsequent homogeneous (minds) has been destroyed by the bestowal, it does not (so connect).

(rGyal tshab:) It follows that (the mind) of one who has obtained bestowal will be unable to connect with subsequent homogeneous (minds) even during life itself, because that ability has been destroyed by the bestowal. Thus, the continuum of the faults of attachment, etc., which have homogeneous seeds, is not removed from one who has merely received bestowal, because when the antidote (to the faults), the wisdom realizing selflessness, increases, (the faults) decrease; and when what helps (the faults), unscrupulous mental acts, increases, (the faults) increase.[651]

r'. A permanent self's unsuitability as a creator (PV 269b-272a, GT 356-7)

(Opponent:) It is unacceptable that you Anātmavādins be liberated.[652]

(rGyal tshab:) It is acceptable for us, but it is not acceptable for those who speak of a permanent self, and it follows that it is contradictory for a permanent self to

generate successively the occasions of bondage and liberation, because a permanent (entity) is independent of conditions. It follows that it also is contradictory that (a permanent self) even generate a result, because the permanent (self) would then have a nature such that it is able to be (both) a producer and a non-producer of results. It follows that cause and result will be identical, because that same self is the accumulator of karma and the experiencer of the result.[653]

(Opponent:) Cause and result are substantially different from that permanent self.

(rGyal tshab:) It follows that this undermines (the idea) that the producer of karma and the experiencer of the result is that permanent self. It follows that it is not even proved that a permanent (self) is able to assist in (bringing about) the result, because a permanent (self) does not have complete ability to (show) positive and negative concomitance.[654]

(Opponent:) If there is no self, then one (person) would have an experience and another would remember it; and one (person) would accumulate (karma) and another would enjoy its (fruits,) etc.

(rGyal tshab:) Those who say the aggregates are momentary by reason of the selflessness[655] of the experiencer and rememberer do not have their (position) damaged by the

consequence that one (person) has an experience and another remembers it, or that one accumulates (karma) and another enjoys (the fruit), because there is no permanent person who first has an experience and later remembers it. It follows that there is no fault such that one wastes karma that has been created or meets (the result of karma) not created, because memory arises from the experience of an object (similar to one encountered before), in accordance with conditions.[656]

iii'. Showing that the wisdom realizing selflessness is the path to freedom (PV 272b-275a, GT 357-8)

Craving is the root of saṃsāra, because, when one has superimposed the inverse of the Four Noble Truths--such as that suffering is permanent, is based (on a self), is pleasurable, or is "I" and "mine," along with the remaining imperfect (interpretations) of the sixteen aspects--then one (generates) craving, and by force of craving there is continued birth. Only the wisdom realizing selflessness is the path to freedom, because the perfect view that realizes selflessness--correctly meditating with a perfect realization of the sixteen aspects, impermanence, etc., the objects that are the opposites of the inverse of the Four Noble Truths--destroys from the root (both) craving and what follows on it.[657]

(Opponent:) Even if there is no craving, if karma and the body (still) exist, one will not be freed from saṃsāra.

(rGyal tshab:) An Arahant cannot possibly be born again into saṃsāra even if karma and his body remain, because one of the chief causes, craving, does not exist. This (Reason) pervades, because birth into (saṃsāric) existence has three causes. For example, without there being a seed, a sprout will not arise.[658]

c'. The unacceptability, as a path to freedom, of merely eliminating karma and the body (PV 275b-282a, GT 358-61)

(This is divided into:) (i') Actual refutation and (ii') Disposing of objections.

i'. Actual refutation (PV 275b-276a, GT 358)

(Digambara Opponent:) Even by the eleimination of karma and the body one will be freed from (saṃsāric) existence, because rebirth has three causes. Thus, it is reasonable to rely on the antidotes only to karma and the body.[659]

(rGyal tshab:) Without abandoning craving, one cannot abandon karma and the body, because there are no antidotes for abandoning karma and the body, because without abandoning craving one cannot utterly abandon (karma and the bo-

dy). It follows that this is so, because when there is craving, there is renewed karma, and from that arises a body.[660]

ii'. Disposing of objections (PV 276b-278a, GT 358-61)

(This is divided into:) (X') Refuting reliance on equally strong antidotes for destroying both karma and craving, (Y') Refuting (the idea) that austerities combine the potencies of (many) karmas and eliminate them and (Z') Refuting the idea that karma and craving are equally to be abandoned.

X'. Refuting reliance on equally strong antidotes for destroying both karma and craving (PV 276b-278a, GT 358-9)

(Opponent:) If that is the case, then it is reasonable that one strive for the sake of eliminating individually both karma and craving, because both are causes of saṃsāra.

(rGyal tshab:) It follows that it is pointless to fatigue oneself (for the sake of) an antidote that will separately eliminate karma, because without abandoning craving one will not abandon (karma); it is not necessary to abandon (karma) separately. By abandoning the one root of the defilements, one can abandon all the others. There is (however) no way that (the abandoning of just one) karma will

have such (a result), because one can infer that people's karmas have many different different strengths, (because) we see that the results of karma are variously pleasant or unpleasant. It follows that by the one tormenting pain inflicted by pulling out hairs or some other specific austerity one will not eliminate all karma, because by abandoning one karma, one will not (abandon) all karma that will be abandoned, since karmas are infinite.[661]

One can infer through objectively impelled reasoning (a) from pleasant results that they were preceded by good karma, (b) from unpleasant results (that they were preceded by) bad karma and (c) from a mixture of pleasant and unpleasant (results) that they were preceded by a mixture of good and bad karma--but where, when and how the karma that preceded the body was created are very hidden (phenomena).[662]

It follows that one will not eliminate all homogeneous and heterogeneous results (just) by actions that torment the body with austerities, because by experiencing, e.g., the torment that is the result of previous karma generated by austerities, one will eliminate only (the fruition of) some (results), which will lessen.[663]

Y'. Refuting (the idea) that austerities combine the potencies of (many) karmas and eliminate them (PV 278b-281a, GT 359-61)

(Opponent:) What? Austerities have a combining power to remove various suffering and pleasurable results. Thus, when one experiences one torment, just that one result which has combining power will entail the elimination of many (karmic results).

(rGyal tshab:) You (must) assert either (a) that austerities are other than (just) bodily torment and the pain of suffering, (and include, e.g.,) generosity, morality, etc.; or (b) that (austerities) are the pain of torment.

If (a), it follows that it is pointless to strive intently for the sake of eliminating karma and its result (through such) torments as setting the five fires, etc., because through a minor torture such as pulling out only one hair one will be able to avoid all the remaining results. The word "or" (in the root-text[664] means that) it follows that without austerities (that involve) the pain of torment one will be able to abandon all karmas and their results, because an austerity has the power to combine into one the potencies of all karmas.

If (b), it follows that this austerity will not combine the potencies of (all) karmas or (even) roughly eliminate their potency, because that austerity is the result of

bad karma, like the karma of a bullock who plows fields.[665]

(Opponent:) Well, then, you contradict your assertion that developing benevolence, etc., and reciting dhāraṇīs purifies karmic obstacles. Further, when you destroy craving you also destroy all karmas, so you also contradict (your assertion) that there is no antidote to karma.

(rGyal tshab:) The wisdom realizing selflessness, which effects the cessation of attachment and any other flaws, has the destructive ability to remove (the seeds of) the results of karma created by the defiled desire for future rebirth, because it destroys the fault of desire for future rebirth. It follows that it will not effect the deterioration of such results as already exist, such as physical defects or crookedness, because it is unable to (prevent) the generation of results that already exist. Accordingly, by reciting dhāraṇīs, etc., one is able to render some karmic obstacles suitable for generating (different) ripened results, but without abandoning craving no one has an antidote able to eliminate all karmas.[666]

Alternatively, the (third) line shows that if there is an abandonment without craving, then after that, one will be able to negate the ripening of even the smallest karmic potency; and the (fourth) line shows that without abandoning craving, one will be unable to render (karma) impotent to bring about the results of any previously-created kar-

ma. (Some explain the third) line (as saying that) one is able to abandon karma (whose results) one need not definitely experience and the (fourth as saying that) one cannot abandon karma (whose results) one must definitely experience. This explanation is not the meaning of the verse, and is rationally unacceptable, because it is said by many Mahāyānists that a full confession with the four (opponent) powers prevents the ripening (even) of karma that one must definitely experience, and that it purifies one.[667]

(Opponent:) Well, then, this contradicts (the idea) that (there is karma whose result) definitely must be experienced.

(rGyal tshab:) (Mahāyānists) say that the meaning of "must definitely be experienced" is that (the karmic result will definitely be experienced) if one does not meet the antidote.[668]

Z'. Refuting the idea that karma and craving are equally to be abandoned (PV 281b-282a, GT 361)

(Opponent:) Since karma arises when there is craving and craving arises when there is karma, each is equally to be abandoned.

(rGyal tshab:) The faults of attachment, etc., are not generated from karma that is without craving, because one accumulates karma from (actions) flawed by craving; but one

does not accumulate (karma) from the reverse (type of action, where there is) no craving.[669]

(<u>Opponent</u>:) Since happiness arises from virtuous karma, (from happiness) will arise the craving to attain the (pleasurable) object again.

(<u>rGyal tshab</u>:) It follows that an Arahant will not generate attachment even from happiness, because he lacks the distorted imputations of false mental judgement.[670]

Thus, we have identified and refuted the four principal factors opposing the truth of path, which are analyzed as paths to freedom by others: (1) meditating on the sense-organs and other things that pertain to the self as suffering, (2) cognizing Prakṛti and Puruṣa as separate, (3) (practicing) rituals that have been bestowed and (4) eliminating karma and tormenting the body.[671]

To summarize: It is unacceptable that those others are paths to freedom from (saṃsāric) existence, because they are wholly founded on taking a permanent self as the foundation of bondage and freedom.[672] Thus, it must be known that any śāstra that is not founded on selflessness does not show the chief path to freedom from (saṃsāric) existence.

ii. The way of proving from that that he is the Sugata (PV 282b-283a, GT 361-2)

The Muni, the Blessed One, knows the nature of reality, because he sees by perception all ways in which the Four Noble Truths exist. His knowledge is firm, because he demonstrates the reality of the Four Noble Truths, and because in all texts where he demonstrates that, there is not the slightest contradiction between earlier and later and direct and interpretable (teachings). His knowledge is complete, because he sees by direct perception every method for (attaining) high rebirths and the definite good. He is the Sugata because he is the Savior of those who strive for freedom.

In this section on the reverse explanation, the reason for explaining the meaning of the word Sugata as having the meaning of a cognition is that it is said to be thus (on the basis of) the assertion that the purity of his knowledge is deduced from his being the Savior. When it was to be proven in the section on the forward explanation that he is the Savior of those who strive for freedom, it was necessary to set forth a proof that he had eliminated all stains; in this section, we infer the purity of his knowledge from the Reason "he is the Savior," so it is reasonable to explain the word Sugata as having the meaning of cognition.

Thus, his cognition is superior to that of non-Buddhists, (Buddhists) on the training-paths and (Buddhists) on the paths of no-more-training, such as Śrāvaka and Pratyekabuddha Arahants.[673]

iii. The way of proving from that that he is the Teacher (PV 283b, GT 362)

(Opponent:) By what cause is he the Sugata?

(rGyal tshab:) (The Sugata) is preceded by the Teacher, which is application toward complete knowledge for the sake of others and which is development (of wisdom), because he possesses excellence of realization. It follows that (this Reason) pervades, because the path that is the cause of his applying himself thus is demonstrated in this case to be the Teacher. If it is not for the sake of others, it is impossible that his knowledge be proven special.[674]

iv. The way of proving from that that he is the Benevolent One (PV 284a, GT 362-3)

(His being the Teacher) is preceded by his being greatly benevolent and compassionate, because he develops the path through striving to apply himself toward complete knowledge.

(Opponent:) Doesn't he become an Authoritative Person merely by his complete knowledge of the Four Noble Truths?

What need is there to prove him greatly compassionate?

(rGyal tshab:) It is definitely necessary that the proof that he is an Authoritative Person be preceded by proof that he is greatly compassionate, because by virtue of his complete development of compassion, even when he has accomplished his own aims he does not refuse to show the Dharma directed toward the aims of others; and because without compassion, even if he has knowledge, he will not instruct others in it.[675]

b. The way of proving from all those that he is authoritative (PV 284b-285, GT 363)

The Muni, the Blessed One, teaches only good and useful (truths) to disciples; he does not teach what is useless, since he has completed the development of great benevolence and compassion. This demonstrates that he is worthy to be (considered) the Savior of those who strive for freedom and that he does save them. He teaches the truth undistortedly because he possesses the complete gnosis that knows (all things undistortedly). This demonstrates that he is able to save. The gnosis that knows (all things undistortedly) does not arise causelessly or from inappropriate causes, because it arises from developing a practice that coincides with benevolence. The Muni is the Savior of those who strive for freedom, because his knowledge is knowledge that coexists with a complete endeavor directly applied

toward teaching it to others. It is well proven that he is nondeceptively authoritative for those who strive for freedom, because he is the Teacher who has completed the two aims.[676]

B. The purpose of praising him for his authoritativeness (PV 286-7, GT 363-5)

There is a purpose in praising the Muni, the Blessed One, through showing that he is such an entity as became authoritative, because he is praised thus for the sake of demonstrating perfectly the nature of authoritativeness (as found in) the texts taught by that teacher. This shows that the definition, investigation, and way of relating to authoritative (cognitions), which establish liberation and omniscience, are extensively discussed in those texts. Therefore, when what is to be established, liberation and omniscience, are demonstrated, one is able to analyze the meanings of all texts by way of the foregoing key.[677]

(The assertion that) "Seeing that one cannot understand those things without first hearing those texts together with their commentaries and having them explained, it is also necessary to prove that liberation and omniscience are proven scripturally" is the assertion only of liars, who are ignorant of reasoning and believe in mere words.[678]

(Opponent:) How do (the texts) show the definition of authoritativeness, etc.?

(rGyal tshab:) "A person who has a cognition of blue (a) cognizes blue, but (b) not blueness." This quote shows the definition of perception. (a) (shows) unmistakenness and (b) shows non-conceptuality.[679]

Inference also is shown to be authoritative, because if (the Buddha) had not desired to show (inference) as authoritative, it stands to reason that he would have refuted (the idea) that it is authoritative, but he did not reject (the idea) that inference is authoritative; and because we see that the basis of inference is applied and discussed in many aspects in such passages as "Any (entity) that has a nature such that it is generated has a nature such that it will cease." Such passages as "knowing fire from smoke" show a Reason of result. Since (the Buddha) used perfectly probative words, we can understand implicitly that he desired (to teach) inference (as authoritative), because the Reason that has the characteristic of not arising when the Predicate is absent is the basis of inference. That relation whereby (the Reason) does not arise if (the Predicate) does not exist also is clearly explained, because it is clearly shown that the Predicate, that which is subject to cessation, pervades the Reason, that which is subject to arising.[680]

(Dignāga and Dharmakīrti) are not expounding scriptural arrangements of the two (types of) authoritativeness

that are discussed only occasionally rather than frequently; since it is impossible that (all) the texts not show the definition of authoritativeness, the basis of inference, etc., we have given examples that demonstrate that they are discussed in all the texts.[681]

(Final Remarks) (no PV, GT 365-6)

Thus, having understood through objectively impelled reasoning the way of proving the Buddha-Teacher, the holy Dharma that is the (truths of) cessation and path, and the Ārya Saṅgha that accomplishes (religious goals) according (the Buddha's teaching), one is induced to go for refuge to the three jewels; and, having gone for refuge, one must prove (the possibility of) perfect enlightenment for the sake of all sentient beings. Having well established by authoritative (cognition) that one has both the potential and the ability to (attain enlightenment), one should take the vows for the generation of the thought of enlightenment; and also, having seen that obtaining perfect enlightenment arises from developing the mind that realizes the reality of the Four Noble Truths, one should undistortedly, through objectively impelled reasoning, investigate the Four Noble Truths, whose gist is reversing entry into saṃsāra, and one must be undistorted in rejecting and adopting again and again the objects (spoken of in the truths).[682]

It is not in the least the case that the beginning,

end, and everything (in between in) this (chapter) do not suggest going for refuge. It is not in the least the case that (the chapter) does not show the method for cutting off superimposition; and, to the degree that one's continuum is free from superimposition, to that degree one lays the foundation of the Dharma-jewel. From (the point where) one (begins to be) free from the seeds of superimposition to (the point where) freedom is complete--that is the Dharma-jewel. From (the point where) one (begins) to strive for freedom from present superimposition, all minds that strive for freedom from any superimposition are a part of going for refuge.[683]

> Proving well through reason the Teacher's teaching
> One gains one-pointed faith in the triple gem.
> Those who strive to accomplish their goal (in the Buddhist) way--
> Those persons should be known as the wise.

From Elucidating the Path to Liberation Explained in the Pramāṇavārttika, this has been the commentary on the second chapter, "The Establishment of Perfect Authoritativeness."[684] By (virtue of) this, may the Muni's precious teaching go out (through) all doors and spread in all directions, and may it be empowered to be widespread for a long time to come.

NOTES TO TRANSLATION

[1]There has been considerable debate over whether the pramāṇasiddhi (tshad ma grub pa) chapter of the Pramāṇavārttika is the second or the first. The Tibetan commentarial tradition considers it the second, and holds the svārthānumāna chapter to be the first because (a) Dharmakīrti is said to have written the svārthānumāna chapter first, to have considered it the most difficult, and to have written an auto-commentary only on it; and (b) because it is necessary to establish at the outset the structure of syllogisms, which will be used as the argumentative framework in the rest of the Pramāṇavārttika. Those who hold the pramāṇasiddhi to be the first chapter do so because the Pramāṇavārttika is said to be a commentary on Dignaga's Pramāṇasamuccaya; since the pramāṇasiddhi chapter comments on the very first verses of the Pramāṇasamuccaya, it must be the first, or it would not follow the order of the text it is commenting on. Modern editors of the Pramāṇavārttika, Rahula Sankrityayana, Dwarikas Shastri and Y. Miyasaka, have treated it as the first chapter. For discussion, cf. Masatoshi Nagatomi, "The Framework of the Pramāṇavārttika, Book I," in Journal of the American Oriental Society, no. 79, 1959, p. 263, note 1; and BL, I, pp. 38-9.

[2]rtogs bya refers to "what is to be cognized" through application of the syllogism whose structure is established in the svārthānumāna chapter, namely "liberation and omniscience and the path leading to them." Cf. GT (vol. I), p. 10.

[3]yan lag gyi don, lit. the "meaning of the limbs," explains the actual verses of the root-text; the "general meaning" that precedes it is an introductory summary provided by the commentator.

[4]I have chosen to translate tshad ma (pramāṇa) adjectivally as "authoritative" and nominally as "authoritativeness." Although strictly speaking tshad ma is always a cognition, and is not wrongly translated as "means of knowledge" (Warder), "avenue of validity" (Sopa), "prime cognizer" (Hopkins) or "valid cognition," "authoritative"/"authoritativeness" carries particularly well the ambiguity involved in discussions of the Buddha as tshad ma--he is authoritative in the double sense that his cognitions them-

selves are valid and that he is a source of valid cognition for "those who strive for freedom."

[5]The first half of the verse corresponds to the first half of the opening verse of Dignāga's Pramāṇasamuccaya. The second half of Dignāga's verse, however, reads: tshad ma bsgrub phyir rang gi gshung kun las / btus te sna tshogs 'thor rnams 'dir gcig bya // "In order to establish authoritativeness, I here make a single compendium of my various scattered (writings)." Cf. Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana, A History of Indian Logic, p. 276; and Nagatomi, "Framework," p. 264. The second half of the verse as quoted by rGyal tshab is taken from Prajñākaragupta's Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra (Tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi rgyan), PTT no. 5719, vol. 132, p. 3. Cf. Part I, note 327.

[6]Although sbyor ba (samapad) denotes application, or action, it refers in this case primarily to mental action, the realization of selflessness.

[7]"Teacher" is put in quotes because of its ambiguity: it can refer to the human being who is a teacher, but its primary referent is the wisdom realizing selflessness.

[8]"Sugata" is ambiguous, too: it can refer to the person who is "well gone," but technically denotes the abandonment and realization that are the characteristic qualities of the "well gone."

[9]sgrub byed in its broadest sense means "accomplishment." It is used in logic to denote the proof of a thesis by a Reason, and more broadly to refer to the accomplishment of any state or goal. The Mīmāṃsaka, therefore, is arguing that omniscience is a condition susceptible neither to logical proof nor actual accomplishment.

[10]Phenomena are divided into three types of objects, classified according to their accessibility to the observer: manifest (mngon gyur, abhimukhī), hidden (lkog gyur, parokṣa) and very hidden (shin tu lkog gyur, atiparokṣa). The first is accessible to sense-perception, the second to inference, the third only to a being who perceives yogically.

[11]For both rGyal tshab and the Indian commentator whose views he mirrors most closely, Prajñākaragupta, the Buddha's authoritativeness implies his omniscience, and

the nondeceptive cognition of an object of knowledge. Direct knowledge of nondeceptiveness entails direct knowledge of authoritativeness. Here, the verb 'jog means "prove"; it generally means to "join" or "connect" with.

[28]sgro 'dogs generally refers to philosophical hypostatization, the superimposition of a metaphysical entity where there is none. Its most common usage is in Mādhyamika texts, where it refers to the view that there is an inherently existing self in the skandhas and dharmas. Here, however, the term is used epistemologically, and simply refers to the cognition that is the contradictory of an authoritative cognition. If I am to cognize authoritatively that a lamp is white, I must have a mind that newly cuts off, or is able to cut off, the possibility that it is non-white. Thus, my authoritative cognition of the lamp as white is actually a cognition of it as non-non-white. This is in accord with the Buddhist theory of apoha, whereby we cognize qualities in objects not by virtue of any universal that inheres in them, but by elimination of everything in the universe that is not the quality of that object. Apoha is treated extensively in the svārthānumāna chapter of the Pramāṇavārttika. Cf. also BL, I, pp. 363-505, and Leonard Zwilling, Dharmakīrti on Apoha. For a criticism of the Buddhist position, cf. Nagin J. Shah, Akalaṅka's Criticism of Dharmakīrti's Philosophy: A study, pp. 76-154.

[29]At issue here is the way in which we become aware of the nondeceptiveness of an authoritative cognition. Sometimes we are directly aware of it; it is, as it were, directly given in cognition itself. Other times, we must be informed by the subsequent designations supplied by ourselves or others. Cf. above, note 19.

[30]The Tibetan here reads: rang las rang gi ngo bo rtogs / tha snyad las ni tshad ma nyid (PV 6b-7a). The most evident interpretation is the first one rGyal tshab gives, i.e., that some authoritative cognitions are self-authenticating, while others require subsequent designation for authentication. However, since tha snyad (vyavahāra) also can mean "conventional," rGyal tshab makes the further point that it is a conventional mind, not a mind cognizing the nature of reality, that is able to distinguish authoritative from non-authoritative cognitions.

[31]rang las rang gi ngo bo rtogs. Cf. previous note.

[32]tha snyad las ni tshad ma nyid. Cf. above, note 30.

[33]The definitions are incomplete because they fail to mention the crucial factor that differentiates self-ascertainment from other-ascertainment: a cognition's power or lack of power to induce certainty toward its object of knowledge independently (rang thob gyis). Self-ascertaining authoritative cognitions have such power; other-ascertained cognitions lack it. Furthermore, the hypothetical definition of self-ascertainment is insufficient because it fails to specify that a self-experiencing apperception must experience not only its own essence, but, specifically, nondeceptiveness. The hypothetical definition of other-ascertainment is insufficient because it fails to specify the need for a subsequent designation (tha snyad) to assist in verifying the cognition that cannot draw certainty by its own power.

[34]rGyal tshab paraphrases Devendrabuddhi's discussion, which is found in his Tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi dka' 'grel (Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā), PTT no. 5717b, vol. 130, p. 220, folios 3-4. The Sanskrit original is not extant.

[35]The Tibetan actually is yul can, "object-possessor," which is applied here because the opponent is speaking from the point of view of objects.

[36]By the time of Dharmakīrti, the term "Lokāyata" seems to have been used interchangably with "Cārvāka" to refer to philosophical materialists. Originally, however, a Lokāyata seems to have been a sort of sophist. Cf. Jayatilleke, Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, pp. 46-57.

[37]Lokāyatas were credited by their opponents with holding the self-contradictory view that only perception is authoritative, and that inference, as rGyal tshab puts it, is "deceptive." Cf. Mādhava, Sarvadarśanasamgraha, tr. E.B. Cowell and A.E. Gough, in A Sourcebook in Indian Philosophy, pp. 231-33; TS, Jha tr. nos. 1460-67, vol. I, pp. 718-20. On the other hand, we also learn from Kamalaśīla that there were Lokāyatas who accepted inference in worldly matters but denied its applicability to metaphysical problems, such as the existence of past and future lives. Cf. Jha, no. 1481, p. 726; Surendranath Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, vol. III, p. 536.

[38]Cf. Lati Rinbochay, p. 121ff., for a full discussion of self-ascertaining and other-ascertained authoritative cognitions.

[39]In other words, whether or not a Lokāyata asserts the authoritativeness of inference, he uses it, and it is as certain for him as it is for someone who does not accept it as authoritative.

[40]The "words of the Omniscient One" are the sūtras.

[41]The Sanskrit term pramāṇa is explained as pra + māṇa. The pra is said to connote the newness or freshness of an authoritative cognition. The māṇa means to "measure," which in an epistemological sense means to comprehend, i.e., to be undeceived about. Hence, pra + māṇa = "new, nondeceptive."

[42]Saying that two definienda have "different opposites of the negative" (ldog pa tha dad), or different contrapositives, is, in Buddhist epistemology, a way of saying that the words may be semantically similar but are, in fact, lexically different. It is often said of synonyms that they are ngo bo gcig dang ldog pa tha dad, "essentially identical, but with different opposites of the negative."

[43]Prajñākaragupta, p. 14/4, conveys this sense, though not in precisely the words cited by rGyal tshab, who may have been working from a different edition, or may simply have paraphrased.

[44]I cannot locate this precise phrase, but the topic is discussed ibid.

[45]A generic image (don spyi) is both an after-image that follows on a moment of direct perception of an object and an image in the memory that assists in the identification of objects. It is not the same as the "universal" of Western philosophy, in that it is neither inherent in objects nor eternal. Cf. Sopa and Hopkins, Practice and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism, pp. 94-5.

[46]An own-mark, or specific characteristic (rang gi mtshan nyid, svalakṣaṇa), is used by Sautrāntikas to refer to the final, existent object that is the real basis of our mental judgements. An own-mark invariably possesses "efficiency" (don byed nus pa nyid, arthakriyatva), the major criterion of reality for Sautrāntikas. Cf. BL, I, pp. 79-118; Sopa and Hopkins, pp. 92-96; and Satkari Mookerjee, The Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux, pp. 1-85.

47 I have not yet been able to locate the source of this quotation, which is found in neither Devendrabuddhi nor Prajñākaragupta.

48 Devendrabuddhi, 221/1.

49 I have been unable to locate the source of this quotation, which is found in neither Devendrabuddhi nor Prajñākaragupta.

50 The opponent has maintained that both own-marks and generic images really exist. rGyal tshab counters by pointing out that when one meditates in the Yogācārin manner neither own-marks nor generic images are found "really" to exist: all there is is "the uncommon, abiding non-duality" that is itself the "own-mark" of all phenomena.

51 The Tibetan translation used by rGyal tshab reads: de ldan bcom ldan tshad ma nyid / "the Blessed One is authoritative in possessing (the characteristics of authoritativeness cited above)." De ldan translates the tadvat of the original Sanskrit (tadvat pramāṇaṃ bhagavan, PV 9a) in a possessive sense, while Devendrabuddhi takes it in a comparative sense, expressed in Tibetan by de bzhin, which makes the verse read: "The Blessed One is authoritative like that." Monier-Williams gives instances of both possessive and comparative uses of tadvat: Sir M. Monier-Williams, A Sanskrit-English Dictionary, p. 434, column 2.

52 The following analysis is found neither in Dharmakīrti's root-verses nor in Devendrabuddhi's commentary. Rather, it reflects the particular concern of rGyal tshab and other commentators (e.g., Prajñākaragupta) for whom the Buddha's authoritativeness is coextensive with his omniscience. The analysis seeks to establish that the Buddha's omniscience fulfils the definition of authoritativeness as a new, nondeceptive cognition.

53 According to Mahāyāna soteriological writings, there are two classes of obstacles to be eliminated before Buddhahood is obtained: defilement-obstacles (nyon sgrib, kleśāvaraṇa) and knowledge-obstables (shes sgrib, jñeyāvaraṇa). Elimination of the former--and with them the roots of greed, hatred and ignorance--is a prerequisite for any liberated state, be it that of a Śrāvaka, Pratyekabuddha or a Buddha. Knowledge-obstacles, which are merely the subtle

traces of uprooted defilements, must be eliminated before one can gain the full omniscience of a Buddha; they still remain in Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas.

[54]According to the most widely accepted scheme, a Bodhisattva traverses ten stages, or grounds (sa, bhūmi) from the time he first directly cognizes the nature of reality until he becomes a Buddha. The eighth of these, the Unshaken (mi skyod, acala) generally marks the point at which the Bodhisattva no longer is in saṃsāra, but is not yet a Buddha.

[55]The path of development (sgom lam, bhavanamārga) is the fourth of the five successive paths to enlightenment posited by the traditions based on either the Abhidharmakośa of Vasubandhu or the Abhisamayālaṃkāra of Maitreya. In the latter, Mahāyāna, tradition, the path of development coincides with the last nine Bodhisattva stages--the first stage coincides with the path of seeing. The main purpose of the path of development is to eliminate utterly all obstacles to liberation and omniscience. It issues in the fifth path, that of no-more-training (mi slob lam, aśaikṣamārga), which is the threshold of Buddhahood. Incidentally, a "path" in this sense comprises a series of mental states of a particular type.

[56]The third Mahāyāna path, that of seeing (mthong lam, darśanamārga), consists of sixteen "moments," or time-divisions, and marks the point at which a Bodhisattva first applies the combination of calm and insight (zhi gnas lhag mthong gzung 'jug, śamathavipaśyanāyuganaddha) toward a direct cognition of emptiness, whether it be emptiness of a substantial difference between subject and object (as in Yogācārin practice) or emptiness of any inherently existing substance in either persons or dharmas (as in Mādhyamika practice). It is only at the point where one cognizes the truth directly that one begins to uproot--as opposed to suppress--the defilements that, together with karma, keep one circling in saṃsāra. Attainment of the path of seeing makes one an Ārya, or "noble."

[57]Dharmatā is a venerable and malleable term, whose general sense is simply "the way things really are." Since different Buddhist schools have differed on how things really are, the term has been used in many ways. Here, dharmatā is being used in its Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika sense as "the way phenomena ultimately exist," i.e., empty (stong pa, śūnya).

[58]The second path, that of application, or linking (sbyor lam, prayogamārga), is that which leads one to the threshold of the direct cognition of the nature of reality afforded by the path of seeing. It consists of four stages, which mark the increasing intensity of one's analytical understanding of the nature of reality. The path of application is preceded by the path of accumulation (tshogs lam, sambharamārga), one which one familarizes oneself with the basic types of meditation, both concentrative and analytical. Entrance into it is marked in the Abhidharmakośa system by the attainment of a spontaneous desire to be fully separated from samsāra, and in the Abhisamayālamkāra system by a spontaneous desire to attain enlightenment for the sake of freeing all beings, i.e., bodhicitta.

[59]Cf. above, note 10.

[60]One way of describing the attainment of the path of seeing is to say that it is the point at which dharmatā becomes a manifest phenomenon for one, rather than a hidden phenomenon; on the path of application it is merely inferred, while on the path of seeing it is directly realized.

[61]This rather sophistic argument by the opponent plays on the definition of "exists." A future object cognized by an omniscient mind is seen to exist as future; since to say that something "exists" is to say that it has already arisen, it follows that a future object has already arisen. The simplest reply is to point out that a future object has already arisen--as future, not as present.

[62]The opponent here attempts to rescue himself by distinguishing between metaphysical and psychological ways of speaking. In general, because of the meaning of the word "exists" as "already arisen," an object that exists in the future has already arisen; it may not, however, be "already-arisen" for a particular person.

[63]An example of another case is that of a seed and sprout: as long as there still are seeds that newly will become sprouts at some future moment, an omniscient mind cognizing that event will cognize newly, and thus fulfil one of the criteria of authoritativeness.

[64]Negative purpose (rnam bcad kyi dgos pa) entails a

conclusion that is to be reached through the elimination of relevant incorrect views.

[65]Positive purpose (yongs gcod kyi dgos pa) entails a conslusion that is to be reached through the establishment of relevant correct views.

[66]I render dbang phyug (Īśvara) as "God," because the attributes imputed to the deity--omnicreation, omnipotence, omniscience--by those Indian schools that posit Him are similar enough to those of the Christian God to warrant the use of the same term. Further, as we will see below, arguments for the existence of dbang phyug bear a remarkable similarity to certain Western arguments for the existence of God.

[67]The term dngos po (vastu) is sometimes translated as "entity," but its sense--for Buddhists--is always of an entity that is causally efficient (don byed nus pa) and impermanent, and here I have translated it as "functioning entity" to highlight its intrinsic contrast with any sort of permanent being, such as God.

[68]PV 10: "An authoritative (cognition) is not permanent, because an authoritative (cognition) cognizes (functioning) entities, and because the impermanence of objects of knowledge (entails) the instability of (that which cognizes them)." (tshad ma rtag pa nyid yod min / dngos yod rtogs pa tshad phyir dang / shes bya mi rtag pa nyid kyis / de nyid mi brten nyid phyir ro // = nityaṃ pramāṇaṃ naivāsti pramāṇyāt vastusadgateḥ / jñeyānityatayā tasyā adhrauvyāt....).

[69]The "presumptuous" Buddhist commentators who believe in a permanent authoritativeness may be the Jo nang pas, a Tibetan school founded in the twelfth century, and held by Tsong kha pa and his followers to stray dangerously close to the extreme of eternalism. It should be noted that the term "permanent" (rtag pa, nitya) means, primarily, unchanging from moment to moment. A permanent phenomenon need not necessarily be eternal, as, for instance, the space inside a pot, which does not change while the pot lasts, but ceases to exist when the pot does. Cf. Sopa and Hopkins, p. 99.

[70]In other words, if the opponent admits that there is a permanent conventional authoritativeness that is to be

refuted, and that that conventional authoritativeness is, e.g., a permanent authoritative cognition such as that attributed to God, then what permanent authoritativeness could there be that is different from this such that it could be called "ultimate" and stand unrefuted? The question is rhetorical, because the opponent cannot, in fact, specify a permanent "ultimate" authoritativeness that is any different from what he admits to be conventional and refutable.

[71]This argument seems to appeal to a notion somewhat like that of the Aristitelian "unmoved mover": God is essentially unmoving, but there is an aspect of himself that, in contact with the contingent universe, moves. In Indian terms, the argument is that God is essentially permanent but that his cognitions are impermanent.

[72]It is a contradiction in terms that impermanent cognitions be generated from a permanent source.

[73]If the opponent argues that God is permanent and his impermanent cognitions generated in dependence on conditions, he is open to the reply that God cannot be subject to external conditions, or he loses his "omnipotence." Also, conditions are impermanent, so they cannot affect a permanent God.

[74]This argument is typically and fundamentally Buddhist, and is crucial to the establishment of the doctrine of momentariness. Its basic formulation is clearly stated by John Koller: "...both terms of the following disjunction are false: either the action of causation is instantaneous and complete, or else it is temporally extended. The action of causation cannot be instantaneous and complete, for then all the effects would be produced at once and reality would, except for that moment, be static. Furthermore, if the action were instantaneous and complete, the question would arise as to whether the permanent exists after the first moment of change--if it does, then it should give rise to the same effects as it did in the first moment, and the same for each succeeding moment. But this is absurd, for it results in an infinity of complete universes. If the permanent continues to exist after the first moment of causation but not as a cause, then apparently it changed from a cause to a non-cause. Since it is not possible for a self-contradictory thing to exist, such a reality is not possible. The alternative to instantaneous and complete causal action is temporally extended causal action. This

view is untenable also, for if it were the case that the permanent cause produced first x, then y, and then z, etc., it could be asked whether or not y or z could have been produced while x was being produced. If the answer is affirmative, it would turn out that all the effects were producible at once, and this alternative would be indistinguishable from the first. But if the first cause could not produce effects y, z, etc., at any given time, say when x was being produced, it would be impossible for it to cause them at any later time, for what is not capable of producing a given effect at a given time cannot produce that effect at any other time, except by assuming other causal activity....Even if it is admitted that certain modifications in the cause are required, the Buddhist argument is successful, for this is an admission that the cause has changed. But if the cause has changed, then there are really two things: the cause prior to change and the cause after change. To admit that the substance changes as it produces effects is to deny permanence and to admit different existences at different moments. And this is in accord with the doctrine of momentariness which the Buddhists wish to support." John Koller, Oriental Philosophies, pp. 154-5. If one substitutes "cognition" and "object" for "cause" and "effect" in the preceding passage, its applicability to the problem at hand is clear.

[75]The flaw in the opponent's argument is his contention that God has been generated beginninglessly from previous homogeneous causes. To be so generated is to be impermanent, but to be impermanent is also to be subject to helping and hindering causes and conditions, yet the opponent insists that his God is both impermanent and free from causes and conditions such as those found in saṃsāra, and that he has always been so. rGyal tshab is arguing that it is meaningless to use the terms "generated" and "impermanent" of an entity and then deny to that entity those characteristics that in part define being generated and impermanent, i.e., susceptibility to hindrance or assistance by external causes and conditions.

[76]The Reason cited by rGyal tshab as proving that "even if (God) is impermanent, he cannot be authoritative" (mi rtag na yang tshad med nyid = anitye 'pyapramānatā), viz., "because he cannot be assisted by anything" (rnam 'gas phan gdags bya min phyir = kathañcinnopakāryatvāt), is taken by Devendrabuddhi as a proof that permanence is impossible: if the opponent argues that God is permanent but generates impermanent cognitions assisted by causes or conditions, this is simply another way of saying that he is

dependent, and a permanent being cannot depend on anything. The syntactical structure of PV 11 would seem to support Devendrabuddhi, yet rGyal tshab was preceded by Prajñākaragupta in his interpretation.

[77]This is an Indian statement of what is known in the West as the teleological argument, or the argument from design. For a lucid contemporary discussion of the argument, cf. John Hospers, An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis, pp. 455-78. It is the second of the three Reasons given--"because they have a particular shape, like a pot"--that most clearly resembles the Western argument, with the pot serving the same analogical function as a watch often has in Western arguments.

[78]A syllogism, in order to be a true syllogism, must demonstrate something not already demonstrated; if it merely restates what has become axiomatic, it is adding nothing to our store of knowledge. The Buddhists maintain, and are content to have proven already, that worldly abodes, bodies and possessions are preceded by mind, i.e., by the mental karma of those beings who use them, so if the theist is merely proving in a general way that they are mind-preceded, nothing new has been proven, and the syllogism is irrelevant. How the Buddhists have proven it, rGyal tshab does not say, but it is likely that they have done so at least in partial dependence on the authoritative word of the Buddha (who alone is authoritative regarding the subtleties of karma); since the Buddha's authoritativeness is at issue, it might be argued that rGyal tshab is begging the question.

[79]The word "or" ('am, vā) separates the above analysis from the one to follow: "the assertion is (already) proven or the example is unproven" ('dod pa grub pa'am dpe ma grub = iṣṭasiddhiḥ asiddhirvā dṛṣṭānte....) (PV 12b).

[80]If the syllogism states that all objects are preceded by a permanent mind, because they are intermittent, shaped and efficient, like an axe, pot and battle-axe, then the examples are unproven, because no impermanent object--and all three examples are impermanent objects--can be preceded by a permanent mind. The Predicate in this case is too restrictive, because it specifies "permanent."

[81]In this case, the Predicate is too broad, and therefore the Reason is uncertain, because it merely states that all objects are preceded by another creator; it does not

not specify or demonstrate that that creator is God.

[82]Further, the Reason is contradictory, because an intermittent result must have an intermittent cause. An intermittent cause is by definition impermanent, and so it is contradictory to cite the fact that objects are intermittent as a Reason proving that they are preceded by a permanent mind.

[83]ma grub (asiddha) is one of the three possible fallacies (ltar snang, abhāsa) of a logical Reason. It occurs when it is unproven that the Reason is present in the Subject (i.e., when there is no phyogs chos, pakṣadharma; cf. above, note 24). In this case, the Reason is unproven in the Subject because it is unprovem that all objects are shaped in the way that a pot is: there are other possible explanations for the shapes of things, explanations that do not depend on their deliberate design. Cf. TS 63.

[84]ma nges (anaikāntika) is another of the fallacies of a logical Reason. It occurs when it is uncertain that the Reason pervades the Predicate, or that the non-Reason pervades the non-Predicate (i.e., when there is either no rjes khyab, anvaya, or no ldog khyab, vyatireka; cf. above, note 24). In this case, the Reason's pervasion on the Predicate is uncertain because it is too broad (khyab ches ba): there are instances of objects that "merely have shape" (Reason) that are not "shaped by a person" (Predicate), e.g., natural objects. Similarly, one cannot infer the presence of fire on a hill merely from the perception of a grey substance, because there are many grey substances that are not smoke. Cf. TS 68.

[85]A rebounding argument ('bras mtshungs, kāryasama) is a form of sophistry, wherein one analyzes a Reason with excessive specificity, and thereby finds it wanting. The argument "rebounds," or, more literally, has "equal results," because the same specific analysis can be employed to invalidate the syllogism of the objector. Here, the opponent is arguing that Dharmakīrti/rGyal tshab's specific analysis of of the use of "shape" as a Reason proving that objects are created by God is a rebounding argument, a sophistry. rGyal tshab rejects this contention. For a discussion of kāryasama that employs the same example as that cited by rGyal tshab, cf. Vidyabhusana, p. 81. Cf. also TS 69.

[86]The Reason is uncertain because something that is a

result cannot be said to exist before its cause; in this case, the conch-sound would pre-exist the effort that is its cause.

[87]The Reason is unproven because for the Sāmkhya (who is the opponent), sound exists prior to its manifestation, in Prakrti. Hence, it is unproven that sound arises from a fresh, unprecedented effort. Vidyabhusana, ibid., gives a somewhat different explanation of the dilemma posed by the opponent.

[88]The relator (_'bral ba can_) is another name for the logical Reason. It is the relator in the sense that it relates the Subject to the Predicate.

[89]This is a slightly more general statement of the definition than that made in the previous paragraph, but the import is the same.

[90]_'gal ba_ (_viruddha_) is the third of the fallacies of a logical Reason. It occurs when the Reason and the Predicate are contradictory. In this case, the Reason is contradictory because a product (Reason) cannot arise from a permanent existent: products are impermanent and so must be their causes.

[91]The Reason is unproven because the product of a pot (Reason) bears no necessary relation to a sound (Subject).

[92]An uncommon uncertain Reason is one in which the Reason "abides in nothing homogeneous with and in nothing heterogeneous from" the Predicate (Vidyabhusana, section 96A.). There is no certainty that a sound exists as either permanent or impermanent; indeed, its impermanence is what is at stake in the syllogism.

[93]The point here is that a word cannot serve as a good logical Reason in _any_ syllogism, simply because it so serves in _one_. "Shaped" is a valid Reason proving that, e.g., a pot is created by a person, because a shaped object is created by a person. One cannot, however, simply take the word "shaped," which belongs to the first proof, and apply it to proving that abodes, etc., are created by God, because it is uncertain that shaped objects are created by God. Similarly, one cannot say that words are cows just because we see that there is a Sanskrit word, _go_, which de-

notes both words and cows. Cf. TS 70.

[94]Words exist simply because someone desires to express them. There is no guarantee that the existence of a word entails the existence of the object to which it refers (cf. above, note 23). If it did, then merely by uttering the word, we should attain the object. Alternatively, the mere existence of the word would lead to the proving of an object in the logical sense and to the accomplishment of a goal in an existential sense.

[95]Other schools' syllogisms are refutable in the general sense that logical faults will be found in their Reasons, not in the specific sense that arguments against the existence of God will be applied to them. Indeed, neither the Jainas nor most Sāṃkhyas believe in God.

[96]The Sāṃkhya syllogism is invalid because it is using as a Reason a doctrine not accepted by the Sāṃkhyas themselves, namely that of impermanence as momentariness, i.e., instantaneous arising and destruction. The Sāṃkhya is attempting to show that the evolutes of Prakṛti are insentient, and does so by arguing that they are evanescent--yet this sort of evanescence is not accepted by the Sāṃkhya himself, since for him evolutes are modifications of an eternal substance, and cannot therefore be impermanent in the sense in which Buddhists use the term. The Jaina syllogism is invalid because it is using as a Reason a doctrine not acceptable to another school: the Buddhists do not accept that death is related to the removal of bark, and have a different notion of sentience. One cannot merely assume one's own doctrine; it is a cardinal rule of logical disputation that the disputants must agree on the terms. Cf. BL, I, pp. 329-30 and II, 173-76.

[97]rGyal tshab's point here is similar to the one he made in regard to a rebounding argument: Reasons are general, and to burden them with excessive precision or with artificial dilemmas is merely sophistry. Indeed, it is precisely the generality of a Reason that gives it the ability to be present in the Subject and pervasive of the Predicate, hence correct and probative.

[98]In other words, the absence of the specific word "product" from a syllogism proving that sound is impermanent will not invalidate the syllogism, as long as the meaning expressed by "product" is supplied by some other

word, e.g., "composite."

[99]The usual Tibetan term for Vaiśeṣika, bye brag pa, is here replaced by 'ug pa pa. 'Ug pa is Ulūka, another name of Kaṇāda, traditionally considered the author of the Vaiśeṣika Sūtras. Cf. Dasgupta, vol. I, p. 71.

[100]The verses under discussion are PV 20-21: "If it is proven that a (Reason) is generally unproven (in relation to its Subject), then it is unproven; (if it is generally proven), then particular (unproven details) do not damage (its validity), as the fact that sound (does not) depend on space (does not contravene sound's impermanence). Even if a word is unproven, if the entity is proven, then (the Reason) is proven, as when the Buddhists (claim) to the Aulūkas that (their term) 'physical' proves (that atoms are impermanent) (dngos po'i ngo bo ma grub na / tshul 'di grub na ma grub kyang / khyad par gnod byed ma yin te / sgra yi nam mkha' la brten bzhin // sgra ma grub kyang dngos po ni / grub na grub par 'gyur te dper / 'ug pa pa la sangs rgyas pas / lus sogs sgrub byed bshad pa bzhin // = vastusvarūpe 'siddhe'yaṃ nyāya: siddhe viśeṣaṇam / abhādakamasiddhāvapyākāśāsrayavad dhvaneḥ // asiddhāvapi śabdasya siddhe vastuni siddhyati / aulūkyasya yathā bauddhenokaṃ mūrttyādisādhanam).

[101]This merely states the contrapositive of what was demonstrated above. Not only can a correct meaning that lacks a specific word be probative, but an incorrect meaning, even where the word is "correct," cannot be probative. A Reason's probative power comes not from the word or words of which it may consist, but from the observable relation between what is symbolized by the word or words of the Reason and what is symbolized by the word or words of the Subject and Predicate.

[102]Lit., rva can, "horn-possessing," another way of saying "cow." Indian syllogisms are constructed so that the Subject and Predicate are not tautologous, hence the frequent use of synonyms to make this explicit.

[103]The verse that makes this point is found only in Tibetan: 'gro ba'i phyir dang lag ldan phyir / rva can glang po zhes sgrub byed / 'di yi sgra yi brjod bya ni / grags pa yin gyis brjod 'dod min //. It falls between verses 22 and 23 of Shastri's edition. It presents two examples of cases where a "correct" word is misunderstood, and

cannot, therefore, serve as a good Reason. In each case, the Reason set forth is in common usage a synonym for the animal that is the Subject of the syllogism: 'gro ba (S. ?), or "goer," is another word for cow; and lag ldan (hathi), or "arm (=trunk)-possessing," is another word for elephant. These cannot serve as correct Reasons because they are merely common expressions, liable to be misunderstood by anyone unaware of their popular usage. The words "goer" and "arm-possessing" are ambiguous, and when they are applied in their more general, non-idiomatic sense, their pervasion of their respective Predicates is uncertain, because there are goers that are not cows and there are arm-possessors that are not elephants. Even if this ambiguity were not present, the syllogisms still would be incorrect, for they would merely use synonyms as Reasons, and thereby supply definitions but not proofs.

[104] God might be asserted as an occasional non-cause because objects arise intermittently, and it might be said that when they do not arise God is their non-cause; but if God is permanent he cannot change his nature, and if he is a cause, he cannot become a non-cause.

[105] If God is asserted to be a non-cause, then, because he is permanent and cannot change his nature, he must always be a non-cause. For the opponent to insist that he still is a cause as well is to say that a non-cause is a cause. Why, then, not say that a post, which has no connection to either the infliction or healing of a wound, is the cause of the infliction and healing? The statement is absurd, but reasonable in light of the absurdity the opponent is asserting.

[106] The basic argument here is that, quite apart from the logical impossibility of a permanent being's assistance in bringing about an impermanent result, God cannot be said to cause or assist in the causation of particular results because his presence or absence is not observed to be relevant to the workings of causality, which are in almost all cases susceptible of satisfactory natural explanations ("natural," in a Buddhist sense, including karma). God, in short, is an unnecessary, metaphysical entity.

[107] If some unseen factor, such as God, is asserted to be a cause, even though his presence or absence makes no discernible difference to the operation of causality, then any unseen factor can be asserted to be the cause of any observed result, an idea that--if not absurd--is quite

useless, because it makes causality so general as to be meaningless, and therefore useless for any purpose, worldly or religious. Cf. TS 90.

[108]The well-worked field that produces a good autumn harvest is a general example of the change in nature undergone by the elements. Before the fields have been properly sown, neither the earth nor the seed is a cause of a sprout; when, however, they have met under the proper conditions, they will result in the sprouts that are the beginning of a bountiful harvest.

[109]In this example, as in the one above, the simple inference is that that the factors causing a particular result must have a different nature when they meet as when they are separate, because when they are separate they are not causes and when they meet they are, and to be a non-cause is to have a different nature from a cause.

[110]As in a number of previous instances, the Tibetan sgrub byed carries the double sense of "prove" and "accomplish." Because there is no way of "accomplishing" omniscience, omniscience has no identifiable cause. Because there is no way of "proving" omniscience, there is no means by which we could identify an Omniscient One. Cf. above, note 9.

[111]The existence of a word, as we have seen, does not guarantee the existence of that which the word denotes. There is, in short, no ontological connection between words and things. Even if there were such a connection, knowledge gained through words still would be indirect, and thus not of the most certain kind.

[112]The Mīmāṃsaka is driving home the logical consequences of claiming that all phenomena can be cognized. To say that all phenomena are cognized successively is to imply that there is a limit to phenomena. If phenomena are--as generally believed in Indian philosophy--infinite, then it is theoretically impossible to cognize all phenomena successively, for there always will be a new phenomenon to cognize. Similarly, to claim that all phenomena are cognized simultaneously is to claim that phenomena can be delimited by a single cognition, and so must be finite in space and time. Saṃsāra, therefore, must have a beginning, contrary to what a Buddhist would maintain.

infinite compassion = omniscience.

130 That the *pramāṇasiddhi* chapter shows "just" (*tsam*) that high rebirths, the definite good and omniscience are possible means that it demonstrates their possibility in a general sense, or in principle. Particular details of particular attainments are considered to be very hidden phenomena, and not, therefore, susuceptible of inference. They must be taken on faith from authoritative scripture. Eventually, it is presumed, one will be able to cognize them directly oneself.

131 rGyal tshab, vol. I, pp. 175-80, discusses reliance on scripture, which is considered a form of inference. Reliable or authoritative scripture must not contradict (1) perception, (2) inference, or (3) authoritative scripture. As Jose Cabezon has pointed out, the last requirement is not circular, because it presupposes different levels of scripture, divided into those of direct meaning (*nges don*, *nitārtha*) and those of interpretable meaning (*drang don*, *neyārtha*). A scripture will not contradict authoritative scripture as long as it does not contradict scriptures of direct meaning. Cf. Jose I. Cabezon, "The Concepts of Truth and Meaning in Buddhist Scriptures," JIABS, 4,1, pp. 7-23.

132 The third is the chapter on perception (*mngon sum*, *pratyakṣa*). Among the types of perception discussed is yogic perception (*rnal 'byor gyi mngon sum*, *yogipratyakṣa*), which alone is capable of cognizing the details of various states of existence.

133 The *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, the Sanskrit text of which is lost, is found in PTT, no. 5710, vol. 130, pp. 102-133. Cf. also Vidyabhusana, pp. 308-9.

134 A moment of breath, sensation or thought is known in general to be preceded by a moment of the same type--indeed, all things have as their "material cause" (*nyer len gyi rgyu*, *upadānahetu*) a preceding event of an appropriate or similar type. Thus, the syllogism proposed is correct, because breath, sense-clarity and mental inclinations all are phenomena that are known to follow on homogeneous causes. Thus, even the "first" moment of breath, etc., in this life must be preceded by a breath-moment from a preceding or intermediate-state existence.

135 That breath, etc, are generated from homogeneous

causes is demonstrated by the fact that (a) whenever there is a breath-moment, a subsequent breath-moment is seen to follow and (b) whenever there is no breath-moment, no breath will be observed in the following moment.

[136]The observation of positive and negative concomitance (rjes su 'gro ldog) between the Reason and Predicate is fundamental to the inductive generalizations that form the basis of correct reasoning. Without positive and negative concomitance, neither general nor particular conclusions may be drawn about causal relations, so all inference would be pointless.

[137]If mind is generated from the elements, and mind is characteristic only of what is living or sentient, it follows that the elements must be sentient. Panpsychism is rejected by Buddhists, for whom there is a clear line of demarcation between sentient beings and dead matter (plants are included in the latter category) and--within the realm of sentience--between the physical body and the mind that is associated with it. This dualism is a hidden presupposition of this and many other Buddhist attacks on materialism.

[138]If breath, etc., are observed during this life to follow in a homogeneous causal series, then not only is it legitimate to infer that the first breath of this life must have been preceded by a homogeneous cause, a breath, but also that the last breath of this life must be followed by a homogeneous effect, a breath. As Rgyal tshab notes, the validity of these inferences is based on the fact that, apart from the observed homogeneous cause of a breath, we do not see any other additional cause. This being so, what is good enough for this life ought to be good enough for previous and subsequent lives. The assertion that there is no additional cause--even in the form of a necessary condition--seems problematic: lungs, for example, seem indispensible to breath, more so, even, than a "previous breath."

[139]This syllogism follows exactly the same form as that of which breath, etc., were the Subjects. The initial syllogism merely paved the way for this one, by establishing an observable example of a homogeneous causal series. Once the notion of the homogeneous causal series has been established, it can be applied to a subject somewhat less open to general inspection: the mind. Essential to this view, of course, is the notion that mind, like matter, can be logically analyzed into instantaneous, efficient events.

If this is the case, then mind too must consist of a homogeneous causal series. Whether mind is, in fact, in the same ontological category as matter (what might be called "substance"), and thus analyzable "atomistically" is not a question that seems to have been raised in Indian philosophy (unless the materialists raised it; cf. above, note 125)--despite the fact that both the Pali nikāyas and the Prasaṅgika Mādhyamikas seem to have some notion of what Ryle calls "category mistakes."

[140]The qualification "attached" mind will be explained at greater length below (e.g., p. 785ff.). It is necessary to specify "attached" because the mind of an Arahant, who is detached, does not, according to the Sautrāntikas, connect at death with a subsequent mind, because the Arahant will enter (pari-) nirvāṇa, which is according to the Sautrāntikas a totally nugatory state.

[141]The opponent is attempting to argue that the elements are divided into those that are able to generate life and those that are not. He does not, however, provide any criterion for distinguishing life-bearing from inanimate elements, and therefore leaves himself open to refutation. A modern, scientifically-trained materialist is able to appeal to the notion of different levels of organization of matter, and thereby to provide a plausible--if not utterly indisputable--explanation of how some "elements" generate life while others do not.

[142]Moisture-birth is one of four different types of birth recognized in Buddhism, the others being birth from the womb, birth from an egg, and miraculous birth, such as is taken by gods. Birth from moisture is similar to the now-discredited Western belief in spontaneous generation. rGyal tshab is arguing against his opponent that it is impossible to divide something as fundamentally simple as the elements into life-bearing and inanimate parts: if some parts of the elements are life-bearing, then all must be.

[143]What is living, rGyal tshab maintains, only can come from what is living; if the elements are the cause of a living being, then they must be living to begin with. It should be noted that once again rGyal tshab appeals implicitly to the strong Buddhist demarcation of the living/sentient from the inanimate/insentient. Cf. above, note 137.

[144]rGyal tshab argues that because of the simplicity and uniformity of the elements, the elements alone are in-

sufficient as an explanation of the variety of beings found, e.g., in a drop of water. One could not, as he puts it, find beings with red heads and yellow bodies _and_ beings with yellow heads and red bodies in the same drop.

[145]According the the Buddhist view, the varieties we encounter among living beings are due to non-physical karmic causes. The general philosophical problems it raises quite aside, karma in this instance is invoked as a non-materialist explanation of phenomena that in the last century have come to be understood materialistically through genetic theory.

[146]This summarizes the Buddhist view: appealing to the elements alone as causes of living beings does not provide us with adequate criteria for distinguishing the living from the non-living--and the distinction must be made, as it is evident from observation that there are in the world both animate and inanimate objects.

[147]rGyal tshab is arguing against the idea that the mind is directly dependent on the activities of the senses; he cites as proof the fact that we see that in many cases a person whose sense-organs are damaged suffers no impairment of his higher mental functions. This, as so many arguments in the _pramāṇasiddhi_ chapter, predates the recognition that the mind is associated with one specific organ, the brain. Some of the arguments can be recast in terms of the brain (as is done, e.g., by Namgyal Wangchen, _kLad sems kyi 'brel ba la brtag pa'i gtam legs bshad tshad ma'i dgongs rgyan_), but some of them have been rendered archaic.

[148]Conversely, rGyal tshab argues, we see that the senses _are_ affected by states of the mind, as when one is, e.g., "blinded by anger." It is, in fact, possible to cite counter-instances to both of his assertions--the mind _is_ often affected by what happens to the sense-organs, and there are many cases in which one's state of mind does _not_ affect the functioning of the sense-organs--but rGyal tshab is most concerned to establish a general point: that there is no _invariable_ relation between states of the sense-organs and states of mind.

[149]A present mind-moment, which is by definition a result, is the result of some previous mental action that is appropriate as its cause, and that, in turn, is the result of still another similar previous action, and so forth, ad infinitum. For example, a moment of desire--whatever the

proximate external conditions--has as its antecedent some previous moment of desire or attachment. Even the first instance of desire after birth, e.g., for the mother's breast, must have a homogeneous cause, and therefore must be traced to instances of desire or attachment in a previous life.

150 A "projecting cause" is, in effect, an indirect material cause or indispensible condition. A projecting cause is usually a karmic "seed," planted at the time of a particular action, and bearing fruit with the coincidence of certain conditions. The sense-organs have mind not as their material cause, but as their indispensible condition.

151 I have been unable to find the exact source of this quotation, which presumably is from the Sūtrapiṭaka.

152 "Body-cognition" is consciousness of touch. A physical sensation of touch is followed by an awareness of that sensation. The awareness of the sensation can lead to a "mental congition," e.g., the thought "I am being touched," but the sensation does not lead directly to the mental cognition. Mental cognition only can be preceded by another mental cognition or by a sense-cognition, and even the sense-cognitions do not have the sensations as their material cause--they arise on the basis of cognitiove capacity when a sense-organ encounters a sense-object and attention is applied.

153 rGyal tshab is simply reversing the opponent's argument: if mind and the sense-organs are seen to be concomitant, it is just as valid to argue that "the sense-organs do not arise without mind" as that "mind does not arise without the sense-organs."

154 The prior assertion is that mind and the sense-organs are mutually dependent.

155 This argument parallels almost exactly one used above (p. 565) to refute the existence of a permanent God who is the creator of impermanent phenomena. It is, quite simply, a contradiction in terms for a non-successive entity to produce successive phenomena, whether that non-successive entity be God or a body.

156 This argument, too, is similar to one used against

the idea of a permanent creator God, who cannot be said to depend on conditions, because dependence on conditions is impossible for a permanent entity (above, p. 565).

[157] The opponent argues that later minds arise not _just_ from a permanent body, but from a permanent body that is somehow "associated" with a previous mind.

[158] rGyal tshab here points out that by making his assertion the opponent lays the groundwork for a proof of the Buddhist view. Since minds are seen to occur at every moment, there must be a continual pre-association of the permanent body with a mind. This is tantamount to a description of a momentary body and mind cooperating in the generation of a subsequent mind. Even if a body does _cause_ mind in the way described by the opponent, that body cannot possibly be permanent, as rGyal tshab's _reductio_ has shown. Nothing can be said in defense of rGyal tshab's opponent, but it might be noted that an opponent who actually argued for the existence of a permanent body might be rather difficult to find. Certainly it is an argument that has no contemporary relevance.

[159] Restated syllogistically, the proposition is as follows: "An ordinary being's death-time mind does not connect with a subsequent homogeneous result, because it is a death-time mind, like a Detached One's death-time mind." The materialist, of course, is taking death to mean cessation--which is not an adequate definition for the Buddhist. Cf. TS 1863.

[160] The opponent is saying that the Buddhist can argue in his turn that "An ordinary being's death-time mind necessarily _does_ connect with a subsequent homogeneous result, because it is a death-time mind," but that such an argument can be countered by a reassertion of the opponent's syllogism. Such trading of syllogisms would go on indefinitely, as long as there remained the fundamental disagreement over the meaning of "death-time mind"--which materialists interpret in its most obvious connotation.

[161] rGyal tshab counters that the Buddhist does _not_ assert the opposite of the opponent's syllogism, because the Buddhist will not use "death-time mind" as a Reason proving that an ordinary being's mind continues, since--for the (Sautrāntika) Buddhist--not _all_ death-time minds connect to a subsequent homogeneous result (an Arahant's does not).

The Reason the Buddhist uses is, of course, "attached mind." Because there is, nevertheless, no inherent contradiction in the idea of a death-time mind's connection with a subsequent mind, the opponent's Reason is uncertain.

[162]An accordant, or appropriate, example (mthun dpe) must be applicable to both the Subject and Predicate of a syllogism, and must be accepted by both proponent and opponent. The example of an Arahant fulfils neither of these criteria, as it is not accepted by the opponent and as, from the Buddhist point of view, it is not applicable to the Subject, since an Arahant is not an ordinary being.

[163]If the opponent insists that the Arahant *is* an appropriate example, he must deny that the Arahant's existence is unproven for him. If he denies that it is unproven, he must accept that it is proven, in which case he accepts the existence of an Arahant, and cannot any longer seriously object to the Buddhist concept of a liberated being.

[164]The remainder of this section is taken up with a digressive discussion of various problems involved in the acceptance of the finality of an Arahant's death-time mind. It is not found in Dharmakīrti's root-verses.

[165]The Reason, as already noted, is uncertain, because not all minds connect with a subsequent mind, the death-time mind of an Arahant being the exception.

[166]Ravigupta is the author of the *Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti*. The Sanskit original is lost, but there is a Tibetan translation extant, in vol. 136 of PTT. Ravigupta was a direct disciple of Prajñākaragupta.

[167]One must, in other words, either take or leave Buddhist writings. If one accepts them, one must accept both the existence of Arahants and the continuation after death of an ordinary being's mind. If one rejects them, one is able to deny future lives, but one cannot then cite the Arahant as an example supporting that denial.

[168]The Arahant's final mind does not produce a subsequent homogeneous result, but it does have effects: it is, for example, perceived by the mind of an Omniscient One, and therefore assists in the generation of a mind--though obviously not as a material cause or indispensible condition. It cannot, therefore, serve as an appropriate example

of entitylessness that is empty of efficiency, because it does have an effect of some type.

169 Pramāṇaviniścaya, second section, in PTT, vol. 130, pp. 108-16.

170 Thus, an Arahant's final mind is scarcely suitable proof that no minds connect with subsequent homogeneous results at death; it is merely one exception to a general rule. Prajñākaragupta, p. 28/2-4.

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172 Ravigupta does not accept the extinction of an Arahant's mind at death. He asserts that undefiled minds do connect to a subsequent homogeneous result at death-time. Ravigupta, op. cit., PTT 136, p. 138/1-3. His is the view of most Mahāyānists.

173 The belief in "three final vehicles" is characteristic of some Yogācārins. It entails the assumption that each of the three spiritual goals--Śrāvakahood, Pratyekabuddhahood and Buddhahood--is an end in itself. Neither a Śrāvaka nor a Pratyekabuddha, according to this doctrine, ever will become a Buddha. The belief in one final vehicle (ekayāna) is upheld by most Mādhyamikas, of whom rGyal tshab is one. The one final vehicle is that of the Buddha, and full Buddhahood is the destiny of all sentient beings. Even Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas eventually will become Buddhas, so their minds are not extinguished at death. They may continue for a very long time entranced by the beatitude of liberation, but their minds do exist, and sooner or later will be stimulated by a fully enlightened being to rouse themselves and complete the Bodhisattva path that alone leads to full enlightenment.

174 The objection has been raised that the existence of a future life is uncertain when one sets forth the syllogism, "The death-time mind of an ordinary being connects to a subsequent homogeneous result because it is a mind," for not all minds connect to a subsequent homogeneous result.

175 An attached mind (chags dang bcas pa'i sems) is not

proximate external conditions--has as its antecedent some previous moment of desire or attachment. Even the first instance of desire after birth, e.g., for the mother's breast, must have a homogeneous cause, and therefore must be traced to instances of desire or attachment in a previous life.

[150]A "projecting cause" is, in effect, an indirect material cause or indispensible condition. A projecting cause is usually a karmic "seed," planted at the time of a particular action, and bearing fruit with the coincidence of certain conditions. The sense-organs have mind not as their material cause, but as their indispensible condition.

[151]I have been unable to find the exact source of this quotation, which presumably is from the Sūtrapiṭaka.

[152]"Body-cognition" is consciousness of touch. A physical sensation of touch is followed by an awareness of that sensation. The awareness of the sensation can lead to a "mental congition," e.g., the thought "I am being touched," but the sensation does not lead directly to the mental cognition. Mental cognition only can be preceded by another mental cognition or by a sense-cognition, and even the sense-cognitions do not have the sensations as their material cause--they arise on the basis of cognitiove capacity when a sense-organ encounters a sense-object and attention is applied.

[153]rGyal tshab is simply reversing the opponent's argument: if mind and the sense-organs are seen to be concomitant, it is just as valid to argue that "the sense-organs do not arise without mind" as that "mind does not arise without the sense-organs."

[154]The prior assertion is that mind and the sense-organs are mutually dependent.

[155]This argument parallels almost exactly one used above (p. 565) to refute the existence of a permanent God who is the creator of impermanent phenomena. It is, quite simply, a contradiction in terms for a non-successive entity to produce successive phenomena, whether that non-successive entity be God or a body.

[156]This argument, too, is similar to one used against

the idea of a permanent creator God, who cannot be said to depend on conditions, because dependence on conditions is impossible for a permanent entity (above, p. 565).

[157]The opponent argues that later minds arise not _just_ from a permanent body, but from a permanent body that is somehow "associated" with a previous mind.

[158]rGyal tshab here points out that by making his assertion the opponent lays the groundwork for a proof of the Buddhist view. Since minds are seen to occur at every moment, there must be a continual pre-association of the permanent body with a mind. This is tantamount to a description of a momentary body and mind cooperating in the generation of a subsequent mind. Even if a body does _cause_ mind in the way described by the opponent, that body cannot possibly be permanent, as rGyal tshab's _reductio_ has shown. Nothing can be said in defense of rGyal tshab's opponent, but it might be noted that an opponent who actually argued for the existence of a permanent body might be rather difficult to find. Certainly it is an argument that has no contemporary relevance.

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175 An attached mind (chags dang bcas pa'i sems) is not

necessarily a mind that is specifically attached to a particular object; it is, rather, any mind in the continuum of a being who has not yet eradicated attachment. Thus, even a virtuous mind in the continuum of an ordinary being falls under the general rubric of "attached mind."

[176]Syllogisms, or Reasons, are based on either causation ('bras bu'i rtags), negation (ma dmigs pa'i rtags) or identity (rang bzhin gyi rtags). An example of a syllogism based on causation is: "On the hill there is fire, because there is smoke." The thesis, that there is fire on the hill, is valid because fire is invariably observed to accompany smoke, which is its result. The Reason and Predicate are thus related by causation. An example of a syllogism based on negation is: "On that lake at night there is no smoke, because there is no fire." The thesis, that on that lake at night there is no smoke, is valid because the absence of the Reason, fire, is concomitant with the absence of the Predicate, smoke. The Reason and Predicate are thus related by negation.An example of a syllogism based on identity is the one proposed by Kamalaśīla, which might be restated: "The death-time mind of an ordinary being is able to generate another mind that is its material effect, because it is an attached mind." An attached mind, the Reason, and a mind able to generate its own material effect, the Predicate, are identical. This syllogism is satisfactory for Buddhists, and helps to resolve the problems raised by the uncertainty of the Reason "because it is a mind." It is not, however, self-evident to an opponent that an attached mind is synonymous with the production of a subsequent homogeneous result, for he has yet to be convinced that mind is its own material cause, nor does he accept the Buddhist division of minds into those that continue (those of ordinary beings) and those that do not (those of Arahants).

[177]This is a final, clear assertion of the contradiction involved when the opponent cites the Arahant as an example of non-continuing minds: not only is the opponent implicitly accepting the reality of the Arahant, but he is quoting Buddhist scriptures in order to bolster his case!

[178]rGyal tshab's tone is sarcastic here. The opponent continues to speak of an Arahant's death-time mind, when what he really is seeking to prove is the non-continuation of an ordinary being's mind. Since it is uncertain that separation from breathing, etc., necessarily entails the mind's inability to connect with a subsequent homogeneous result, rGyal tshab suggests that the opponent try to apply

"separation from breathing, etc.," to a syllogism that has "an ordinary being's death-time mind" as its Subject.

[179]The "latter" syllogism is the one proposed for his opponent by rGyal tshab: "The death-time mind of an ordinary being does not connect with a subsequent homogeneous result, because it is separated from breathing, the sense-organs, etc., which are its cause."

[180]Mind cannot have as a principal condition (bdag rkyen, adhipatipratyaya) the body together with the sense-organs, because then the various capacities of the body, organs and mind would become conflated, and the body might be said to cognize as the mind does, or the mind to experience sensations as the body does.

[181]There are two problems, then, inherent in claiming that the collection of sense-organs is the principal condition of the mind: (a) the individual functions of the various organs would be eliminated and (b) if even one member of the collection, e.g., the eyes, were absent, the mind could not arise, a suggestion that is patently absurd.

[182]How, the opponent wants to know, are we to account for the coexistence of the sense-organs and mind in the same individual if they are not related as basis and based?

[183]rGyal tshab points out that different qualities can inhere in a whole without having an essential causal relation, as the color and taste of sugar. The sense-organs can act as an immediately-preceding condition of mind, but they cannot be mind's principal condition, because a principal condition must be a directly efficient cause, and mind is generated not directly from the sense-organs but from either a previous mind or from sense-cognitions--they have the sense-organs as their principal conditions. Cf. David J. Kalupahana, Causality: The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, pp. 165-6. rGyal tshab explains the coexistence of different qualities in the same whole as being due to their derivation from a common seed. In the case of an oak tree, all of its qualities are inherent in the acorn; in the case of mind and the sense-organs, both are inherent in a particular karmic seed sown sometime in the past. A materialist might agree with the principle but argue that the coexistence of mind and body is inherent in the genetic coding in the combined sperm and egg at the moment of conception.

[184]Mind is not _directly_ affected by physical substances or changes introduced into the body, because it takes as its objects the physical or mental cognitions of those substances or changes. Poison, e.g., is the principal condition of a body-cognition of the effects of the poison; that cognition, in turn, can serve to generate a mental cognition that is aware that poison has been introduced and its effects are being felt. Physical sensations are too far removed from mental cognition to serve as its principal condition.

[185]A special indispensible cause is a factor, _x_, such that its absence necessitates the absence of result _y_. A moment of lamp-light invariably follows a moment of lamp, and should there be no lamp, there can be no lamp-light. Notice that the light _succeeds_ the lamp that is its cause. It is the Sautrāntika view that an effect only can arise when the cause has ceased to function. Thus, moments of lamp and lamp-light may exist simultaneously, but they cannot have a causal relationship. A particular moment of lamp-light will have as its cause the previous moment of the lamp.

[186]The two unidentified "sūtra" passages cited are standard general formulations of the law of dependent origination (_pratītya samutpāda_), which might more fully be formulated: if _x_, then _y_; therefore, if non-_x_, then non-_y_. "Then" is to be understood in its temporal sense. Dependent origination is a central notion in Buddhist texts of every era--indeed, it might almost be considered the "special indispensible condition" of Buddhism, its _a priori_. The formula by which Assaji (at _Vinaya_, i,23; cf., e.g., Warren, p. 89) converts Sāriputta and Moggallāna to the Buddha's Dhamma has been regarded throughout the ages as something like a "Buddhist creed," inscribed on statues and in temples throughout the Buddhist world: "Of those phenomena produced by causes, the Tathāgata has pronounced the cause; and also their cessation--thus speaks the great recluse." Cf. Part I, note 169.

[187]An attached mind, in other words, has as its special indispensible condition a previous attached mind; and if attached mind leads to attached mind in this life, then there is no reason why the last attached mind of this life should not connect to an attached mind in a subsequent life, since no other indispensible condition has been or can be proved by the opponent.

[188]Fire assists an earthen pot by baking it to completion. When the pot is complete, the fire no longer is present. Similarly, the argument runs, body assists mind, but is not indispensible to it, and mind can continue to exist when the body has ceased to function. Just as fire cannot be the indispensible cause of a pot because it is substantially different from it, so body cannot be the indispensible cause of mind, because it is substantially different from it. It is problematic whether the analogy is apt, for not only could it be argued that the fire _is_ indispensible to the _completion_ of a pot--although substantially different from it--but also that mind and body are different in a different way than fire and a pot: fire and a pot are both material, so their interaction is not problematic, whereas mind and body are substantially different in a much more fundamental sense, and the assertion of their interaction raises the familiar problem of how something immaterial can interact with something material.

[189]The special basis (_rten khyad par can_) is synonymous with the principal condition (_bdag rkyen_), special indispensible cause (_ldog byed kyi rgyu khyad par can_) and the special cooperative condition (_lhan cig byed rkyen khyad par can_).

[190]Cf. previous note.

[191]The double negatives, as so often in rGyal tshab, can be a bit bewildering here. The opponent is simply arguing that a dead body cannot be conscious because the appropriate conditions of mind, e.g., breathing, are absent, just as they are in a fainting spell. What, then, would differentiate a fainting spell from death is not indicated.

[192]rGyal tshab at first seems to be taking the rather unscientific position that individual breaths are dependent on individual mental exertions (a notion predating the discovery of the autonomic nervous system), but in fact he only is repeating the more general observation that breathing is projected by previous mental karma--certainly not every breath we take in this life is preceded by a thought, "I will breathe." Cf. TS 1864.

[193]Breathing is possible during deep sleep precisely _because_ breathing in general is projected by previous mental karma. Conscious thought is _not_ necessary for breathing to occur. If each breath necessitated an immediately prece-

ding thought,there could not be breathing during deep sleep, but since such immediacy is not the nature of the relation between mind and breath there is no problem.

[194]rGyal tshab here makes the general point--in support of his specific observations on breathing--that a cause and effect need not--indeed they cannot--coexist: a cause always precedes an effect; when the cause is present, the effect has not yet arisen, and when the effect has arisen, the cause is no longer present. Therefore, it is not necessary that when an effect, breathing, is observed, its cause, mind, still be present. Hence, breathing during deep sleep is not impossible.

[195]Quite simply, if breath is the material cause of mind and body is the material cause of breath, then the presence of the body in the case of a corpse should necessitate the presence of breath, and the presence of breath should necessitate the presence of mind.

[196]The opponent argues that if mind's presence can be projected by previous karma, it can be present in a dead body. rGyal tshab replies that this is not the case, because the karma that projects the coexistence of mind and body ceases to function at the time death.

[197]Wind, bile and phlegm are the three humors recognized in Indian and Tibetan medicine. Good health is said to depend on a proper balance among them, and disease to result from their imbalance.

[198]Although rGyal tshab will refute this objection, the general point is well taken: it is not simply the body that is the indispensible condition of mind; it is the body's proper functioning, represented by a proper balance among the humors. A modern materialist or physicalist might argue in the same vein that mind has as its indispensible condition a properly functioning brain.

[199]rGyal tshab here is raising the point that, in effect, death is the end of disease. If disease--in this case, a severe imbalance among the humors--is said to cause death, then when the result, death, exists, the cause must be absent, so disease will, as it were, "degenerate" in a dead body. This reply seems sophistic, playing as it does with definitions of cause and effect. There is nothing to indicate that the humors are either balanced or unbalanced

in a dead body; indeed, the concept of humors only is relevant to a living body, as is the concept of disease. The fact that death "eliminates" disease or imbalance among the humors does not mean that "health" or a balance among the humors has been restored, because what has been eliminated is only the relevance of a concept.

200 The opponent argues that a dead body cannot be revived because the body's passage from sickness to death is an irreversible transformation, like the burning of wood.

201 rGyal tshab rightly points out the subtlety of the matter and the inadequacy of the opponent's example. If disease is said to be an irreversible process, like the blackening of wood, then no disease should be curable, which manifestly is not the case. The appropriate example for disease, rGyal tshab points out, is that of a reversible transformation, like that of solid gold into liquid.

202 The opponent counters with the contention that, if disease is said to be a reversible transformation, then any disease must be curable, so there cannot be any incurable diseases, which manifestly is not the case.

203 The curability or incurability of a disease, rGyal tshab holds, is not due to any intrinsic curability or incurability, but to the presence or absence of the conditions necessary for a cure, which are a doctor and/or medicines. When those are present but death still results, then it is due to "the karmic exhaustion of the life-span of the sick person"--an admittedly metaphysical explanatory principle.

204 rGyal tshab points out that it is actually the opponent's position that implies that there are no incurable sicknesses, because if the absence of curative conditions, especially of the karmic determinant, is <u>not</u> the cause of death, then any disease must be curable, because disease has been redefined as a reversible transformation. Without the admission of factors other than the disease itself, the opponent cannot assert that <u>any</u> disease cannot be cured.

205 This is a way of making the same point as above, p. 608: if the cause of mind is body, and the cause of the body's death, poison, can be removed, then the body ought to be revived and mind present in a corpse from which the poison <u>has</u> been removed, because the material cause is pre-

sent and the contradictory conditions absent. This point does not seem well taken, because the removal of a cause does not imply the removal of the effect. If the cause never arises, the effect never will result, but in this case poison has been administered, so its result, death, has occurred; the subsequent elimination of the poison from the corpse does not negate the fact that the causal process has taken place.

206 Defined--as are all other types of cause--in terms of the fundamental Buddhist doctrine of momentariness, a material cause is an entity-moment that is transformed in the very next moment into a material result that is essentially related to it. The most important quality of a material cause is transformation. In a general sense, a transformation in some entity, such as a lamp or mud-clay, will inevitably lead to a transformation of lamp-light or a pot, so the latter can be regarded as material results,and the former as material causes. In a specific sense, a moment of the lamp or mud-clay is transformed into a moment of lamp-light or pot, and each moment of lamp-light or pot is necessarily preceded by a moment of lamp or mud-clay. Thus, a material cause results in a transformation both of and into a material result. I have translated the passage in the former sense, because the grammar accords more closely with the idea of a "transformation of," but both senses are connoted by rGyal tshab's definition.

207 The term ba lang min does not mean a "non-cow" in some logically contradictory sense, but, rather, some animal that is not a cow, e.g., a horse.

208 Because a material cause must be an entity whose modification or transformation invariably modifies or transforms an essentially similar entity that is thus regarded as its material result, an entity whose transformation does not entail the transformation of a particular entity posited as its material result cannot be that latter entity's material cause. A change in a horse does not entail a change in a cow. Just so, argues rGyal tshab, a change in body does not invariably entail a change in mind: not only do we observe that this the case, but, also, mind and body are substantially different enough that the one cannot "establish an uncommon imprint of just its essence" on the other. It is problematic whether this refutation can as easily be applied to the brain, for, as far as neurophysiologists are aware, there is no mental event that is not--at the very least--correlative with a neural activity

in the brain; a transformation in the brain invariably will produce transformations of "mind," and no mental event can occur without the "transformation of"--i.e., without activity in--the brain. The problem of the substantial relation between brain and mind is also, at best, problematic, it not being at all obvious that mind is a phenomenon even describable in "substantial" terms.

209 Molten copper, though seemingly "one" collection, in fact consists of a fire element and a copper element. Since fire and copper are substantially different, the one cannot be the material cause of another. On the other hand, they coexist because the one acts as the cooperative condition of the other. Fire, thus, has a previous moment of fire as its material cause and a previous moment of molten copper as its cooperative condition. Copper has previous copper as its material cause and previous fire as its cooperative condition. Similarly, mind has previous mind as its material cause and previous body as its cooperative condition. Note that body is a cooperative condition, but not a special or indispensible cooperative condition--mind, after all, according to Buddhists, _can_ exist without it.

210 A non-existent entity does not have _any_ basis, so the question of whether its "basis" is substantially identical to or substantially different from it, or whether that basis precedes it or is simultaneous with it, is irrelevant. An existent entity cannot have a substantially different simultaneous basis because it already has come into existence, and so does not _need_ any simultaneous basis for its existence. Thus, a mind that has not yet arisen cannot have any basis for its existence, because it does not exist; a mind that _has_ arisen does not need a basis for its existence because it already exists. Furthermore, two simultaneous, substantially different entities cannot be related causally, for causality obtains between entities existing in different moments.

211 The Vaibhāṣikas posit four characteristics of a "moment": arising, abiding, decaying and destruction, and hold that these characteristics are different from that which possesses the characteristics, the "moment." The Sautrāntikas, Yogācārins and Mādhyamikas, however, maintain that a moment cannot be thus divided without ceasing to be a moment--i.e., the shortest conceivable unit of time; they also deny that the moment itself is in any way different from its characteristics. Thus, if a moment possessed a quality such as abiding (which the Sautrāntikas, etc., do

not admit), that quality would not be in any way different from that which abides, the moment itself. Cf. BL, I, p. 84ff.

212 Cf. previous note.

213 If abider and abiding are substantially differnt entities that exist at the same time, then there can be no causal connection between them, and one cannot be considered the "basis" of the other. Further, if a body and its abiding are different entities, what relates them? Don gzhan, "objectively separate," is synonymous with rdzas tha dad, "substantially different."

214 If a mind-moment exists, and in addition has abiding as an intrinsic characteristic, then how could it ever end? It would seem that it could not, and that it would be permanent.

215 The flaw is the same as before, because a destructive cause must be either identical to or different from that which is destroyed (e.g., mind). If destructibility is identical to--and therefore the nature of--mind, then a cause of abiding can do nothing to make it abide; if destructibility is different from mind, then it is impossible to see how it could be destroyed. Above, we saw that if abiding is inherent in mind, it cannot be destroyed; whereas if it is not, it cannot persist.

216 An already existent mind that does not meet a destructive cause will abide on its own, without need of a cause of its abiding. A mind that does meet a destructive cause could not abide even through the power of a cause of abiding. Therefore, a cause of abiding is on the one hand unnecessary and on the other powerless. Cf. TS 357-62.

217 The opponent claims that it is necessary to posit a cause of abiding. If there were no cause of abiding, then mind would be destroyed before it has a chance to meet its destructive cause; as it is, a cause of abiding makes an entity abide until it meets its destructive cause.

218 rGyal tshab is not upset in the least by the problem the opponent is attempting to solve, for he admits that entities have destruction as their very nature. Thus, they will not persist until they meet a destructive cause, be-

cause there is no destructive cause other than the entity itself. Since entities are inherently destructible, they do not abide at all, so a cause of abiding is both irrelevant and powerless, and must be dismissed as an unnecessary metaphysical entity. Cf. BL, I, p. 95.

219Although the Tibetan *rten*, translated above as "basis," is used in the next section without qualification, in fact the Sanskrit term that it translates has changed, from *aśraya*, "basis," to *ādhāra*, "support." Compare PV 68b-70 with the Tibetan.

220The opponent has attempted to cite an instance in which an object (an earthen pot) acts as the support for something substantially different from it, water. rGyal tshab maintains, however, that the same consequences apply as in the case of a "cause of abiding." In this case, if water has as a support something substantially different from but simultaneous to it, it is impossible to establish a causal connection. If its support is substantially identical to it, it must always be supported, with or without an earthen vessel.

221Thus, an earthen vessel is the "support" of water only in a conventional sense. Water consists of, as it were, a stream of water-moments. Each of these is the material cause of its successor. An earthen pot is merely the assistant, immediately preceding cooperative condition, which assures that the water-moment-stream is continually generated in the same place; the pot certainly is not necessary to the continued existence of the water itself. Similarly, body may act as the support of mind in the sense that it assures mental continuity in the same "place," and is an immediately-preceding cooperative cause of mind, but it is by no means indispensible to mind's existence, and therefore is not a simultaneous causal support of the kind envisioned by the opponent. The explanation given by the Buddhist--in terms of successive moments--is the only one that can account for two substantially different entities acting as support and supported.

222These are three of the six *a priori* categories (*padārtha*) recognized by the Vaiśeṣikas. The six are Substance (*dravya*), Quality (*guṇa*), Action (*karma*), Universals (*sāmānya*), Particulars (*viśeṣa*) and Inherence (*samavāya*). Cf. Dasgupta, I, p. 313ff.; Koller, chapter 6.

223The Vaiśeṣika categories, therefore, cannot even be

said to be supported in a conventional sense, for a pot, e.g., acts to prevent the spilling, falling or flowing of the water that is in it. Something that spills, falls or flows necessarily is impermanent, and thus conventionally can be said to require a support. The Vaiśeṣika categories, however, are permanent. They do not change from moment to moment, let alone spill, fall or flow, so they cannot be described as supported, even by the entities in which they are said to inhere. Furthermore, as we have seen above, there cannot be a connection between a permanent and impermanent entity, so it is impossible for the Vaiśeṣika to explain how the categories can inhere in impermanent entities. Cf. TS 802.

[224] "This reasoning" refers to the statement (above, p. 613, PV 65) that there is no point in either a non-existent or an existent entity's having a simultaneous cause of its abiding.

[225] Inherence is conceived as an essentially causal factor, for it "causes" Universals to inhere in Particulars. However, if it exists as substantially different from but simultaneous to the categories that it relates, it cannot "cause" anything, and would require a further factor to relate it to the categories it is supposed to connect, a requirement that leads to an infinite regress. Similarly, Substance is considered the cause of Qualities' coexistence in the same collection; but, since it is held to exist simultaneously with and to be substantially different from them, it cannot "cause" them at all. Additionally, the Vaiśeṣika categories cannot function causally because they are conceived as permanent, non-successive "entities."

[226] The opponent attempts to claim that if there is no simultaneous, substantially different cause of Inherence, then there can be no Inherence at all. Yet, rGyal tshab points out, the opponent himself asserts that Universals exist independently of their Particulars, so it is unnecessary for him even to posit the existence of Inherence.

[227] The syllogism thus would read, "The Particulars are not the basis of the abiding of an already existent Universal, because even without Particulars, Universals do abide." Since the existence of Universals is not dependent on their connection with Particulars, the Particulars cannot be said to be the basis of the Universals' abiding.

[228]Body and mind, as substantially different, cannot be related by some third entity, such as Inherence, for the reasons outlined above.

[229]This recapitulates arguments offered above. If an entity is not inherently destructible, it does not need a cause of abiding to make it abide, for it will do so naturally. If it is naturally destructible, then a cause of abiding can do nothing to make it abide.

[230]If there does exist a cause of abiding, then no entity ever can be destroyed, for it would have continuously present a cause of its perpetuation, which is not very different from such metaphysical concepts as the ātman.

[231]Finally, if an entity is inherently destructible, then nothing can make it abide; if it were not inherently destructible,then no cause of abiding would be necessary.

[232]The mental complexes ('du byed, saṃskāra) are various types of mental attitudes and propensities.They comprise the fourth of the five aggregates (phung po, skandha) of the "person." They are considered to be non-physical. rGyal tshab's basic point is that mental qualities vary on the basis of a combination of their past development and external present circumstances, but that the projecting cause or special basis of a moment of wisdom is some previous wisdom, not the condition of the body, which is merely assistant. Cf. TS 1904.

[233]rGyal tshab argues here, as he has before, that the body indirectly affects the mind, by generating a body-cognition that is, then, the cause of a mental cognition, and thus of a variation in wisdom, etc. The body is not, however, the special basis of mind or its wisdom, so one cannot maintain that wisdom varies with the condition of the body as the intensity of lamplight varies according to the condition of the wick. Undoubtedly, a better case can be made that there is a remarkably close correlation between the condition of the brain and mental abilities, but the Buddhist still would deny that the physical organ is the special basis of mind, because he would maintain that there still intervenes a "body-cognition"--or perhaps "brain-cognition"--between the physical and the mental events. Whether the Buddhist description of body, body-cognition and cognition is, in fact, defensible, or whether it was developed in part so as to maintain the traditional distinction

between the physical and the mental, is problematic, but I will not go into it here.

[234]The point here is similar to that made above: a particular physical condition, i.e., the balance or imbalance of the humors, generates particular bodily feelings of comfort or discomfort. These feelings then are apprehended by a body-cognition, which in turn effects a mental cognition that may be represented as an increase or decrease of attachment, anger or other vices. Only in this very indirect sense can the health of the body be said to affect mental states, which, just like wisdom, have as their principal condition some previous mental complex of the same type.

[235]Again, the condition of the mind is affected only indirectly by occurrences in the body, between which and the mind a body-cognition always will intervene.

[236]This simply restates the basic Buddhist position--that a type of mind must be preceded by a similar component of the mental complex. It may, in fact, be correct, but it must be reiterated that it presupposes (a) the existence of past mental complexes that somehow can continue in latent form and "manifest" in the present under appropriate conditions, (b) that a particular description of perception and consciousness, i.e., in terms of sensation/sense-cognition/cognition, is valid and (c) that mind and body can, in a general sense, be described as substantially different.

[237]The opponent argues that just as a child's body succeeds on but is not substantially different from its parents' bodies, so mind succeeds on but is not substantially different from body. Also, the fact that past mental complexes may affect present mental states does not mean that the present mental states are not dependent on body. It might, for example, be argued that the mental complexes require a physical basis for storage, and cannot manifest unless that "storage-system" is properly working.

[238]rGyal tshab replies that if the mind is substantially identical to body, then mental qualities should appear in the body and physical qualities in the mind, which is absurd. He rightly points out that to describe body and mind as identical is to confuse two different types of events. However, it remains open to question whether mind and body differ exactly as Buddhists maintain they do. It may show logical absurdity and linguistic confusion simply

to "reduce" mind to body, but it is not clear that the Buddhist way of explaining "the ghost in the machine" is not itself perhaps based on linguistic carelessness or a category mistake. Cf. Ryle, chapter 1; and Part I, chapter 4, section 6.

[239]This is an assertion of the basic Buddhist notion that we and only we are responsible for our own destinies. "All that we are," as the Dhammapada begins, "is a result of what we have thought"--not only our present states of mind, but our present bodies and external circumstances are the result of actions of body, speech and mind committed earlier in this life or in some previous life. Because actions ultimately are under the sway of the mind, "all that we are" has its origin there. The idea that there exists a God who could control our destinies has already been refuted above. The basic cause of rebirth in saṃsāra, then, is our own attachment to self.

[240]rGyal tshab points out that we willingly take birth in a suffering abode because we do not realize that it is suffering--we ignorantly mistake it for an abode of happiness (as we also take the non-self for the self, the ugly for the beautiful and the impermanent for the permanent), and therefore crave it. Ignorance compounded by craving equals saṃsāra's continuation. Note that, at this point, the fact that ignorance and craving perpetuate saṃsāra and that there exists a being, an Arahant, who abandons ignorance and craving and thereby transcends saṃsāra, is simply asserted--it is not proved.

[241]Water is said to enter clay and mercury gold in the same way that a being in the intermediate state can pass through objects. The construction of an analogy, however, does not guarantee that both terms of the analogy do, in fact, exist. While rGyal tshab is correct in pointing out that non-perception of something does not automatically entail its non-existence, in asserting that, e.g., beings of the intermediate state exist, he must rely on extra-sensory perception. A Lokāyata, who is essentially a positivist, will not admit extra-sensory perception as legitimate evidence; or, if he were to, it is entirely possible that he might claim on the basis of his own E.S.P. that there is no such thing as an intermediate-state being. In that case, an uncommitted observer would be left with having to choose between two instances of E.S.P., neither of which is accessible to him, a problem that highlights the epistemological problems entailed by claims to knowledge on the basis of E.S.P. Cf. TS 1938, and Part I, chapter 2, section 6.

[242]In this case, proving the Reason involves establishing the validity of the Reason to be set forth formally in the next section as a disproof of a partless whole: the necessity of attributing contradictory qualities to an ontologically unique entity.

[243]If the whole is indivisible, then its "parts" cannot be considered in isolation from it, for the whole becomes a unique ontological unit, of which contradictory qualities cannot be predicated. Thus, if the whole has quality x, then the parts all must share this quality, for they cannot be considered apart from that whole. If it is not the case that a whole cannot combine contradictory qualities, then it must possess parts that are conceptually independent of the whole, which is what the Vaiśeṣika (the opponent in this section) seeks to deny.

[244]This makes the same point as above: if the body is a partless whole, then what is true for "part" must be true for the whole, because no ultimate distinction is possible between them.

[245]The root-verse (PV 87a) reads gcig bsgribs pa na thams cad dag / bsgribs par 'gyur ba'am ma bsgribs na / mthong 'gyur.... (ekasya cāvṛtau sarvasyāvṛtiḥ syādanavṛtau). The Buddhist's reading of this is: "If one (part) is covered, then the whole will appear covered; or if (one part) is not covered, (then the whole cannot appear covered)." The opponent's reading is: "If one (part) is covered, then will the whole appear covered? (We see that) it will not." The opponent is trying to maintain that the whole-part distinction is still valid, and that only a part has been covered, not the whole.

[246]rGyal tshab pursues his logical line, and maintains that if a whole is not divisible into parts, then what describes the one must describe the other, and vice versa. Thus, if the opponent claims that the whole is not covered, then none of the parts can be covered, either, because they are not substantially different from the whole.

[247]Again, a partless whole cannot be the basis for contradictory qualities, so a body can be either blue or not-blue, but cannot be both. Throughout this section, the Buddhist is relying on a version of the law of contradiction to expose the weakness of the opponent's position: an analytically indivisble unit cannot possess contradictory

qualities.

[248]The opponent repeats in a slightly different context the point he has made above, i.e., that a part can be described as covered while a whole is not, but he fails to perceive how the Buddhist has used his own position to catch him in a contradiction.

[249]Once again, if one says that a part (the face) has been painted blue but the whole has not, then it would be reasonable to see two faces, a blue and a non-blue, the former on the basis of the fact that a part has been painted, the latter on the basis of the fact that the whole has not--for by the opponent's own admission, the whole is partless, and thus not logically separable from any parts.

[250]Even if there exists a gross external object with parts, one discovers on analysis that the ultimate parts of a gross external object are atoms. A gross object is visible and tangible, and thus has qualities that are contradictory to those of its parts, atoms, which are invisible and non-resistant. For a Vaiśeṣika, then, a whole must be substantially different from its parts.

[251]rGyal tshab criticizes two views: (1) that a gross object does not have substantial existence and (2) that a collection and its parts are substantially different. A gross object <u>does</u> have substantial existence, because it can be the object of a cognition. At the same time, the collection and its parts are <u>not</u> substantially different, because if they were, then the problem of the coexistence of contradictory qualities in a unitary collection, as raised above, would be unsolved.

[252]The actual position being refuted in this section in general is, rGyal tshab reminds us, that of the Lokāyatas. The Vaiśeṣika view has been singled out for specific discussion because one of the types of body that a Lokāyata might assert as the basis of mind is the body as a partless whole, so the notion must be shown to be incoherent. Whether anyone ever actually has tried to argue that a partless whole body is the basis of mind, I do not know--the position certainly has no recent parallels in Western thought.

[253]The opponent argues that if a gross object is not substantially different from its atoms, then the object

should be as invisible as the atoms of which it is composed.

[254] rGyal tshab replies that it is unproven that atoms do not change from a state of invisibility to a state of visibility from one moment to the next--indeed, on the contrary, all objects change from one moment to the next and, in particular, atoms must change from separate invisibility to composite visibility, or we never would see anything.

[255] Furthermore, a pot is not conceptually identical to its atoms. We may not be able to make a metaphysical distinction between the whole and its parts, but we certainly do distinguish epistemologically. If we did not distinguish epistemologically, then no one could perceive a pot without knowing of the existence of atoms, which manifestly is absurd. A pot and its atoms are substantially identical, but have different contrapositives (ngo bo gcig ldog pa tha dad; cf. above, note 42).

[256] Devendrabuddhi, 236/1/4. Atoms, though they are the basis of the sense-cognition that recognizes a "pot," are not the designated object of that cognition, because they are, individually, too subtle to be perceived as atoms.

[257] Not all external objects are necessarily gross objects. "Blue," for instance, is external but not gross. As an external object, blue would have to be composed of atoms. Yet, according to the opponent's position, if it is atoms, it cannot be perceived; conversely, if it is perceived, it cannot be made of atoms.

[258] The opponent's assertion of the substantial non-existence of gross objects, coupled with his denial of the cognizability of atoms, leads to the undesirable conclusions (1) that an object of sense-perception is a non-efficient entity, because it is not atoms, which alone ultimately are efficient, and (2) that an object is non-efficient because, as a gross object, it has no substantial existence, and that which lacks substantial existence cannot be an efficient entity.

[259] The root-verse (PV 88a) reads: du ma nyid na nga ma bzhin (...smādanekatve'pi pūrvavat). The opponent's original objection comprised both. The objection is that if the body is composed of many atoms, then from moment to moment one's ultimate object of cognition is, simply, the many a-

toms of the body. The reply is that the fault is "as before."

[260]The Vaiśeṣika is disturbed by the implication that if there is no partless whole, then there is no object that is "more" than the sum of its atoms, and all we ever perceive is individual atoms. The Buddhist, who believes that atoms are invisible individually, but visible in composite, does not face this dilemma, but recognizes that the Vaiśeṣika does.

[261]In the Vaiśeṣika view, which admits only of the possibility of individually visible atoms if there does not exist a gross, partless whole, no object could block any other. Buddhists, however, assert that atoms in aggregate are different from atoms not in aggregate; thus, although individual atoms cannot block each other, aggregates of atoms can.

[262]A mixture of mercury and gold, or paint and stone, though known to exist, could not, on the Vaiśeṣika view, be cognized as a mixture, because (a) each disparate element is a partless whole that cannot combine with other partless wholes and (b) atoms of disparate elements cannot have any basis for their combination.

[263]Thus, painted stone and mercury mixed with gold are appropriate examples of composites that would be inadmissible under Vaiśeṣika theory. Molten iron, on the other hand, would not be an appropriate example, because when iron is molten, there is a substantial identity between fire and iron, and it is the mixture of substantially <u>different</u> elements that Vaiśeṣika theory renders impossible. Contrast this view with that expressed above, p. 612 and note 209, where molten copper and fire seem to be described as substantially different. I cannot account for this discrepancy.

[264]The three conditions of sense-cognition--organ, object and cognition--are individually unable to generate their common result; yet, if there is no whole that is substantially from them--as the Buddhist has proven there cannot be--then their aggregate generation of sense-cognition cannot be explained, because, again, the Vaiśeṣika is unable to explain aggreagtes other than by recourse to the concept of an objectively separate whole.

[265]The Vaiśeṣika explains that disparate substances form aggregates through a Quality known as Conjunction (ldan pa, saṃyoga). Thus, sense-cognition is the result of the object, organ and mind, all of which are brought together by Conjunction. Cf. Robinson, Classical Indian Philosophy, p. 37.

[266]The Vaiśeṣika asserts that sense-cognition is generated from Conjunction, but the generation of Conjunction itself is inexplicable. The factors individually cannot generate it, and since there is no principle by which they can combine, there is no basis for asserting that there is a change in their situation such that they could generate Conjunction--any more than they could generate a sense-cognition.

[267]The Vaiśeṣika claims that atoms are invisible, so anything that is based on atoms, such as their Conjunction, must be invisible as well. According to the Buddhist view, although atoms are never the designated object of a sense-cognition, they are an object--indeed, they are the ultimate objects on the basis of which we impute the collection or aggregate that is the designated object.

[268]If there is no whole substantially different from its elements, the Vaiśeṣika cannot explain how a drink that combines different qualities of color and taste can be said to possess its own color or taste, because, in the absence of a substantially different whole, it remains atomic.

[269]The opponent tries to argue that although what we actually taste are merely individual tastes and what we see are individual colors, we impute a taste and color on the combination of them. The Buddhist, however, maintains--correctly--that the taste and color of the combination of individual substances is different from that of any of the individual substances, and so cannot be known simply through a knowledge of qualities of all the individual substances.

[270]Cf. previous note.

[271]If there is no substantially separate whole, a Vaiśeṣika cannot explain how we can speak of "a long garland," because (a) as we have seen, he has no other principle by which to explain collections and (b) by his own principles, a Quality cannot depend on another Quality, so if Conjunc-

tion is invoked to explain the fact that the garland is long, the principle is violated, because Conjunction and length both are Qualities.

272 An unmistaken mind is a clear sense-cognition, which, in its initial moment, cognizes things just as they are. Since an examination of the contents of sense-cognition does not inform us of the existence of any Number, etc., existing related to but substantially different from the pot, there is no basis for positing the existence of such entities.

273 Once again, the Buddhist raises the point that there is no necessary connection between verbal designations and the ontological status of what is designated. Of course, we say "one pot," "two pots," etc., but that does not mean that there is a "Number" existing somewhere that corresponds to our verbal distinctions. The Buddhist, in his wholesale repudiation of universals, maintains that when we specify that there is _one_ pot, we simply are eliminating the possibility that _this_ pot can be characterized as _non_-one. The process, thus, is thoroughly negative, and need not admit the existence of an ontologically distinct Number. For an interesting discussion of the Buddhist attitude toward universals, cf. Nagin J. Shah, _Akalaṅka's Criticism of Dharmakīrti's Philosophy_, chapter III.

274 The fact that we can speak menaingfully of a combination of more than one Quality--an impossibility by Vaiśeṣika principles--or can ascribe Qualities to objects not presently existent demonstrates the independence of linguistic designations from ontological facts.

275 An imputed name (_btags ming_) is distinguished from an objective name (_dngos ming_). The latter is the name given to an entity on the basis of its actual nature, the former is the name given figuratively, or by convention. Thus, past and future objects do not actually exist, so they cannot possess number, but we can conventionally designate that they do, or would, if they existed.

276 rGyal tshab argues that if the Vaiśeṣika is going to apply imputed names to unreal entities, then he should apply them to all those substantially separate Qualities the Buddhist has already shown to be non-existent. Since virtually everything is asserted by the Vaiśeṣika to be a substantially separate whole or quality, everything should merely be described by an imputed name.

[277]The Vaiśeṣika maintains that objective names are applied to substantially separate Qualities and imputed names to anything not that; rGyal tshab replies that these definitions are entirely arbitrary, idiosyncratic as they are to a particular system that is, in fact, open to refutation.

[278]The Vaiśeṣika argues that if there are no substantially separate entities corresponding to our verbal distinctions, then there would be no difference between saying "cow" and "one cow," and the predication "one" would add nothing to what we already know when we say "cow."

[279]The Buddhist replies that the predication "one" does give us non-redundant information, even if it does not correspond to an ontologically distinct entity.

[280]The Vaiśeṣika cannot argue that a white object has an additional, ontologically distinct Quality of "oneness," because he himself has said that a Quality cannot be based on another Quality, and in this case "oneness" would be based on "whiteness." Or, if he does base oneness on whiteness, then he is treating one or the other as if it were a Substance, and thus undermining the distinction between Substance and Qualities, which he has striven to establish.

[281]The fact that we can apply predications without there being an ontologically distinct entity to which the predications apply is shown by our ability to speak of "non-Action" in relation to Substance, and vice versa--certainly there is no substantially separate Quality called "non-Action" or "non-Substance" that can be predicated of Substance or Action, yet there is no question that the predications are applied appropriately. In general, predicates do not name an ontologically distinct entity, but eliminate all predicates other than the one we wish to specify. Cf. TS 1043-44.

[282]The Vaiśeṣika argues that if there is no substantially separate Quality of, e.g., number, then we cannot legitimately use the genitive, or possessive, case, because possession expresses a relation between two ontologically distinct entities.

[283]The root-verse (PV 99) says "the words expressing an entity" (dngos po brjod pa'i sgra rnams kyis = bhāvavācibhiḥ), which rGyal tshab glosses to mean the words ex-

pressing a predicate. Words genitively expressing the predicate, such as "the number of the pot," appear to relate two ontologically distinct entities, but they do not--they only serve to set one predicate or quality apart from all other possible predicates or qualities. Specifying "the form" of the pot, therefore, excludes as a possible predicate any other quality of the pot.

284 The phrase "conjunction of fingers" has the specific purpose of identifying one predicate of "fingers" for someone who wishes to know just that predicate of "fingers" and no other. There is no other way that this can be expressed except genitively, yet it does not entail an ontological distinction between the fingers and their conjunction.

285 Expressions in which the predicate is the base, e.g., "the conjunction of fingers," exclude all other possible predicates by making one predicate the grammatical subject. Expressions in which the subject is the basis--and therefore also the grammatical subject--e.g., "the fingers are conjoined," do not exclude other possible predicates, for fingers just as easily can be long, short, white or black.

286 Thus, the general purpose of applying different predicates and types of predicate-sentences to an object is to enable one's listener to know either one or a number of predicates of an object, depending on what the listener desires to know.

287 The Vaiśeṣika here raises in a slightly different form the objection he has voiced above. If there is no substantially different whole pot, he claims, then we cannot speak genitively of the form of a pot, because there is no substantially existent pot to which form could be predicated to "belong."

288 The word "pot" does not refer to some whole that is substantially different from its parts. It is a collection-word, applied to that combination of eight atomic elements that is able to contain water. Because it is able to contain water, it is causally efficient, and thus "real" according to Dharmakīrti's criterion. The fact that it is "real," or that there is a word that identifies it, does not, however, mean that it is a substantially separate whole, because the word that points to it is a collection-word, a word that connotes something made up of parts.

289 The root-verse (PV 103a) says "the expression 'the form of the pot' does not have one base" (...bum pa gzugs so zhes / gzhi gcig pa can sgra ma yin = ...na rūpam ghaṭa ityekādhikaranā śrutiḥ). This means that the phrase can be broken down into "pot" and "form of the pot." The latter specifies one quality of the pot, namely, its form, while the general collection-word, "pot," excludes all predicates, and merely includes the collection, pot, itself. Cf. TS 1034.

290 Depending on one's point of view, "pot" is either a collection-word or a genus-word. In the expression "the form of the pot," it excludes any predication other than of its form, and thus is a collection-word. In the expression "the golden pot," it does not exclude particular attributes, for it is known to be golden. In this latter case, therefore, "pot" is a genus-word.

291 Mt. Vindhya is, of course, a name that we apply to a concatenation of rock, trees, etc., and it is, thus, a collection. At the same time, it excludes the parts that comprise the collection, which semantically, if not ontologically, is greater than the sum of its parts.

292 "Form" is not the concatenation of any parts, but is, rather, a general term--a genus word--of which there can be many particular instances, e.g., the form of a pot, the form of fingers, etc.

293 A pot is, as noted above, both a collection-word and a genus-word. It is a collection-word because it names a specific concantenation of material elements that cannot be confused semantically with its parts or qualities. It is a genus-word because it names a type of entity of which any number of particular instances are possible, e.g., a golden pot, a formed pot, etc.

294 An example of a word that expresses neither a collection nor a genus is a proper name, such as "John."

295 Because of the definitions of collection- and genus-expressions in terms of the exclusion of parts and the non-exclusion of particulars, there is no simple one-to-one correspondence between the application of collection- and genus-words and the existence of ontologically distinct entities that the words denote, for the two types function in different ways, and, besides, their function is semantic,

and semantics need not have ontological overtones.

[296] To reiterate, then, the purpose of an expression such as "the form of the pot" is to distinguish, for someone who wishes to know about it, a specific quality--the form--of a general collection--the pot.

[297] Again, in an expression such as "the smell of sandal," the smell is the grammatical subject, i.e., the "particular base," and the sandal is its "particular predicate." The phrase is a particular grammatical arrangement that fulfils a particular semantic need, i.e., the need to specify the smell of sandal from among all other possible predicates.

[298] A collection is not a collection unless all of its parts are present. If the body's collection of atoms is asserted to be the cause of mind, it is necessary that every single atom of the body be present. Yet, if one were to lose, say, a finger, some of the atoms of the body's collection of atoms would be missing. Thus, the collection would be "incomplete," and since the collection is the cause of mind, mind could not be generated.

[299] If atoms are said to be able to generate mind individually--the logical alternative to their generation of mind collectively--then there could in theory be as many minds as there are atoms in the body, which is patently absurd.

[300] The argument that individual minds are generated by a single, partless permanent breath is undermined by the fact that breath has extension; it is accepted as pervading the entire body, and thus necessarily has as many parts, i.e., atoms, as does the body itself.

[301] The hypothetical opponent asserts that there is a permanent partless breath that is the cause of mind. If that is the case, rGyal tshab replies, then many minds must exist in simultaneous overlap, because the cause of each one is continuously present.

[302] The opponent argues that the permanent breath is the cause of just one cognition at a time. rGyal tshab replies that it only is conceivable that a permanent breath generate minds simultaneously. Because it is permanent, it cannot change its nature so as to generate minds succes-

sively--indeed, the very idea of a permanent entity generating a successive result is, as we have seen before, untenable.

[303]A breath has not only extension but duration, so it is unreasonable to assert that a single breath generates only one mind, for during the course of a breath, many objects are cognized. Furthermore, if a permanent breath is theoretically capable of generating one mind, there is no reason why it should not generate many.

[304]The contention that one mind cognizes many objects is absurd. If the mind is said to cognize objects with their aspects or qualities, then multiple cognitions must be involved, for an object and its aspects cannot be cognized by one and the same mind. If the mind is said to cognize objects without their aspects, then there must be no limit to the number of objects cognized by a single mind. Further, cognition without aspects lacks the basis for distinguishing earlier from later, so such a cognition cannot be aware of succession. Cf. TS 197-198.

[305]The opponent's contention that the body generates successive breaths which, in turn, generate successive thoughts, is futile, because the body, which is constantly presnt and thus permanent, cannot generate a successive result, the breaths. If the generation of successive breaths cannot be adequately explained, then the generation of successive minds cannot be, either.

[306]If the opponent amends his argument by contending that breaths arise not from a permanent body but from previous homogeneous causes, then he faces a dilemma: if he holds to his contention that the first breath of this life cannot have a predecessor because there are no past lives in which a predecessor could have existed, then he is undermining his admission that all breaths have previous homogeneous causes; if, on the other hand, he concedes that all breaths have previous homogeneous causes, then the first breath of this life cannot be an exception, which means that it must have a predecessor in a previous life, a state of affairs that undermines the denial of past and future lives.

[307]Any breath, even the first of this life, has extension, so by definition its various parts must generate various minds, so that even at the moment of first breath, many minds should exist simultaneously. Cf. above, note

300, for a similar argument.

[308]If the breaths existing simultaneously are asserted collectively to be the cause of mind, then the failure or absence of even a single breath--as, e.g., in the case of asthma--should insure the absence of mind, for when a collection is invoked as a cause, it only can act as a cause when it is complete.

[309]If the opponent doggedly continues insisting that mind is caused by breath, then he must face the consequence that mental clarity will vary directly as the strength or weakness of breath varies, because in general an event cannot be said to be the result of a particular cause unless it varies in accordance with the variations of the alleged cause. The opponent's attempt to establish breath as the cause of mind clearly fails on this score, but it is not as obvious that the argument would fail if for "breath" he substituted "brain."

[310]The opponent asserts that simultaneously existing minds also are entailed by the Buddhist position, because there have occurred a number of previous homogeneous causes that could, theoretically, issue in numerous homogeneous results at the same time. rGyal tshab replies with a statement of the Buddhist doctrine that one mind-moment is capable of generating only one homogeneous result.

[311]The opponent might still suggest that the single results of various single causes might theoretically be able to coexist. Such is not the case, however, because our minds are known to function through attachment to particular objects. Attachment is attention, and attention to one object precludes attention to other objects that may coexist with the object of attachment. In specific causal terms, it is asserted that the immediately preceding condition of potential attachment to, e.g., a sound, is robbed of its power by the intensity of the attachment to, e.g., the visual object.

[312]The opponent is attempting to argue that it is only at first that the various types of cognition are generated from the body; once they have come into existence, they generate their own subsequent homogeneous results. This reproduces on an ontogenetic scale the argument that mind is an emergent property of matter, as argued by, e.g., Alexander, Broad and Popper. The basic contention is that mind has material origins but, once established, has a quasi-in-

dependent existence within its own realm.

[313]The Buddhist reply is to point out that there is no reason why the body, if it once has the capacity to generate mind should, at a certain point, cease to generate it, particularly since it is constantly present and the conditions that enabled the initial generation of mind have not been removed. The capacity to ensure a particular result should guarantee the result. If the cause with such capacity does not change, then the capacity remains, so the result should be generated continuously.

[314]This summary of arguments about the relation between mind and body is interpolated by rGyal tshab; it does not correspond to anything in Dharmakīrti's root-verses.

[315]The full verse (PV 180b-181a) reads "Since it is occasional, suffering is proven to have a cause, because (something) causeless does not depend on other (factors), so it will exist always or not at all" (res 'ga' ba nyid yin pas na / sdug bsngal nyid rgyu bcas nyid grub / rgyu med gzhan la mi ltos phyir / rtag tu yod pa'am med par 'gyur = kadācitkatayā siddhā duḥkhasyāsya sahetutā / nityaṃ sattvamasattvaṃ vā hetorbāhyānapekṣaṇāt). Cf. below, p. 712, for rGyal tshab's commentary on this verse.

[316]The verse (PV 149) reads in part: "(Suffering)... does not (arise) accidentally, because it is contradictory that (something) arise without a cause" (...'dod rgyal nyid min te / rgyu med skye ba 'gal phyir ro = yadṛcchāto'hetorjanmavirodhataḥ). Cf. below, p. 693.

[317]The verse (PV 169b) reads: "(If) attachment (etc.,) arise without previous (homogeneous causes), it follows that they cannot be ascertained (as having any cause)" (snga na med pa 'byung ba las / chags sogs nges med thal bar 'gyur = rāgadyaniyamo'pūrvaprādurbhave prasajyate). Cf. below, p. 706.

[318]The full verse (PV 185) reads: "Production from) permanent entities has been refuted, and it is not possible that (anything be generated) from God, etc., because (God, etc.,) are unable (to generate results)" (rtag rnams bkag cing dbang phyug la / sogs pa las kyang srid min te / nus med phyir ro.... = nityānāṃ pratiṣedhena neśvarādeśca sambhavaḥ / asāmarthyādato....). Cf. below, pp. 713-14.

[319]The verse (PV 45a) reads: "Something successive does not (arise) from something non-successive, (because) something non-successive does not change, and even (if it is asserted to) depend (on conditions), it will not (be a producer, because something permanent cannot depend on conditions)" (rim can min las rim can min / khyad par can min bltos pa'ang med = nākramāt kramiṇo bhāvo nāpyapekṣa'viśeṣiṇaḥ). Cf. above, p. 595.

[320]Cf. below, pp. 740-92.

[321]The full verse (PV 81) reads: "The mental complexes of listening, etc., which are based on (previous homogeneous) minds, will, when mind (is examined) be qualities that (appear) clearly in the body, because (mind and body) are not (substantially) different" (ji ltar sems la brten byas nes / thos sogs 'du byed sems la ni / dus gsal tha dad med pa'i phyir / de ltar lus la yon tan 'gyur = yathā śrutādisaṃskāraḥ kutaścetasi cetasi / kālena vyajyate'bhedāt dehe'pi tato guṇaḥ). Cf. above, p. 621.

[322]Cf. above, pp. 606-17.

[323]The verse (PV 53a) reads: "Since the body abides, it follows that mind will not be absent (from a corpse)" (lus ni gnas pa nyid na sems / ldog pa med par thal bar 'gyur = anivṛttiprasaṅgaśca dehe tiṣṭati cetasaḥ). Cf. above, p. 605.

[324]The verse (PV 65a) reads: "(Body is not the basis of mind,) because whether a substance is existent or nonexistent, it does not have a basis (that is substantially different from it)" (yod med dag la rten med phyir = anāśrayāt sadasatoḥ). Cf. above, p. 613.

[325]The full verse (PV 75) reads: "Wisdom, etc., increase and decrease through specific (previously developed) mental complexes, without (depending on) the increase and decrease of the body('s health)" (lus kyi phul byung 'grib med par / blo yi byed pa'i khyad par gyis / shes rab la sogs phul byung dang / 'grib pa dag tu 'gyur ba yin = buddhivyāpārabhedena nirhrāsātiśayāvapi / prajñāderbhavato dehanirhrāsātiśayau binā) Cf. above, p. 618.

[326]The verse can be taken as a Reason refuting the idea that the body's relation to mind is that of *either* ma-

terial cause or special cooperative condition, because each of those is a causal factor that is indispensible to the result, so neither can be altered without the result being altered.

[327]The eye-organ, a special cooperative condition of eye-cognition, will affect the clarity of the cognition by its strength or weakness. Since the body's strength or weakness does not thus affect mind, body is not a special cooperative condition of mind.

[328]The full verse (PV 49-50a) reads: "Mind is not (generated) from (body) together with the sense-organs, because (if that were the case, body) would grasp (forms) just as cognitions do. (Mind) also is not (generated) from all (the sense-organs), because each (organ) has a separate ability to generate (a particular kind of) cognition. It (cannot be generated) from (a dead body), because there is no mind (in that)" (de blo bzhin du 'dzin 'gyur phyir / dbang po bcas las yid shes min / shes skyed nus pa tha dad phyir / kun las kyang ni ma yin no / sems med nyid phyir gzhan las min = taddhovad grahaṇaprāptermanojñānaṃ na sendriyāt / jñānotpādanasāmarthabhedānna sakalādapi / acetanatvānnānyasmād). Cf. above, p. 602.

[329]The full verse (PV 86) reads: "(The body) is proven to have different (parts), because (otherwise) if an arm, etc., moved, then the whole body would move, because it is unsuitable that contradictory actions exists in a (partless) One" (lag sogs g-yo na thams cad dag / g-yo ba 'gyur phyir 'gal ba can / las ni gcig la mi rung phyir / gzhan du tha dad grub par 'gyur = pāṇyādikampe sarvasya kampapraptervirodhinaḥ / ekasmin karmaṇo'yogāt syāt pṛtak siddhiranyathā). Cf. above, p. 624.

[330]The full verse (PV 105) reads: "If (the atoms) all together are the cause (of mind), then if even one part were absent, (mind) would not (arise); also, if individual (atoms) are able (to generate mind), then many (minds) will arise simultaneously" (ma lus rgyu nyid yin na ni / yan lag gcig dang bral na'ang min / re re nus pa nyid yin na'ang / cig car mang po 'byung bar 'gyur = hetutve ca samastānāmekāṅgavikale'pi na / pratekamapi sāmarthye yugapad bahusambhavaḥ). Cf. above, p. 641.

[331]If the parents' bodies are the material cause of the child's body, then the child's body should come into existence as soon as the parents' bodies exist, for if

something has the capacity to produce a result, it must do so. Of course the present-life child's body could not come into existence at the same time as the parents' bodies, but the child's previous-life body might be held to. Either possibility is absurd. This Buddhist refutation fails to take into account the idea that the parents' bodies are the material cause of the child's body only under certain circumstances, namely when a sperm and an egg unite during intercourse; and, of course, it is not the parents' bodies as a whole that are the cause, but specialized substances combining under particular conditions.

[332] PV 80, which reads in part: "Mind follows on some specific mental complex" (...nges par gang nyid kyi / 'du byed kyis ni rjes 'jug pa'i / sems.... = svasyaiva saṃskāraṃ niyamenānuvartate / ...cittam....). Cf. above, p. 620. The argument here is that if the child's mind has the parents' minds as its material cause, then the qualities and fluctuations of their minds should exactly be mirrored in his, which obviously is not the case. Incidentally, another reason why neither the body nor mind of the parents could, in the Buddhist view, be the material cause of the child's mind is that, according to the Buddhist definition, a cause ceases to exist when the result has arisen. Since both the mind and body of the parents still exist at the time that the child's mind has arisen, they cannot be its cause.

[333] This is merely a reiteration of the fundamental syllogisms alleged to prove that past and future lives exist. For an evaluation of the cogency of these syllogisms, cf. Part I, chapter 4, section 6.

[334] The opponent is suggesting that the Buddhist contention that mind and body are ultimately independent leads to the conclusion that there is no reason to believe a future life's mind would affiliate with a new body.

[335] It is the Buddhist view that mind and body, while not causally indispensible to one another (for there exist bodies without mind, such as corpses, and minds without bodies, such as formless-realm beings), can act as mutually assisting cooperative conditions. They need not do so, however. If a being is about to born into the desire realm again, his previous karma assures that his death-time mind does have the capacity to act as the cooperative condition for the next life's body; if, on the other hand, he is to be born into the formless realm, his previous karma will assure that his death-time mind does not have the capacity

to act as the cooperative condition of a next-life body, because there will be no body in the formless realm.

[336]The _āyatanas_ (_skye mched_), sometimes translated as "entrances," usually number twelve, divided into six "subjective" (eye, ear, nose, tongue, body and mind entrances) and six "objective" (form, sound, smell, taste, touch and mental event entrances). Cf., e.g., Tenzin Gyatsho, _The Opening of the Wisdom Eye_, pp. 38-9. In this case, the subjective and objective mental entrances have been disregarded, and the subjective and objective sensory entrances conflated, leaving five. In effect, _āyatana_ is here used as a synonym for _indriya_ (_dbang po_), usually translated as "organ."

[337]This is simply another way of saying that the material cause is that cause which maintains essential continuity when it "transforms" into the material result. Like, therefore, comes from like.

[338]The remainder of this section is a digression by rGyal tshab, not covered in Dharmakīrti's root-verses.

[339]Mind cannot be the material cause of body any more than body of mind, so the final mind of a desire-realm being cannot be the material cause of the first moment of a subsequent desire-realm birth--indeed, since a formless-realm being is involved, there cannot be any matter present in its final moment. How, then, can material sense-organs be generated in the next moment?

[340]If the opponent claims that the sense-organs of the previous desire-realm life are the _direct_ material cause of the sense-organs of the subsequent desire-realm life, he will face the absurd possibility that immediately after the first desire-realm life one can be born into both the formless and desire realms. One must take birth in the formless realm because the direct material cause of a formless-realm birth, a final mind that has the capacity immediately to generate a formless-realm mind, is present. One must take birth in the desire realm, because the direct material cause of a desire-realm birth, a final sense-organ moment that has the capacity immediately to generate desire-realm sense-organs, is present. The key is the assertion that the previous desire-realm birth's final sense-organs are the direct material cause. A direct material cause invariably will generate its result in the very next moment, so if the previous life's final organs are the direct material cause,

they must by definition generate the organs of another desire-realm body in the next moment.

[341]The opponent argues that the final organs of the previous desire-realm life are the direct material cause of the organs of the subsequent desire-realm life, but that they cannot bring about their result unless they are accompanied by a direct cooperative condition, the final mind of the intervening formless-realm life. The causal efficiency of the final organs of the previous desire-realm life somehow continues through the formless-realm life until its final moment, when, in combination with the final mind-moment of that existence, it generates the organs of the subsequent desire-realm life.

[342]The opponent's position is unreasonable, because if the causal efficiency of the final organs of the previous desire-realm life is said to persist through the formless-realm life, then a permanent cause is being asserted; if the efficiency does not persist, then the final organs of the previous desire-realm life cannot be the direct material cause of the organs of the subsequent desire-realm life, because they have already ceased before the final moment of the formless-realm life, when they would have to be present to act as a material cause.

[343]The verse cited (de tshe med phyir don las min.... = nārthāt bhāvastadābhāvāt....) is found at 375a of the pratyakṣa chapter of PV.

[344]The opponent claims that the final organs of the previous desire-realm life do have the capacity eventually to generate subsequent desire-realm organs, even if a formless-realm life intervenes--there is, perhaps, a momentary "potency" that carries through the formless-realm life until its final moment.

[345]rGyal tshab reiterates the fact that if something is a direct material cause, it must generate its result in the following moment--yet the final organs of the previous desire-realm life obviously do not generate organs in the next moment, for the next moment is that of a formless-realm life. If organs have not arisen, the preceding-moment organs must not have had the capacity to generate organs, so they cannot have been the direct material cause of any subsequent organs.

[346]If one argues that, since the final organs of the previous desire-realm life and the first organs of the subsequent desire-realm life are not separated by any other physical moments, then the former can be the direct material cause of the latter, the same objections as above apply: the final organs of the previous desire-realm life must be either a permanent cause or have ceased before they can directly generate the first organs of the subsequent desire-realm life; and, in any case, since they do not generate organs in the next instant, they cannot be described as a direct material cause.

[347]rGyal tshab's--and presumably Dharmakīrti's--position is that there exists in the mind of the intervening formless-realm being a "seed" that has the capacity to generate organs under the right circumstances--e.g., combination with a final formless-realm mind with the capacity to generate a desire-realm mind as its own material result and with the capacity to serve as the direct cooperative condition for the generation of desire-realm organs. This seed is momentary throughout the formless-realm life, but its capacity is undiminished from moment to moment. It is not material--despite its capacity to be the material cause of something material--because it is classified as a "non-associated compositional factor" (ldan min 'du byed, viprayuktasaṃskāra), which is neither mental nor material, but can, in any case, exist in the formless realm.

[348]The problem that rGyal tshab has outlined is similar--but not exactly parallel--to that of explaining how awareness is possible after deep sleep. Just as the final organs of the previous desire-realm life cannot be regarded as the direct material cause of the first organs of the subsequent desire-realm life, so the final moment of awareness before deep sleep cannot be regarded as the immediately-preceding condition of the first moment of awareness after waking, because, quite simply, it does not immediately precede it. What is the immediately-preceding condition of the first moment of awareness after waking is an "unclear" or subtle consciousness that continues--momentarily, of course--through the deep sleep. The unclear cognition that is an immediately-preceding condition has the same function as does the "seed" of the sense-organs that continues through the formless-realm life. The two are slightly different types of causes, but their functions are analogous.

[349]Cf. above, pp. 622-3.

[350]One cannot assert, "There are no future-life sense-organs, because they are sense-organs," because it is not proven that sense-organs cannot generate subsequent homogeneous effects in another life. Indeed, the entire thrust of the preceding discussion has been to show that they can--even with the intervention of a formless-realm life. In general, if the Buddhist notions of momentariness and the necessary homogeneity of material causes and results be accepted, sense-organs _must_ be capable of generating homogeneous results that are the organs of subsequent lives, just as the first organs of this life must be the results, in turn, of the organs from some previous life. In short, the arguments used to establish the continuity of the mind can equally be applied to proving the continuity of the organs.

[351]Cf. previous note.

[352]The sense-organs of a previous life must arise from a body, because if they are said to arise from a body that _has_ sense-organs, then homogeneous causes are being accepted, and the acceptance of homogeneous causes entails the acceptance of past and future lives; if they are said to arise from a body that does not have sense-organs, then non-homogeneous causes are being asserted, and this entails the various problems that have been discussed above in relation to the mind.

[353]If the opponent asserts that this life's organs are generated from mind--an absurdity given the necessity of homogeneity of cause and result--then a future life's organs also must be generated thus, for whatever type of cause a phenomenon has, that must invariably be its cause. In any case, the opponent's assertion does nothing to undermine the existence of past and future lives, since causal continuity still is assumed.

[354]In logical terms, the opponents' proofs of the non-existence of past and future lives are fallacious because--although the Reason is present in the Subject, i.e., final minds (Subject) are both death-time minds and separated from breath (alternative Reasons); and although the accordant is appropriate because we observe that death-time minds separated from breath do not appear to continue--there is doubt that the non-accordant, i.e., the contrapositive (_ldog khyab_) is present, because we do not observe _non_-continuation, either.

[355]The opponent is arguing that the impossibility of infinite increase is demonstrated by two examples: jumping ability, which cannot be increased infinitely because there is no carry-over from one jump to another--each jump requires renewed effort; and boiling water, which never will "ignite"--i.e., become infinitely hot--because as it boils, its heat ever increasing, its basis, the water, is evaporating. Once the water is gone, there is nothing more to boil, so both boiling and heat will cease. The examples are to be applied to benevolence, wisdom and other mental qualities, which cannot be increased infinitely (a) because they require repeated effort and (b) because their basis, the body, is ultimately unstable, and when it disappears, the mental states will, too. Cf. TS 3168.

[356]The Buddhist agrees that neither jumping ability nor boiling water is susceptible of infinite increase, but he claims here--and will go on to prove--that they are not examples that can be appropriately applied to mental qualities, for the characteristics of jumping ability and boiling water--respectively, the necessity for repeated effort and the existence of an unstable basis--that render their infinite development impossible are <u>not</u> characteristics of mental states--particularly of the sort of positive mental states under discussion. Cf. TS 3421.

[357]The non-necessity of repeated effort and the existence of a stable basis are qualities that some phenomena possess. If jumping ability and boiling water were phenomena that possessed such qualities, they would be susceptible of infinite increase. They do not, and so they are not, but because the qualities in question can apply in principle to some phenomena, it is reasonable to talk about benevolence, wisdom, etc., in terms of them.

[358]Benevolence, etc., are said to have a stable basis because they are generated from homogeneous causes that have a clear mental cognition as their basis. A clear mental cognition is assumed to be a stable basis because it is capable of virtually indefinite repetition, particularly by persons with considerable mental control. The natural development of mental qualities, independent of repeated effort, is analogous to fire's natural "entry" of wood--fire need not begin burning the wood anew each time it is applied, because what has already been burned has been burned, and need not be burned again. Mercury enters gold as naturally as fire does wood, and so is a second illustration. Alternatively, mercury and gold may be considered

as separate examples of substances that, once they are purified, need not be purified continually, but, rather, "naturally" generate subsequent homogeneous pure moments, without "repeated effort." Cf. TS 3422.

[359] It is, as noted in the previous note, a Buddhist assumption that a clear mental cognition provides a stable basis for the development of various mental qualities, because a clear cognition does not have a nature such that its continuation assures its exhaustion; on the contrary, given that mind is endless, there is no reason why clear cognitions should not be endless, too. A Buddha, of course, is a being whose every cognition is perfectly clear and stable.

[360] It is assumed that because they are generated with a stable basis, instances of various positive mental qualities have the capacity to generate--either immediately or eventually--multiple qualities of the same type. Thus, the process of mental development is geometrical rather than merely arithmetical. Positive mental actions are, thus, "expandable." Cf. TS 3414.

[361] The two applications (sbyor ba gnyis) are two qualities that one brings to efforts: consistency (rtag) and intensity (gus). Any effort that is assisted by the two applications is bound to be a long-term success.

[362] Jumping ability cannot be increased infinitely--as benevolence, etc., can--because its conditions, physical strength and physical exertion, necessarily are limited. In general, physical conditions are limited, while mental conditions are capable of infinite increase. This, in turn, presupposes of course that mind is beginningless and endless, a fact supposedly ascertained in the previous section of the chapter. Cf. TS 3424.

[363] Jumping ability never will reach infinity, because its conditions, such as the body and strength, are invariably finite. On the other hand, jumping ability is susceptible of increase and development, because its conditions will vary with the condition of the body, as determined, e.g., by the balance among the humors. Development occurs when there is a progressive elimination or neutralization of the contradictory conditions preventing such development.

[364]Jumping ability must have particular conditions as well as homogeneous causes to explain it, for without the limiting conditions, one step (the material cause) *could* result in an infinitely long jump. Also, mere practice at jumping cannot lead to its infinite increase, because "practice" merely is an index of how long and hard one has tried. If practice alone were a factor, and limiting physical conditions did not play an important role, the monkeys and birds (and, for that matter, humans) who were equally practiced in "jumping" (the word must be used advisedly in the case of birds) should be able to jump equal distances, which manifestly they cannot.

[365]Just as jumping ability varies with the conditions (particularly the opposing ones) found in each individual, so compassion varies with the degree to which its possessor also has in his mindstream those factors that tend to limit or destroy compassion, such as anger. A being with some proclivity toward compassion, but who still is afflicted by various negative conditions, such as anger, is likely only to be able to generate benevolence toward a limited number of sentient beings. Contrary conditions make it impossible for him to generate the great compassion that is the desire utterly to free *all* sentient beings from their manifold sufferings.

[366]Because mind is beginningless, all sentient beings have been both mother and father to all other sentient beings. There is, therefore, not a single sentient being who is not in principle capable of contemplating the past kindnesses that other sentient beings have shown him, as well as the present sufferings that they are undergoing. Thus, there is no sentient being who, in the absence of contrary conditions, will not generate the great compassion that is the desire to free all his ex-parents from their present sufferings.

[367]It is only when the appropriate positive conditions (previous development seriously pursued) are present and the opposing negative conditions (anger, etc.,) absent that mental qualities such as benevolence and wisdom can be expanded to the ultimate degree. It is evident from a simple observation of human (and other sentient) behavior that most beings do not fulfil one or the other or both of these conditional criteria.

[368]The Sanskrit (PV 133a) reads: *kṛpātmakatvamabhyāsād ghṛṇāvairāgyarāgavat*, which means "benevolence natur-

ally (arises) from development, like kindness, detachment and attachment"; the Tibetan reads: goms las brtse ba'i bdag nyid de / chags bral chags dang yid log bzhin, which means "benevolence naturally (arises) from development, like detachment, attachment and aversion." Regardless of the proper reading, the meaning is the same: we can understand that, e.g., detachment naturally arises in the mind of an Arahant, who has developed detachment, so we should understand that benevolence, etc., can naturally arise in a mind that has practiced them.

[369]This summary is provided by rGyal tshab, and does not correspond to anything in Dharmakīrti's text.

[370]Having completed the proofs of the Buddha as authoritative and compassionate, Dharmakīrti now goes on to show that he is the Teacher. The verse with which this section begins in the Sanskrit (PV 133b) is not found in the Tibetan. It reads: niṣpannaḥ karuṇotkarṣaḥ paraduḥkhākṣameritaḥ, "perfect in abundant compassion, unable to endure the suffering of others." Grammatically, it serves as a series of appositives for dayāvān (brtse ldan), the "benevolent one," who is the subject of the next verse (PV 134). The "benevolent one" is taken by rGyal tshab to be a Bodhisattva on the second of the five paths, that of application (cf. above, note 58). A Bodhisattva on the path of application is still an ordinary being (so skye). He meditates consistently and intensively (cf. above, note 361) in order to reach the path of seeing (cf. above, note 56), where he will cognize directly the key to ending his own suffering. Directly understanding the way to end his own suffering, he will then be able to assist other beings in ending their suffering--it is, after all, the desire to help others that is the Bodhisattva's primary motive. Incidentally, only the first paragraph of the "brief demonstration" directly relates to Dharmakīrti's verse; the two latter paragraphs are an independent discussion by rGyal tshab on the nature of a Bodhisattva on the path of application.

[371]The word upāya (thabs), which generally denotes "method," here (PV 134b) connotes "cause," perhaps in the sense in which methods, or means, can be considered the causes of the ends to which they lead.

[372]The Sanskrit samudaya simply means "arising," or "origination." The Tibetan equivalent, kun 'byung, is simply a mechanical translation of sam + udaya, but Tibetan commentators gloss the compound as two words, which mean

the arising or origination of all (suffering).

[373]The reason why a Bodhisattva strives for a direct cognition of the Four Noble Truths, and hence of the key to saṃsāra and nirvāṇa, is because an indirect cognition of them still will lack total clarity; thus, he will neither be able to apply them to himself with total confidence nor explain them to others; thus, he will fulfil neither his own aims nor those of others.

[374]The generation of the Mahāyāna thought (cittotpada = sems bskyed) is, specifically, the bodhicittotpada, that is, the generation of the intention to attain enlightenment for the sake of all sentient beings.

[375]As long as one has not attained the path of seeing, one does not cognize the reality of the Four Noble Truths directly. As long as one does not cognize them directly, one cognizes them through their generic images (don spyi; cf. above, note 45). Generic images appear more or less clearly. They are less clear to a Bodhisattva on the first path, that of accumulation (cf. above, note 58); they are more clear to a Bodhisattva on the path of application. Clear generic images either are or are not associated with, or "held by," bodhicitta. A being whose cognition of clear generic images is associated with bodhicitta is said to fulfil the definition of a Bodhisattva on the path of application.

[376]The verse (PV 135) speaks of "investigating through scripture and reasoning" (lung dang rigs pas rnam dpyod pa = yuktyāgamābhyāṃ...parīkṣate). One way of describing this process is in terms of three "wisdoms," or methods of investigation, i.e., through hearing, or study (thos pa, śruta) critical reflection (bsam pa, yukta or cinta) and meditation (sgom pa, bhavanā). The three are held to be successive phases in one's integration of a particular truth or topic.

[377]A second way of "investigating through scripture and reasoning" is described in terms of attempting to cognize manifest, hidden and very hidden phenomena (cf. above, note 10). Very hidden phenomena, such as the details of karma, must be understood through reliance on authoritative scripture. Scripture is determined to be authoritative if it contradicts neither perception nor inference nor other authoritative scriptures (cf. above, note 131). Hidden phenomena may be known through correct reasoning. Manifest

phenomena are known through sense, mental or yogic perception. On the path, ordinary beings generally will rely on scripture in order to understand the broad outlines of what is to be done. Then they will rely on reasoning independent of scripture to ascertain the truth of various important propositions. Correct reasoning will help take them to a point where they can directly cognize what before had only been known inferentially, or through generic images. Eventually, when beings are enlightened, even very hidden phenomena will be manifest to them.

[378]Thus, the investigation of the nature of suffering entails a concern for the truth of the first three of the Four Noble Truths, the recognition that (a) there is suffering, which is undesirable, (b) there are identifiable causes for suffering and (c) if there are identifiable causes of suffering, then the elimination of the causes should entail the cessation of the suffering. The Four Noble Truths are examined in greater detail in the section on the reverse system of explanation. The key assumption, of course, is that suffering can be adequately understood on the basis of the law of dependent origination, such that its causes can be discovered and hence eliminated.

[379]The search for an antidote to suffering entails a concern for the truth of the fourth Noble Truth, i.e., the path, the method that is to be applied to the elimination of suffering. Since the cause for the origination of suffering is said to be self-grasping (which is at the root of craving), the removal of the cause of the origination should assure the removal of suffering. The cause of origination only will be removed by a way of considering phenomena that is diametrically opposed to self-grasping, i.e., grasping phenomena as selfless. This point also will be discussed at greater length in the section on the reverse system of explanation.

[380]Craving is, in a sense, an omnipresent factor in the minds of ordinary beings, assuring that any act committed while under its sway will have a suffering result--suffering being taken in the broadest sense, as that which pertains to all "contaminated" (*zag bcas*, *sāsrava*) phenomena. Craving is, specifically, the indispensible cooperative condition for the generation of acts that will have suffering results. The five aggregates that are the objects of craving compose the psycho-physical individual. They are: form, feeling, perception, complexes and cognition.

[381]If the root of craving, hence of continued suffering in saṃsāra, is self-grasping, the cause of the cessation of suffering, i.e., the path, must be the contradictory of self-grasping, the wisdom realizing selflessness. These two are the keys to saṃsāra and nirvāṇa, and their establishment is vital to Dharmakīrti's proof of the Buddha's authoritativeness.

[382]The root-verse (PV 136b) reads, in part: "one investigates the objective opposite that destroys the cause" (de rgyu gzhom phyir / mi mthun phyogs la brtag pa mdzad = hetorhānārtha tadvipakṣaṃ parikṣate).

[383]It has already--to Dharmakīrti and rGyal tshab's satisfaction--been proved that there are countless past and future lives, and that mental qualities are susceptible of infinite development over the course of these lives. Hence, it is not at all unreasonable to assert that the Buddha, who has taken so many different births for the sake of beings, should have developed a complete knowledge of what is to be rejected and what adopted--this knowledge, in turn, is definitive of the Buddha's authoritativeness (cf. above, pp. 583-6).

[384]The opponent accepts that Arahantship may be attainable through the elimination of self-grasping, and that the elimination of self-grasping must perforce involve knowledge of what is to be rejected and what adopted, but he argues that this in no way entails the omniscience that Mahāyānists attribute to the Buddha.

[385]According to rGyal tshab (Dharmakīrti's root-verse makes no reference to this), the Buddha may rightly be regarded as omniscient because he has been able to familarize himself over the course of countless lives not only with the essential details of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa, but with all the details. Since saṃsāra and nirvāṇa (= what is to be rejected and what adopted) are two categories exhaustive of all phenomena, if the Buddha knows saṃsāra and nirvāṇa in all their details, he is by definition omniscient. Cf. above, note 114,for a brief discussion of Dharmakīrti's attitude toward omniscience.

[386]Because his mind is utterly clear and purified, the Buddha may be said not only to have eliminated all the causes of suffering, but also the latent dispositions or propensities to originating the cause. Since qualities of body

sāric existences; the Once-returner (len cig phyir 'ong ba, sakṛdāgāmin), who will attain Arahantship after at most one more saṃsāric existence; and the Non-returner (phyir mi 'ong ba, anāgāmin), who will attain Arahantship from a divine abode after the end of his present saṃsāric existence. Cf. above, Part I, p. 70. According to the Abhidharmakośa path-system, the "fruits" of the Streamwinner, Once-returner and Non-returner are attained on the paths of seeing and development, while the first moment of the fourth fruit, Arahantship, coincides with the path of non-more-training. Neither Bodhisattvas nor those with the three lower Hīnayāna fruits have irreversible abandonments; Arahants and Buddhas do.

[401]The opponent is arguing that if self-grasping and non-self-grasping are defined as contradictories, then each should be able equally to damage the other. There should not, thus, be any reason why self-grasping--once replaced by non-self-grasping--might not in turn replace non-self-grasping. The objection is not only philosophical; it is based on observation of the mental states of ordinary beings.

[402]rGyal tshab's reply is that although self-grasping and non-self-grasping are contradictories, they are not equally weighed, because the former is a false manner of grasping reality, while the latter is a true manner of grasping reality, and where the truth has become securely established, falsehood cannot again take root. Thus, non-self-grasping can replace self-grasping, but self-grasping cannot replace non-self-grasping. Note that this argument presupposes both the truth and soteriological value of non-self-grasping. In other words, it presupposes the correctness of the Buddhist identification of the cause of the origination of suffering and of the antidote to that origination. In fact, the correctness of the Buddhist analysis will not be extensively demonstrated until later, during the discussion of the truth of path (below, pp. 740-54).

[403]The third special quality of the Buddha's abandonment, one that is exclusive to the Mahāyāna, is that it is remainderless (ma lus, niḥśeṣa). Śrāvaka and Pratyekabuddha Hīnayāna Arahants have abandonments that are good (because they result from the development of the antidote to suffering, the wisdom realizing selflessness) and irreversible (because they will not revert to saṃsāra), but they have not abandoned all the subtle stains, or trace-faults, left by the defilements they have destroyed. Thus, they have not

eliminated all knowledge-obstacles, and are not omniscient with regard to all dharmas to be adopted and rejected; thus, they cannot teach the path to liberation to others with utter clarity. A Buddha, on the other hand, has completely eliminated all faults, and thus has entirely attained his own aim. On the basis of the complete attainment of his own aim, he is able to teach others the path to liberation with complete clarity.

[404]The rGyal dpog pas are, apparently, synonymous with the Mīmāṃsakas.

[405]The rGyal dpog pa objection is basically a common-sense one, namely that conventional observation does not give us a basis for distinguishing the attainments (or abandonments) of a Buddha from those of other men. All we really can observe of other men, such as those we meet on the road, is that they speak and have bodies and organs. We know that most people who have bodies and organs and speak have not abandoned suffering, and there is no additional information provided by observation of an alleged Buddha that would guarantee that he is any different from other people we encounter.

[406]The opponent's argument is uncertain for the simple reason that there is no inevitable concomitance between speakership and the possession of sense-organs on the one hand and the quality of having eliminated or not eliminated flaws on the other. To argue that the Buddha has not eliminated flaws because he has body and speech is to cite insufficient evidence, for it is not impossible (a) that someone with an "impure" body or speech have a mind that has eliminated flaws or, more importantly, (b) that there exist someone whose body and speech are not flawed in the slightest. That the Buddha is an example of the former is a Vaibhāṣika contention; that he is an example of the latter is a Mahāyānist contention.

[407]When one analyzes the opponent's possible arguments in greater detail, their uncertainty becomes even clearer. If one argues that the Buddha has not abandoned flaws because his speech is pure only on the basis of what he has been taught by past teachers, or because he speaks with attachment, one's syllogism lacks a contrapositive (ldog khyab), for there is no invariable non-concomitance between the non-abandonment of flaws on the one hand and personal experience or non-attachment on the other. Generally speaking, the fact that one possesses body and speech does not

automatically entail that one's body or speech is either pure or impure, for instances of both are held to be possible, as the purity of body and speech are determined by the purity of mind, and purity of mind is accepted by most as a possibility.

[408]"Those who say that the Buddha's physical form is not the Buddha" include the Vaibhāṣikas, who claim that only the Buddha's mind is truly the Buddha, and that his body and speech are the impure residue of past karma. This position opens the way for the rGyal dpog pa objection raised above (p. 676). Mahāyānists, in general, accept that the Buddha is his body, speech and mind, and that all aspects of him are pure. His mind, which is equivalent to the dharmakāya, is the pure result of the accumulation of gnosis; his speech and body, which are (roughly) equivalent to the sambhogakāya and nirmāṇakāya, are the pure result of the accumulation of merit. Cf. TS 3369b-3370a.

[409]Reasons (4) and (5) would affirm that there does exist someone who can assist others in eliminating their flaws, and that such a person would, in fact, assist others in so doing. The proof of this is said to be contained in PV 134, which discusses a benevolent Bodhisattva's striving for a perfect accomplishment on the basis of which to explain the path to others (cf. above, p. 666, and note 370). This entire section on "Investigating the extremes through reasoning and refuting them" is added by rGyal tshab; there is nothing corresponding to it in Dharmakīrti's verses. It is a lucid summary of opponents' arguments and the Buddhist replies, the five points of the latter being absolutely fundamental Buddhist religious propositions.

[410]Since the Buddha has utterly abandoned all flaws, he has a complete understanding of all dharmas to be rejected (saṃsāra) and all dharmas to be adopted (nirvāṇa). Thus, he is in a position to explain to others the path that he has travelled. The fact that he possesses an ultimate abandonment, i.e., that he is the Sugata, enables him to teach and otherwise assist others, i.e., to be a Savior; indeed, it is only because of the ultimacy of his abandonment that he can teach and assist others in every possible way. At this point, rGyal tshab launches on another parenthetical explanation, which comprises the rest of the section on "The excellence of others' aims."

[411]It cannot be the case that the Buddha does not teach the path at all, because it already has been proven

(above, p. 666ff.) that he is the Teacher, with a knowledge of the cause and antidote of saṃsāric suffering. His search for and development of the antidote (the wisdom realizing selflessness) is motivated by his desire to help free all beings. His successful development of the antidote issues in his abandonment of all faults, or Suagatahood, a condition from which he actually is able to help free all beings, just as he had originally intended, and one of the methods by which he helps free beings is teaching the path.

[412]It cannot be the case that the Buddha teaches distortedly, because he has been shown to have abandoned all flaws. He has been shown to have abandoned all flaws because he has developed to the highest degree the antidote to the origination of suffering. As one who has abandoned all flaws, i.e., as a Sugata, he is free from error. Thus, when he teaches the path to others in his capacity as Savior, he cannot possibly do so distortedly (cf. above, p. 673ff.)

[413]It cannot be the case that the Buddha does not possess the great compassion that has others as its intentional object, because it already has been shown that great compassion can be developed infinitely over a series of rebirths, and that it is the motive on the basis of which a Bodhisattva exerts himself in the discovery and development of the antidote to the origination of suffering. The antidote, as we have seen, is the wisdom realizing selflessness, which is, in turn, called "the Teacher." Thus, great compassion is the cause of the Teacher.

[414]The syllogism thus would read: "The Muni is the Savior, because he is compassionate and because he is the Teacher." The fact that he is the (ultimate) Teacher assures that he has a complete knowledge of all that is to be rejected and adopted; the fact that he is compassionate assures that he will teach what he knows.

[415]Cf. above, note 411.

[416]Cf. above, note 413.

[417]Thus, the forward-system syllogism might read: "The Muni is the Savior, because he is compassionate, which leads to his becoming the Teacher, which leads to his becoming the Sugata, which enables him to be the Savior of others." Alternatively, it can be said that "The Muni is the

ted above (pp. 686-7). The four wrong ideas he has listed correspond exactly to the four distorted views (viparyāsa) that one may entertain toward phenomena in general. However, the distorted idea that suffering is pure has no aspect that corresponds to it. Thus, the third and fourth aspects must be seen as contradicting two different aspects of one distorted view, that suffering is (or is related to) a self. In Vasubandhu's enumeration of the four distorted views about suffering, "purity" does not appear. "Pertaining to a self" (ātmīya) and "a self" (ātman) do appear, and they are countered by the third and fourth aspects, empty and selfless.

[438] The fact that suffering's origination has the aspect of cause counters the idea that there is no cause originating suffering.

[439] The fact that suffering's origination has the aspect of repeated origination counters the idea that there can be just one cause of suffering, for multiple and various results imply multiple and various causes.

[440] The fact that suffering's origination has the aspect of being strongly generated counters the view that it can be generated by some other being, such as God, for another being--particularly a permanent one, such as God--cannot persuasively be shown to be able to effect all one's suffering. rGyal tshab's interpretation of prabhāva (rab tu skye ba) as forceful generation is a departure from Vasubandhu's version, which takes prabhāva in the general sense of "generated." For him, the fact that suffering's origination is generated implies that it is successive, which, in turn, counters the idea that any entity comes into existence as the transformation of a pre-existent cause, as in the pariṇāmavāda of the Sāṃkhyas, in which all results are a transformation of a prime stuff, Prakṛti.

[441] The fact that suffering's origination has the aspect of conditioning counters the view that something permanent can change according to circumstances. In other words, because the origination of suffering is in part under the sway of particular cooperative conditions, such as craving for existence, it cannot be asserted to result from any sort of a permanent being, such as God, because such a permanent being could not generate particular sufferings in accordance with varying conditions and still remain a permanent being. According to Vasubandhu, the aspect of conditioning counters the view that things come into being pre-

ceded by an intelligent creator--when, in fact, they come into being through a multiplicity of causes and conditions.

[442]The fact that cessation is cessation, and therefore is the abandonment of suffering, counters the idea that cessation never comes about.

[443]The fact that cessation is peace, and therefore is the abandonment of defilements, counters the view that some state in which defilements (kleśa) or contaminants (āśrava) still remain can be the cessation that is sought. According to Vasubandhu, the aspect of cessation as peace counters the view that cessation somehow entails suffering.

[444]The fact that cessation is sublime, and therefore beneficial and pleasurable, counters the idea that just the cessation of some particular suffering can be the supreme cessation. The Sanskrit term for this aspect, praṇīta, simply means "supreme," and thus is taken by Vasubandhu as countering the idea that particular cessations, such as those entailed by the dhyānas and samāpattis (in which, in fact, all defilements have not been eliminated) are the supreme cessation. The Tibetan translation of praṇīta, gya nom pa, is somewhat more ambiguous, as it implies both superiority and pleasure. Thus, it may be taken not only as countering the view that a cessation in which defilement remains is the supreme cessation, but also as countering the view that the cessation that is nirvāṇa is simply non-existence, devoid even of pleasure (a view, incidentally, held by, among others, the Sautrāntikas; it is not entirely clear whether Dharmakīrti subscribed to this view).

[445]The fact that cessation is definite emergence counters the idea that cessation is somehow reversible.

[446]The fact that the path has the aspect of being a path counters the idea that there is no path that leads to the cessation of suffering.

[447]The fact that the path is reasonable, or correct, counters the idea that it is unreasonable to assert that the wisdom realizing selflessness is the path. Because the wisdom realizing selflessness sees reality correctly, it has the power to eliminate defilements, and so it reasonably is asserted to be the path, for the path is simply the process of eliminating defilements until the cessation of suffering is attained. According to Vasubandhu, the aspect

of reasonableness counters the idea that a false or unreasonable path is the path to cessation.

[448]The fact that the path entails accomplishment counters the idea that some particular samādhi is the path, for an "accomplished" realization is a complete one, and only a complete realizatoon will have the power to eliminate defilements and thus merit identification with the path.

[449]The fact that the path entails definite removal of suffering counters the idea that there is a Dharmic path that leads to suffering rather than to the cessation of suffering. The path is the wisdom realizing selflessness, and that wisdom permanently abandons the defilements. Thus, once attained, the path is irreversible.

[450]Devendrabuddhi, 246/4/4-5.

[451]rGyal tshab points out that "studying" (thos pa) this chapter involves more than merely studying syllogisms. It requires of a scholar internalizing what he learns, and taking to heart the viciousness of saṃsāra and the necessity for liberation from it. Thus, an understanding of this chapter requires study (thos), reflection (bsam) and meditation (sgom), which is literally interpreted as accustoming one's mind to a particular object.

[452]Study of this chapter eventually entails the development of the three higher trainings, for once one has taken to heart the fact that saṃsāra is vicious and liberation from it to be sought, one will be moved to perfect one's morality, concentration and wisdom, which are the basis of that liberation.

[453]"Seizing well the essential" (snying po legs par len pa) involves gaining an acquaintance with the basic truths and procedures of the Buddhist path. The basis from which one strives for the great aim is a "perfect" human rebirth, which is, negatively speaking, free from certain hindrances, such as being born in divine or lower realms where Dharma-practice is difficult, being born on earth in places or times where the Dharma is unknown, or being oneself a heretic or an idiot. Positively speaking, a perfect human rebirth involves being human, being born where the Dharma is known, possessing clear faculties, having committed no inexpiable crimes, having confidence in the moral practices enjoined by the Vinaya, practicing the Dharma as-

siduously at a time when it is still taught purely, and developing compassion. Cf. sGam po pa, chapter 2.

[454]The non-virtues, sometimes called "sins," (sdig pa) are: killing, stealing, sexual misconduct, lying, harsh speech, slander, gossip, covetousness, malice and heterodoxy. The downfalls (ltung ba) involve breaking any precepts that one may have taken: those of a lay practitioner or of a novice or fully-ordained monk or nun, which are taken for life; or those of a Bodhisattva or tāntrika, which are to be observed until one attains enlightenment.

[455]rGyal tshab is simply reiterating the importance of internalizing, i.e., meditating on, what one studies, for mere scholarship will bring us no closer to liberation than will farming.

[456]The five aggregates (form, feeling, perception, mental complexes and cognition--form is lacking in a formless-realm being), which together are what we usually call a person, are said to be suffering because they are under the control of karma and defilements (kleśa) such as attachment, anger and ignorance. These karma and defilements, usually negative and always uncontrolled, impel one from life to life--and each life is essentially suffering, because the one who lives it is not liberated, but is subject to the three kinds of suffering (cf. above, note 429).

[457]The rather dubious point made by the opponent is that the first moment of a next life, because it is a first moment, never has occurred before, while the meaning of saṃsāra is an ever-returning circle of births that we have experienced before countless times. Thus, a moment that never has been experienced before must not be saṃsāra. The opponent, of course, misunderstands saṃsāra's "repetitive" nature. One certainly repeats types of experiences--those of a particular realm, and even particular experiences within those realms--but one never repeats experiences in all their particulars. The conditions of particular "repeated" experiences will invariably be somewhat different from one instance to another--at the very least, an experience will be unique because it occurs when it does, and not at some earlier or later time.

[458]The assertion that a permanent person is, or is the basis of, saṃsāra, is made by most non-Buddhist schools. A Buddhist will reject it on the grounds that a permanent entity cannot undergo the transformations that suffering is

observed to entail.

[459]Attachment, anger and other defilements are just like the positive qualities of benevolence, wisdom, etc.: their material causes are previous instances of the same sort of mental attitude. This is shown by the fact that--just like positive attitudes--they increase or decrease depending chiefly upon the degree to which they are developed (goms). If defilements increase or decrease through development, and if mind is independent of body, then defilements must have existed beginninglessly. Hence, the saṃsāra through which they impel the aggregates must be beginningless.

[460]It is commonly observed that particular defilements do not arise continually, but only occasionally. Something that only arises occasionally must have certain conditions necessary and sufficient for its arising--for there must be a difference between occasions when it arises and occasions when it does not. The conditions in the absence of which something will not arise must be considered its "causes." Therefore, entities that arise occasionally must be caused. Indeed, to apply to them the very word "generated" is to imply that there are occasions on which they do not exist (i.e., prior to their generation). The fact that one time they do not exist, while at another they do, can only be explained by the absence or presence of certain conditions. The critical conditions are, again, the "causes." Cf. TS 1948.

[461]It was the view of Indian physicians that defilements or negative states of mind simply resulted from an imbalance of the humors, with excessive phlegm leading to desire, excessive bile to anger and excessive wind to ignorance or dullness. Note that desire (rāga), anger (dveṣa) and ignorance (moha), are the traditional "three poisons" considered by Buddhists to be the fundamental negative states of mind.

[462]The opponent's reason is uncertain, because there is no invariable concomitance between the preponderance of a particular humor and the expression of a particular defilement. Thus, a person who shows clear physical signs of being dominated by phlegm should be expected to be lustful or attached all the time. In fact, however, we observe that such people often may display little desire and much anger--which we would expect only of a bilious person.

463 The opponent argues that his Reason is <u>not</u> uncertain, because anger occurs in a phlegmatic person when a certain amount of bile is mixed with the phlegm.

464 The opponent's qualification is inadequate, because the preponderance of each humor has a number of different physical and psychological results. Indeed, it is by these various results that the preponderance of a particular humor is diagnosed. Thus, a preponderance of bile has among its results not only anger, but prematurely white hair, jaundice, excessive perspiration and a certain mental clarity. If the opponent asserts that anger in a phlegmatic person results from the mixture of bile with the phlegm, then he must be ready to concede that not only anger, but also the other results of bile, should be manifest. They are not, of course, because if they were, the person would no longer be phlegmatic, but bilious, and the opponent would be left with his original proposition (that there is an invariable concomitance between physical types and the expression of one or the other of the three poisons), which has already been refuted. Cf. TS 1960.

465 The opponent argues that each of the three humors is capable of generating all three poisons, and that the fact that each humor-type manifests all three poisons is thus explained. The problem with this, as rGyal tshab points out, is that everyone would then have the same psychological make-up, since everyone has the same three humors. Furthermore, if one's defilements were caused by <u>all</u> the humors, then one would expect each person to display the physical and psychological effects of <u>all</u> the humors, an obvious impossibility.

466 The opponent attempts to support his case with an analogy: just as people have different body sizes, even though their bodies are composed of the same elements, so people's dispositions differ, even though their bodies include the same three humors. rGyal tshab replies that in either case, the equality of the causes (elements or humors) only can entail the equality of the results (body size or mental states), and that, in fact, neither is a complete causal explanation: one must also take into account the particular karmas that act as the principal conditions for a particular body size or the disposition toward particular states of mind. Put in somewhat more modern terms, rGyal tshab's argument amounts to this: the mere fact that one has a body cannot explain why one's body is the size it is; that must be explained through addi-

tional factors, such as heredity (in this case, = karma) and nutrition (or conditions). Similarly, the fact that one expresses particular emotions cannot be explained by the general fact that one has the potential to express various emotions; that one expresses particular emotions only can be explained by other conditions, such as one's previous expression of them (and also perhaps by--again--a certain amount of heredity).

[467]rGyal tshab is here repeating the same general point he has made before, that there is no invariable concomitance between the humors and the defilements, and he cites as a demonstration the fact that an increase in phlegm, which should automatically entail an increase in attachment, sometimes weakens the body, and that in that case, attachment is observed to decrease. There is no Sanskrit śloka corresponding to the Tibetan verse on which rGyal tshab is commenting: chags sogs rang bzhin thams cad kyi / chos yin par yang 'dod na go / nus med rang bzhin med pas na / 'bras bu mi mtshungs gang las yin //. The Tibetan verse falls between verses 152a and 152b of Shastri's edition.

[468]A Reason correct in all three ways possesses the tshul gsum, or three aspects, of any correct Reason: the Reason's relevance to the Subject, its invariable concomitance with the Predicate, and the non-Reason's invariable concomitance with the non-Predicate. That a Reason is correct in all three ways can be shown by refuting the charge that it is either unproven or uncertain.

[469]The Buddhist's syllogism is, basically: "Defilements do not result from humors, because their invariable succession on the humors is uncertain." The opponent claims that the Reason is unproven, because the uncertainty of concomitance is not a quality that the opponent accepts as being relevant to the Subject—since he believes that it is certain that defilements invariably follow on the humors.

[470]rGyal tshab defends the Buddhist contention that the invariable concomitance between defilements and humors is uncertain, on the grounds that anger can result from the "transformation," or predominance of any of the humors, so anger must be asserted to result from any of the humors, not just bile. It cannot be that anger is generated from all the humors, though, because then each of the humors should be capable of generating all of the defilements, and the predominance of one humor would then entail the genera-

tion of all the defilements, which manifestly does not occur.

[471]The previous basic Reasin is the assertion that defilements do not result from humors because their invariable succession on the humors is uncertain.

[472]There are results that directly follow an increase in one of the humors: fever, for instance, will increase following an increase in bile. If a defilement is to be so direct a result, then it must invariably increase when the humor asserted to be its cause increases--and it has been shown that there is no such invariable concomitance.

[473]rGyal tshab argues, as he has before, that a mental event, such as a defilement, cannot arise directly from a physical cause, such as the elements; rather, it arises from a principal condition that is an internal feeling-state brought about by transformations in the humors or elements. In this sense, the physical is only an indirect, assistant cause of the mental.

[474]The opponent, who holds that attachment is generated from an equilibrium among the three humors, argues that the Buddhist could not observe a particular cause of attachment, because he asserts that defilements result from painful or pleasurable feelings that follow on the disequilibrium of the humors, and in the case of attachment there is no such disequilibrium. On the other hand, we know that attachment arises, so the Buddhist has simply failed to account for it.

[475]Here, the opponent makes his position explicit: the equilibrium of the three humors entails an increase in the production of semen, which, in turn, leads to attachment. Note that "semen" is not used strictly in the sense of the male seminal fluid, but in the more general sense of sexual secretions. Females, thus, are capable of attachment and lust, too.

[476]The opponent's Reason is uncertain, for there is no invariable concomitance between an equilibrium of the humors and attachment, or semen and attachment. First, attachment is known to be generated not only when the humors are in equilibrium, but also when they are in disequilibrium. Secondly, there are beings whose humors are in equilibrium--such as Āryas--who do not develop attachment. Third-

ly, attachment is not observed automatically to decrease in people whose semen has been depleted through, e.g., the loss of blood (the connection between blood and semen is an ancient Indian medical notion). A man who has lost semen through a loss of blood should not, by the opponent's theory, feel lust for a beautiful woman, but this is not observed to be the case. Therefore, attachment must be the result of something other than semen.

[477]The opponent's attempt to argue that beauty is the cause of attachment also fails, because--again--the concomitance between the supposed cause and result is uncertain: there are cases in which men do not generate attachment to women acknowledged to be beautiful, and also cases in which they generate attachment to women not acknowledged to be beautiful. By the opponent's theory, however, all beautiful women should generate attachment in all men, and no non-beautiful women should generate attachment in any men. The opponent is making an external, "objective" quality the cause of attachment, while the Buddhist maintains that "beauty is in the eye of the beholder," and that attachment results from internal, mental events.

[478]The opponent retreats somewhat, conceding that it is one's attitude toward a beautiful woman--i.e., holding her to be beautiful--that generates attachment.

[479]The opponent's concession is inadequate, because he still holds that beauty is an objectively existing quality of an external object. As long as he maintains that, in effect, a beautiful woman is objectively and always beautiful, then anyone who looks at her automatically will hold her to be beautiful, and thus automatically will become attached, so the problem is not resolved, but merely removed one step. Cf. TS 1952.

[480]Another consequence of the opponent's original contention--that there is an invariable concomitance between an increase in a particular humor and the increase of a corresponding defilement--is that someone who is phlegmatic could not ever be angry, because the predominance of phlegm should assure constant attachment, and attachment and anger are contradictory qualities: one cannot exist in the same time and place as the other. The consequence is an absurd one, however, because we do, in fact, observe that "phlegmatic" people can grow angry. Therefore, there is no invariable concomitance between the humors and defilements.

[481]The "system of the rationalists" (*rigs pa smra ba gang gi lugs*) does not refer to a particular school of Buddhism, as, e.g., *rnam par shes pa smra ba* refers to Vijñānavāda, but simply to those who use reason in support of their doctrines.

[482]The Buddhist position is that defilements arise in the mind on the basis of an assortment of conditions that arouse propensities or dispositions (*bag chags*, *vasanā*) to a specific defilement. The material cause of a defiled state of mind will be the propensity, or seed, while its conditions will be whatever has the ability to awaken the propensity. The conditions may--but need not--include external or physical conditions, but in any case it will be the internal appraisal of external conditions that will be the *indispensible* condition for the arousal of the propensity to a particular defilement. Thus, an increase in bile may *lead to* anger, or the sight of a beautiful woman may *lead to* attachment, but they are only assistant, indirect causes, and they no more will invariably lead to the defilement described than the defilement described need result only from them. Cf. TS 1954-56.

[483]Defilements cannot be the result of the elements any more than they can be the result of the humors, for the uncertainty that there is an invariable concomitance between the alleged cause and result is equally strong in both cases. Causality involves existence at different times. If the opponent argues, as he will attempt to, that the elements and defilements exist *simultaneously* as basis and based, rGyal tshab will refute him on the grounds that a basis and based only can exist simultaneously if they are substantially identical, and that substantially different qualities that exist simultaneously (such as the sweetness and color of sugar) cannot be described as basis and based. This argument has been applied above to the discussion of the relation between mind and body (pp. 613-16). The verse cited is PV 65a. Cf. above, note 324.

[484]The opponent attempts to argue that because the Buddhist accepts that secondary qualities (lit., "transformed elements," *'byung 'gyur*) coexist with and are based upon the primary elements (*'byung ba*), he also must accept that defilements coexist with and are based upon the elements, or contradict his own position.

[485]The opponent has drawn his version of the Buddhist position from a passage found in the *Abhidharmakośa* (Pous-

sin, I, p. 65) and attributed to the Buddha, that seems to indicate that secondary qualities are based upon the elements with which they coexist. In fact, however, the Buddhist does not assert the elements and secondary qualities as being simultaneous, substantially different basis and based. Elements and secondary qualities may conventionally be designated as basis and based, but in fact they do not have such a relation, for simultaneous, substantially different entities cannot exist as cause and result, and the real meaning of basis and based is precisely such a causal relation--which obtains in the case of the elements and secondary qualities to the degree that a previous moment of an element serves as a cooperative condition for the subsequent moment of the secondary quality, and vice versa. Thus, the elements and secondary qualities have a causal relation, and in that sense are basis and based, but since one cannot establish an invariable causal relation between the elements and defilements, one cannot describe them as basis and based in any sense.

[486]The opponent attempts to counter with an example of simultaneous, but substantially different entities that are accepted as basis and based, namely liquor and its power to intoxicate.

[487]rGyal tshab, however, denies that liquor and its intoxicating power are substantially different: if they exist simultaneously and do not have each other as immediately-preceding conditions, then they must be substantially identical. Generally, two terms are said to be substantially identical when they arise, exist and are destroyed together, as the Buddhist holds liquor and its intoxicating power do. I have assumed that the text's de lta min na is a misprint for de lta yin na, "since that is the case."

[488]The opponent counters that liquor and its intoxicating power cannot be substantially identical on the Buddhist's definition, because we observe that heated liquor has lost its power to intoxicate. If they were substantially identical, the absence or presence of one should automatically entail the absence or presence of the other. Thus, even when liquor was heated, its intoxicating power should remain, because the liquor remains; or, conversely, if one asserts that the intoxicating power has been destroyed, then the liquor should have disappeared as well.

[489]The Buddhist would most likely disagree that heated liquor entirely loses its intoxicating power, and thereby

avoid the opponent's objection. Since liquor and its intoxicating power are identical, one cannot use them as an example demonstrating the relation between the elements and the defilements, because the elements and the defilements are substantially different. We know that this is so because an unmistaken mind cognizes them thus; one is an external, observable phenomenon, the other an internal event, not intersubjectively observable. Two such disparate phenomena cannot be substantially identical. This very important argument is, in effect, based on the common-sense observation that the physical and the mental cannot be substantially identical because they seem to be irreducibly different types of phenomena. This common-sense view, the basis of our instinctive mind-body dualism, is asserted by Dharmakīrti to be supported by the observation of an unmistaken cognition. This assertion, however, begs the question, for we are attempting to establish what, in fact, an unmistaken cognition will cognize. If mind and body, e.g., actually are not utterly different types of phenomena, i.e., if one does automatically entail the other (as a physicalist would insist is the relation between mind and brain), then an unmistaken cognition will cognize their similarity rather than their difference. Cf. Part I, chapter 4, section 6.

[490]The Buddhist argues that body cannot be the principal condition of mind, because a variation in the result, mind, must entail a prior variation in the cause, body, yet we observe that body does not alter as much as mind; hence, it cannot be mind's principal condition. The validity of this argument hinges on the opponent's assertion of an unchanging body. If a body is held to be momentary in the same way that mind is, then the body is constantly (though subtly) changing all the time, and thus can in theory serve as mind's principal condition. A modern opponent would maintain that the brain, as the particular organ that is mind's principal condition, is, in fact, changing just as rapidly as is mind, so there is no fallacy such that the principal condition is held to "remain" while the result changes.

[491]Mental cognition, or conceptual thought, cannot possibly be invariably directly influenced by an external object, because if it were, then memory, imagination and dreaming all would be impossible, for these are mental phenomena that occur in the absence of any corresponding external object. The intentional object of a memory, imagination or dream is a generic image of some object, not the object itself. Furthermore, the material cause of a mental

cognition is a previous mental cognition, either actual or latent, for--again--mind must be preceded by a homogeneous material cause.

[492]This is another form of the common-sense argument used above: mind and body are not only substantially different, but substantially different types of phenomena, so it is inconceivable that one be the material cause of the other, since a material result must have as its material cause a phenomenon of the same type, or genus. Because the mental cannot, as a consequence, result from the non-mental, e.g., at the moment of conception, there must be a previous mental cause of the mind at the moment of conception, namely a mind-moment associated with a previous life, whether in the intermediate realm or in one of the six realms of saṃsāra.

[493]The opponent is arguing that he does not accept that the mental arises from the non-mental, either, because he asserts that everything has mentality to some degree, and therefore the capacity to generate mind. This view, akin to what in the West is called panpsychism, was held by both Jainas--who attributed latent or actual mentality to all phenomena--and Sāṃkhyas--who maintained that all entities, both sentient and non-sentient, are transformations of a primordial stuff, Prakṛti, that has the capacity to generate mind. rGyal tshab interprets the position as that of the Sāṃkhya.

[494]The Lokāyatas, or materialists, who are Dharmakīrti's principal hypothetical opponents in his defense of the validity of the truth of suffering, apparently prided themselves on their common-sensical approach to life, and Dharmakīrti wonders how they can sustain such pride while at the same time positing an explanation of causality as--to a Buddhist--nonsensical as that of the Sāṃkhyas.

[495]The reason the Sāṃkhya view of causality is nonsensical, or, in Dharmakīrti's word, "bovine," is that it implies that the result in some sense already "exists" in the cause. Thus--given that all phenomena are transformations of Prakṛti, a blade of grass that is temporally prior to a hundred elephants is in some sense the cause of those elephants, because a transformation of the same material cause, Prakṛti, at some point will result in a hundred elephants. Since, however, the effect is always said to preexist in the cause, the hundred elephants should be visible on the tip of the blade of grass. No matter how minutely we

analyze the blade of grass, however, we do not find there the hundred elephants whose visibility should be entailed by the effect's pre-existence in the cause. In fact, of course, it is impossible for the effect to pre-exist in the cause; by the Buddhist view, the effect only can exist when the cause has ceased to exist, for two simultaneously-existing entities cannot be cause and effect--cause-and-effect being a temporal relation. Alternatively, the exemplary case described by Dharmakīrti may be interpreted as that of a hundred insects on the tip of a blade of grass, who should be visible as the hundred elephants that they may be in a future rebirth. This interpretation of the example would seem to accord more closely with an attack on the Jainas, who did not posit that all phenomena are simply transformations of a basic stuff, but nonetheless maintained a substance-mode way of speaking of the careers of transmigrating beings--thereby implying the result's pre-existence in the cause. Incidentally, since the Jainas maintained that mind is present in all entities, the blade of grass could as easily someday be an elephant as could an insect, so the first interpretation of the example could be taken as a criticism of the Jainas as well as of the Sāṃkhyas. Dharmakīrti here refutes panpsychism on the basis of its association with substance-mode theories of causality. A panpsychism based on momentariness (which seems not to have existed in India) could not be rejected on these grounds--indeed, the dispute between a Buddhist and a panpsychist who accepted momentariness simply would boil down to a disagreement over how generously the word "mind" should be attributed to entities that do not usually display traits that we usually associate with the word (this is assuming that the panpsychist does not make the mistake of attributing to, e.g., a blade of grass, the "potential" for mind--but simply asserts that the grass actually has mind, only in an "unclear" form.

[496]A consequential syllogism that entails an independent syllogism (rang rgyud 'phen pa'i thal ba) is a syllogism that states the absurd consequences of an opponent's view in such a way that if the Reason and Predicate are reversed and their logical opposites supplied, a correct independent syllogism representing one's own view will result. For example, the consequential syllogism that stems from an opponent's assertion that sound is permanent is: "It follows that sound is non-produced, because it is permanent." If one reverses the Reason and Predicate and supplies their logical opposites, one is left with the independent syllogism, "Sound is impermanent, because it is produced."

[497]In skeletal form, the opponent's assertion is that ordinary beings' minds arise newly at conception, without homogeneous precedent. The consequential syllogism based on this is: "Ordinary beings may be born as non-attached beings, because their minds arise newly at conception, without precedent." The implicit assumption, of course, is that if attachment does not come from homogeneous causes, it may not occur at all. When one reverses the Reason and Predicate of the consequential syllogism and supplies their opposites, one is left with an independent syllogism that expresses the Buddhist view: "Ordinary beings do not have minds that arise newly at conception, without homogeneous precedent, because they are born as attached beings." The same assumption as above applies. A Reason based on apprehension of contradictory pervasion (_'gal khyab dmigs pa'i rtags_) is one of eleven different types of Reasons based on non-apprehension, or negation (_ma dmigs pa'i rtags_).

[498]The opponent holds that the elements are the material cause of the defilements. Since beings are known to be born with defilements such as attachment, and since the elements do not change their nature, there is no reason to believe that attachment ever can be eliminated. rGyal tshab points out that if the elements are the material cause of the defilements, then, since the elements are roughly equal in all people, then the defilements should be, too, which manifestly they are not.

[499]If the opponent claims that the amount of one's defilement varies with the amount of one's elements, he finds himself in the position of implying that it might be possible for some beings to be "more alive" than others, because of their greater quantities or intensities of the elements that are the cause of life. In fact, of course, we do not observe that there is any difference in "aliveness" between one being and another--a being is either alive or it is not. On the other hand, we _do_ observe a difference in the degree of defilement manifested by various beings. Defilement, therefore, must not come from the elements, but from a previous homogeneous cause. Thus, the causes of the defilements are quite independent of the elements, and the question of whether or not the defilements can be eliminated does not depend on the status of the elements.

[500]The opponent argues that there _are_ differences in the amount of attachment in various beings, but that detachment _still_ is impossible because the nature of the cau-

sal elements does not permit it. If he continues to maintain that the elements are the cause of attachment, however, then he cannot escape the consequence that the equality of the elements should entail the equality of attachment in all beings. If he wishes to explain the obvious _in_equality in the amount of attachment manifested by beings, then he must abandon his contention that the elements are the material cause of attachment, and thereby open himself to other possible causal explanations of attachment, including that of the Buddhists.

501 The sorts of differentiations of intensity that are entailed by the opponent's attempt to account for the differences in the amount of attachment displayed by various beings by claiming that there are differences in the elements, are not found actually to be present in living beings as we observe them. Furthermore, although such distinctions do not apply within the realm of the living, there _is_ a difference between non-living entities composed of the elements and living beings composed of the elements. If the opponent claims that the elements are the material cause of life and its properties, then he cannot explain why some collections of elements are living and others are not.

502 The opponent argues that just as fire, although of various temperatures, always is hot, so attachment, although of various amounts, always remains. The Buddhist reply is that the opponent has drawn an incorrect analogy, for fire and its heat are substantially identical, and thus inseparable, while attachment and the elements have _not_ been shown to be substantially identical--or, for that matter, invariably causally related. Incidentally, a modern materialist, especially an identity theorist, would maintain that the examples _are_ similar, although he would argue that it is not the elements, but brain states, that are identical to attachment and other mental states. For an explanation of why the modern materialist's case--while hardly airtight--can be made more plausibly than the ancient materialist's, cf. Part I, chapter 4, section 6.

503 A more appropriate analogy, rGyal tshab argues, is between the elements and "tertiary qualities" (such as a specific color, white) on the one hand and the elements and the defilements on the other. Just as the elements invariably will have secondary qualities, such as color, but need not have one or the other instance of a secondary quality (a blanket must have color, but that color need not be

white), so too the elements may be associated with some sorts of mental qualities, but those qualities need not be defiled.

[504]Since the defilements are not inseparably connected with the elements any more than whiteness is inseparably connected with a blanket, it is possible that elements continue to exist without association with attachment or other defilements.

[505]The "two" referred to are whiteness and the defilements; the implication is that the appropriate analogy is between the secondary quality, color in general, and the defilements, i.e., just as the elements always have color of some sort, so the elements of a living being always are the cause of some sort of defilement.

[506]The idea that defilements are related to the elements in the same way as secondary qualities are has been refuted above (p. 702). Here, rGyal tshab simply reiterates the fact that if the cases were the same, then the defilements invariably would coexist with the elements, just as secondary qualities do, because in either case the similarity of material cause, the elements, assures the invariable coexistence of the two. Yet, although we do not see any instances in which elements do not entail secondary qualities, and vice versa, we do see instances in which the elements do not entail defilements--e.g., in non-living beings, not to mention in liberated living beings.

[507]One cannot assert that defilements are generated in dependence upon some external object, because if that were so, one never could be of a defiled mind toward an imagined or remembered object--which, obviously, one can. Cf. above, p. 704.

[508]The Buddhist maintains that the defilements cannot exist--indeed, nothing can exist--without a previous homogeneous (or "corresponding," sabhāga) material cause. If the opponent insists that at the moment of conception or any other time such a homogeneous cause is not present (as it never will be if the elements, asserted by the Buddhists to be heterogeneous, are the material cause), then he cannot appropriately argue that the defilements can result. Thus, everyone should be detached. There is a findamental disagreement between the Buddhist and his opponent about the nature of causality. For brief discussion of this prob-

lem, cf. above, Part I, pp. 234-5 and 318-19.

[509]Furthermore, if the opponent asserts once again that the elements are the material cause of the defilements, then he must accept the consequence that defilements are continuously present, because their cause, the elements, is continuously present. Not only that, the defilements also would have to be eternal, because the elements are. Thus, a corpse could still be asserted to be defiled, or, in the extreme instance, a rock could be, too.

[510]The "present faulty collections" are the five psychophysical aggregates that constitute what we usually refer to as a person. The present aggregates themselves are "faulty" because they have been taken as a result of, and still are susceptible to, defilements and karma.

[511]The difference between the aspects of selflessness and emptiness is this: the fact that suffering is selfless means that suffering itself cannot be described as a permanent, partless, independent substance of any sort, because a permanent entity cannot have impermanent extrinsic causes, and suffering, because it arises occasionally, obviously must have such causes; the fact that suffering is empty means that suffering cannot be caused by a permanent, partless, independent substance extrinsic to it (e.g., God, or some permanent self associated with the individual), because it is a result that is observed to arise occasionally, and thus to be impermanent, and an impermanent result (i.e., any result) cannot arise from a permanent cause--indeed, a permanent entity cannot be shown to have any causal efficiency at all.

[512]Cf. previous note.

[513]At least part of the definition of a cause is a factor in whose absence a result will not arise and in whose presence a result will arise. For example, an object can be determined to be a "cause" of a sense-cognition, because we observe that when an organ and mind are present but an object is not, there is no sense-cognition; while where an organ and mind are present and an object is, too, a sense-cognition does arise. A "cause," in short, is a factor whose presence or absence makes a difference. A permanent cause will always be present, so it can never be absent--thus, it cannot be ascertained that it makes a difference.

[514]It has already been established that the only entities that can be described as "uncaused" are those that are either permanent or non-existent--neither of which is a predication that can be applied to suffering.

[515]The view represented by the "Lokāyatas, Mīmāṃsakas, etc.," is the svabhāvavāda, the view that certain things simply happen "naturally" (svabhāveṇa), without any specific cause, and that the sharpness of a thorn and the roundness of a pea are such things. The Buddhist view is that such things do not come about causelessly, because, in the examples cited, the qualities are dependent on the existence of the thorn or pea, which is, in turn, dependent on a number of causes and conditions: seed, soil, water, sunlight, etc. The presence or absence of these factors will affect the presence or absence of the thorn or pea, which, in turn, will affect the presence or absence of the quality of sharpness or roundness. Generally, rGyal tshab observes, such qualities as sharpness or roundness must be considered caused because they can be described in terms of the general formula, "if x, then y; if no x, then no y."

[516]Tangibility is a quality that exists simultaneously with form in a collection. Therefore, it and form serve as mutually assistant cooperative (or simultaneouly-arising) conditions. It is not, however, tangibility that is the actual object condition for a sense-cognition--the form itself functions thus. Tangibility is a "cause" of a sense-cognition only to the degree that it is a cooperative condition of the form that is an indispensible condition; it is not itself indispensible. The term "corresponding cause" (sabhāgahetu) is used differently here than above (p. 710), where it meant a previous homogeneous causal moment. Here, it is being used as synonymous with "cooperative condition," or "simultaneously arising cause."

[517]Suffering cannot have a unique cause, such as God, because (a) a unique cause could not account for the variety of sufferings that are observed to arise and (b) such a unique cause usually is conceived of as permanent, and a permanent entity cannot have any causal efficiency at all. Therefore, all suffering must originate from a collection of various causes.

[518]Here, rGyal tshab gives the traditional Buddhist explanation of the cause of suffering: it is craving (sred pa, tṛṣṇa) or desire ('dod pa, iṣṭa) of various sorts,

which can be reduced to the craving for existence (srid 'dod, bhavecchā). That craving has a causal efficiency such that it invariably obtains its result. Thus, saṃsāra rolls on and on, impelled by beings' desire for continued existence.

[519]At numerous places in the sūtras (e.g., D.,ii,308) and śāstras (e.g., AK,v,29), craving is described as threefold: craving for existence, craving for annihilation (or destruction) and craving for sense-pleasure. Dharmakīrti points out that his description of craving chiefly in terms of the craving for existence does not contradict these passages, for the craving for existence (the main force impelling the continuation of saṃsāra) entails the other two: the desire for objects in general is roughly synonymous with the craving for existence, the specific desire to enjoy objects is the craving for sense-pleasure, and the specific desire to avoid objects that cause suffering (or to avoid the suffering connected with objects we desire) is the craving for annihilation. Thus, the two cravings that operate most of the time in ordinary life are the craving for pleasure and the craving for non-pain (= annihilation). One mistakenly believes that some sort of ultimate pleasure and ultimate absence of pain can be found within saṃsāra, so one generates the craving for further existences. One gets one's wish, further rebirths, and therefore continues to suffer.

[520]Craving is the "condition" for the origination of suffering, because it is the indispensible cooperative condition for rebirth into a subsequent existence. Craving for existence involves the mistaken assumption that what is not pleasurable (duḥkha) is pleasurable (sukha), and thus becomes the basis for continued rebirth in realms whose nature ultimately is suffering. The root of the mistaken assumption, in turn, is self-grasping, or attachment to self (bdag 'dzin, ātmagraha). Because one either intuitively or philosophically posits a self, one posits an entity whose pleasure and pain one ultimately cares about, i.e., an entity to which one is attached. Because it is based on a misapprehension of the nature of reality, this attachment seeks the wrong objects in the wrong manner, and thus succeeds only in frustrating one's ultimate desire: the elimination of all suffering.

[521]This is a crucial argument--that craving is the cause of rebirth because there is no rebirth for one who has no craving, i.e., an Arahant. Unfortunately, the argument begs the question, for the existence of a being such

as an Arahant has not yet been conclusively shown (only a proof of the truths of cessation and path can do that), so an opponent need not accept the Arahant's attainment as probative of anything, since the Arahant himself remains to be proved.

522 The opponent argues that one can take Dharmakīrti's proof that attachment is the cause of rebirth and derive from it the notion that the body is the cause of attachment, because someone who has no body has no attachment, which indicates a causal concomitance between the two.

523 The Buddhist will accept that the body is a cause of attachment--specifically, a cooperative condition--but not that it is the cause, or an indispensible cause.

524 Cf. above, under discussions of the mind-body relation and the truth of suffering for arguments to the effect that the body is neither the material cause nor the special cooperative condition of the defilements (or any mental qualities, for that matter).

525 The Lokāyatas threaten to undercut their own position when they attempt to turn the Buddhist proof around, for (1) they have asserted generally what the Buddhists already have proven, i.e., that the body is a cause of attachment and (2) they have been willing to carry on their discussion in terms of the example of an Arahant, accepted by the Buddhist, but not by the materialist (cf. above, pp. 597-601 for a similar instance).

526 If the opponent argues that the body of, say, this rebirth cannot result from attachment because when we consider the moment of conception we only see the simultaneous coexistence of body and attachment, rGyal tshab points out that simultaneously-existing factors cannot be causally related, so (a) one can as easily expect that attachment causes a body as the other way around and (b) because two simultaneously-existing factors cannot be causally related, the first moment of attachment cannot be derived from the body, and so must be derived from a previous moment of attachment.

527 As before, rGyal tshab is most interested in the immediate cause for the continuation of saṃsāra, and only craving, or attachment, functions thus. Ignorance is at the root of craving, but is not itself the projecting or impel-

ling cause of a subsequent rebirth. Karma may predispose one toward ignorance or craving, but one may have "leftover" karma even when one has abandoned craving, so the presence of karma does not necessarily entail the taking of a rebirth. For example, an Arahant, at his death, still may have karmic seeds left over, e.g., for rebirth as a king, but since he has utterly abandoned craving (and, of course, ignorance), there no longer is any basis for the presence of a cause that would project a subsequent rebirth, so the karmic seeds are, as it were, forever prevented from ripening. Incidentally, this helps to explain why the fact that we have accumulated an infinity of karmic seeds in the beginningless past does not mean that we cannot ever be liberated because we have an infinity of karma to dispose of; karmic seeds only will ripen under the proper conditions, the most important general condition being the presence of craving. If craving is eliminated, then no matter how many karmic seeds lie unripened in the mindstream, they have forever lost the opportunity of fruition.

[528]The suffering endemic to the aggregates of sentient beings, then, can be stopped, for it has identifiable causes and conditions that perpetuate it, and these causes and conditions are subject to counteraction by the appropriate antidote. The antidote has the power to eliminate the causes and conditions of sufferings and hence contribute to the elimination of suffering itself.

[529]The following discussions of liberation and omniscience are interpolated by rGyal tshab, and do not correspond to anything in Dharmakīrti's root-text.

[530]The process whereby suffering comes to cease can be likened to the process whereby any condition comes to cease. A given condition, such as horripilation, is ascertained to result from contact with cold. The application of the "antidote" to cold, heat, is seen to end the horripilation. Similarly, the suffering of sentient beings has been ascertained through the truth of origination to be due to craving rooted in self-grasping. Therefore, the application of the antidote (the wisdom realizing selflessness) should entail the cessation of the suffering resulting from self-grasping. rGyal tshab is maintaining that the "physical" case is no different from the "psychological": where we can ascertain specific causes for the generation of a particular result, the removal of those causes must entail the non-generation of the result.

[531]rGyal tshab here uses "superimposition" (*sgro 'dogs*) in the same rather general sense that Dharmakīrti usually does. Thus, it has not the particular sense of *ātmavāda*, but the general sense of *any* mistaken apprehension of reality, *any* cognition involving a belief in what is not the case. Thus, the belief that there exists a self of persons is an "inversion," or distortion, of the way things actually are as regards the self-question in the same way that the belief that there is no fire on a smoky hill is an inversion of the way things actually are as regards instances of smoky hills.

[532]I.e., that grasping at a self of persons is the cause of one's resultant suffering.

[533]The verses in question, PV 219b-222a, read: "In someone who sees a self, there constantly arises attachment (based on the thought of) 'I.' Since one is attached (to the self), one craves its happiness, and since one craves (its happiness) its faults are hidden. When one sees good qualities (in the self), one craves (the self) utterly and seeks to accomplish (actions springing from the notion) of 'mine.' Attached thus to the self, one will (be attached to existence), and so will continue (to be born) in saṃsāra. Since (one thinks that) there is a self, one thinks (also) that there are others, and from the distinction between self and others (will arise) grasping and hatred. From connection with these two, all faults arise" (*gang zhig bdag mthong de la ni / nga zhes rtag tu zhen par 'gyur // zhen pas bde la sred 'gyur te / sred pas skyon rnams sgrib par byed / yon tan mthong bas yongs sred pa / nga yi zhes de'i sgrub byed len // des na bdag la mngon chags pa / de srid de ni 'khor bar 'gyur / bdag yod na ni gzhan du shes / bdag gzhan cha las 'dzin dang sdang // 'di dag dang ni yongs 'brel las / nyes pa thams cad 'byung bar 'gyur* = *yaḥ paśyatyātmānaṃ tatrāsyāhamiti śāsvataḥ snehaḥ // snehāt sukheṣu tṛṣyati, tṛṣṇā doṣāṃstiraskurūte / guṇadarśo paritṛṣyan mameti tatsādhānanyupādatte // tenātmābhiniveśo yāvat tāvan sa saṃsāre / ātmani sati parasaṃjñā, svaparavibhāgāt parigrahadveṣau // anyoḥ sampratibandhaḥ sarve doṣaḥ prajāyante* //).

[534]rGyal tshab is satisfied that the sequence he has described demonstrates adequately the degree to which belief in a self is the root of our sufferings within this life, i.e., that there is psychological cogency in the Buddhist notion that self-grasping is the root of suffering.

[535]Since every suffering moment of this life (i.e., every moment) has been conditioned by self-grasping, and since it already has been proven that the last mind-moment of this life has the capacity to connect to a subsequent mind-moment in another life, the first mind-moment of the subsequent life must involve suffering, since the last mind-moment of this life will--all things being equal--involve self-grasping.

[536]The opponent is willing to accept that the first moment of the next life will have the sense, or meaning (don ldog) of suffering, but is doubtful that it simply can have the name (rang ldog) "suffering."

[537]rGyal tshab points out, simply, that if the first moment of the next life is accepted to have the "meaning" of suffering, then certainly the "name" of suffering can be applied to it.

[538]The verses, PV 249b-250a, read: "Because he would obtain other, better (organs if he could), and because (he sees that) the organs are generated and destroyed (while the self is not), a person recognizes that his self is different from his organs, etc." (mchog gzhan don du gnyer phyir dang / skye 'jig blo can nyid kyi phyir // skye bo 'di yis dbang sogs las / bdag ni tha dad gyur par shes = parāparaprārthanāto vināśotpadabuddhitaḥ // indriyādau pṛtagbhūtamātmānaṃ vettyayaṃ janaḥ /).

[539]The object of refutation for someone who is attempting to understand whether or not there is a self is not the "self of the philosophers," but the self in which we all instinctively believe. The fact that we all do instinctively believe in a personal self that is neither coterminous with the aggregates nor identified merely with one of them, is shown by the fact that we entertain such thoughts as, "If only I could be in his shoes," or "If only I could have a mind like his." A merchant makes a similarly instinctive distinction between a merchant (= the self) and his goods (= the aggregates). If he did not make such a distinction, then he would have no notion of how to obtain the goods belonging to another or to exchange his own goods for those of another, because there would then be no "other" with whom to do business.

[540]In other words, if there did exist a self that was more than simply an imputation on the aggregates, an autho-

ritative cognition would recognize it. Something that will be cognized by an authoritative cognition, however, must stand up to analysis, and the concept of an independent self will not, when we search for it, be found.

[541]The actual syllogism proving selflessness will read: "An independent person that is naturally identical with or different from the aggregates is not a naturally existing (entity), because it is neither naturally identical with nor different from the aggregates. Its non-natural existence is like that of the horns of a hare." The syllogism is correct because an independent self cannot, in fact, exist in relation to the aggregates in either of the two possible ways, i.e., as identical to or different from. It cannot be identical to the aggregates because the aggregates are known to be impermanent and under the power of extrinsic causes and conditions, whereas a permanent self cannot be under the power of anything but itself. It cannot be different from the aggregates, because then the analysis investigating "persons" would discover it as an intentional object separate from the aggregates; in fact, however, analysis reveals that all the qualities and characteristics that we usually attribute to a "person" are covered by the five aggregates. There cannot, therefore, be any additional factor that "really" is the person. Thus, the person is simply a designation or imputation on the aggregates, nothing more, nothing less, and the search for any other "person" or "self" is bound to be futile. In the analogy often used by Tibetan teachers, a farmer believes that he has lost a cow, but knows that there are only two places where she might be found; looking in both places, he fails to find her, and therefore concludes that he has not, after all, lost a cow. For further discussions of selflessness, cf., e.g., Hopkins, Meditation on Emptiness, Tenzin Gyatsho, The Opening of the Wisdom Eye and The Key to the Madhyamika; and Ngagwang Dhargyey, Tibetan Tradition of Mental Development. Many of the discussions in these works are based on those in such classics as Candrakīrti's Madhyamakāvatāra (6th chapter) and Śāntideva's Bodhicaryāvatāra (9th chapter). The former, along with Candrakīrti's autocommentary, has been partially translated by La Vallée Poussin, in Le Muséon (1907, 1910-11). The latter can be found in any of the several available translations of the Bodhicaryāvatāra, the best of which is that (from the Tibetan) of Stephen Batchelor, A Guide to the Bodhisattva's Way of Life (Dharamsala, 1979). For a fuller discussion of the 9th chapter of the Bodhicaryāvatāra, cf. Michael Sweet, Śāntideva and the Mādhyamika: The Prajñāpāramitā-pariccheda of the Bodhicaryāvatāra; and Geshe Kesang Gyatso, Meaningful to Behold, tr. Tenzin Norbu, ed. Jonathan Landaw. Can-

drakīrti and Śāntideva were, of course, Mādhyamikas, and the specific mode of analysis they employed was somewhat different from that of Dharmakīrti, a Sautrāntika-oriented Yogācārin. There is, however, nothing in Mādhyamika analyses that contradicts anything in Dharmakīrti. rGyal tshab's proof, therefore, simply adumbrates and adds rigor to Dharmakīrti's own discussions.

542 The proof that there cannot exist a self independent of the aggregates provides one with a basis for extirpating the innate self-grasping that is the root of saṃsāra, and therefore with the basis for attaining a cessation of suffering.

543 It is through the power of assiduous meditation on selflessness that defilements actually will be eradicated, beginning with the path of seeing and continuing through the path of development. Throughout these higher paths, the gap between one's direct meditative awareness of selflessness and one's conceptual recognition of it when not meditating narrows, until finally, when one is enlightened, one directly realizes selflessness at all times.

544 The actual syllogism on which is based the proof of omniscience will read: "The mind realizing the reality of the Four Noble Truths (in such aspects as) selflessness, etc., is the type (of entity that exists) in simultaneous combination with the (gradual) elimination of all destructibles of (the appropriate) type, because it is a powerful destroyer, like a powerful fire, which exists in simultaneous combination with the (gradual) elimination of all kinds of destructible cold to which it is proximate." Contradictory conditions, such as the view of selflessness and self-grasping, can be related in one of two possible ways. The first, "symmetrical" relation is like that between day and night, one of which inevitably suppresses the other, but also invariably will, in turn, itself be suppressed. An "asymmetrical" relation is like that between heat and cold: heat steadily applied will eliminate all cold to which it is proximate, and once the cold has been eliminated, it has no power to return--as long as the heat is present. It is a fundamental assumption of Buddhist soteriology that the relation between the realization of selflessness and self-grasping is of the second, "asymmetrical" kind, i.e., that once selflessness has been "directly" realized, it has the power to eliminate any instance of self-grasping to which it is applied, that it is, in short, a "powerful destroyer." This view may be--alhtough it is not necessarily--re-

lated to the equally fundamental Buddhist assumption that the mind is naturally luminous and free from defilements, which are merely adventitious. The prevailing Western view is considerably different: the mind is considered to be fundamentally imperfect and "defiled," capable of development but not perfection; thus, the relation between the realization of selflessness and self-grasping is more likely to be considered "symmetrical," i.e., ultimately cyclical. There is a fundamental disagreement between the Buddhist and the Westerner over the salvific power of "truth," much of which is, in turn, rooted in the differing sorts of empirical criteria accepted as having confirmatory power: Western assumptions are based more on the observation of ordinary psychological states, while Buddhist assumptions take into account extraordinary meditative states. The Buddhist observations are by no means necessarily incorrect, but they do rest on less firm epistemological ground. For further discussion, cf. Part I, chapter 2, section 6, and chapter 4, section 11. In any case, based on the aforementioned assumptions, rGyal tshab is able to conclude that the "powefully destructive" realization of selflessness is able in principle to eliminate all instances of self-grasping, and therefore all defilements and "stains" based on it. A mind that is free of all possible stains or obstacles is, by definition, omniscient.

[545]As rGyal tshab has already pointed out, Dharmakīrti takes the "lowest common denominator" in the <u>pramāṇasiddhi</u> chapter, and therefore discusses only the selflessness of persons. In the <u>pratyakṣa</u> chapter, however, he does explicitly mention the selflessness of dharmas, conceived in the Yogācārin manner as an object's emptiness of substantial difference from the subject that cognizes it. Thus, the realization of the selflessness of dharmas, a prerequisite for omniscience, is only implied in the <u>pramāṇasiddhi</u> chapter. If the selflessness of dharmas is implied, then so too by extension may be "full" omniscience, which Dharmakīrti nowhere in his writings specifically upholds. Thus, rGyal tshab has found in the <u>pramāṇasiddhi</u> chapter two "implicit" proofs of omniscience: (1) that based on the idea that because the Buddha has a knowledge of what is to be rejected and adopted by those striving for freedom, he knows every detail of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa, for those are what are to be rejected and adopted by those striving for freedom, and since saṃsāra and nirvāṇa are categories exhaustive of all phenomena, the Buddha must be omniscient; and (2) that based on the idea that any practitioner is in principle able to eliminate every instance of self-grasping, and therefore every defilement or defilement-stain based on that self-grasping, and that once all defilements and

stains have been eliminated, there are no more obstacles in the mind, and one is omniscient.

[546]The objection that a person cannot be liberated because he is a "saṃsāric subject" may be made by both believers and non-believers in liberation. A sceptic, such as a materialist or Mīmāṃsaka, will hold that liberation is impossible because beings are essentially saṃsāric, i.e., because their minds are inherently defiled. A believer in liberation, such as a Sāṃkhya, will hold that liberation is impossible without a "self" or "person" to be bound or liberated, and that if aggregates such as those described by the Buddhists are considered to be bound, it is inconceivable that they ever be freed. Dharmakīrti does not refute the sceptic here, although he will attempt to do so later, when he seeks to demonstrate that the mind is, in fact, intrinsically free of defilement. The Sāṃkhya is refuted by the observation that the Buddhist is describing an _impermanent_ self (that is equivalent to the aggregates), and that while it may be certain that a _permanent_ self described as bound could never be freed, there is no such certainty in the case of an impermanent self. Furthermore, of course, there can be no permanent self that is the basis of bondage and freedom, because the existence of such a self cannot be proven.

[547]The opponent argues that if there is no self that first is bound and later freed, there is no point in striving for liberation, since "no one" is freed. The reply is that it is precisely the belief in a self that prevents liberation, for our instinctive belief in a self is the basis of saṃsāric suffering, while it is precisely the recognition that there is no permanent self independent of the aggregates that permits those aggregates, i.e., a person, to attain liberation. Alternatively, the Buddhist might argue, as Nāgārjuna does, that it is precisely because there is no permanent self that liberation is possible, and that if there did exist a permanent self that was "bound," it never could change, and therefore never could be liberated.

[548]There are two possible reasons why a being who has eliminated all faults through an application of the wisdom realizing selflessness may continue to exist in saṃsāra: (1) because the life-span karmically allotted to his body has not been exhausted and/or (2) because--even though he could leave his body--he chooses not to, because he is compassionate, and sees that there is some purpose conducive to the aims of others to be served by remaining embodied.

[549]An Arahant who remains in his body is simply finishing out the terms of the karma that projected that body. He has eliminated ignorance, and therefore craving, and since he lacks craving, he no longer has the cooperative condition necessary for the ripening of karma as a future rebirth. He will not, therefore, take rebirth, and cannot really be described as "under the power of karma," although in a technical sense he still has karma "remaining."

[550]The opponent maintains that if an Arahant is held to be compassionate, then he must have objects of his compassion, and that he therefore must have "selves" as his objects of compassion. In fact, however, it is not necessary to believe in a permanent, independent self in order to have compassion for the suffering of those collections of aggregates that are conventional "selves." Indeed, it is precisely the recognition that the sufferings of various collections of aggregates are based on the belief that there <u>is</u> a self where there is not, that impels the Arahant or Bodhisattva to generate compassion--based on previously-developed equanimity or benevolence.

[551]Maintaining the same line of attack, the opponent claims that an Arahant must be "attached" to sentient beings, because he <u>desires</u> their welfare. rGyal tshab points out that his "desire" for their welfare is not a desire like that rooted in self-grasping (since an Arahant has abandoned self-grasping), but one rooted in a recognition of and response to the suffering of other beings; indeed, precisely because he has abandoned self-grasping he is able more easily and spontaneously to sympathize with others, for there are no "personal" considerations to interfere.

[552]Nor can an Arahant grow "angry" in the usual sense of the word, since the basis of anger is self-grasping, and he has abandoned self-grasping. If he displays "anger," or "upset," it is either as a result of empathy or, more often in the case of a Bodhisattva, out of a compassionate application of skill-in-means--when the Bodhisattva recognizes that a display of "anger" will be the most beneficial for a given being in a given situation (as a parent will display anger toward a child to emphasize the dangers of touching an electric socket into which he is about to insert a finger).

[553]Whether or not one is subject to saṃsāric suffering is determined ultimately by whether or not one has aban-

doned self-grasping. In one has, then one no longer will create karma conducive to further suffering, nor need one experience the results of past karma that has not yet ripened. One's present body is an instance of karma that has already ripened, so it cannot be reversed. Thus, while an Arahant's body, as the result of past defiled karma, is included in the truth of suffering, "he" no longer suffers in saṃsāra, because his mind is utterly free of the defilements that are the force behind saṃsāra's perpetuation. From the Mahāyāna point of view, a Buddha's body is not included in the truth of suffering, because it is the result not of past karma but of his completion of the two accumulations, of merit (bsod nams, puṇya) and gnosis (ye shes, jñāna). As a result of the accumulation of gnosis, the Buddha attains the dharmakāya (his purified, omniscient mind), and as a result of the accumulation of merit he attains the sambhogakāya (the "enjoyment body" perceived only by advanced Bodhisattvas) and the nirmāṇakāya (the "transformation bodies" seen by ordinary beings). The body in which he appeared on earth in the 6th century B.C., underwent his career and preached the Dharma was an instance of the nirmāṇakāya, its impurity only apparent. In fact, as the result of the accumulation of all possible merit, it was utterly pure, "unclothed" or uncovered by faults any more than a lotus is covered by the mud out of which it has risen.

554 The opponent's contention that because of their unending compassion enlightened beings will remain in saṃsāra forever is wrong in some cases and misleading in others. It is wrong where Śrāvaka and Pratyekabuddha Arahants are concerned, because their compassion is not sufficient to insure that they feel compelled to remain in existence for long. Bodhisattvas on the "great stages" (the 8th, 9th and 10th bhūmis), who have abandoned all defilements, but not all subtle stains of the defilements, have compassion sufficiently strong to "compel" them to remain in saṃsāra until that elusive day when it is utterly emptied. To say that they are "in saṃsāra" is misleading, however, for as Āryas they are able to take rebirth at will and by choice, and their physical involvement with saṃsāra does not in the least affect their minds, which are free of self-grasping and therefore of all defilements. They are, then, "in saṃsāra," but not "of it."

555 The opponent's contention that one who has attained the path of seeing and become a Streamwinner should immediately leave saṃsāra because he has abandoned the view that there is a self in perishable composites, or aggregates

('jig tshogs lta ba, satkāyadṛṣṭi) fails to distinguish the conceptual belief in a self from the innate belief in a self. It is true that a Streamwinner on the path of seeing has overcome the conceptual, or philosophical belief in a self, but he has not yet overcome the innate belief in a self, and until that innate belief is uprooted, he cannot be free from saṃsāra (into which he will be reborn at most seven more times).

556 If the opponent counters with the assertion that a Streamwinner abandons even the innate belief in a self, then he must be a Streamwinner of the highest type, who by virtue of his attainments on the path of seeing will attain final peace in this very lifetime. He will not, however, attain nirvāṇa directly from the path of seeing, for, like all Āryas, he must pass through the path of development before attaining the path of no-more-training. It is likely that because of his mental acuity he will traverse the path of development in the shortest possible time.

557 The opponent, most likely a Vaibhāṣika, argues that it is not the innate belief in a self that is the basis of saṃsāra, but the philosophical belief, derived from adhering to a system of tenets, and that one will not gain release from saṃsāra as long as one has not specifically changed one's philosophical views.

558 It certainly is the case that there is a belief in self that is philosophically based, but it is not the case that there is no belief in self not based on systems of tenets, because all beings instinctively wish to attain happiness and avoid suffering for themselves, thereby displaying an instinctive, untutored belief in a self that exists as more than just an imputation on their aggregates. It is this innate belief in a self that is, in fact, the basis of saṃsāra.

559 While ordinary beings' wish for happiness for themselves is indicative of the presence of an innate belief in an independent self, the mere use of the word "I" does not prove that the person using the word believes in a self of persons, since the word is used as a conventional designation of their aggregates by Arahants and Buddhas, whose behavior otherwise reveals them to be utterly free of any self-grasping.

560 Since liberated beings use the word "I" as a designation of their own aggregates, yet are not suffering in

saṃsāra, the belief in a self that _is_ the basis of saṃsāra must be something other than just a designation of the aggregates. In fact, the "I" belief in which is the basis of saṃsāra is an "I" independent of the aggregates, which entails belief in both an independent "I" and a "mine" that is controlled by that self. Such belief in "I" and "mine" can be either philosophical or innate--it is the innate belief that is the actual basis of saṃsāra, for, although abandoning the philosophical belief in a self is a necessary condition for freedom, it is not a sufficient condition.


[561]If belief in a self, or the view that there is a self in perishable composites, is simply the designation "I" or "him," then the aggregates so designated would be the self of persons. Since a self of persons is a philosophically incoherent concept, so too would the concept of the aggregates be; thus, the aggregates would be an impossibility in the same way that a self of persons is.

[562]Again, if merely designating the aggregates as "I" is tantamount to holding a self of persons, then saying "I give charity," or "I guard morality" (or even "I realize selflessness"!) will involve belief in a self of persons, and thus will only serve to perpetuate one's suffering. Such close identification between the conventional designation "I" and the self of persons, rGyal tshab claims, shows that one is actually well-disposed toward belief in a permanent self, since any instance of the word "I" will entail such a belief.

[563]Finally, it must be noted that grasping at a self of persons is a broader category than the view that there is a self in perishable composites, for self-grasping involves belief in the existence of an independent self not only in ourselves but in others, too, while the view that there is a self in perishable composites involves belief in "I" and "mine" only in relation to oneself. Grasping at a self of others presupposes the view that there is a self in the perishable, but it is _not_ that view.

[564]Thus, at whatever point a Streamwinner has eliminated the innate view that there is a self in and independent of his aggregates, he will abandon the craving for existence--since he no longer deludedly seeks the happiness of a phantom "I." When he has abandoned the craving for existence, he no longer will have the cooperative condition for future rebirth. The foregoing discussion of the relations among grasping at a self of persons, the view that there is

a self in perishable composites, and the mere designation of the aggregates as "I" may be indicated diagrammatically:



A = those who grasp at a self of persons (gang zag gi bdag 'dzin, pudgalātmagraha) in regard to both themselves and others. A in regard to others is not B, but presupposes it, and no one with A in regard to others lacks B.

B = those with the view that there is a self in perishable composites ('jig tshogs lta ba, satkāyadṛṣṭi). This view holds that independent of the aggregates there exists an independent "I" and a "mine" that is controlled by it. It may be either conceptual or instinctive, with the latter being more fundamental.

C = those who designate the aggregates as "I" (some of whom--ordinary beings--grasp at a self of persons and some of whom--Āryas--do not).

565 The opponent argues that if there is no self, then bondage and freedom become meaningless, because there is no one who is bound and then freed. The reply, of course, is that only a permanent, independent person is denied, not a collection of impermanent aggregates in which defiled states of mind can induce suffering and the wisdom realizing selflessness can induce liberation. Indeed, it is only on the basis of impermanent aggregates that bondage and freedom can be meaningfully explained, since a permanent self can be neither cause nor result, and therefore neither binder and freer nor bound and freed.

566 dGe 'dun grub identifies the opponent as a Saṃmitīya. The Saṃmitīya and Vātsīputrīya seem to be interchangeable designations for Pudgalavādins, or "personalists." The two classic discussions of the Pudgalavāda are in the Kathāvatthu and the Abhidharmakośa. Cf also, Dutt, Buddhist Sects in India, p. 197ff.

567 The Pudgalavādin claims that the person is neither permanent nor impermanent. This assertion, however, involves the assertion that the person is not impermanent. If the person is not impermanent, then it cannot be either a cause or a result, so it cannot partake of the processes involved in bondage and freedom. Furthermore, since it is

ment and anger come from the same cause, self-grasping. Attachment and anger do replace one another, but the one is not capable of cutting the root of the other, for neither will disappear until its cause, self-grasping, is eliminated. Wisdom replaces self-grasping, but will not, in turn, be replaced by it, because it is an opposing condition that has the power to uproot its opposite.

[581]Thus, love, compassion, sympathetic joy and equanimity are able to replace or suppress such negative states of mind as malice, ill-will, envy or partiality, but they cannot uproot such attitudes, because they do not strike directly at the root of such states of mind, self-grasping. Only the wisdom realizing selflessness is able to strike directly at the root of all negative states of mind, which is described as defiled ignorance or the view that there is a self in perishable composites.

[582]The opponent argues that ignorance and the self-view cannot be considered synonymous, because the self-view is the definite determination that there exists a self independent of the aggregates, and is, thus, a mental state with a specific intentional object, while ignorance is merely mental unclearness, a "privative" state with no intentional object.

[583]There are, in fact, three types of opposing factors to a particular mental state, e.g., the wisdom realizing selflessness: (1) Nescience, or the simple lack of knowing what is known in that mental state. This is the function of ignorance according to the opponent. (2) Other opposing conditions, i.e., anything that is not the mental state in question, such as a chair or an orangutan. (3) A contradictory opposing condition, which is a way of grasping directly in opposition to the way of grasping betokened by the mental state in question. Ignorance is, in fact, this third type of opposing condition. Unlike nescience, it has a specific intentional object, a self. Unlike other opposing conditions, it is a state of mind.

[584]The opponent's claim that, then, only ignorance--but not the self-view--is the contradictory opposing factor to the wisdom realizing selflessness, is refuted by the fact that ignorance is defined in the sūtras as a way of grasping opposite to the way of grasping entailed by the wisdom realizing selflessness, and the view that there exists an "I" or "mine" independent of the aggregates also entails a way of grasping that is the opposite of wisdom's.

Thus, the two must be identical.

585 The Candrapradīpa Sūtra, better known as the Samādhirāja, is extant in Sanskrit, and has been edited by P.L. Vaidya and issued as no. 2 in the Buddhist Sanskrit Texts series. It is found in vol. 31 of the PTT. According to Warder, Indian Buddhism, p. 395, it "is usually reckoned to stand closest to the Perfection of Understanding in doctrine, but expresses this primarily as the knowledge of the 'sameness' or 'equality' (samatā) of own-nature of all principles, the realization of which is the object of the practice of concentration. This 'sameness' is nothing but the emptiness of principles of any own-nature."

586 The Daśabhūmika Sūtra also is extant in Sanskrit. It too has been edited by Vaidya, and issued as no. 7 of Buddhist Sanskrit Texts. It is found in vol. 25 of the PTT. According to Warder (p. 424) it sometimes is reckoned as the 22nd or 24th chapter of the Avataṃsaka Sūtra. It is concerned chiefly with a detailed accounting of a Bodhisattva's progress through the ten stages leading to Buddhahood.

587 Thus, it is clear that ignorance is, in fact, synonymous with self-grasping. Since it grasps a specific intentional object, ignorance is not just non-knowledge, nescience or an unclear cognition: it is the specific "active" grasping of phenomena in a manner opposite to wisdom's way of grasping phenomena.

588 Furthermore, if ignorance did not entail self-grasping, the Buddha would not have specified that it does when he set forth the twelve factors of dependent origination (cf. above, Part I, pp. 95-6). It is, after all, the self-grasping entailed by ignorance that allows the generation of karmic complexes (saṃskāras), which, in turn, ripen as the first cognition, or consciousness (vijñāna) of a particular rebirth when the appropriate conditions are present. (We have already seen that the indispensible cooperative condition of rebirth in saṃsāra is craving, which is rooted in self-grasping.)

589 The opponent still is attempting to establish that ignorance and the view that there is a self in the perishable are different factors. Thus, he cites a passage from the Daśabhūmika where ignorance and the self-view are said to be "concomitant factors" (mtshungs ldan). The opponent takes this to mean that they are concomitant factors in the

most technical sense, i.e., that they are mental factors (sems byung, caitta) that are concomitant with a primary cognition in terms of basis, time, aspect, object and substance (cf., e.g., Rabten, p. 65). Since, however, a cognition only can be concomitant with one mental factor at a time, one cannot assert that both ignorance and the self-view are mental factors associated with the same primary cognition without contradicting the definition of concomitant factors. Thus, ignorance and the self-view must be different, with ignorance entailing the self-view, but not being the same as that view.

590 rGyal tshab replies that when the Daśabhūmika describes ignorance and the view that there is a self in the perishable as "concomitant," it does not mean that they are "concomitant factors" in the technical sense used in epistemology, but simply that they are the same. They are not absolutely identical, because ignorance is the broader category and self-view the narrower, since every instance of the self-view is an instance of ignorance, but not every instance of ignorance is an instance of the self-view, since there also is ignorance regarding such matters as permanence, happiness, etc. Still, it is conventionally acceptable to describe ignorance as the self-view, because the self-view is the most basic and important type of ignorance. Similarly, one may speak of "a pālāśa forest," because even though the area known as the "forest" will contain instances of trees other than pālāśas, pālāśas predominate.

591 Candrakīrti's discussion of this matter is found in chapter six of the Madhyamakāvatāra (dBu ma la 'jug pa). Cf. above, note 541.

592 The first line (PV 216b) says that "whatever is contradictory is to be explained here" ('gal ba gang yin 'dir bshad bya = vyakhyeyo'tra virodho yaḥ). rGyal tshab notes that this means not that whatever seems to contradict scripture or reasoning can here be explained away, but that whatever is contradictory to self-grasping (i.e., the realization of emptiness) is to be explained as the opposing factor to self-grasping.

593 This is one of the rare instances in which Dharmakīrti employs the term emptiness (śūnyatā, stong pa nyid) rather than selflessness (nairātmya, bdag med pa). He is, however, still employing the concept of emptiness as he does throughout the pramāṇasiddhi chapter, as referring to

the selflessness of persons and not the selflessness of dharmas. Incidentally, wisdom is a manner of "grasping," but only in the epistemological sense that it involves the grasping ('dzin) of an object (gzung), selflessness. Grasping objects in the manner of one who believes in a self is an instance of epistemological grasping that leads to grasping at a self and consequently grasping as conducive to happiness what in fact only is conducive to further suffering.

594The Buddhist here considers the opponent's Reason unproven because he maintains that faults are not natural to living beings, for it has been demonstrated that the mind is intrinsically pure and that its stains are adventitious, and can be removed by application of the appropriate "cleansing agent," the wisdom directly realizing selflessness.

595The opponent attempts to argue that faults can be restored to the mind because transformations are reversible. Gold, for instance, can be melted, but then can be restored to its solid state. In fact, however, the opponent has cited an inappropriate example, for there also are transformations that cannot be reversed, such as that wrought in wood by a fire. The transformation of the mind that occurs when one directly realizes selflessness is of the irreversible kind, because that wisdom becomes utterly natural to the mind, and thus ever-present. Since it is ever-present, self-grasping cannot arise, because wisdom is true and the self-view false, and truth inevitably is stronger than falsehood. The same examples are used above, pp. 608-10, during the discussion of the mind-body problem.

596This rather succinct account of the way in which belief in a self leads to suffering is cited and paraphrased by rGyal tshab in his discussion of the truth of cessation, above, p. 721.

597This paragraph is interpolated by rGyal tshab as a sort of preface to the discussion, to follow shortly, on the impossibility of relating the concepts of bondage and freedom to a permanent self (for a permanent self cannot be a cause and, indeed, grasping at it actually is the cause of suffering).

598The previous verse showed how belief in a self inevitably leads to continued saṃsāric suffering. This verse

elaborates, showing how self-grasping brings about a conceptual division of the world into the realms of "self" and "other," with the natural attitude toward one's own interests being attachment, and the natural attitude toward the interests of others being resentment. Attachment and resentment are equivalent to desire and anger, which are, along with the ignorance on which they are based, the fundamental defilements.

[599]The discussion to follow revolves around the division of one's concerns into the self (bdag, ātma), that of which one says "I"; and what pertains to the self (bdag gi ba, ātmiya), that of which one says "mine." The fundamental premise of all those who thus discuss freedom and bondage is that, at the very least, the self is permanent and flawless. It will be Dharmakīrti's basic contention that as long as one believes in such a self, either conceptually or instinctively, one cannot possibly be detached from it, because it is considered good, and one inevitably strives for what is considered good, even if it be a phantom.

[600]One cannot blithely maintain that simply by seeing the flaws in attachment to self one will get rid of attachment to self, for as long as one continues to see good qualities in the self itself--or, for that matter, even to believe in its existence--one cannot abandon attachment to it, any more than a drunkard can cure himself of alcoholism simply by agreeing that the desire for alcohol is bad, but that alcohol itself is good. What is good inevitably will be considered desirable, and thus will be desired--and whereof one has desire, thereof one will not be detached. One only will be rid of attachment to self when one has come to recognize the self as flawed--not flawed in the sense that a real object is flawed, but flawed in the sense that it is a non-existent object the very concept of which leads to all mental faults.

[601]It is inconceivable that one who believes the self to be flawless really be detached from it, particularly when one's soteriology revolves around the attempt to "free" the self from its identification with what pertains to it. As long as one desires the freedom of the self, one is attached to the self, and therefore by definition unable to see the flaws in attachment to that self.

[602]Attachment to self may, in fact, be the basis of saṃsāric suffering (such certainly is the Buddhist view), but recognizing that that attachment entails suffering is

useless as long as one persists in accepting the existence--let alone the value--of a self that is in some sense the ultimate subject, the mind in its truest sense, for detachment from such a self is virtually impossible.

603 If the Ātmavādin argues that the self itself is flawless, but that suffering in relation to the self arises from the self's association with various mental qualities, then it can just as easily be argued conversely that the various mental qualities, including negative ones, must be flawless, because they are associated with a flawless self--how, after all, could "desire" for what is ultimately flawless really be flawed? Buddhists do not consider the "desire" to attain enlightenment to be a negative mental attitude, nor, by the same token, should Ātmavādins consider "desire" for the flawless self to be negative, let alone the basis of suffering. The Buddhist, of course, does believe that the desire for the self is the basis of suffering, but that is because he does not accept that that self exists. His point is that if one accepts something as real and good it is impossible to consider desire for it to be undesirable.

604 Heretofore, the Buddhist arguments have been directed against the Ātmavāda in general, particularly against the view of self held by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas and Sāṃkhyas (since Dharmakīrti lived either contemporaneously with or, more likely, before Śankara, Vedānta does not seem to have been the important school during his time that it would become later). Now the Buddhist argument is turned against specific soteriologies. The Vaiśeṣika view is that "Through having practiced yoga for some time in accordance with the quintessential instructions of a guru, a yogī comes to know the self as a thing other than the senses and so forth, and thereby sees reality. He understands the nature of the six categories of existents, and he knows the self to be an all-pervasive entity that lacks activity. He does not accumulate either virtuous or non-virtuous actions or the predispositions they establish. Because he does not accumulate new actions but extinguishes old ones, the self separates from the body, senses, mind, pleasure, pain, desire, hatred and so forth, and does not assume a new body and senses. Thereby, the continuum of births is severed like a fire which has consumed its fuel. When the self is alone (without any of its nine qualities, desire, hatred, effort, pleasure, pain, consciousness, virtue, non-virtue and activity), this is said to be the attainment of liberation" (Sopa and Hopkins, p. 57). Cf. also Sourcebook, chapter XI; Dasgupta, I, chapter VIII; and Koller, chapter 6. The Vai-

śeṣika takes disassociation of the self from what pertains to it as the path to liberation; thus, he does <u>not</u> accept the Buddhist's contention that an object must be rejected if desire for it is to be rejected, holding as he does that the self need not be rejected, but that desire for it should be.

605 The Buddhist argues that the Vaiśeṣika's contemplation and rejection of the suffering of what pertains to the self springs from an insufficiently profound analysis of suffering, i.e., from a concern with the suffering of suffering rather than the pervasive suffering of complexes. The attempt to abandon suffering merely by disposing of what pains one is bound to fail, because one has not thus abandoned the attachment, to the pleasures of the self, that is the primary force binding one in saṃsāra. As long as one believes in a self, one will be attached to the pleasures of the self, and therefore incapable of utterly rejecting what pertains to the self, since what pertains to the self is naturally seen as a contributor to the pleasure of the self.

606 Thus, one cannot really become detached from one's sense-organs, because they are instinctively felt to contribute the the pleasure of the self, and most of us naturally consider even defective organs to be preferable to no organs at all.

607 The basic criterion by which we instinctively judge whether something is worthy of our concern is its "usefulness" or "uselessness" to the self. Thus, hair and nails that have been cut off are no longer of concern to us, because they no longer can affect the self's happiness, whereas hair and nails still on our bodies can affect our feelings, and thus remain of concern to us. A possible Vaiśeṣika response to many of the foregoing Buddhist objections might be to point out that the Buddhist is insightful in his psychological analysis, but that it still is possible for a yogi to overcome his instinctive identification of the self with what pertains to it, and thus to gain a "higher" realization of what is conducive to the <u>ultimate</u> happiness of the self, which is its separation from all that one once considered potentially beneficial to it.

608 In Koller's words (p. 74), "The category of inherence reflects the fact that different things, such as substance, quality, action, etc., appear as one whole. Thus, the size of the man, his color, his nature as man and his

particularity as this man, all appear so unified that we think of one thing appearing, rather than a collection of things appearing to us. Thus, the whole inheres in its parts; the jug in the clay, the pencil in the wood, etc. The basis for the unity of different categories must, like other categories, have a foundation in reality, as different from other kinds of things. Otherwise, it would appear as one of the other kinds of things, and not as separate. Therefore, the category of inherence is recognized as an independent kind of reality." "Conjunction" (saṃyoga, ldan pa), which has been discussed above, pp. 631-2, is that Quality which is responsible for "connecting" two instances of the same category, i.e., two Substances when "a pen is on the table" or two Qualities when sugar is "sweet and white." Conjunction is impermanent, lasting only as long as the "connection" of which it is an expression. Inherence, on the other hand, relates instances of different categories to one another, as in the example given by Koller. Inherence, like all the Vaiśeṣika categories (padārtha), is considered permanent, and for a Buddhist, this is its critical characteristic, for if it is permanent, it must be indestructible. Thus, if it is asserted that the idea of "mine" or the quality of "suffering" "inhere" in the self, that Inherence must be permanent, and the idea of "mine" or of "suffering" incapable of elimination.

[609]For further discussion of Inherence, cf. Dasgupta, I, p. 319; Sourcebook, pp. 422-3. The list of types of Inherence is supplied by rGyal tshab.

[610]Since the two types of Inherence that relate things other than the self to the self (nos. 1 and 5 above) only relate to the self such "internal" qualities as pleasure and pain and the sense-organs, the Buddhist argues that the Vaiśeṣika eliminates from identification with the self such obvious items as external food, clothing, housing, etc. It might, however, be pointed out in the Vaiśeṣika's defense that the self, as a Substance, would be related to such other Substances as food and clothing not by Inherence (which is inter-categorial) but by Conjunction, which relates items intra-categorially, so the exclusion of food and clothing from the list of items related to the self by Inherence does not imply that no relation is possible.

[611]In any case, according to the Buddhist, the Vaiśeṣika's failure to account for all possible objects to which the word "mine" might be applied shows that what is considered "related" to the self, i.e., as pertaining to the

self, is inadequate as a basis for explaining attachment. One must, therefore, adopt the rather broader Buddhist explanation, which is that anything considered beneficial to the self, whether internal or external, is in fact what pertains to the self and is, thus, an object of the word "mine," hence an object of attachment.

612 The Vaiśeṣika argues that we can transcend attachment to the sense-organs and other things that pertain to the self by recognizing that they are flawed and generate suffering; the Buddhist reply is that the recognition that something can cause some suffering is an inadequate basis for detachment from that thing, because as long as there remains the belief that that thing can provide some pleasure, too, one will not want to be rid of it.

613 Furthermore, even if one recognizes something as being primarily a cause of suffering, one will continue to be attached to it as long as one conceives that it is in the least bit necessary. Thus, even if we cannot have great pleasure, we happily will accept small and transient pleasures rather than no pleasures at all, just as we will eat potentially bad food rather than starve. Thus, even if, e.g.,the organs are considered "primarily" a source of pain, we still prefer to live with them than to be utterly without them, for they still can supply a small amount of the pleasure considered essential to the self.

614 Most beings, in short, continue to pursue the pleasures of a phantom self, unaware of the unsurpassable pleasure that is involved in liberation--attained, of course, at the price of abandoning the concept of self. They continue to garner what small pleasures they can--to the point of utter debasement--rather than giving up the idea of trying to please them"selves."

615 There necessarily is a disjunction between the self that is freed and the self that is desired, even though it seems that the self that is desired is, in fact, the self that is freed. The self that is desired is a self that experiences and moves from bondage to freedom. The self that is freed is said to be the basis of all experience, including bondage and freedom. A permanent self, however, cannot reasonably be asserted to "experience" anything, or to move from one state (e.g., bondage) to another (e.g., freedom), since experience and transition presuppose change, and a permanent entity cannot change. Thus, the Vaiśeṣika desires the freedom of the self, but because that self is seen as

permanent it cannot "become free," for to "become" anything requires a mode of existence impossible for a permanent entity.

[616]As long as there remains some desire for what pertains to the self, there must necessarily remain attachment to the self whose "needs" are served by what pertains to it. Conversely, as long as there exists attachment to self, there will follow desire for what pertains to the self, because one will naturally seek out that which pleases the self.

[617]In short, then, as long as one does not abandon self-grasping, one will continue to seize on whatever good one can find in what pertains to the self, assuming that "good" will contribute to the happiness of the self. In fact, however, one's attitude is based on a distorted understanding of reality, and entails a grasping that only serves to lengthen one's term in saṃsāra.

[618]The opponent's attempt to argue that at the time of liberation, attachment to both what pertains to the self and the self itself is overcome, is absurd in the light of Buddhist assumptions about liberation. On the one hand, if one really is liberated, then one must have come to understand that there is no self, so one no longer can speak of a self to which one is or is not attached. On the other hand, if, prior to liberation, one's meditative efforts are directed toward freeing a flawless self, it is unlikely that at the time of liberation one will suddenly cease to be attached to it, for one's "liberation" is thoroughly tied in with the existence of that self.

[619]Meditation merely on the suffering or flaws of what pertains to the self hardly can be considered sufficiently profound to lead to one's detachment from all suffering, because even non-yogis, simply by being ill, directly realize that what pertains to the self involves some suffering. Thus to understand the suffering of suffering, however, is not to understand the fact or process of the subtler and more pervasive sort of suffering (that of the complexes) that infects all saṃsāric beings. Even the suffering of suffering cannot be eradicated unless one understands and eliminates the more fundamental suffering, which is rooted in self-grasping. Thus, an appreciation of the suffering of suffering does nothing to dispel that suffering as long as one continues to be attached to the self, and thus to generate the grasping that is the real cause of suffering re-

births.

620 To become thoroughly detached from an object or type of object, it is not sufficient that we see that what once was a source of pleasure now is a source of suffering. As Dharmakīrti notes, the fact that a man may come to see the flaws in a woman to whom he has been attached does not mean that he sees all women as flawed; indeed, most men who have rejected one woman will attach themselves to another. Even if a man should come to see attachment to women in general as flawed because of his unhappy experiences with one woman, he still will seek pleasure for his phantom self through attachment to other objects or activities, e.g., drink, or travel, or art. As long as he persists in his innate attachment to the self, he will continue to seek some type of pleasure for that self, and thus to grasp at one or another object that pertains to the self. Thus grasping, he will continue to be reborn in saṃsāra.

621 As long as attachment to self continues, one will be concerned with obtaining that which "benefits" the self and avoiding that which "harms" it; one will, thus, generate desire and aversion, which are, in turn, the basis of our creation of the karma that leads to our various suffering experiences and rebirths.

622 It is impossible that a Vaiśeṣika free himself from attachment to either the self or what pertains to the self. Just as a Buddhist does not consider desire and striving for flawless Buddhahood to be "saṃsāric" desire or striving, the Vaiśeṣika must consider his desire for the self to be good, because the object that he desires and strives for is good. By the same token, just as a Buddhist will consider that which "gives pleasure" to the Buddhas, offerings, to be "good," so too the Vaiśeṣika must consider that which contributes to the pleasure of the "good" self--the organs and whatever else pertains to the self--to be "good," too. Thus, a Vaiśeṣika must instinctively believe that the self and what pertains to it (as well as the subject that cognizes both) are flawless and be attached to them. The Buddhist, of course, believes that such attachment is the root of saṃsāra, so he assumes that the Vaiśeṣika not only can never be detached, but never can be freed, either, since freedom depends on detachment from self-grasping.

623 Just as believing the self to be flawless entails one's belief that what pertains to the self must be flawless, so, conversely, holding what pertains to the self to

be flawed will entail believing that the self is flawed, for the two are inextricably interrelated. If, however, one sees the self as flawed but continues to believe in it, one will not strike at the self-grasping that is the root of saṃsāra, and so will not be freed from it.

[624]The opponent attempts to argue that, just as attachment arises from seeing the good qualities in a particular object, so detachment will arise from seeing the flaws in an object. The Buddhist focuses his reply on a demonstration that it cannot be shown that attachment and a recognition of an object's good qualities are invariably concomitant, for (a) one may be attached without consciously recognizing good qualities, as children are; (b) one may be attached while recognizing something's flaws, as when one has a defective, but nothetheless serviceable, sense-organ; (c) one may recognize the good qualities of an object without being attached to or craving it, as when one recognizes that another person has good eyes but does not desire them because one's own eyes are good, too; and (d) one who is utterly detached does not consider either the good or bad qualities of what pertains to the self to be worthy of further concern, understanding that the designation of good and bad qualities is based chiefly on self-grasping, which he has transcended.

[625]Thus, regardless of one's attempts to see what pertains to the self as flawed, one invariably will superimpose some desirable qualities on what pertains to the self, because one continues to believe in a self whose needs must be served by the organs and anything else of which the word "mine" may be used.

[626]Cf. above, note 606, for a possible Vaiśeṣika defense against the sorts of arguments raised by the Buddhists. Even if a Vaiśeṣika were able to argue that the Buddhist's psychological analysis failed to take into account the sublimity of yogic experiences, as a result of which one might seem to have transcended attachment to what pertains to the self, it is questionable that the Vaiśeṣika concept of the self would be able to stand up to criticism. If religious accomplishment is to be preceded by correct understanding of reality, and the Vaiśeṣika's understanding is proven false, it is impossible that the Vaiśeṣika really accomplish what he claims to.

[627]For further discussion of the Sāṃkhya position, cf. Sourcebook, pp. 424-52; Dasgupta, I, chapter VII; Koller,

chapter 5; and Sopa and Hopkins, pp. 58-62.

[628]This is the passage cited by rGyal tshab above (p. 723) in his discussion of the innate belief in a self independent of the aggregates, which is the object of refutation of a meditation on selflessness. Here, the Sāṃkhya is ridiculed for asserting as the basis of his soteriology a fact that not only is instinctively believed by all beings, but which, if accepted, actually is the basis of all suffering, not liberation. The Sāṃkhya argues that the "Person" (Puruṣa) is utterly different from "Nature" (Prakṛti), which includes the intellect (buddhi), the I-principle (ahaṃkāra), the organs and the elements, i.e., everything that we ordinarily would list as comprising the cosmos. According to the Buddhist, it is precisely the belief that there is a permanent "person" or "self" independent of the impermanent aggregates that is the ignorant view that leads to the self-grasping that ensures our continued rebirth in saṃsāra. That such a belief is instinctive is shown by two facts: (1) we instinctively desire to "exchange" defective aggregates for better ones, without fearing that we thereby would become a different "person" or have a different "self" and (2) we recognize that our pleasures and the organs through which they are enjoyed are transient, yet we continue to strive for perpetual, unchanging pleasure. That such belief is false is shown by the fact that no such self can be found to exist either within or independent of the aggregates, which are, in fact, exhaustive of the "person."

[629]Prakṛti itself is not a manifest phenomenon, but must be inferred from the various items that evolve from it, such as the organs, elements, intellect, etc. Through knowing that the various items that comprise, or are evolutes of, Prakṛti are separate from Puruṣa, one will be able to infer that Prakṛti itself is separate from Puruṣa. Further, Prakṛti is said to be inanimate, i.e., ultimately physical, while Puruṣa is said to be conscious. The Buddhist, of course, divides the physical from the conscious differently, disposing of the "Person" altogether, and finding that within "Nature," i.e., the aggregates, form is physical, while cognition, mental complexes, perception and feeling are to one degree or another non-physical. The "pure consciousness" of the Sāṃkhya Puruṣa is most closely approximated by the aggregate of cognition, whose nature is the grasping of objects as they actually exist.

[630]Thus, as long as one accepts the existence of a "Person," one will be attached to self and to what may benefit the self. Thus, one will continue instinctively to

believe that what pertains to the self, i.e., "Nature," is necessary to the self, and one thus will continue to identify the two. From the Sāṃkhya perspective, however, as long as one continues to associate Puruṣa with Prakṛti, one cannot be liberated. In the light of Buddhist psychological analysis, then, Sāṃkhya metaphysics renders Sāṃkhya soteriology problematic.

[631]The Buddhist argument is, in effect, that aversion and detachment are not the same. Our affliction by some type of suffering generates aversion to or renunciation of that suffering, but it is not detachment from it, because aversion actually is an example of anger, which is a defilement, and because one in whom there is aversion continues to be attached to regaining the "happiness" he had enjoyed before the onset of his suffering. Cf. above, p. 746, for an analysis of why anger and attachment are opposing conditions without the absence of one entailing the perpetual absence of the other.

[632]A presumably hypothetical opponent argues that if aversion is generated continually, then attachment never need arise again. Such an argument is absurd, however, for the suffering of suffering has been shown to arise occasionally. Thus, particular instances of suffering feeling must cease, and when they have ceased, one inevitably will be comparatively "happy," and thus once more under the manifest sway of attachment.

[633]What is to be adopted and what rejected by worldly beings (objects of attachment and anger) is conceived in relation to a self. An Arahant no longer believes in such a self, and thus is indifferent to what ordinarily is sought or avoided on its behalf. Thus, his equanimity in the face of pleasure and pain--which he may continue to feel, but to which he is quite indifferent, since he does not (excuse the word-play) "I"-dentify with it.

[634]As we have seen above (p. 692), suffering is identified with the five aggregates that are under the control of karma and the defilements, and thus with the third type of suffering, that pervading all complexes--not merely with the suffering of suffering or the suffering of change. The latter two types of suffering cover, respectively, what we usually call pain and pleasure, while the suffering of complexes describes the suffering that pervades all saṃsāric existence. It is not, as we have seen, based on a permanent self, because it arises through causes and conditions.

[635]The sūtra quotation is found in the Pāli canon, at M.,i,232. It is not furnished by Dharmakīrti, but by his various commentators, who see it as a scriptural basis for ordering the first three "marks of existence" according to Buddhism: all composites are impermanent, all contaminated phenomena are suffering, and all dharmas are selfless (the fourth is: nirvāṇa is peace). Only the direct realization of selflessness can directly effect the peace of nirvāṇa, but the realization of selflessness can be assisted by the prior recognition of impermanence and suffering: the realization that all composites are impermanent leads to the realization that no saṃsāric happiness can endure, and thus that there is suffering. The suffering of contaminated phenomena, however, is seen to be under the power of various defilements and karma, and thus not to be a permanent self (for a self could not thus be under the power of causes and conditions). Thus, the aggregates that are identified with suffering are seen to be selfless.

[636]The following paragraph is interpolated by rGyal tshab as a clarification of the relationship among the realizations of impermanence, suffering and selflessness.

[637]The upper realms, whose suffering nature only can be understood when one understands subtle impermanence, are the form and formless realms, which correspond to the god realm among the six types of saṃsāric rebirth (gati). Generally, it is sufficient to recognize that one's happiness is impermanent and that it therefore is suffering, and that the conditionality of suffering insures that that which suffers is selfless. One cannot, of course, utterly renounce saṃsāra until even the sublimest divine existence is understood to have a suffering nature, but the general recognition of one's impermanence and suffering provides a sufficient basis for a preliminary appreciation of the fact of selflessness.

[638]The chain of reasoning is this: When a self is "freed," a self is still conceived to exist. There is, thus, attachment to self. Since there is attachment to self, one will continue to strive for that which benefits the self and avoid that which harms it. One will, thus, continue to commit defiled actions based on craving, and thereby to circle in saṃsāra. In short, then, when the opponent asserts that "a self" is freed, he is, in fact, asserting an impossibility, for where a self is asserted there can be no freedom, and only where there is a recognition of selflessness can there actually be freedom.

[639]Although the view opposed here is not clearly identified, it seems to be that of a Vedāntin, who maintains that only the self is real, and that what pertains to the self is ultimately non-existent or illusory. If that is asserted, however, then the self too must be non-existent, for the self is said to be the experiencer of what pertains to the self, and if what pertains to the self is non-existent, then so too must be the self, since the experiencer and the experiencer must have the same ontological status, or their interaction could not be explained. Furthermore, a permanent self such as posited by all Ātmavādins cannot possibly be both the creator of karma and the experiencer of karmic results, because such a self would have to change its nature from the time it was a "creator" to the time it was an "experiencer," but only an impermanent entity can change its nature.

[640]This paragraph concludes the main part of Dharmakīrti's attack on the Ātmavādin soteriology, which has been marked by two major thrusts: the <u>psychological</u> observation that belief in the existence of a permanent self independent of the aggregates can be seen to be the basis of all our defiled actions and suffering, and the <u>philosophical</u> observation that the existence of such a self cannot stand up to analysis, and thus must be false, and since successful action cannot be preceded by false understanding, spiritual accomplishments alleged to be based on the self-view cannot actually come to pass.

[641]The following section, concerned chiefly with refuting the idea that liberation can be attained through divinely-bestowed rituals recorded in scripture, seems to be aimed chiefly at practices of the Naiyāyikas, rather than the better-known ritualism of the Mīmāṃsakas, for the rituals criticized by Dharmakīrti are bestowed by God (in which the Mīmāṃsakas did not believe), and involve the "Unseen," a concept central to Nyāya cosmology. Cf. Dasgupta, I, chapter VIII.

[642]The fact that "sacred authority" (<u>lung</u>, <u>āgama</u>) asserts that liberation is said to be attained through ritual is not sufficient grounds for accepting that this is in fact the case, because "sacred authority" may be in error or misinterpreted, and its assertions must be checked by generally-accepted perceptual and inferential tests.

[643]The first half of the verse (PV 259b) reads: <u>lung ni de lta'i dngos yin pa'i</u> / <u>rgyu ma mthong ba rnams la ni</u>

= āgamāsya tathābhāvanibandhanamapaśyatām. The plural marker (rnams = ām) simply indicates that there are a number of different schools, including the Buddhist, that do not hold sacred authority or scripture to be inerrant. Thus, "Those who do not see any reason for (believing that) entities exist as scripture (claims)...."

644 On the one hand, if rituals alone can lead to liberation, then any ritual with some sort of discernible physical effect ought to be soteriologically valid, so not only should mantras be able to eradicate defilements, but so too should any of the various practices that have been enjoined at one time or another on Hindus: smearing the body with special oils or unguents, burning oneself, bathing in the Ganges, etc. On the other hand, it is not, in fact, the case that defilements can be destroyed by ritual means, because the various ritual practices have only physical effects, while defilements are a mental matter. Thus, one can sweat or scorch or starve oneself to the point of emaciation, shedding a great deal of physical weight, but one will not, thereby, lighten in the least the weight of the defilements that pollute the mindstream--for only mental changes will be able to lessen one's defilements.

645 sems pa (cetanā), often rendered as "volition," which I have translated as "mental action," is in Buddhist psychology one of the five mental factors that is invariably concomitant with a primary cognition. In Geshe Rabten's words, "(Mental action) is both the coscious and automatic motivating element of consciousness that causes the mind to involve itself with and apprehend its objects. Just as a magnet by nature moves any iron that comes into contact with it, likewise by the mere existence of (mental action), the mind is moved to various beneficial and detrimental objects. In addition, (mental action) is the actual principle of activity. It is karma itself. Whether an action is mental, vocal or physical, the formative element that is primarily responsible and that accumulates tendencies and imprints on the mind is (mental action). Thus it acts as a basis for conditioned existence" (The Mind and Its Functions, p. 69). Thus, any cognition invariably will have concomitant with it some kind of mental action. In all sentient beings, in turn, mental action will invariably be concomitant with craving that arises from ignorance. When mental action is concomitant with craving, saṃsāric rebirth will continue; when mental action no longer is concomitant with craving, as in the mind of an Arahant, rebirth need no longer occur.

[646]Thus, when a Buddhist says that "karma" is a cause of continued saṃsāric existence, he actually is saying that a mental action concomitant with craving and a distorted cognition of reality is a cause of continued saṃsāric existence. The qualification that mental action must be concomitant with craving and distorted cognition is important, because it is not mental action as such that is saṃsāric, since a Buddha's cognitions invariably will be concomitant with mental action. His mental actions, however, will no longer be concomitant with craving or distorted cognition; they will be concomitant with such factors as the wisdom realizing selflessness, great compassion, etc.

[647]The opponent replies that karma is not, as the Buddhist claims, identical with mental action, but that it is, rather, the complex of activities that begin with actions by the invisible but nevertheless physical Unseen (ma mthong ba, adṛṣṭa) and eventually issues in the mental, verbal and phsyical actions observed in the world. The Unseen is described by Dasgupta (I, p. 72) as the "potecy" of any action, and is believed to be affected by ritual performance. Thus, Dharmakīrti's opponent claims that since karma is bound up with the Unseen, which is ultimately physical, a bestowal, or initiation, that affects the Unseen will affect karma, too--to the point where a bestowal that utterly destroys the power of the Unseen will by definition remove all karma, including that which impels one to take saṃsāric rebirths.

[648]The first Buddhist reply is a general counter-assertion: it is only mental action that can be observed to be invariably concomitant with actions and experiences of body, speech and mind; rituals are not thus concomitant. Thus, ultimate control of the quality of one's actions cannot be gained through ritual, but only through transformation of the mental actions that are the seed of all that we experience. Indeed, far from undermining saṃsāra, most rituals simply perpetuate it, because they are based on a mistaken apprehension of reality, and do not profoundly affect the actual causes of saṃsāra.

[649]The opponent claims that a bestowal or ritual has the power to neutralize craving and ignorance, and thus prevent rebirth. The Buddhist reply is that if that is the case, then mental action must have been neutralized as well, for craving and ignorance will invariably accompany mental action in any mindstream that lacks a direct realization of selflessness. Thus, mental action's capacity to

focus upon a particular object also will be neutralized as soon as the bestowal has been received--which clearly does not happen in those who have received bestowal. A possible opponent's reply to this alleged absurdity, not considered by Dharmakīrti, is that the bestowal has the power not to destroy mental action as such, but simply to disassociate mental action from craving and ignorance. The Buddhist reply to this contention would, of course, be to point out again that a ritual that does not presuppose or entail a direct realization of selflessness simply will not have the power to disassociate mental action from craving and ignorance.

650 The opponent shifts his tack slightly, arguing that a bestowal has the power to assure that at death-time there will be no more mental action, and thus no craving or rebirth. The Buddhist reply is that each mental moment in which craving is involved has the capacity to generate a subsequent mental moment in which craving also is involved, and that the sequence must perforce continue until an antidote to the craving is applied. Thus, a bestowal should have the power immediately to destroy craving, or not at all. If craving has been observed to persist in a person who has received bestowal, we can safely conclude that the bestowal has not eradicated his craving, and that craving thus will be present at death-time, and will help impel him into a subsequent saṃsāric existence.

651 If the opponent argues that a bestowal specifically destroys the mind's ability to connect with a subsequent mind at death-time, the consequence is the same: if the bestowal does have such power, then mind should cease immediately after bestowal; since mind does not cease immediately after bestowal, we may conclude that the bestowal does not have the power to prevent mind from connecting with its subsequent homogeneous result. In fact, there is no concomitance between bestowal and the presence or absence of mental faults; the concomitance is between the faults and different types of mental actions: negative, ignorantly-based actions lead to an increase in faults, while positive mental actions, based upon wisdom, lead to a decrease in faults.

652 This is a standard Ātmavādin retort to the Anātmavādin: if there is no "self" or "person" who first is bound and then liberated, one cannot say that anyone is liberated, so one cannot speak meaningfully of an Anātmavādin's "liberation."

[653]The Buddhist reply is that, in fact, bondage and liberation only can be meaningfully predicated when there is no permanent self, for (a) a permanent self cannot generate both bondage and liberation, since the two are situations requiring utterly different conditions--but a permanent entity cannot be dependent on varying conditions, and thus cannot generate different types of situations; (b) a permanent self cannot, in fact, be held to generate any result, since if it generates one result, it simultaneously is the non-generator of other results, and thus simultaneously possesses two contradictory qualities--but whether it is a generator or a non-generator, it should remain thus forever, because it is permanent; and (c) a permanent self that is both the creator of karma and the experiencer of the result can only experience a result that is identical with the cause, because such a self neither changes nor is changed by conditions.

[654]If the permanent self is said to be different from cause and result, then it no longer is meaningful to say that that self creates karma and experiences the result, for cause and result have become extrinsic to the self--and the Ātmavādin's entire argument has been based on positing a substantial self that could be the basis of bondage and freedom. Furthermore, a permanent self cannot even be asserted to be an assistant cause in the generation of some result, because an assistant cause must be such that its presence is correlated with the result's arising and its absence with the result's non-arising, and a permanent self never can be absent. Thus, it cannot meaningfully be described as a cause.

[655]The Tibetan text reads _bdag yod_ ("existence of a self"), but this almost certainly should be amended to _bdag med_ ("selflessness"), since it is the Buddhist position that is being described.

[656]The Buddhist account of the operations of karma and memory neither requires a permanent self nor entails that a karmic result or memory will pertain to someone utterly different from the person who created the karmic cause or had a previous similar experience. Rather, the karmic causes and original experiences are events in a particular impermanent mindstream. Their seeds or impressions exist from moment to moment, outside the range of conscious awareness, as mental complexes (saṃskāras). When the specific conditions that are necessary for the ripening of a karmic seed are present, that karma will "ripen" as the appropriate re-

sult. Similarly, memory occurs when one has an experience or set of experiences that appear similar to a previous experience or set of experiences of which one continues to carry an impression. There is no permanent person who both experiences and remembers, but there is a person: the five impermanent aggregates. If the "person" is understood to be no more than the aggregates, then it is meaningful to speak of the same person experiencing and remembering--it simply always must be borne in mind that the person is impermanent.

657 Thus, the opposites of the sixteen aspects of the Four Noble Truths are not an arbitrary listing, but comprise a description of the attitudes toward reality that contribute to the continued generation of craving and, thus, rebirth; while the sixteen aspects themselves comprise a description of attitudes toward reality that are conducive to the elimination of craving--the most important, of course, being selflessness and emptiness, for direct understanding of them is the basis for the elimination of all craving. Cf. above, pp. 686-9.

658 Rebirth is asserted to have three causes: craving, karma and the body. (Sometimes ignorance is listed instead of the body; cf. above, p. 718.) If any of these is absent, the resultant rebirth will not occur. Thus, even if an Arahant still has a body and residual karmic seeds in his mindstream, if he lacks craving he no more can be reborn than a sprout can appear where there no longer is a seed. Although rGyal tshab includes this objection-and-answer in his discussion of wisdom as a path to freedom, it might easily be included in the following section, since the opponent seems to reflect a Jaina point of view.

659 The Digambara, of course, represents one of the two major traditions within Jainism, the other being the Śvetambara. Digambara means "sky-clad" (= naked) and Svetambara means "white-clad," and, in fact, the differences between the traditions are little more than skin-deep, being based as they are on disagreements over particular types of observances rather than on doctrinal disputes. All Jainas, certainly, would agree that the primary goal of religious striving is the exhaustion or elimination of karma, particularly through physical austerities. The exhaustion of previous karma and the non-creation of new karma leaves one liberated and omniscient, for the soul (jīva) is intrinsically pure but soiled by karma, and the elimination of karma allows the soul to shine forth with all its natural radiance. Cf. Sopa and Hopkins, pp. 62-3; Dasgupta, I, chapter

VI; Sourcebook, chapter VIII; and, e.g., Jagmanderlal Jaini, Outlines of Jainism.

[660]Here, there simply is a disagreement on soteriology. The Jaina believes that the elimination of karma through, e.g., physical austerities, will entail the elimination of craving. The Buddhist, on the other hand, believes that both karma and the body are rooted in craving, and that as long as craving remains there will be karma and continued rebirth, while if craving is eliminated there will be no further basis for rebirth or the fruition of previously-created karma. The Buddhist will be unable to accept that the Jaina path can eliminate craving, karma or the body, because craving is the basis of the other two, and craving only can be eliminated through a direct realization of selflessness, a doctrine not held by the Jainas (who maintain that the soul's states are impermanent, but that its nature is permanent).

[661]Craving and karma are both causes of rebirth, but they are not equally responsible, for there can be karma without craving, but there cannot be craving without karma. Since craving is the more fundamental cause, one can eliminate karma through eliminating craving, but one cannot eliminate craving simply through the elimination of karma. Furthermore, because craving demonstrably is the basis of all other defilements and of the creation of all negative karma, the elimination just of craving will ensure the elimination of all other defilements and the prevention of the fruition of previously-created karma. One cannot, on the other hand, argue that one karma or type of karma is the basis of all other karmas, for different karmic results presuppose utterly different types of karmic causes. Thus, the experience--hence "exhaustion"--of one karmic result does not entail the exhaustion of other, heterogeneous karmas, in part as karmas are infinite. An infinity of karmas never can be exhausted one-by-one--they only can be rendered impotent by the destruction of the condition indispensible to their ripening, which is, according to Buddhism, craving based on self-grasping.

[662]This and the following paragraph are added by rGyal tshab. It is his contention that the invariable concomitance between types of experiences and types of karmic causes can be inferred from observation, and thus that the general validity of karma can be proven logically (whereas the relation between particular results and particular causes--particularly where multiple lives are involved--only can be known perceptually by a highly developed or omnisci-

ent mind). The former contention seems problematic, because (a) it is not necessarily the case that everything that happens to us is a result of causes we and we alone have created; (b) it is arguable that every act of body, speech and mind has a specifically moral quality that someday will fructify in further experiences for the agent and (c) the validity of karma is greatly dependent on the existence of past and future lives, which is itself debatable. For a further discussion of the concept of karma, cf. above, Part I, pp. 155-9.

[663]In any case, the great variety and number of karmic causes we have created beginninglessly assures that the experience of just one type of karmic result eliminates only the karma or type of karma that is the seed of that result; other types of karma remain intact in the mindstream, their results still to be experienced, although perhaps with lessened effect.

[664]The "or" at the conclusion of the Tibetan line nyon mongs cha 'gas spong ba'am does not, as best I can tell, reflect a corresponding "or" in the Sanskrit (PV 279a).

[665]If the Jaina maintains that an austerity has the power to exhaust many different types of karmas, then he is faced with a dilemma. If, on the one hand, austerity is something different from painful torment, then mild austerities should suffice for the elimination of all sorts of karma, while if, on the other hand, austerity is identical to painful torment, then austerity is nothing but a karmic result, and a bad one at that, the experience of which will entail the elimination only of the seed of that specific experience. In other words, if one asserts that many karmas of differing strength and quality can be eliminated by a single austerity, then if austerity is not identical with pain, a mild austerity or even a pleasant experience that is a result of one of the karmas to be eliminated should suffice as an "austerity." If austerity is identical with pain, then the Jaina faces the same problem as before: austerity only can eliminate the single karma of which it is a result.

[666]The abandonment of craving through the realization of selflessness can prevent the generation of further defilements and the experience of the results of defiled karma already created (since craving is the basis for either of these, and now is absent); it cannot "repeal" karma whose results already have been experienced. Thus, an Ara-

hant whose body was crooked before his enlightenment will remain crooked afterwards, but he no longer creates karma for future crooked bodies, nor need he experience the results of future-body karma created but unripened before his enlightenment, because his enlightenment represents the utter destruction of the craving that is the indispensible condition for defiled karma's creation or fruition.

[667]The "third" and "fourth" lines are the latter two Tibetan lines of the verse under consideration. They correspond to PV 281a, and read: "(Wisdom) has the ability to (eliminate) the generation of karma, but it fails (to eliminate) such (karma) as has already been created" (*des skyed las la nus 'gyur gyi / ji ltar byas pa nyams par 'gyur = tajje karmaṇi śāktāḥ syuḥ kṛtihāniḥ katham bhavet*). An incorrect interpretation of these lines takes the former to mean that the realization of selflessness will insure that weak karmas, the experience of whose results is uncertain, will be eliminated; and the latter to mean that those stronger karmas whose results definitely must be experienced will not be eliminated. If this interpretation were correct, then enlightenment would be impossible, since there are in the mindstream infinite karmas whose result "definitely must be experienced." In fact, both lines may be taken as referring to all karma, both weak and strong, with the first indicating that if craving is eliminated, all karma (except that whose results already have been experienced) can be prevented from fructifying; and the second indicating that if craving is *not* eliminated, no other karma can be prevented from fructifying. Mahāyānists hold that a full "confession" involving (1) recognition of nonvirtue committed, (2) regret for its commission, (3) a vow never to repeat the offense and (4) application of an antidote, has the power to prevent the experience of the results of the negative action, be it "strong" or "weak."

[668]Thus, the designation of some karma as that whose results definitely must be experienced does not mean that there is karma whose results absolutely cannot be avoided--again, that would make enlightenment impossible. Karma whose results "definitely must be experienced" simply is karma sufficiently forceful that its fruition cannot be prevented unless mitigated or destroyed by the power of an antidote. A mitigating antidote is, e.g., a dharaṇī, which can alter the manner in which a karmic result will be experienced. A destructive antidote is the direct realization of selflessness, which uproots craving and thus eliminates the indispensible condition for the ripening of previously-created karma.

[669]There may be a correlation between craving and karma, but the concomitance is not invariable, for karma can still exist (although impotent) where there is no craving; nor are the two equally fundamental as causes of saṃsāra, since craving is the invariable basis of the creation of negative karma, while negative karma is not necessarily the basis of craving--for residual negative karma will not generate craving in the mindstream of a person who has eliminated craving.

[670]An Arahant cannot possibly be attached to the pleasure he experiences, because he is free from any notion of a self to whose pleasure he could be attached. His pleasure is a genuine pleasure, unlike the spurious and transient pleasures of ordinary beings, but his enjoyment of it is unsullied by grasping or desire, which, after all, are based on the belief in a self.

[671]These, correspond, of course, to the Vaiśeṣika, Sāṃkhya, Theistic-Ritualist and Jaina soteriologies. They do not correspond to the opposites of the four aspects of the truth of path, nor, for that matter, do the four aspects themselves seem to be explicitly discussed by Dharmakīrti. The section on the truth of path may perhaps best be seen as an extended discussion of the aspect of path, with the other three aspects (reasonableness, accomplishment and definite removal) implicitly covered at one or another place in the discussion. The aspect of definite removal, for instance, seems to be covered by the refutation of the idea that the wisdom realizing selflessness cannot utterly eliminate mental stains. The other two aspects are covered in passing.

[672]However arguable the details of the various soteriologies refuted, the central fact that each of them is based on the belief in a permanent self that is the basis of bondage and freedom is itself sufficient to make them inconsistent, contradictory and, quite simply, false; and since false cognition cannot be the basis of the successful attainment that one expects, the liberation expected by those who believe in a self never will come to pass. The realization of selflessness, on the other hand, is rational and true, and thus can be the basis of the attainment to which it points. Thus, Ātmavādin liberation is impossible, while Buddhist liberation is possible.

[673]Since in the forward system the emphasis was on

proving the Buddha's accomplishment, the three special characteristics of the Sugata were described in terms of abandonments of various sorts of obstacles. In the reverse system, the emphasis is on the Buddha's knowledge, which is saving knowledge. Thus, from the fact that the Four Noble Truths are true, we can infer that the Buddha must be a Sugata who is cognitively special in three ways: (1) unlike non-Buddhist yogis, he knows the truth about saṃsāra and nirvāṇa, encoded in the Four Noble Truths; (2) unlike Buddhist practitioners who are not yet rid of all mental faults or stains, he has knowledge that is utterly firm and coherent, and not in the least conducive to further rebirth; and (3) unlike Hīnayāna Arahants, he has knowledge that is complete, for he knows all possible paths to liberation and and all saṃsāric dharmas that are to be rejected. Dharmakīrti's characterization of the Buddha's knowledge as "complete" (ma lus, aśeṣa) comes close to an assertion of his omniscience, but is not explicitly so; it may merely imply that the Buddha knows all that is necessary for salvation, not that he knows all phenomena.

674 If the Buddha is the Sugata, with the knowledge needed by those who strive for freedom, he must also be the Teacher, who, altruistically motivated, has discovered the truth and developed its salvific power to the utmost. More abstractly, of course, the "Teacher" is one's excellence in application of the wisdom realizing selflessness, the completion of which is presupposed by the assertion that he has true, firm and complete knowledge. Thus, the Buddha is the Teacher because he is the Sugata.

675 If he is a Teacher whose development of wisdom issues in a complete knowledge by virtue of which he both can and does act as a Savior of sentient beings, the Buddha must necessarily be motivated by compassion. If he were not thus motivated, he would be content to understand the Four Noble Truths with sufficient profundity to extricate himself from saṃsāra, but not to develop his wisdom to the utmost. Without developing his wisdom to the utmost, he cannot possess the "complete" knowledge that is the third characteristic of a Sugata. Without being a Sugata, he cannot be a Savior. Without being a Savior, he cannot be utterly authoritative for those who strive for freedom. Thus, it is necessary that he be motivated by altruism. Thus, we must infer: "The Buddha is the Benevolent One, because he is the Teacher"--with "Teacher" signifying the complete development of the wisdom realizing selflessness.

[676]Thus, once again, the Buddha is shown to be soteriologically authoritative because he can and does save beings. That he *can* save beings is shown by his completion of his own aim, *i.e.*, by the fact that he is a Sugata with true, firm and complete knowledge of all that is to be adopted and rejected by those who strive for freedom. That he *does* save beings is shown by the fact that his knowledge is combined with an infinite development of the benevolence that desires to take responsibility for the salvation of all beings. Thus, he has completed his own aim through the accumulation of wisdom and he completes the aims of others through the accumulation of merit from actions motivated by compassion. The accumulation of wisdom (or gnosis) results in the dharmakāya; the accumulation of merit results in the sambhogakāya and nirmāṇakāya (= *rūpakāya*).

[677]The "key" referred to by rGyal tshab is the five-epithet interpretive schema supplied by Dignāga, on which, of course, the entire *pramāṇasiddhi* chapter is based. The assertion here is that, contrary to what some have supposed, authoritativeness (*pramāṇa*) is discussed in all its many aspects even in sūtras that do not seem to have anything to do with it. We have already seen that it is meaning, not words, that is of primary importance in philosophical analysis, and it thus is both possible and necessary to maintain that all Buddhist scriptures touch on the problem of authoritativeness. It *is* possible because the meanings embedded in, e.g., the sūtras can be shown to presuppose or entail understandings of authoritativeness that only are made explicit in a few places. It is necessary because without presupposing or entailing a correct understanding of authoritativeness, the texts cannot be the basis for correct understanding by those who hear or read them, since all correct understanding is based on authoritative cognition. Dignāga's "key" is particularly useful when authoritativeness and knowledge are put into a specifically religious context--as Dharmakīrti has done in the *pramāṇasiddhi* chapter.

[678]Those who assert that liberation and omniscience are proven simply by by the fact that they are scripturally taught, are derided for their ignorance of reasoning and their unreasonable faith in mere words. It may, in fact, be the case that everything taught in Buddhist scripture is true, but a Buddhist will maintain that this is the case not simply because it is *scriptural*, but because it is *reasonable*. Such validity as scripture may have derives not from its being a special or separate source of knowledge,

but from its conformity to what can be understood perceptually and through objectively impelled reasoning. Thus, scriptural testimony is not itself an independent source of authoritative cognition, for it cannot be accepted unless it conforms to what is established by authoritative perception and inference.

[679]The fact that an authoritative perception is unmistaken, or unsublated, establishes that it fulfils the definition of authoritativeness discussed by, e.g., Dharmakīrti at the outset of the pramāṇasiddhi chapter; the fact that it is non-conceptual establishes that it cannot involve inference, and thus must be perceptual. I have not been able to locate the quotation, which almost certainly is contained in the Sūtrapiṭaka (for the point in this section is to prove that authoritativeness is discussed in the sūtras).

[680]It is wrong to argue that although the Buddha clearly recognized the importance of authoritative perception, he did not believe that inference was authoritative, for (a) he nowhere explicitly denies that inference is authoritative and, more importantly, (b) the sūtras show evidence of syllogistic thinking, if not of syllogisms. Inference is not limited to formal syllogisms, for inference is a common mode of cognition. Indeed, syllogisms merely formalize and give coherence to cognitive procedures in which we all engage constantly. Thus, the presence of inference is established not by the presence of a formal inference itself, but by the presence of the basis of inference, which is a Reason or mark that is relevant to a Subject and positively and negatively concomitant with a Predicate. With this criterion in mind, the sūtras can be shown to contain all recognized types of syllogisms. Thus, the statement that "Any entity that has a nature such that it is generated has a nature such that it will cease" can be recast as a syllogism based on identity: "Any entity (S) will cease (P), because it is generated (R)." The Reason is relevant to the Subject because any entity is generated; the Reason is positively and negatively concomitant with the Predicate because generation entails destruction and non-generation entails non-destruction. The statement that "we know fire from smoke," of course, can be restated as the classic syllogism based on causality, or result: "In that place (S) there is fire (P), because there is smoke (R)."

[681]One might, thus, paraphrase the Buddha: "Whether or

not śāstras are written to explain them, the two types of authoritativeness necessarily are dealt with in all the Buddha's teachings." Cf. above, note 677.

682 Implicitly, then, the pramāṇasiddhi chapter describes the three jewels of refuge. On the basis of having taken refuge and become convinced of the possibility of attaining enlightenment, one should vow to attain enlightenment for the sake of all sentient beings. The surest way to fulfil that vow is to understand the Four Noble Truths, adopting what is to be practiced and rejecting what is to be avoided, until one reaches the stage where selflessness is realized directly and defilements are actually uprooted. When all defilements and their stains have been eliminated, of course, one is oneself a Sugata, able and willing to be a Savior of beings. Thus, this chapter should inspire the reader to strive himself to become an Authoritative Person.

683 rGyal tshab here rather imaginatively relates the Dharma-jewel to a more general theory of knowledge. Knowledge in Buddhist usage involves cutting off incorrect superimpositions on what really exists or really is the case. Thus, the Dharma-jewel, most often spoken of as the wisdom realizing selflessness, can be described epistemically as any correct cognition that eliminates the seeds of further superimposition. Furthermore, any attempt to cut off superimposition, even in present mundane matters, may be considered as a "part" (yan lag) of refuge, since it is a mental action that exists on the same continuum as such exalted instances of cutting-off-superimposition as the wisdom realizing selflessness. Thus, to the degree that "all human accomplishment is preceded by correct cognition," correct cognition is necessary in every sphere, from the mundane to the sublime, and to the degree that the most sublime "accomplishment," enlightenment, is preceded by the same condition--the cutting off of superimposition--as is the most mundane, the most mundane can as reasonably be considered a part of the Dharma-jewel as the most sublime--for in every instance falsehood is binding and restricting, while truth is what is believed to make us free.

684 In Shastri's and most Tibetan editions, the chapter is simply called pramāṇasiddhi, or "establishment of authoritativeness." The "establishment of perfect authoritativeness" would in Sanskrit be samyagpramāṇasiddhi.

APPENDIX 1:

THE TIBETAN TEXT OF THE PRAMĀṆASIDDHI CHAPTER OF THE PRAMĀṆAVĀRTTIKA

Following is the complete Tibetan root-text of the pramāṇasiddhi chapter of the Pramāṇavārttika of Dharmakīrti, arranged according to the text-divisions (sa bcad) of rGyal tshab's rNam 'grel thar lam gsal byed. The Tibetan text I have followed is that of the Tibetan Monastery, Sarnath (1974), now out of print. The numbering of the verses follows that of Shastri's Sanskrit edition (Varanasi, 1968). Because it was not accessible to me, I have not used the most recent edition of the Pramāṇavārttika, that of Y. Miyasaka, who gives both Sanskrit and Tibetan (in Acta Indologica, 1971-77). Miyasaka does not count the two introductory verses included by Shastri as verses 1 and 2 of the pramāṇasiddhi chapter. Thus, the corresponding verse in Miyasaka's edition almost invariably can be found simply by subtracting 2 from the number I have used. Two stylistic notes: the designations "a" and "b" for partial verses usually, but not invariably, correspond to Sanskrit half-ślokas. / marks the end of a Sanskrit śloka.

(3a)
tshad ma bslu med can shes pa
don byed nus par gnas pa ni

(3b-4)
mi slu sgra las byung ba yang
mngon par 'dod pa ston phyir ro / 3
smra ba bo yi byed pa'i yul
don gang blo la rab gsal ba
de la sgra ni tashad ma nyid
don gyi de nyid rgyu can min / 4

(5a)
gzung ba 'dzin phyir kun rdzob ni
mi 'dod blo ni tshad ma nyid

(5b-6a)
blang dang dor bya'i dngos po yi
'jug la de gtso yin phyir dang / 5

yul rnam can ni tha dad pas
blo yi rtogs pa tha dad phyir

(6b-7a)
de yod na 'di yod phyir ro
rang las rang gi ngo bo rtogs / 6
tha snyad las ni tshad ma nyid
bstan bcos rmongs pa zlog byed yin

(7b-8)
ma shes don gyi gsal byed kyang
rang gi ngo bo rtogs 'og tu / 7
spyi yi rnam par shes pa thob
rang gi mtshan nyid mi shes pa
shes pa gang yin zhes dgongs phyir
rang gi mtshan nyid dpyad phyir ro / 8

(9a)
de ldan bcom ldan tshad ma nyid

(9b)
ma skyes pa ni bzlog don du
gyur ba nyid gsungs de yi phyir
sgrub byed la ltos tshad yin rigs / 9

(10-11a)
tshad ma rtag pa nyid yod min
dngos yod rtogs pa tshad phyir dang
shes bya mi rtag pa nyid kyis
de ni mi brtan nyid phyir ro
rim bzhin skye ba can dag ni / 10
rtag las skye ba mi 'thad phyir
bltos pa mi rung ba yi phyir
rnam 'gas phan gdags bya min phyir

(11b)
mi rtag na yang tshad med nyid / 11

(12)
sdod 'jug dbyibs kyi khyad par dang
don byed pa la sogs pa dag
'dod pa grub pa'am dpe ma grub
yang na the tshom za ba yin / 12

(13)
byin rlob yod med rjes 'jug can
dbyibs sogs ci 'dra rab grub pa
de las rjes su dpog gang yin
de ni rigs pa nyid yin no / 13

(14)
tha dad dngos la rab grub pa
sgra mtshungs tha dad med pa'i phyir
rjes dpog rigs pa ma yin te
skya bo'i rdzas las me bzhin no / 14

(15)
de lta min na rdza mkhan gyis
bum pa la sogs 'jim pa yi
rnam 'gyur 'ga' zhig byed pa'i phyir
grog mkhar yang des byas grub 'gyur / 15

(16)
bsgrub bya'i rjes 'gro phyir 'bras bu
spyis kyang sgrub par byed pa la
'brel ba can nyid tha dad phyir
tha dad skyon brjod 'bras mtshungs 'dod / 16

(17)
rigs kyi khyad par la grub pa
sgra yi spyi ni mthong ba las
sgrub byed mi rigs ngag la sogs
go nyid phyir na rva can bzhin / 17

(18)
rjod par 'dod pa'i gzhan dbang phyir
sgra rnams gang la'ang med ma yin
de yod pas ni don grub na
thams cad kyis ni thams cad grub / 18

(19)
'dis ni ser skya la sogs kyi
mi rtag sogs phyir yang sems med
sogs dang shun pa bshus na ni
'chi phyir sems ldan dpyad pa yin / 19

(20-22)
dngos po'i ngo bo ma grub na
tshul 'di grub na ma grub kyang
khyad par gnod byed ma yin te
sgra yi nam mkha' la brten bzhin / 20
sgra ma grub kyang dngos po ni
grub na grub par 'gyur te dper
'ug pa pa la sangs rgyas pas
lus sogs sgrub byed bshad pa bzhin / 21
de nyid 'khrul la sogs yin na
sgra ni 'khrul pa med na yang
sgrub byed skyon ldan shes bya ste
dngos las dnos po grub phyir ro / 22

'gro ba'i phyir dang lag ldan phyir
rva can glang po zhes sgrub byed
'di yi sgra yi brjod bya ni
grags pa yin gyis brjod 'dod min / (no Skt.)

(23-26)
ji ltar dngos de rgyu yin pa
de lta de nyid gang gi tshe
rgyu min gang gis de ni rgyur
'dod la rgyu ma yin mi 'dod / 23
mtshon dang sman sogs 'brel ba las
nag pa'i rma dang 'drubs yin na
'brel med sdong dum ci yi phyir
rgyu ni du ni rtog mi byed / 24
rang bzhin khyad par med par ni
byed par yang ni mi rung ngo
rtag la ldog pa med pa'i phyir
nus pa nyid kyang rtogs par dka' / 25
gang dag yod na gang 'gyur nyid
de dag las gzhan de yi rgyu
rtog pa yin na thams cad la
rgyu rnams thug pa med par 'gyur / 26

(27-30)
myu gu skyed la sa la sogs
rang bzhin yongs su gyur nas ni
rgyu yin de legs byas pa na
de yi khyad par mthong phyir ro / 27
gal te ji ltar yul dbang po
tshogs pa khyad med blo rgyu yin
de ltar 'di yin zhe na min
de la'ang khyad par yod phyir ro / 28
so so so sor nus med rnams
rang bzhin khyad par med pas na
tshogs kyang nus pa med 'gyur bas
de phyir khyad par grub pa yin / 29
de phyir so sor gang nus med
tshogs na yon tan srid 'gyur ba
de dag rgyu yin dbang phyug sogs
ma yin khyad par med phyir ro / 30

(31)
tshad ma lkog gyur don shes yin
de sgrub byed kyang med pa'i phyir
nan tan byed pa yod ma yin
zhes ni kha cig rab tu brjod / 31

(32)
mi shes ston par byed pa la
'khrul par dogs pa can rnams kyis
des bshad nan tan bya ba'i phyir
shes ldan 'ga' zhig tshol bar byed / 32

(33)
de phyir de yi bsgrub bya ru
gyur ba'i ye shes rnam dbyed bya'i
'di yis srin bu'i grangs mkhyen pa
nged la 'gar yang nyer mgo med / 33

(34-35)
blang dang dor bya'i de nyid ni
thams dang bcas pa rigs mdzad pa
gang de tshad ma nyid 'dod kyi
thams cad rigs mdzad ma yin no / 34
ring po mthong ba'am min yang rung
'dod pa'i de nyid mthong ba yin
gal te ring mthong tshad yin na
tshur shog bya rgod bsten par gyis / 35

(36a)
sgrub byed thugs rjes goms las de

(36b)
blo ni lus la brten pa'i phyir
goms pas grub pa med ce na

(36c)
ma yin rten ni bkag phyir ro / 36

(37-42)
skye ba yongs su len pa na
'byung rngub dbang po blo dag ni
rang gi rigs la ltos med can
lus nyid 'ba' zhig las skye min / 37
ha cang thal phyir mtshungs sbyor bar
nus ldan mthong ba gang de la
ci zhig yod 'gyur gang med pa
gang gis phyi nas mtshams sbyor med / 38
gang du drod gsher la sogs pa
skye bo skye bar mi 'gyur ba'i
sa sogs cha de 'ga' yang med
de phyir thams cad sa bon bdag / 39
de phyir dbang sogs rang rigs la
ltos pa med par 'byung yin na
ji ltar gcig na yongs 'gyur bzhin
kun 'gyur khyad par med phyir ro / 40
dbang rnams re re la gnod na

yid blo la gnod yod ma yin
'di 'gyur na ni de dag kyang
'gyur ba dag tu mthong ba yin / 41
de phyir blo gnas pa yi rten
blo nyid la ni brten pa 'ga'
dngos po rnams kyi rgyu yin pas
de phyir blo las dbang po yin / 42

(43-46)
de 'dra'i 'phan byed yod gyur na
phyis kyang da 'drar 'gyur ba yin
de yi shes pas phan 'dogs phyir
yod ni lus la brten par bshad / 43
gal te dbang po med par blo
ma yin de yang de med par
de lta'ang phan tshun rgyu nyid pas
de phyir phan tshun rgyu can min / 44
rim can min las rim can min
khyad par can min bltos pa'ang med
lus las rim gyis blo 'gyur na
de'i yang rim pa gsal bar byed / 45
skad cig nga ma snga ma ni
skad cig re re sngon med de'i
rgyu yin de yi phyir na rgyu
thams cad tshe na mthong ba nyid / 46

(47a)
tha ma'i sems ni sems gzhan dang
mtshams sbyor ba la 'gal ci yod

(47b)
dgra bcom sems gang yin de yang
gang las mtshams sbyor med par 'dod / 47

(48a)
tshad mas ma grub don can gyi
grub mtha'i rjes su 'brang ngam ci

(48b-50a)
gal te de rgyu bral phyir na
de nyid 'dir ni cis ma brjod / 48
de blo bzhin du 'dzin 'gyur phyir
dbang po bcas las yid shes min
shes skyed nus pa tha dad phyir
kun las kyang ni ma yin no / 49
sems med nyid phyir gzhan las min

(50b)
rgyu gcig phyir na lhan cig gnas

dbang bzhin gzugs dang ro bzhin no
don gyi sgo nas 'gyur ba yin / 50

(51-52)
rtag tu de yi rjes 'jug phyir
gang zhig yod pas phan 'dogs byed
de rgyu de phyir bdun pa dang
skyes phyir zhes ni bshad pa yin / 51
'ga' zhig tshe na sems rgyun la
phan 'dogs byed pa'ang yin sla ste
bum sogs la ni me sogs bzhin
de tsam gyis ni ldog pa min / 52

(53a)
lus ni gnas pa nyid na sems
ldog pa med par thal bar 'gyur

(53b-55)
de yod yod dang dbang gyur phyir
de las 'byung rngub de ma yin / 53
rlung 'byin pa dang 'dren pa ni
'bad rtsol med par gang las yin
de dag phul byung 'grib pa las
phul byung 'grib pa thob par 'gyur / 54
de dag la yang thal ba mtshungs
sems rgyu yin na mtshungs ma yin
gnas pa'i 'phan byed gzhan dag kyang
gang phyir rgyu ni yin par 'dod / 55

(56)
gal te sdong po la sogs bzhin
nyes pas mi mthun lus rgyu min
shi bas nyes pa nyams gyur tshe
slar yang 'tsho ba dag tu 'gyur / 56

(57-61)
gal te me ni ldog na yang
shing gi 'gyur ba mi ldog bzhin
de ni ldog pa med ce na
ma yin gso sbyor yod phyir ro / 57
slar mi 'byung bar 'ga' zhig ni
la lar 'gyur ba skyed par byed
'ga' zhig ldog pa yin phyir dper
shing dang gser la me bzhin no / 58
dang po chung yang ldog pa min
slar ldog rung bar 'gyur byas gang
de ni slar yang 'byung 'gyur te
gser gyi sra ba nyid bzhin no / 59
cung zad gso bya min brjod pa
'chos byed rnyed par dka' phyir ram

tshe zad phyir ro nyes 'ba' zhig
yin na gso min med pa gnyis / 60
shi ba'i dug sogs ldog phyir ram
de yi sos zin bcad las kyang
'gyur ba'i rgyu dang bral bas na
de cis slar yang 'tsho mi 'gyur / 61

(62)
nyer len 'gyur ba med par ni
nyer len can dag 'gyur bar ni
byed par mi nus dper 'jim pa
'gyur ba med par bum sogs bzhin / 62

(63-64)
dngos gang 'gyur ba med par ni
dngos po gang zhig rnam 'gyur ba
de de'i nyer len mi rigs te
ba glang ba min la sogs bzhin / 63
sems dang lus kyang de bzhin no
de rgyu lhan cig byed pa las
ske ba'i 'bras bu lhan cig gnas
me dang zangs ma'i zhu nyid bzhin / 64

(65a)
yod med dag la rten med phyir

(65b-68a)
ma yin yod pa'i gnas rgyu ni
rten yin zhe na 'di rten med
gnas pa po las gzhan min phyir / 65
gzhan yin na yang de rgyu nyid
des ni dngos po ci zhig byas
'jig pa med par thal bar 'gyur
gal te de 'jig rgyu las 'dod / 66
de la'ang thal ba mtshungs pa yin
gnas pa'i rgyus kyang ci zhig byas
gal te 'jig rgyu phrad bar du
des gnas 'jig pa dngos chos nyid / 67
yod pa 'di gnod med phyir dang
gnas pa'i rgyus ni ci zhig bya

(68b-70)
gal te dper na chu sogs kyi
rten bzhin zhe na 'di la'ang mtshungs / 68
dngos rnams skad cig re rer ni
'jig na dngos rgyun de lta bur
skye rgyu yin phyir de rten yin
de lta min na rigs ma yin / 69
'bo ba yis ni gegs byed phyir
chu sogs kyi ni rten 'gyur gyi

'gro ba med can yon tan spyi
las rnams la ni rten ci dgos / 70

(71)
'dis ni 'phrod pa 'du ba dang
'phrod pa 'du ba can rgyu dang
rigs la sogs pa rnam gnas nyid
rten med phyir na bsal ba yin / 71

(72-74)
gal te gzhan las dngos 'jig na
de yi gnas rgyus ci zhig bya
de bzhan med par 'jig na yang
gnas pa'i rgyu rnams nus med yin / 72
rten bcas thams cad gnas ldan dang
skye ba can kun rten bcas yin
de phyir dngos po thams cad ni
'ga' zhig tshe na'ang 'jig mi 'gyur / 73
gal te rang 'jig ngang tshul bdag
yin na de gnas byed gzhan gang
gal te rang 'jig ngang tshul bdag
min na de gnas byed gzhan gang / 74

(75-76)
lus kyi phul byung 'grib med par
blo yi byed pa'i khyad par gyis
shes rab la sogs phul byung dang
'grib pa dag tu 'gyur ba yin / 75
'di ni mar me'i 'od la sogs
rten pa rnams la yod ma yin
de las kyang 'di khyad 'gyur te
sems la phan 'dogs med par min / 76

(77-79)
'ga' tshe chags sogs rgyas sogs kyi
'phel ba bde sdug las skyes yin
de yang khams snyoms la sogs pa
nang gi don ni nye ba las / 77
'dis ni 'dus pa la sogs pa
dran pa nyams sogs bshad pa yin
nang don khyad par las skyes pa'i
blos ni 'gyur bar byed phyir ro / 78
dper rgyud khyad par 'ga' zhig la
rtag nyid dang ni khrag la sogs
thos pa dang ni mthong ba las
rmongs pa la sogs 'byung 'gyur bzhin / 79

(80)
de phyir nges par gang nyid kyi
'du byed kyis ni rjes 'jug pa'i

sems ni de med mi 'byung ba
de phyir sems la brten pa yin /80

(81)
ji ltar sems la brten byas nas
thos sogs 'du byed sems la ni
dus gsal tha dad med pa'i phyir
de ltar lus la yon tan 'gyur / 81

(82-83)
bdag la chags pa dang ldan pas
sems can gzhan gyis bkri min par
bde sdug dor thob 'dod pas na
dman pa'i gnas ni yongs su len / 82
sdug bsngal phyin ci log blo dang
sred pa kun nas 'ching ba ni
skye rgyu gang la de med pa
de ni skye bar mi 'gyur ro / 83

(84-85)
gal te 'gro 'ong ma mthong na
dbang po mi gsal phyir ma mthong
dper na mig mi gsal ba yis
du ba chung ngu mi mthong bzhin / 84
lus can yin yang phra ba'i phyir
'ga' zhig la lar thogs med de
chu bzhin gser la dngul chu bzhin
ma mthong phyir na med pa min / 85

(86-87)
lag sogs gyo na thams cad dag
gyo ba 'gyur phyir 'gal ba can
las ni gcig la mi rung phyir
gzhan du tha dad grub par 'gyur / 86
gcig bsgribs pa na thams cad dag
bsgribs par 'gyur ba'am ma bsgribs na
mthong 'gyur gcig tshon gyis bsgyur na
bsgyur ba'am ma bsgyur rtogs par 'gyur / 87

(88a)
de phyir tshogs pa gcig yod min

(88b-89a)
du ma nyid na snga ma bzhin
khyad med phyir dang phra rab phyir
rtogs min zhes na / 88) khyad med par
ma grub khyad par can rnams ni
dbang yul de phyir rdul phran min

(89b)
'dis ni sgrib byed la sogs pa
med pa dag kyang bsal ba yin / 89

(90-92)
dngul chu gser dang 'dres pa 'am
rdo tshon la sogs ji ltar snang
dbang sogs so sor nus med rnams
rtogs pa dag ni ji ltar yin / 90
ldan pas she na 'dir thal mtshungs
gal te gser dang dngul chu ni
ldan pas snang ba yin zhe na
rten mthong med par gang las rtogs / 91
ro gzugs la sogs ldan par 'gal
gal te nye bar btags ba las
'dod na blo tha dad par 'gyur
ji ltar 'phreng ring zhes byar 'gyur / 92

(93)
de ldan rang gi ngo bo dang
brjod pa dag las tha dad par
grangs ldan las la sogs pa yi
ngo bo blo la mi snang ngo / 93

(94-96)
sgra shes dngos po tha dad pa'i
rjes 'brang rnam rtog btags don can
dper na yon tan la sogs pa
zhig dang ma skyes dag la bzhin / 94
gal te 'dir ni btags 'dod na
rgyu mtshan gang gis de 'dod pa
de ni dngos po thams cad la
de dag gi rgyus cis mi 'dod / 95
gal te kun la nyer btags min
tha dad khyad par gtso bo zhes
bya nyid gang las tha dad pa
med la tha dad don med na / 96

(97-98)
don gzhan rgyu mtshan can min yang
dkar la sogs pa grangs sogs dang
ldan pa'i sgra ni rnam grangs min
gal te de la'ang don gzhan na / 97
yon tan rdzas ni khyad med 'gyur
don gzhan min yang ldog pa yi
dbye bas tha dad pa yin te
las rdzas min pa'i sgra bzhin no / 98

(99-101)
dngos po brjod pa'i sgra rnams kyis

grangs sogs de dang ldan pa las
tha dad bzhin du bstan gang de'ang
chos gzhan khyad par byed pa yin / 99
de tsam shes par 'dod pa la
gzhan kun 'phangs pa med par ni
la lar sor mo'i ldan pa zhes
tha dad chos bzhin rjod par byed / 100
don gcig brjod kyang thams cad ni
'phen phyir sor mo ldan 'gyur zhes
chos can brjod par grags yin te
de ltar brdar ni byas pa yin / 101

(102-104)
gzugs sogs nus pa'i khyad par ni
spong bas de mtshungs 'bras bu yi
rgyu min pa ni rnam gcod la
bum pa'i sgra ni 'jug par 'gyur / 102
des na bum pa gzugs so zhes
gzhi gcig pa can sgra ma yin
des na 'di ni rigs dang ni
tshogs pa brjod pa'i khyad par yin / 103
de spyi yan lag tu byas te
bum pa yi ni gzugs sogs zhes
de nus khyad par ston par byed
phyogs 'dis gzhan la'ang brjod par bya / 104

(105a)
ma lus rgyu nyid yin na ni
yan lag gcig dang bral na'ang min

(105b)
re re nus pa nyid yin na'ang
cig car mang po 'byung bar 'gyur / 105

(106-108)
du ma nyid du mtshungs pa'i phyir
'byung rngub dag ni nges byed min
gcig ni na yang mang gsal 'gyur
de rgyu rtag tu nye phyir ro / 106
gal te du ma'i rgyu min na
rim gyis kyang min kyad med phyir
dbugs gcig la yang don du ma
'dzin phyir de las nges ma yin / 107
du ma blo gcig gis she na
de ni cig car nyid 'gyur te
'gal ba med phyir rim gyis kyang
mi 'gyur khyad par med phyir ro / 108

(109-111)
rang rigs min pa'i dus can gyi

dbugs kyi skad cig mang po dag
gal te de 'dra'i sems nyid kyi
rgyu yin par ni rtogs byed na / 109
go rim ldan pa'i rgyu med par
de dag rim ldan ji ltar 'gyur
rang rigs snga ma rgyu nyid na
dang po 'byung bar mi 'gyur te / 110
de rgyu de 'dra yod ma yin
dbugs 'byung tha dad yul can phyir
yod kyang du ma nyid du nges
de phyir blo ni cig car skye / 111

(112-113)
gal te du ma'ang gcig dus can
sems gcig gi ni rgyu yin na
dbugs rgyu zhen pa la sogs su
gcig ma tshan na'ang mi 'byung 'gyur / 112
ci ste ji ltar yod rgyu min
shes pa la yang khyad yod 'gyur
gang zhig gang gi tha dad las
tha dad min de de 'bras min / 113

(114)
rnam shes nus pa nges pa'i phyir
gcig ni gcig gi rgyu yin te
rnam shes don gzhan chags pa yis
nus med don gzhan mi 'dzin phyir / 114

(115)
gal te lus las cig car blo
skyes shing phyis ni rang rigs las
des na lus kyis nus pa ni
ci yi phyir na ldog pa yin / 115

(116-117a)
gal te lus ni ldog pa na
rten min phyir na sems 'ba' zhig
gnas 'gyur zhe na gal te de'i
rgyu 'jug thob phyir sems kyi rgyun / 116
gnas rgyu yan lag mi 'gyur na

(117b)
tshe 'di nyid kyi skye mched lnga
lus gzhan skyed pa'i rgyu nyid yin / 117

(118)
de yi yan lag dngos po dang
rgyu nyid 'gog la mi dmigs pa
nges 'byed min par rab tu bshad
dbang sogs kyang ni lhag ldan yin / 118

(119-120)
dbang po snga ma rang rigs las
nus pa dag ni mthong ba yin
'gyur ba mthong phyir gzhan dang gzhan
skye ba dag kyang 'grub pa nyid / 119
gal te lus las de skye na
snga ma bzhin du thal bar 'gyur
sems las she na lus gzhan yang
'di nyid las ni skye bar 'gyur / 120

(121)
des na rgyu dang bral ba'i phyir
tha ma yi ni sems rnams kun
mtshams sbyor med pa min de'i phyir
de 'dra'i sgrub byed lhag ldan 'dod / 121

(122)
goms las khyad par 'gyur na yang
mchongs dang chu yi drod bzhin du
rang bzhin las 'das min zhe na
byas te / 122

(123-124)
gal te slar yang ni
'bad rtsol la ni ltos 'gyur ram
rten mi brtan pa nyid 'gyur na
khyad par dag ni mi 'phel na
rang bzhin da 'dra'ang ma yin te / 123
de la phan 'dogs nus pa rnams
khyad par phyi ma dag la ni
sgrub pa'i nus pa med phyir dang
rtag tu rten gnas ma yin phyir / 124

(125)
khyad par 'phel yang rang bzhin nyid
min phyir gang tshe byas gyur pa
yang rtsol la ltos mi 'gyur na
rtsol gzhan khyad par byed par 'gyur / 125

(126-128)
sems la brtse sogs goms skye ba
rang gi ngang gis 'jug 'gyur te
me la sogs pas shing dag dang
dngul chu dang ni gser sogs bzhin / 126
de phyir de dag las skyes te
ngo bo nyid skyes yon tan yin
de na rtsol ba phyi ma dang
phyi ma khyad par byed pa yin / 127
gang phyir rigs mthun snga ma yi
sa bon las ni 'phel ba can

brtse ba la sogs blo de dag
goms pa gyur na gang la gnas / 128

(129-130)
de ltar mchongs nyid la mchongs min
de rgyu stobs dang 'bad rtsol dag
nus pa nges pa nyid kyi phyir
mchongs pa nges pa'i bdag nyid yin / 129
de ni dang po phyis nyid du
mchongs min lus mi mthun pa'i phyir
rtsol bas rim gyis mi mthun pa
gsal la rang stobs nyid du gnas / 130

(131-133)
brtse rang sa bon las byung ba
gal te rang sa bon rgyu can
mi mthun phyogs kyis gnod med na
sems la de bdag nyid du 'gyur / 131
'di ltar goms pa snga ma dang
snga ma'i sems chos brtse ba dang
chags bral blo sogs gzhan dag gi
gsal ba yi ni rtsa ba yin / 132
goms las brtse ba'i bdag nyid de
chags bral chags dang yid log bzhin / 133

(134)
brtse ldan sdug bsngal gzhom pa'i phyir
thabs rnams la ni mngon sbyor mdzad
thabs byung de rgyu lkog gyur pa
de 'chad pa ni dka' ba yin / 134

(135-136a)
lung dang rigs pas rnam dpyod pa
sdug bsngal nyid kyi khyad par gyis
sdug bsngal rgyu dang de mi rtag
la sogs rang bzhin rtog par mdzad / 135
gang phyir de ltar rgyu gnas na
'bras log gzigs pa med phyir ro

(136b-138a)
de rgyu gzhom phyir de yi ni
mi mthun phyogs la brtag pa mdzad / 136
rgyu yi ngo bo rtogs pa'i phyir
de mi mthun phyogs kyang nges 'gyur
bdag dang bdag gir 'dzin byas pa
'dus byas spyod yul can chags ni / 137
rgyu yin de yi gnod byed ni
bdag med mthong ba 'gal ba yin

(138b-139a)
rnam pa du mar thabs mang po
yun ring dus su goms pa las / 138
de la skyon dang yon tan dag
rab tu gsal ba nyid du 'gyur

(139b)
des na thugs kyang gsal ba'i phyir
rgyu yi bag chags spangs pa yin / 139

(140a)
thub chen gzhan don 'jug can gyi
bse ru la sogs khyad 'di yin

(140b-141a)
de don phyir na thabs goms pa
de nyid ston pa yin par 'dod / 140
grub las dang po 'byung ba'i phyir
gnyis po 'di ni rgyu ru bshad

(141b)
rgyu spangs yon tan gsum bde gshegs
nyid yin / 141

(142-144)
sdug bsngal rten min phyir
legs yin de ni bdag med pa
mthong ba'am sbyor ba las yin no
skye dang skyon ni kun 'byung dag
slar yang ldog ces bshad pa yin / 142
bdag lta'i sa bon spangs pa'i phyir
slar mi gshegs pa nyid yin no
de bden tha dad bdag nyid kyis / 143
lus ngag sems kyi gnas ngan len
nyon mongs med dang nad med dang
lam bshad mi gsal nyid lus yin
goms phyir ma lus spangs ba nyid / 144

(145-147a)
kha cig smra sogs phyir na skyon
zad min zhes zer 'di ldog la
the tshom za ba de phyir 'khrul
rtag nyid phyir ram thabs med phyir
yang na thabs ni mi shes phyir
skyon rnams mi zad pa nyid ces
bya bar yongs su rtog drang na
rgyu yod phyir dang rgyu yi ni
gnyen po goms pas zad phyir dang / 145-6
rgyu yi rang bzhin shes pa yis
de shes pa yang grub pa yin

(147b-148a)
skyob pa nyid gzigs lam gsungs pa
'bras med phyir na brdzun mi gsung / 147
thugs brtse ldan phyir rtsom kun yang
gzhan gyi don du sbyor phyir ro

(148b)
de phyir tshad yin

(148c)
yang na skyob
bden pa bzhi ni ston mdzad pa'o / 148

(149a)
sdug bsngal 'khor ba can phung po

(149b)
goms las 'dod chags sogs gsal ba
mthong phyir

(149c)
'dod rgyal nyid min te
rgyu med skye ba 'gal phyir ro / 149

(150a)
'khrul phyir rlung sogs chos ma yin

(150b-152a)
gal te rang bzhin 'dres pa'i phyir
skyon med ce na de yi chos
de las gzhan yang cis ma mthong / 150
thams cad 'dod chags mtshungs par ni
thal phyir kun gyi chos ma yin
gzugs sogs bzhin skyon med ce na / 151
gal te de la khyad par can
las rnams bdag po ma yin na (152a)
der yang rtsod pa mtshungs pa yin
chags sogs rang bzhin thams cad kyi
chos yin par yang 'dod na go
nus med rang bzhin med pas na
'bras bu mi mtshungs gang las yin (no Skt.)

(152b-158a)
skyon rnams khyad par yod na yang
khyad par med phyir ma grub nyid / 152
ma yin thams cad 'gyur ba yis
'gyur phyir kun las skye ba'ang min
rgyu ni 'phel bar gyur pa na
'bras bu 'grib par mi rung ste / 153
tsha ba sogs bzhin chags sogs kyi

'gyur ba bde sdug las skyes yin
cha mi mnyam skyes sdug bsngal gyis
gal te 'dod chags mi skyed na / 154
cis skyed smos shig cha mnyam las
khu 'phel de las 'dod chags yin
cha mi mnyam la chags can mthong
gzhan ni ma mnyam na yang min / 155
gzhan ni zad nas khrag 'dzag kyang
bud med gcig la khu nges med
de gcig la chags drag mi 'gyur
gal te gzugs sogs kyang yan lag / 156
ma yin kun ma nges phyir ro
nges pa med par 'byung ba'ang min
yon tan mi 'dzin pa la'ang 'gyur
gal te yon tan 'dzin de yang / 157
yan lag yin na thams cad kyis
yon tan 'dzin pa can 'gyur te
rgyu la khyad par med phyir ro

(158b-159a)
gnas skabs gang la chags can 'dod
de 'dra zhe sdang can mi 'gyur / 158
de gnyis ngo bo mi mtshungs phyir
'di la nges par mthong ba'ang med

(159b-160a)
gang gi 'dod chags la sogs pa
rigs mthun bag chags khyad par la
rag las pas ni 'jug 'gyur ba
de la skyon 'dir thal ba med

(160b)
'dis ni 'byung ba'i chos nyid bkag
rten yang bkag pa nyid phyir ro / 159-60

(161-164a)
dkar po la sogs sa sogs la
brten pa nyid ni ma yin no
de rten sgra yang rgyu don nam
yang na rang gi rten dag dang / 161
dbyer med par ni gnas pa'i phyir
rten yin gzhan du 'thad ma yin
gal te myos sogs nus pa bzhin
dbyer yod ce na dngos po las / 162
nus pa don gzhan nyid ma yin
dngos po 'jig 'gyur rten tshang bar
gnas na brten pa 'jig pa yin
gal te de mtshungs she na min / 163
snang ba tha dad can rtogs pas
'byung sems tha dad nyid phyir ro

(164b-166a)
ji srid lus ni 'gyur bar du
gzugs sogs bzhin du yid ngo bo
mtshungs 'gyur rnam par rtog pa ni
don gyi gzhan dbang can nyid gang
gang tshe lus la bltos med par
shes pa 'ba' zhig 'ga' zhig gis
bag chags sad pa'i rgyur 'gyur ba
des na 'ga' zhig las 'ga' yin

(166b-169a)
rnam shes min pa rnam shes kyi
nyer len min pa'i phyir yang 'grub / 164-6
gal te dngos po thams cad ni
rnam shes nus ldan phyir 'dod na
rtsa sogs rtse na glang chen brgya
sngon tshe ma mthong yod do zhes
de skad grangs can phyugs las gzhan
ngo mtshar bcas pa su brjod rtsol
rgyu ni lan brgyar rnam phye yang
ngo bo gang zhig snang gyur pa'i
ngo bo de ni sngar mi snang
ji ltar de ni yod par 'gyur

(169b)
snga na med pa 'byung ba las
chags sogs nges med thal bar 'gyur / 167-9

(170-171)
'byung ba'i bdag las ma 'das phyir
gal te kun chags sogs ldan na
thams cad 'dod chags mtshungs par 'gyur
gal te 'byung kyad las yin na / 170
'byung rnams srog chags khyad med kyang
khyad par 'di rten gang yin la
de ni phul byung 'grib pa bzhin
de yod pa las de med 'gyur / 171

(172-173)
gal te chags sogs tha dad kyang
rgyu mtshungs bdag nyid mi ldog phyir
min na bdag nyid 'dra rgyu'i phyir
kun la 'dod chags 'dra bar 'gyur / 172
mtshungs bdag las byung ba glang gi
shes pa'am 'dir yang sa sogs la
srog chags nyid sogs khyad par gyi
rim pa la lar yod ma yin / 173

(174-177a)
dro rim khyad par yod na yang

dro med me 'ga' yod min pa
de bzhin 'dir yang zhe na min
dro las me gzhan bkag phyir ro / 174
gang zhig gzhan yod yon tan ni
khyad par rim pa dang ldan pa
de dag de yi khyad par ni
la lar chad 'gyur dkar sogs bzhin /175
gzugs sogs bzhin du nges min te
de bdag 'byung dang dbyer med phyir
gal te de mtshungs she na min
chags sogs lhan cig skyes thal phyir / 176
rnam par brtags pa yul yin phyir
yul yang nges byed ma yin no

(177b-178a)
skal mnyam rgyu dang bral ba'i phyir
chags sogs nges pa med pa 'am / 177
rgyu ni nye phyir blo rnams kun
thams cad kun tshe skye bar 'gyur

(178b-181a)
de ni res 'ga' dmigs pa'i phyir
mi rtag nyes pa'i rten phyir dang / 178
rgyu dbang phyir yang sdug bsngal yin
bdag min byin gyis brlabs pa'ang min
rgyu min byin gyis rlob pa min
rtag pa ji ltar skyed byed yin / 179
de phyir gcig las du ma ni
dus tha dad par skye mi 'gyur
rgyu gzhan dag ni tshogs na yang
'bras bu skye ba med pa'i phyir / 180
rgyu gzhan rjes su dpog 'gyur na
de ni rtag rnams la yod min

(181b-184)
res 'ga' ba nyid yin pas na
sdug bsngal nyid rgyu bcas nyid grub / 181
rgyu med gzhan la mi ltos phyir
rtag tu yod pa'am med par 'gyur
ji ltar tshor ma la sogs kyi
rno ba nyid sogs rgyu med pa / 182
de ltar 'di dag rgyu med 'gyur
zhes ni kha cig rab tu brjod
gang yod nyid na'ang gang skye ba'am
gang 'gyur na yang rnam 'gyur ba / 183
de ni de rgyu rab tu brjod
de ni de rnams la yang yod
reg pa gzugs rgyu nyid yin phyir
mthong ba la ni rgyu mtshan yin / 184

(185a)
rtag rnams bkag cing dbang phyug la
sogs pa las kyang srid min te
nus med phyir ro

(185b-186a)
de yi phyir
srid 'dod rgyu yin gang gi phyir / 185
mi rnams yul gyi khyad par ni
yongs 'dzin de thob bsam pas byas

(186b-187a)
de ni srid 'dod gang phyir dang
srog chags bde sdug thob pa dang
'dor 'dod 'jug pa de dag ni
'dod dang 'jig sred yin par 'dod

(187b-188a)
bdag tu chags pa'i rgyu nyid las
bde min bde bar 'du shes pas
kun la rab tu 'jug 'gyur ba
de phyir sred pa srid rten yin

(188b)
chags bral skye ba ma mthong phyir

(188c-192a)
zhes ni slob dpon rnams kyis gsungs / 186-8
lus med chags pa ma mthong phyir
lus las kyang ni 'dod chags 'byung
rgyu mtshan khas blangs phyir na 'dod
nyer len nyid ni bsal ba yin / 189
rigs 'di rjes su 'dod na ni
rang nyid rang 'dod la gnod 'gyur
gal te skye la chags mthong phyir
skye dang lhan cig 'byung zhe na / 190
skal mnyam skye phyir sngar grub yin
mi shes srid pa'i rgyu yin yang
ma brjod sred pa nyid bshad pa
rgyun ni 'phen pa byed phyir dang / 191
de ma thag phyir las kyang min
de yod na yod med phyir ro

(192b)
de ni gtan du ba min te
rgyu la gegs sogs srid phyir ro / 192

(193a)
'khor phyir thar pa med ce na
med na 'dod dang ma grub phyir

(193b-194)
ji srid bdag chags ma bcom zhing
de ni yongs su gdung 'gyur ba / 193
de srid sdug bsngal sgro btags nas
rang bzhin du ni gnas pa med
grol ba po ni med na yang
log par sgro 'dogs gzhom phyir brtson / 194

(195-196a)
'dod chags bral ba'i gnas pa ni
brtse ba'am yang na las kyis yin
'phangs las ldog med 'dod phyir ro
srid pa'i sred las rnam brgal ba'i / 195
las gzhan 'phen nus ma yin te
lhan cig byed pa zad phyir ro

(196b-199a)
sdug bsngal shes la 'gal med pas
'du byed snga ma 'jug pa can / 196
dngos chos brtse ba skye ba de
sems can rjes 'brel can ma yin
de bdag min pa'i chos la ni
bdag gzhan sgro 'dogs pa las chags / 197
sdug bsngal rgyun rig tsam las ni
brtse ba skye bar 'gyur ba yin
gti mug nyes pa'i rtsa ba te
de yang sems can 'dzin pa yin
de med / 198) nyes rgyu las khro min
des na brtse ba nyes med 'dod

(199b-201a)
grol med ma yin mngon 'du byed
zad nas gzhan mtshams mi sbyor phyir / 199
'du byed nus pa ma grang na
gang de gnas pa nyes med nyid
snying rje dman pa nyid phyir yang
gnas pa'i 'bad rtsol chen po med / 200
gang dag brtse ba chen po pa
gzhan gyi ngor ni bzhugs pa yin

(201b-204a)
gal te 'jig tshogs lta bral phyir
lam dang por ni srid med 'gyur / 201
lhan cig skyes pa ma spangs phyir
spangs na'ang srid pa ga la yod
bde bar gyur pa'am sdug bsngal bar
ma gyur cig ces 'dod pa na / 202
nga 'o snyam pa'i blo gang de
sems can la blta lhan cig skyes
nga zhes mthong ba med par ni

'ga' yang bdag la chags ma yin / 203
bdag la sred pa med par yang
bde ba 'dod pas mngon rgyug yin

(204b-207a)
sdug bsngal skye ba'i rgyu nyid ni
'ching yin rtag la de gang las / 204
sdug bsngal mi skye rgyu nyid ni
thar yin rtag la de gang las
mi rtag nyid du brjod med gang
de ni 'ga' yi'ang rgyu ma yin / 205
brjod bya min la'ang bcings dang thar
ji lta bur yang yod ma yin
gang gi rang bzhin 'jig med pa
de la mkhas rnams rtag ces brjod / 206
des na ngo tsha'i lta ba 'di
spongs la de ni rtag par smros

(207b)
bshad zin lam de goms pa las
gnas gyur gal te gnas gyur kyang / 207

(208a)
lam bzhin skyon ni 'byung zhe na
ma yin nus pa med phyir ro

(208b-210a)
rnam shes yul 'dzin pa yi chos
ji ltar yod / 208) de 'dzin pa dang
yod pa yi ni bdag nyid de
'di yi skyed par byed pa'ang yin
rang bzhin 'di yin 'di las de
rkyen gzhan gyis ni gol gyur zhing / 209
ldog pa la ni rkyen la ltos
mi brtan sbrul gyi blo bzhin no

(210b-211a)
sems kyi rang bzhin 'od gsal te
dri ma rnams ni blo bur ba / 210
de phyir sngar yang nus med rnams
de bdag gyur la phyis nus med

(211b-212a)
nus yod na yang gnod pa can
skyed nus snying po can dngos la / 211
yun du gnas nus yod min te
sa rlon la ni me bzhin no

(212b-213a)
'tshe ba med dang yang dag don

rang bzhin la ni phyin log gis / 212
'bad du zin kyang mi zlogs te
blo ni de phyogs 'dzin phyir ro

(213b-215a)
bdag 'dzin rgyu gcig can nyid dang
rgyu dang 'bras bu'i dngos po'i phyir / 213
'dod chags khong khro phan tshun du
tha dad na yang gnod ma yin
byams sogs rmongs dang 'gal med phyir
shin tu nyes pa tshar gcod min / 214
nyes kun de yi rtsa ba yin
de yang 'jig tshogs lta ba yin

(215b-216)
rig pa'i mi mthun phyogs phyir dang
sems byung nyid kyis dmigs pa'i phyir / 215
log par dmigs nyid ma rig par
gsungs phyir gzhan ni rigs ma yin
'gal ba gang yin 'dir bshad bya / 216

(216b-217a)
('gal ba gang yin 'dir bshad bya) / (216b)
stong nyid lta dang de 'gal phyir
de yi rang bzhin nyes kun dang
'gal bar rab tu grub pa yin

(217b-218a)
zad min srog chags chos nyid phyir
gzugs sogs bzhin min ma grub phyir / 217
gnyen po'i phyogs dang 'brel ba na
ldog pa dag kyang mthong phyir ro

(218b-219a)
nyes pa rnam par 'gags pa ni
sra zhing slar yang skye med de / 218
de bdag nyid kyis 'bras med dang
thal ba bzhin du ma nges phyir

(219b-221a)
gang zhig bdag mhtong de la ni
nga zhes rtag tu zhen par 'gyur / 219
zhen pas bde la sred 'gyur te
sred pas skyon rnams sgrib par byed
yon tan mthong bas yongs sred pa
nga yi zhes de'i sgrub byed len / 220
des na bdag la mngon chags pa
de srid de ni 'khor bar 'gyur

(221b-222a)
bdag yod na ni gzhan du shes
bdag gzhan cha las 'dzin dang sdang / 221
'di dag dang ni yongs 'brel las
nyes pa thams cad 'byung bar 'gyur

(222b-223a)
nges par bdag la chags pa ni
bdag gi la chags mi 'bral zhing / 222
nyes med bdag la chags pa dang
bral ba'i rgyu yang yod ma yin

(223b- 226a)
gal te chags pa skyon bcas na
de las cir 'gyur de spong 'gyur / 223
'di yul sun phyung med par ni
de spong bar ni nus ma yin
yon tan skyon dang rjes 'brel ba'i
'dod dang sdang sogs spong ba ni / 224
de dag yul la ma mthong bas
yin gyi phyi tshul gang gis min
chags yon tan gyis chags min gyi
don gyi yon tan mthong bas yin / 225
ma tshang med rgyu de la ni
'bras bu gang gis zlog par byed

(226b-228a)
chags la skyon yang gang zhig mthong
gal te sdug bsngal rten zhe na / 226
de lta'ang 'di la chags bral min
bdag gir mthong phyir dper bdag bzhin
gal te de med bdag sdug bsngal
rgyu min de yang de dang 'dra / 227
de ltar gnyis ka'ang skyon med pa
de phyir gnyis la chags bral min

(228b-231a)
gal te sprul gzung yan lag bzhin
sdug bsngal bsgoms pas spong 'gyur na / 228
bdag gi ba blo bcom pas 'di
'dor ba yin gyi bzlog la min
dbang po la sogs longs spyod kyi
rten nyid du ni bzung ba la / 229
rang blo gang gis bzlog 'gyur te
de la chags bral de gang las
lus las bog pa'i skra sogs la
yid byung blo ni skye 'gyur zhing
gzhen la zhen bcas skye 'gyur ba
thams cad kyi ni mngon sum yin

(231b-232)
de la 'du sogs 'brel ba las
rang gi blo ni skye 'gyur ba'i /230-31
'brel te de bzhin nyid gnas phyir
mthong du zin kyang spong mi 'gyur
'du ba la sogs med na yang
phan 'dogs nyid ni kun la yod / 232

(233-235)
sdug bsngal bskyed phyir sor mo bzhin
rang gi blo ni mi 'gyur na
gcig tu de ni sdug bsngal min
phal cher sdug bcas zas bzhin no / 233
khyad par can bde la chags pas
de 'gal ba la chags bral 'gyur
khyad par can bde la sred pas
bde ba cung zad yongs su spong / 234
bsam med bdag la chags pa yis
ji ltar rnyed bzhin la 'jug ste
bud med dag ni ma rnyed par
dud 'gro la 'dod spyod mthong bzhin / 235

(236-237a)
bdag ni 'dod pa gang yin te
ji ltar de ni 'jig par 'dod
myong ba dang ni tha snyad dang
yon tan kun gyi rten log pa / 236
ji ltar zhen pa yin 'dod de
zhen pa'i rang bzhin de 'dra min

(237b-240a)
rnam pa kun tu bdag 'dzin ni
bdag la chags pa brten par byed / 237
de ni bdag gir zhen pa yi
sa bon gnas skabs de nyid gnas
brtson yang yon tan cha rten nas
'jug ldan bdag gi ba la ni
chags bral gegs byed pa nyid dang
de yi skyon yang bsgribs pa yin
gal te bdag la'ang chags bral na
da ni chags bral gang yin med / 238-9
de ni ji ltar bdag 'dor ba
sdug bsngal bsgom pa don med 'gyur

(240b-243a)
de dag sdug bsngal bsgoms pas kyang
sdug bsngal nyid ni rnam shes byed / 240
de ni sngar yang mngon sum nyid
de lta na yang chags bral med
gal te de la nyes pa yis

skad cig de yi blo ldog kyang / 241
de la chags bral mi 'gyur te
'dod ldan bud med gzhan la bzhin
blang dang dor bya'i khyad yod na
gcig las byung ba'i chags gang yin / 242
de nyid rnam grangs kyis bskyed tshe
chags pa kun gyi sa bon yin

(243b-245a)
skyon med yul can chags pa dang
sgrub byed kyang ni skyon med yin / 243
'gro ba'ang de tsam nyid yin na
de ni gang la chags bral 'gyur
der de skyon bcas kyang yin na
de ni bdag la'ang mtshungs pa yin / 244
der de'i skyon la chags bral med
de ni gang la de chags bral

(245b-248a)
yon tan mthong ba las byung ba'i
zhen pa nyes pa mthong bas 'jig / 245
de ltar dbang sogs la de min
byis sogs la yang mthong phyir dang
skyon ldan la yang yod phyir dang
yon tan ldan yang / 246) gzhan dag la
med phyir 'das pa la sogs pa
bdag gi ba la med phyir ro
de nyid phyir na bdag gi ba'i
blo rgyu'ang / 247) yon tan mthong bas min
de phyir yon tan min mthong bas
de yang spong ba ma yin no

(248b-249a)
gzhan yang yod min yon tan ni
sgro 'dogs chags pas der yang mthong / 248
des na de rgyu gnod med can
bsgrubs pas de la ji ltar gnod

(249b-251a)
mchog gzhan don du gnyer phyir dang
skye 'jig blo can nyid kyi phyir / 249
skye bo 'di yis dbang sogs las
bdag ni tha dad gyur par shes
de phyir gcig nyid mthong bas kyang
chags min bdag la chags pa de / 250
dmigs pa'i nang gi yan lag la
ngo bo nyid kyis rjes chags 'gyur

(251b-253a)
gang zhig da ltar sdug bsngal pas

yid 'byung de 'dra sdang yin gyi / 251
chags bral ma yin de tshe yang
chags yod skabs gzhan tshol phyir ro
zhe sdang sdug bsngal rgyu can phyir
de ni de srid tsam du gnas / 252
de log na ni rang nyid kyi
rang bzhin nyid la slar rten 'gyur

(253b-254a)
blang dang dor bya spangs pa'i phyir
thams cad la ni mnyam snyoms can / 253
tsandan ste 'u mtshungs pa la
chags bral zhes ni brjod pa yin

(254b-256a)
'du byed sdug bsngal la dgongs nas
sdug bsngal bsgoms par gsungs pa yin / 254
nged kyi de yang rkyen las skyes
de ni bdag med lta rten yin
stong nyid lta bas grol bar 'gyur
sgom pa lhag ma de don yin / 255
de phyir mi rtag las sdug bsngal
sdug bsngal las ni bdag med gsungs

(256b-257a)
chags bral min dang srid ldan dang
rtsom pa kun la brten pa de / 256
nyon mongs las las grol ma yin
de 'dra 'khor ba pa zhes bya

(257b-258a)
bdag gi nyid ni mi 'dod na
de yi za ba po yang med / 257
bya dang longs spyod mtshan nyid can
de tshe de yi bdag kyang med

(258b-259a)
de phyir grol 'dod thog med pa'i
rgyu can rigs mthun sa bon las / 258
byung ba'i 'jig tshogs lta ba dag
rtsa ba nyid nas dbyung bar gyis

(259b-262a)
lung ni de lta'i dngos yin pa'i
rgyu ma mthong ba rnams la ni / 259
lung tsam gyis ni grol bar yang
smra ba yongs su mgu byed min
sa bon sogs grub cho ga ni
skyes bu mi skyed par nus min / 260
til mar bskul dang mes bsregs sogs

bdag kyang grol bar thal phyir ro
sngar lci ba dag phyis yang phyir
sdig pa bcom par byas pa min / 261
'di yi lci nyid med 'gyur gyi
lus can min phyir sdig lci min

(262b-264a)
log shes dang ni de las byung
srid pa sems pa'i dbang dag gis / 262
dman gnas 'gro ba skye ba yin
de phyir de bcad 'gro mi 'gyur
de tsam las ni 'byung ba'i phyir
skye ba de dag nyid nus yin / 263
sems pa de dag rang nyid las
yin phyir skye rgyu nyams pa med

(264b-266a)
'gro dang rtogs rten byed pa yin
de ni ma mthong ba las 'gyur / 264
ma mthong zhig phyir 'gro ba med
des na 'du byed sems pa min
yod dang med pa'i rjes 'jug phyir
byed pa skyed la blo yi ni / 265
nus mthong gzhan gyis ma yin na
de yod de dag cis mi 'gro

(266b-267a)
gal te de dag nus med na
dbang sogs byas ma thag de dag / 266
sems pa'i dbang gis 'dzin dang 'jug
g-yeng dang 'gog pa med par 'gyur

(267b-269a)
ci ste de tshe blo med phyir
mi 'gyur dri ma rnams kyi / 267) blo
mtshams sbyor de rnams nus med na
gson pa nyid na'ang nus med 'gyur
gnyen po dang ni rang gi phyogs
'phel na 'grib dang 'phen ba'i phyir / 268
nyes rgyun rang gi sa bon can
dbang bskur ba las ldog pa med

(269b-272a)
rtag la ltos pa med pa'i phyir
rim gyis skyed par byed pa dang / 269
byed dang mi byed pa dag ni
'dra ba'i bdag nyid byed pa 'gal
rgyu dang 'bras bu'ang gcig par 'gyur
de dag de las tha dad na / 270
byed po za bo nyams par 'gyur

nus pa yang ni 'grub ma yin
gzhan gyis dran dang longs spyod sogs
thal ba gnod byed ma yin te / 271
'ga' yang dran pa med pa'i phyir
des na myong las dran pa 'byung

(272b-275a)
bden pa bzhi la brten pa dang
bde dang nga dang nga'i zhes sogs / 272
yang dag min pa rnam bcu drug
sgro btags nas ni yongs su sred
de nyid la ni mi 'gal don
de nyid rnam pa rjes rtogs can / 273
legs bsgoms yang dag lta ba yis
sred pa rjes 'brang bcas 'joms byed
las dang lus dag gnas na yang
gcig med phyir na rgyu gsum can / 274
skye ba srid pa ma yin te
sa bon med par myu gu bzhin

(275b-276a)
las dang lus dag spong min te
gnyen po dag ni med phyir dang / 275
nus med phyir ro sred pa ni
yod na slar yang 'byung phyir ro

(276b-278a)
gnyis zad don du 'bad na yang
las zad dub pa don med yin / 276
'bras bu sna tshogs mthong ba'i phyir
las rnams nus pa tha dad du
rjes dpog des na dka' thub kyi
nyon mongs dngos gcig gis mi mdzad / 277
rnam 'gas de bskyed 'bras bu ni
chung 'gyur rigs mi mthun can min

(278b-281a)
'bras bu nyams su myong ba ni
ci ste dka' thub nus pa yis
nus pa 'dres pa zad pa na / 278
nyon mongs cha 'gas spong ba 'am
nyon mongs med par kun spong 'gyur
gal te dka' thub nyon mongs las
gzhan 'dod nyon mongs nyid ce na / 279
de ni las 'bras yin phyir 'dis
nus pa 'dres sogs 'gyur ma yin
skye 'dod nyes pa bcom pa'i phyir
gang yang skyon rnams 'gog byas pa / 280
des skyed las la nus 'gyur gyi
ji ltar byas pa nyams par 'gyur

(281b-282a)
las las nyes pa ma yin te
skyon ldan byed 'gyur bzlog las min / 281
log pa'i rnam rtog med par ni
bde ba las kyang 'dod mi 'gyur

(282b-283a)
skyob las de nyid dang bstan dang
ma lus khyad par mkhyen par grub / 282
gshegs pa rtogs pa'i don phyir te
de phyir phyi rol pa dang slob
mi slob las lhag de yi phyir

(283b)
gzhan don mkhyen sbyor de ston pa / 283

(284a)
de las brtse yin gzhan don dor
don grub mdzad pa mi 'dod phyir

(284b-285)
brtse bas legs dang ye shes las
bden pa gsung mdzad sgrub byed bcas / 284
de gsung bar yang mngon sbyor ldan
gang phyir des na tshad ma nyid
de lta'i dngos ston bstod pa ni
de yi bstan pa nyid las ni / 285

(286-287)
tshad ma'i de nyid grub don de
rjes su dpag pa ma bzlog phyir
cung zad skye ba'i bdag nyid can
gang de thams cad 'gag chos can
zhes sogs rnam pa du mar ni
'di yi sbyor ba'ang mthong phyir ro
med na mi 'byung mtshan nyid can
rtags ni rjes dpag rten yin no
bsgrub byas gtan tshigs khyab pa ni
bstan phyir de yang gsal bar bshad / 286-7

APPENDIX 2:

GLOSSARY

Because Sanskrit is the richer language, a Tibetan term often will have more than one Sanskrit equivalent. I have tried to include only the Sanskrit term or terms that occur most commonly in the pramāṇasiddhi chapter. For all variants, cf. Nagatomi's dissertation, A Study of Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttika: An English Translation and Annotation of the Pramāṇavārttika, Book I (Harvard, 1957), part D. Sometimes--especially when the term is found in the commentary but not in the Sanskrit original--I have not supplied a Sanskrit equivalent. A question mark (?) before a Sanskrit equivalent indicates that it is conjectural. My chief sources in compiling this glossary were part D of Nagatomi's thesis, Das's Tibetan-English Dictionary, and Lokesh Chandra's Tibetan-Sanskrit Dictionary. Cf. the bibliography for details.

English	Tibetan	Sanskrit
abandonment	spangs pa	prahāṇa
abider	gnas pa po	sthātṛ
abiding	gnas pa (cf. existence)	sthiti
ability	nus pa (cf. potency)	śakti
absent	ldog pa	vinivṛtti
absorption	bsam gtan	dhyāna
accept	khas blangs	upagama
accomplishment	sgrub pa	pratipatti
accordant example	mthun dpe	sajātīya dṛṣṭānta
action	las	karma
activity	spyod pa	cārya
adventitious	glo bur	āgantuka
aggregate	phung po	skandha
already arisen	byung zin	---
already existent	grub zin	---

anger	zhe sdang (cf. hatred)	dveśa
	khong khro	pratigha
antidote	gnyen po	pratipakṣa
apparent object	snang ba'i yul	?pratibhāsa viṣaya
appearance	snang ba	pratibhāsa
application	sbyor ba	prayoga yukti
appropriate conditions	mthun rkyen	?sajātīya nimitta
apperception	rang rig	svasaṃvedanā
Arahant	dgra bcom pa	arahant
ascertainment	nges pa byed pa	niścaya
aspect	rnam pa	ākāra
assertion	'dod pa	mata
assistant	phan 'dogs pa	upakārya
Ātmavādin	bdag smra ba	ātmavādin
atoms	rdul phran	paramaṇu
attached mind	chags can gyi rig pa	---
attachment	chags pa	sneha (cf. desire)
	'dod chags	rāga
austerities	dka' thub	tapas
authoritative (cognition), authoritative, authoritativeness	tshad ma	pramāṇa
authoritative inference	rjes dpag tshad ma	anumāna pramāṇa
authoritative perception	mngon sum tshad ma	pratyakṣa pramāṇa
authoritative person	tshad ma'i skyes bu	pramāṇapuruṣa
aversion	yid log	ghṛṇā
balance	snyoms pa	sāmya

based	brten	āśrita
basis	rten (cf. support)	āśraya
became authoritative	tshad mar gyur pa	pramāṇabhūta
beginningless	thog med	anādi
benevolence	brtse ba	kṛpā dayā
bestowal	dbang bskur	abhiṣeka
bile	mkhris	pitta
Blessed One	bcom ldan 'das	bhagavan
Bodhisattva	byang chub sems dpa'	bodhisattva
body	lus	deha
body-cognition	lus kyi rnam par shes pa	kāyavijñāna
bondage, bound	bcing ba	bandha
breathing, breath	dbugs	prāṇa
Buddha	sangs rgyas	buddha
cause	rgyu	hetu kāraṇa
cause of abiding	gnas kyi rgyu	sthitikāraṇa
cessation	'gog pa	nirodha
characteristics	mtshan nyid (cf. definition)	lakṣaṇa
circumstances	gnas skabs	avastha
clarity, clear	gsal ba	pāṭava
coexistence	lhan cig gnas pa	sahavāsa
cognition	rtog pa (cf. mind)	adhigama
	shes pa	jñāna (cf. gnosis)
	rig pa	vidyā (cf. mind)
collection	tshogs	sambhāra
collection-expressions	tshogs brjod pa'i sgra	---

compassion, compassionate	thugs rje	karuṇā
completely transformed state	gnas 'gyur mthar phyin pa	āśrayaparavṛtti
completion	mthar phyin pa	niṣṭāgata
complexes	'du byed	saṃskāra
conceptual thought	rnam par rtog pa	vikalpa
concern	dogs pa	śaṅka
concomitant factors	mtshungs ldan	saṃprayoga
conditional intentional object	dmigs rkyen	ālambana pratyaya
conditions	rkyen rgyu mtshan (cf. reason)	pratyaya nimitta
confession	bshags pa	deśanā
confusion	rmongs pa	moha
confuted	bsal ba sun phyung	nirākṛta dūṣita
Conjunction	ldan pa	saṃyoga
Conjunction-Inherence	ldan pa la 'du ba'i 'brel pa	---
Conjunction-relation	ldan 'brel	---
Conjunction-relation in the Conjunction	ldan pa la ldan pa'i 'brel ba	---
connects	mtshams sbyor	sandhāna
consequential syllogism	thal ba('i gtan tshigs)	?prasaṅga(hetu)
contaminated	zag bcas	sāśrava
continuum	rgyun rigs 'dra	santāna ---
contradiction, contradicts	'gal ba	viruddha

contradictory condition	'gal rkyen	?viruddhapratyaya
contrapositive	ldog khyab	vyatireka
conventional	kun rdzob tha snyad pa	samvṛti vyāvahara
cooperative condition	lhan cig byed rkyen	sahakāripratyaya
corresponding cause	skal mnyam gyi rgyu	sabhāgahetu
counteract	gnod (cf. damage)	bādhyate, bādhā
craving	sred pa	tṛṣṇa
craving for annihilation	'jig sred	vibhāvatṛṣṇa
craving for existence	srid sred	bhāvatṛṣṇa
craving for sense-pleasure	'dod sred	kāmatṛṣṇa
creativity	bzo	śilpa
creator	bzo ba	śilipan
damage	(cf. counteract)	
death-time	'chi kha'i dud	maranakāla
defilement	nyon mongs	kleśa
defilement-obstacle	nyon mongs kyi sgrib	kleśāvaraṇa
definiendum	mtshan gzhi	---
definite good	nges legs	niḥśreyasa
definite release	nges par 'byung ba	niḥsarana
definite removal	nges pa 'byin pa	nairyāṇika
definition	mtshan nyid	lakṣaṇa
demonstrated, demonstration	go bar byed pa bstan pa (cf. teachings)	gamaka upadeśa
depends	bltos	apekṣā
designation	tha snyad pa	vyāvahara

desire	'dod pa zhen pa	iṣṭa sneha (cf. attachment)
desire realm	'dod khams	kāmadhātu
desired goal	'dod don	?icchārtha
desires (v.)	bzhed pa	icchati
destructive cause	'jigs pa'i rgyu	?nāśahetu
detached	chags bral	virāgya
development	goms pa	bhavanā
Dharma, dharma	chos	dharma
direct opposition	dngos 'gal	---
direct results	ma chod pa'i 'bras bu	---
disadvantages	nyes dmigs	upālambha
disciple	'dul bya	---
disease	nyes pa (cf. humor, fault)	doṣa
distorted	log pa phyin ci log pa log par zhugs pa	mithyā viparyāsa
doubt	the tshom	vicikitsā
ear-cognition	nyan shes	śrotavijñāna
earth	sa	bhūmi
efficiency	don byed nus pa	arthakriyatva
efficient cause	'grub byed kyi rgyu	---
elements	'byung ba	bhūta
elimination	zad pa	kṣaya
elucidation	gsal byed	prakāśa
embodied being	lus can	dehin
empty	stong pa	śūnya
emptiness	stong pa nyid	śūnyatā
enlightenment	byang chub	bodhi
entity	dngos po	vastu
entitylessness that is empty of efficiency	don byed nus stong dngos med	?arthakriyatvena-śūnyāvastu

equanimity	btang snyoms	upekṣa
equilibrium	cha mnyam pa	sāmya
essence, essential	ngo bo	svarūpa
etymological definition	skad dod kyi sgra	---
example	mtshon bya dpe	laksman dṛṣṭānta
excellence	khyad par	viśeṣa
excellence in causes	rgyu phun tshogs	hetusampat
excellence in results	'bras bu phun tshogs	phalasampat
excellence of application	sbyor ba phun tshogs	prayogasampat
excellence of others' aims	gzhan don phun tshogs	parārthasampat
excellence of one's own aims	rang don phun tshogs	svārthasampat
excellence of realization	rtogs pa phun tshogs	?jñānasampat
excellence of thought	bsam pa phun tshogs	āśayasampat
existence	gnas (cf. abiding) yod pa srid pa	sthāna bhāva
existent	yod pa	bhāva
experience	myong ba	anubhava
expression	brjod pa'i sgra	?kīrtiśabda
external objects	phyi rol gyi don	bahyārtha
extreme consequences	ha cang thal ba	atiprasaṅga
faith	yid dpyod	manaḥparikṣā
fallacies	ltar snang	ābhasa

fault	nyes pa (cf. flaw, humor, disease)	doṣa
fetter	btags pa	upacāra
final mind	tha ma'i sems	?antabuddhi
flaw	skyon	doṣa (cf. fault)
follows	thal	prasaṅgate
form	gzugs	rūpa
formless realm	gzugs med khams	arūpyadhātu
forward system of explanation	bshad pa'i lugs 'byung	---
four alternatives	mu bzhi	catuṣkoṭi
four immeasurebles	tshad med bzhi	caturapramāṇa
Four Noble Truths	bden bzhi	catuḥsatya
four (opponent) powers	stobs bzhi	?caturbala
freedom	grol ba	mukti
future	'byung 'gyur (cf. yet to arise)	?niṣkrāmiṣye
	phyi ma (cf. subsequent)	uttara
generates	skyed	utpatti
generation of the Mahāyāna thought	theg chen sems bskyed	mahāyānacittotpāda
generic image	don spyi	?arthasamānya
generosity	sbyin pa	dāna
genus-expressions	rigs brjod pa'i sgra	---
gnosis	ye shes	jñāna (cf. cognition, knowledge)
goal	don (cf. object, meaning)	artha
God	dbang phyug	īśvara

good quality	yon tan (cf. quality)	guṇa
great compassion	thugs rje chen po	mahākaruṇā
gross	rags pa	sthūla
hatred	zhe sdang (cf. anger)	dveŝa
hedonist	tshu rol mdzes pa	?aparakāntin
hidden phenomena	lkog gyur	parokṣa
high rebirths	mngon mtho	abhyudaya
humor	nyes pa (cf. fault, disease)	doṣa
	nad (cf. sickness)	?jvara
ignorance	ma rig pa	avidyā
immediate cause	de ma thag pa'i rgyu	anantarahetu
immediately preceding condition	de ma thag rkyen	anantaranimitta
impermanent	mi rtag pa	anitya
impossible	mi srid	abhāva
imprint	lag rjes	---
imputation	kun brtags	vikalpa (cf. conceptual thought)
imputed name	btags ming	---
inappropriate	mi mthun pa	vaiguṇya
independent	rang stobs	svabala
	bltos pa med pa can	?apekṣaviratavan
independent (syllogism)	rang rgyud (gtan tshigs)	svatantra(hetu)
indestructible	'jig pa med pa	avināŝa
indirect results	chod pa'i 'bras bu	?chedphala
inference	rjes dpag	anumāna
infinite regress	thug pa med pa	anavastha

Inherence	'phrod pa 'du ba 'du 'brel	samavāya
Inherence in the Conjunction	ldan pa la 'dus par 'du ba	---
innate	lhan skyes	sahaja
intentional object	dmigs yul	?ālambanaviṣaya
intermediate state	bar do	antarabhava
internal tangible object	nang gi reg bya'i don gzung yul	---
inverse pervasion	'gal khyab	---
investigation	dpyad pa	vicāra
irreversible	slar mi ldog pa	?apunarviparyaya
it follows that...	...thal	prasaṅgati
just-conceived	skyes ma thag	---
karma	las	karma
knowledge (hon.)	mkhyen pa	jñāna (cf. gnosis)
knowledge-obstacle	shes sgrib	jñeyāvaraṇa
liberation	thar pa rnam thar	mokṣa vimokṣa
life	skye ba	janman
lineage	rigs (cf. type)	gotra
listening	thos pa (cf. study)	śruta
living being	srog chags	prāṇin
logic	rtog ge	tarka
Lokāyata	rgyang phan pa	lokāyata
love	byams pa	maitri
lower abodes	dman gnas	---
lower realms	ngan 'gro	durgata
maker	byed pa po	kartṛ
manifest phenomena	mngon gyur	abhimukhī
material cause	nyer len gyi rgu	upadānahetu

meaning	don (cf. goal, object)	artha
meaningful sounds	rjod byed kyi sgra	---
meditation, meditate	sgom	bhavanā
	nyams su len pa	āsthitikriyā
mental action	sems pa	cetanā
mental cognition	yid kyi shes pa	manovijñāna
mental factor	sems byung	caitta
method	thabs	upāya
mind	blo	buddhi
	yid	manas
	rtog pa	adhigama
	(cf. cognition)	
	rig pa	vidyā
	(cf. cognition)	
mindstream	rgyud	santāna
mistaken	'khrul pa	vyabhicāra
moisture-born being	drod gsher las skyes pa skyes bo	saṃsvedaja
moment	skad cig	kṣaṇa
morality	tshul 'khrims	śīla
movement	g-yo ba	kampa
Muni	thub pa	muni
mutual causes	phan tshun rgyu	parasparahetu
mutually successive	phan tshun rjes su byed pa	---
naturally	chos nyid du	dharmatvena
	ngang can	śālin
nature	bdag nyid	ātmatā
	rang bzhin	svabhāva
	de kho na nyid	tattva
	(cf. reality)	
	chos nyid	dharmatā
negative purpose	rnam bcad kyi dgos pa	?vyavicchannāprayojana
nescience	mi shes	ajñā

new	gsar	nava
nirvāṇa	mya ngan las 'das pa	nirvāṇa
non-associated compositional factors	ldan min 'du byed	viprayuktasaṃskāra
non-conceptuality	rtogs bral	akalpanā
nondeceptive	mi slu ba	avisamvāda
non-dual	gnyis med	advaya
non-existent	med pa ye med pa	abhāva ---
Non-returner	phyir mi 'ong ba	anāgamin
non-virtues	sdig pa	pāpa
Number	grangs	saṃkhyā
object	don (cf. goal, meaning) gzung yul	artha gṛhīta viṣaya
object of authoritative cognition	gzhal bya	prameya
object of knowledge	shes bya	jñeya
object of refutation	dgag bya	niṣedhya
objection	rgol ba rtsod pa	vardhan codana
objective condition	dmigs rkyen (cf. conditional intentional object)	ālambanapratyaya
objective name	dngos ming	?vastunāma
objectively impelled inference	dngod stobs rjes dpag	---
objectively separate	don gzhan	arthāntara
obstacle	sgrib	āvaraṇa
omniscience	thams cad mkhyen pa	sarvajña

opposing factor	mi mthun phyogs	pratipakṣa
opposite of the negative	ldog pa tha dad	---
ordinary being	tha mal pa	sacarācara
organ	dbang po (cf. senses)	indriya
origination	kun 'byung	samudaya
other-ascertainment	gzhan nges	paraniścaya
own-mark	rang gyi mtshan nyid	svalakṣaṇa
pain	sdug (cf. suffering)	duḥkha
part	cha yan lag	aṃśa aṅga
particular mental inclinations	blo'i khyad pa g-yer bag	---
paticular qualities	khyad par gyi chos	viśeṣadharma
Particulars	gsal ba	?viśeṣa
partless	cha med	niraṃśa
past	byung zin (cf. already arisen) 'das snga ma (cf. previous)	--- atikrama pūrva
past and future lives	skye ba snga phyi	?purvottarajanma
path	lam	mārga
path of application	sbyor lam	prayogamārga
path of development	sgom lam	bhavanāmārga
path of no-more-training	mi slob lam	aśaikṣamārga
path of seeing	mthong lam	darśanamārga
peace	zhi ba	śānta
perception	mngon sum	pratyakṣa

permanent	rtag pa	nitya
perplexity	dvogs pa	śaṅka
person	skyes bu gang zag	puruṣa pudgala
pervasion, pervades	khyab pa	vyāpti
phlegm	bad kan	kapha
pleasure	bde ba	sukha
pointless	don med	anartha
positive and negative concomitance	rjes su 'gro ldog	anvayavyatireka
positive purpose	yongs gcod kyi dgos pa	?avadhiprayojana
potency	nus pa (cf. ability)	śakti
powerful destroyer	stobs ldan gyi gnod byed	---
Prakṛti	rang bzhin	prakṛti
Pratyekabuddha	rang sangs rgyas	pratyekabuddha
predicate (gram.)	chos	dharma
Predicate (logic.)	bsgrub bya'i chos	sādhyadharma
predicate-expression	chos brjod pa'i sgra	---
present	da ltar ba	pratyutpanna
previous	snga ma (cf. past)	pūrva
previous homogeneous (causes)	rang gi rigs 'dra snga ma	---
principal condition	bdag rkyen	adhipatipratyaya
projecting cause	'phen byed kyi rgyu	?akṣepaṇahetu
proof	sgrub byed	sādhana
propensities	bag chags	vasanā
pure	gtsang ba	śuddha

purification	rnam byang	vaiyavadānika
purpose	dgos	prayojana
Quality	yon tan (cf. good quality)	guṇa
real nature	gnas gyur	bhutārtha (cf. reality)
reality	gnas lugs	bhutārtha (cf. real nature)
	de kho na nyid (cf. nature)	tathatā
realization	rtogs pa	adhigama
reason (causal)	rgyu mtshan (cf. conditions)	nimitta
Reason (logical)	rtags gtan tshings	liṅga hetu
reasoning	rigs pa	yukti
Reason's presence in the Subject	phyogs chos	pakṣadharma
rebounding argument	'bras mtshungs	kāryasama
redundant	rnam grangs pa	paryāya
reflection	bsam pa	cintā
refuge	skyabs pa	śaraṇa
refutation	dgag pa	pratiṣedha
renunciation	yid 'byung	nirveda
result	'bras bu rgyu can	phala yonitva
reverse system of explanation	bshad pa lugs ldod	---
ritual	cho ga	viddhi
sacred authority	lung (cf. scripture)	āgama
samādhi	ting nge 'dzin	samādhi
Sāṃkhya	grangs can pa	sāṃkhya
saṃsāra	'khor ba	saṃsāra
(saṃsāric) existence	srid pa yang srid	bhāva punarbhāva

Sangha	dge 'dun	sangha
śāstra	bstan bcos	śāstra
Savior	skyob pa	tāyin
science	rigs pa (cf. reasoning)	vidyā
scripture	lung (cf. sacred authority)	āgama
	gsung rab	pravacana
secondary qualities	'byung 'gyur	---
self	bdag	ātman
self-ascertainment	rang nges	svaniścaya
self-grasping	bdag 'dzin	ātmagraha
self-grasping cognition	rang 'dzin shes pa	---
self-view	bdag lta	ātmavāda
selflessness	bdag med pa	anātmya
selflessness of dharmas	chos kyi bdag med	dharmanairātmya
selflessness of persons	gang zag gi bdag med	pudgalanairātmya
semen	khu ba	mada
sense-cognition	dbang shes	indriyavijñāna
senses, sense-organs	dbang (cf. organ)	indriya
sentient being	sems can	sattva
shape	dbyibs	saṃsthāna
sickness	nad (cf. humor)	jvara
similarity	mtshungs pa	tulya samā
simultaneous basis	dus mnyam gyi rten	---
simultaneously	cig car	yugāpat
sound	sgra (cf. word)	śabda

special basis	rten khyad par can	?viśeṣāśraya
special cooperative condition	lhan cig byed rkyen khyad par can	viśeṣasahakāripratyaya
special indispensible cause	ldog byed kyi rgyu khyad par can	---
speech	ngag	vāc
Śrāvaka	nyan thos	śrāvaka
stage	rim	krama
stains	dri ma	mala
Streamwinner	rgyun zhugs	śrotāpanna
strongly generated	rab tu skye ba	prabhava
study	thos pa (cf. listening)	śruta
subject (epist.)	'dzin	grahaka
Subject (logical)	chos can	dharmin
subject-expression	chos can brjod pa'i sgra	---
sublime	gya nom	praṇīta
subsequent	phyi ma (cf. future)	uttara
subsequent cognition	bcad shes	?paricchinnajñāna
substance	rdzas	dravya
substantially different	rdzas tha dad	?anyadravya
substantially identical	rdzas gcig pa	ekadravya
subtle momentariness	phra ba'i skad cig ma	sukṣmakṣaṇikatva
successively	rim gyis rim can	krameṇa kramin
sudden conditions	'phral gyi rkyen	?ākasmikapratyaya
suffering	sdug bsngal	duḥkha (cf. pain)

suffering of change	'gyur ba'i sdug bsngal	vipariṇāmaduḥkhatā
suffering of suffering	sdug bsngal gyi sdug bsngal	duḥkhaduḥkhatā
suffering (pervading all) complexes	'du byed kyi sdug bsngal	saṃskāraduḥkhatā
Sugata	bde gshegs	sugata
suitable	rung	yujyate
superimposition	sgro 'dogs	āropa
support	rten (cf. basis)	ādhāra
syllogism	rigs can	?jātiya
system	lugs	naya
system of tenets	grub mtha'	siddhānta
Teacher	ston pa	śāstṛ
teachings	bstan pa (cf. demonstrated)	śasana
tenet	grub mtha' (cf. system of tenets)	siddhānta
those who strive for freedom	grol ba don gnyer rnams	?muktiprārthāni
thought of enlightenment	byang chub sems	bodhicitta
three final vehicles	mthar thug theg pa gsum	?niṣṭatriyāna
to be adopted	blang bya	upadeya
to be rejected	dor bya	heya
too broad	khyab ches pa	ativyāpti
too narrow	ma khyab	avyāpti
topic	brjod bya	vācya
trace-faults	gnas ngan len	dauṣṭulya
training	slob pa	śikṣa

training-path	slob lam	śaikṣamārga
transformation	'gyur ba	vikāra
transmigrators	'gro ba	gacchan
truth of cessation	'gog pa bden pa	nirodhasatya
truth of origination	kun 'byung bden pa	samudayasatya
truth of path	lam bden pa.	mārgasatya
truth of suffering	sdug bsngal bden pa	duḥkhasatya
twelve factors of dependent origination	rten 'brel yan lag bcu gnyis	dvadaśāṅgapratītya-samutpāda
type	rigs (cf. lineage)	gotra
ultimate	mthar thug	niṣṭa
unacceptable	mi 'thad	?anupapati
uncertain	ma nges	anekānta
Universal	spyi rigs	sāmānya jati
undistorted	phyin ci ma log pa	aviparyāsa
unproven	ma grub	asiddha
unreasonable	mi rigs	anyāya
Unseen	ma mthong ba	adṛṣṭa
unstable basis	rten mi brtan	asthirāśraya
Vaiśeṣika	bye brag pa	vaiśeṣika
Vātsīputrīya	gnas ma bu pa	vātsīputrīya
Vedas	rig byed	veda
very hidden phenomenon	shin tu lkog gyur	atiparokṣa
view (that there is a self in) perishable composites	'jig tshogs lta ba	satkāyadṛṣṭi
virtuous friend	bshes gnyen	kalyanamitra
what pertains to the self	bdag gi ba	ātmaka

whole	yan lag can	?aṅgin
wind	rlung	prāṇa
wisdom	shes rab	prajñā
wisdom of reflection	bsam pa'i shes rab	cintāmayiprajñā
wisdom of study	thos pa'i shes rab	śrutamāyiprajñā
wisdom realizing selflessness	bdag med rtogs pa'i shes rab	?anātmyādhigamana-prajñā
yet to arise	'byung 'gyur (cf. future)	---
yogic perception	rnal 'byor mngon sum	yogipratyakṣa

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